Canada’s labour market training system

Barnetson, Bob

2018

Athabasca University Press

How does the current labour market training system function and whose interests does it serve? In this introductory textbook, Bob Barnetson wades into the debate between workers and employers, and governments and economists to investigate the ways in which labour power is produced and reproduced in Canadian society. After sifting through the facts and interpretations of social scientists and government policymakers, Barnetson interrogates the training system through analysis of the political and economic forces that constitute modern Canada. This book not only provides students of Canada’s division of labour with a general introduction to the main facets of labour-market training—including skills development, post-secondary and community education, and workplace training—but also encourages students to think critically about the relationship between training systems and the ideologies that support them.

Business

Management

English

978-1-77199-241-1 (pbk.)

978-1-77199-242-8 (PDF)

978-1-77199-243-5 (epub

Canada’s
Labour
Market
Training
System

OPEL – Open Paths to Enriched Learning
Series editor: Connor Houlihan
Open Paths to Enriched Learning (OPEL) reflects the continued
commitment of Athabasca University to removing the barriers—including
the cost of course material—that restrict access to university-level study.
The OPEL series offers introductory texts, on a broad array of topics,
written especially with undergraduate students in mind. Although the
books in the series are designed for course use, they also afford lifelong
learners an opportunity to enrich their own knowledge. Like all AU Press
publications, OPEL course texts are available for free download, as well as
for purchase in both print and digital formats.
Series Titles
Open Data Structures: An Introduction
Pat Morin
Mind, Body, World: Foundations of Cognitive Science
Michael R. W. Dawson
Legal Literacy: An Introduction to Legal Studies
Archie Zariski
Interrogating Motherhood
Lynda R. Ross
Health and Safety in Canadian Workplaces
Jason Foster and Bob Barnetson
Canada’s Labour Market Training System
Bob Barnetson

Canada’
Labour
Market
Training
System
B O B

B A R N E T S O N

Copyright © 2018 Bob Barnetson
Published by AU Press, Athabasca University
1200, 10011 – 109 Street, Edmonton, AB T5J 3S8
Cover and interior design by Sergiy Kozakov.
Printed and bound in Canada.
ISBN 978-1-77199-241-1 (pbk.)
ISBN 978-1-77199-243-5 (epub)

ISBN 978-1-77199-242-8 (PDF) 
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication
Barnetson, Bob, 1970-, author
Canada’s labour market training system / Bob Barnetson
(Open paths to enriched learning)
Includes bibliographical references.
Issued in print and electronic formats.
1. Labor market—Canada. 2. Skilled labor—Canada. 3. Occupational
training—Canada. 4. Manpower policy—Canada. I. Title. II. Series: Open
paths to enriched learning
HD5728.B375 2018
331.120971
C2018-905134-5
C2018-905135-3
We acknowledge the financial support of the Government of Canada
through the Canada Book Fund (CBF) for our publishing activities and the
assistance provided by the Government of Alberta, Alberta Media Fund.

This publication is licensed under a Creative Commons licence, Attribution–
Noncommercial–No Derivative Works 4.0 International: see
www.creativecommons.org. The text may be reproduced for non-commercial
purposes, provided that credit is given to the original author. To obtain
permission for uses beyond those outlined in the Creative Commons licence,
please contact AU Press, Athabasca University, at aupress@athabascau.ca.

Contents

List of Abbreviations  vii  

◆ 

Acknowledgements ix

List of Figures and Tables xi ◆  Preface xiii

1
2

Canada’s Training System in Outline  1

Post-Secondary Education and the Apprenticeship Train

ing System  33

3

cy  63

Government Training and Immigration Poli

4
5

6

Workplace Training and Learning  95

Community-Based Education and Training  121

Reproducing Patterns of Advantage and Disadvantage through Training  147

Glossary 165 ◆  Bibliography 175

Abbreviations

ALL

Adult Literacy and Lifeskills

ALMPs

Active labour-market policies

ASETS

Aboriginal Skills and Employment Training Strategy

AWHC

Alberta Workers’ Health Centre

CJFA

Canada Job Funding Agreement

CJG

Canada Job Grant

CJS

Canada Jobs Strategy

CLLN

Canadian Literacy and Learning Network

EAL

English as an additional language

EI

Employment Insurance

ESL

English as a second language

GDP

Gross domestic product

IMP

International Mobility Programs

KSA

Knowledge, skills, and abilities

LBS

Literacy and Basic Skills

LFDS

Labour Force Development Strategy

LIC

Live-in caregiver

LLP

Lifelong Learning Plan

LMA

Labour Market Agreement

LMAPD

Labour Market Agreements for Persons with Disabilities

LMIA

Labour Market Impact Assessment

LMDA

Labour Market Development Agreements

LMO

Labour Market Opinion

OECD

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

PLE

Public legal education

PLEA

Public Legal Education Association

PRO

Professional regulatory organization

PSE

Post-secondary education

PTs

Provinces and territories

ROI

Return on investment

SAWP

Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program

TFW

Temporary foreign worker

TFWP

Temporary Foreign Worker Program

TIOW

Targeted Initiative for Older Workers

UFCW

United Food and Commercial Workers

UI

Unemployment Insurance

WDA

Workforce Development Agreement

Acknowledgements

This book seeks to introduce readers to the Canadian labour-market
training system—what it is, how it works, and why it works that way. It
builds upon much prior research and course-development work done by
current and former colleagues at Athabasca University. Thanks are due
to Steve Boddington, Derek Briton, Ursule Critophe, Winston Gereluk,
Tara Gibb, Cal Hauserman, Patricia Hughes-Fuller, Jenna Kelland, Ingo
Schmidt, Bruce Spencer, Jeff Taylor, Michael Welton, and Theresia Williams. Particular thanks are due to my friend and research partner, Jason
Foster, for patiently listening to me work out what I actually thought;
making uncountable helpful suggestions; and being an able stats-monkey.
Much of the research and writing of this book took place during annual
research leaves secured by the collective agreement negotiated by the
Athabasca University Faculty Association. Revisions were completed
during a research sabbatical secured by the same agreement. Without
such job-protected leaves, the completion of large research projects would
be very difficult.
Thanks are also due to the editorial committee and staff of Athabasca
University Press, including Connor Houlihan, Sergiy Kozakov, Karyn
Wisselink, and Megan Hall, and to the two anonymous reviewers of the
original manuscript for their helpful comments.
I would also like thank my family—Jennifer and Jessica—who listened
patiently as I complained (sometimes bitterly!) about this project. Jennifer
also closely read the entire first draft and suggested numerous substantive
improvements.

 ix
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Figures and Tables

Figures
Figure 1.1 Demand relationship  11
Figure 1.2 Supply relationship  12
Figure 1.3 Labour supply and demand  12
Figure 1.4 Supply and demand when labour demand increases  13
Figure 1.5 Supply, demand, and wage suppression  13
Figure 2.1 Highly gendered fields of study  43
Figure 2.2 Percentage of apprentices by jurisdiction, 2015  54
Figure 2.3 Occupational segregation by gender in the trades  58
Figure 3.1 Migrant workers in Canada, 1996–2015  87
Figure 5.1 Skills pyramid  128
Figure 5.2 Literacy levels in Canada, 2011–12  130

Tables
Table 1.1 Jurisdiction of labour-market policy  17
Table 2.1 PSE students by field of study, 2014–15  42
Table 2.2 Apprentices by trade, 2015  54
Table 3.1 Migrant workers by skill level, 2015  88

 xi
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Preface

It is difficult to explain how the Canadian labour-market training system
is structured or operates. It isn’t a system in the conventional sense of
the term. It doesn’t have components that all work together to achieve
a clear goal—such as producing an adequate number of appropriately
trained workers.
Rather, the training system is a political system, wherein groups of
stakeholders—employers, workers, and governments—seek to advance
their interests. Conflicts among stakeholders’ interests are resolved by
stakeholders exercising whatever power they can muster to achieve
their goals. The result is a fragmented and ever-shifting system that is
riven with conflict and compromise. In this way, the training system
operates similarly to the industrial-relations system. Broadly speaking,
employers seek to maximize their profitability by externalizing training
costs onto workers and the state and advocating for an oversupply of
trained workers (in order to reduce wage levels). By contrast, workers
want training that helps them maximize their wages and ability to find
work. And the state seeks to manage conflict in a way that ensures both
the production and social-reproduction processes tick along.
I’ve chosen to explain Canada’s labour-market training system through
a political lens for two reasons. First, in providing a coherent explanatory framework, this approach helps readers understand both how the
system operates and why it operates in that way. Seemingly inefficient or
otherwise defective training structures and processes are the outcome of
the interplay of interests and power, rather than otherwise inexplicable
mistakes that are amenable to simple fixes.

 xiii
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Second, this approach is likely to make readers uncomfortable. The
key audience for this book is undergraduate students. In my experience,
presenting students with controversial arguments, for example, that
employers misrepresent skills shortages or that governments collude
with employers to the detriment of vulnerable Canadians, motivates
them to critically evaluate the evidence presented (or marshal their own),
improves understanding, and leads to a deeper knowledge of the subject
(even if they disagree with the conclusions).
The risk of this approach is that other readers may be tempted to
dismiss the analyses as a polemic or merely ideological. This book is
polemical, in that it makes a controversial argument that refutes many
common-sense views about labour-market training (e.g., that there are
widespread skills shortages). And it is also ideological, in that it is premised upon an integrated set of assertions, theories, and beliefs (i.e., a
loosely Marxist analysis of employment and education).
That does not, however, mean the arguments contained in the book
are mistaken—although that is usually the rhetorical intent of calling
something polemical or ideological. Rather, this approach is an effort to
undertake an engaging and insightful analysis that helps us better appreciate how and why our training system operates as it does.
The evidence I’ve marshalled in support of the arguments relies
heavily on peer-reviewed academic research and statistics generated by
governments or international bodies. One of the challenges of writing a
contrarian account is that an author often must fill in the gaps in the literature (which tends to echo the traditional views) through logic, argument,
and inference as well as by using credible studies published by reputable
think tanks. I’ve attempted to write my account with a consistency befitting a rigorous polemic, which aims to provide students with the facts
about the Canadian training system, as seen within the space of political
and social contestation.

xiv 
xiv Preface
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

C H A P T E R

O N E

Canada’s Training System in Outline

Learning Objectives
After reading this chapter, you will be able to:
➢➢ Define labour-market training and explain why it occurs.
➢➢ Identify how the interests of training stakeholders converge and
conflict.
➢➢ Define access to, control of, and benefit from training and explain
why these dimensions are analytically important.

Fear of the economic consequences of a skill and labour shortage is
a recurring theme in Canadian newspapers and television reports. For
example, a 2016 report by the Information and Communication Technology Council warned, “If Canada does not address the talent and skills
gap, it could cost the economy billions of dollars in lost productivity, tax
revenues, and gross domestic product.”1 The remedies proposed by this
industry lobby group are typical and include mandatory computer science
classes for school children, the reduction of barriers to labour force entry
for women and other traditionally excluded workers, and tax breaks to
encourage employer-sponsored training.2
That same year, the Canadian Agricultural Human Resources Council
predicted a shortfall of 17,000 farm workers in the prairie grain-and-oilseed
industry by 2025. This projected labour shortage could lead to hundreds of
millions of dollars in lost product sales, opined the industry lobby group.
Its proposed solution to the aging farm labour force was to allow prairie farmers better access to temporary foreign workers.3 Neither report
engaged with the rather obvious possibility that employers providing
better wages and working conditions might help attract workers to these
industries and thereby reduce or avoid the projected shortages.
Many commentators question the accuracy of employer claims about
skill and labour shortages, noting that they are often self-serving and
based on poor evidence.4 But, faced with seemingly endless corporate
hand-wringing, the media tends to focus on laying blame for these shortages. Governments and educational institutions are characterized as out
of touch with the needs of employers. And students and workers are said
to be too ill-informed, naïve, or lazy to get the training they need to be

 3
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

competitive in the labour market. Mostly ignored in this discourse is the
low and continually declining level of employer-sponsored training.
The overall impression left by these discussions is that the Canadian
labour-market training system is broken because it is unable to supply an
adequate pool of appropriately skilled workers to industry.5 This book
examines the key forms of labour-market training in Canada and asks
whether this criticism of the system is warranted and true. A good place
to start is asking whether a coherent and functional training system is a
reasonable expectation for anyone to have.

Systems and Metaphors
We often reflexively consider a system as a collection of parts that operate
together to achieve a goal. For example, a car’s subsystems—the engine,
transmission, and steering—all work together so we can get where we
want to go. If we examine the four main components of Canada’s training system—post-secondary education (PSE), government training and
immigration policies, workplace training, and community education—
through the lens of this mechanical metaphor, we’ll see that Canada does
not have an integrated training system. Rather, Canada’s training “system”
is a collection of mismatched parts that are constantly changing and often
working towards different (and sometimes conflicting) goals. Not surprisingly, this training “system” seems to fall short of its putative goal of an
adequately trained workforce.
So, does that mean Canada’s labour-market training system is broken?
Maybe. But it might also mean that thinking about the Canadian training
system as a machine is wrong-headed. There are many other metaphors
for systems besides the organization as machine. For example, we might
think about organizations as biological organisms, which have needs and
imperatives of their own. Or we might view organizations as cultures,
which have developed specific ways of seeing the world and of behaving
within it. In short, the lens through which we choose to view the world
affects what we see, what we don’t, and what behaviour and outcomes
we expect and desire.6
This book uses a political metaphor to understand the Canadian
labour-market training system. A political system is one wherein groups of

4  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

actors seek to advance their interests. These interests sometimes converge
and sometimes conflict. Where there is conflict, different groups will
seek to exert power in order to achieve their goals (often at the expense
of other groups). Considering how power and differing interests shape
labour-market training in Canada reveals that there is an underlying logic
to the existing training system. Over the six chapters of this book, we’ll see
that Canada’s seemingly ad hoc and dysfunctional training “system” serves
to stabilize and replicate a class-stratified social and economic system.
Stabilization and replication of a system riven with conflict can occur in
a number of ways. Sometimes a government will intervene with legislation
or money in order to prevent conflict or disruption. Other times, actors
may use rhetorical strategies to manage discontent. For example, employers may assert that workers can better their lives by undertaking training.
This draws attention away from other ways workers could improve their
lives, such as by seeking social, economic, or political change. Prioritizing
social stability and replication may sometimes interfere with the training
system’s ability to ensure there is an adequately trained labour force. For
example, allowing students to choose the post-secondary program they
want to enroll in (a reasonable expectation by students in a democratic
society) may result in skill mismatches. The training system’s components
and how they interact with one another reflect that training—like most
other aspects of employment in Canada—is contested terrain.

Training, Education, and Learning
Training is the process of intentionally acquiring, modifying, or reinforcing
knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs) as well as values and preferences.
The intentionality of training distinguishes it from the broader process
of learning. That is to say, we undertake training with the explicit goal
of learning something and, thereby, becoming more capable. Of course,
the world isn’t as neat and tidy as that. For example, we may go seek
out information about how to paint a landscape and practise doing so.
During this training, we may also learn other things unintentionally (or
even unconsciously), such as how the colour of objects appears to become
lighter as the distance to them increases.

Canada’s Training System in Outline 5
 5
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

The terms “training” and “education” are often used interchangeably.
Both training and education entail acquiring, modifying, or reinforcing
KSAs. So is there a difference? Perhaps not. Yet, imagine how your expectations might differ between two classes, one advertised as “sex education”
and the other as “sex training.” Clearly, there is some sort of widely held
qualitative difference between training and education.7 This difference
centres on the tendency of training to develop KSAs for immediate use
and perhaps with a greater vocational (or performance) focus. This stands
in contrast with the longer-term, intellectual, and perhaps intrinsic-reward
focus of education. That said, the dividing line between training and education is unclear, and the terms are often used interchangeably.
There are many forms of training. We may take a class, watch an online
video, or do hands-on work with tools or machinery. We might also practise what we have learned, either on our own or with others. Indeed,
training often entails cycling back and forth between learning something
new and incorporating that learning into our daily practice. Training is
also often framed as something that is done to others. For example, an
employer may train a worker in the correct operation of a cash register.
But we can also train ourselves. For example, confronted with a flat tire,
we may figure out how put the spare tire on. In doing so, we have (quite
intentionally) learned a new skill. This example also reveals that training
doesn’t just occur in formal situations, such as a classroom or training
program with formal learning objectives and curriculum. In fact, training can occur almost anywhere—the key characteristics of training are
(1) an intentional effort to (2) improve our (or others’) capabilities (3)
through learning.
The analysis in this book looks at Canada’s overall labour-market training system. Labour-market training is often defined fairly narrowly. For
example, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) defines labour-market training as follows: “Labour market training measures are those undertaken for reasons of labour market policy,
other than special programmes for youth and the disabled. Expenditures
include both course costs and subsistence allowances to trainees, when
such are paid. Subsidies to employers for enterprise training are also
included, but not employer’s own expenses.”8

6  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

The OECD’s definition focuses on programming provided by the
government (or “the state”) to operationalize labour-market policy. In
this definition, apprenticeship programming is labour-market training
because the state funds training at colleges and technical institutes as
well as financially supports apprentices during training through the
Employment Insurance (EI) system. Yet training offered by employers, trade unions, or professional regulatory bodies would be excluded
from consideration.
Looking at the entire Canadian labour-market training system—
including post-secondary education, government training and
immigration policy, employer workplace training, and community-based
education—provides a broader picture that allows us to better understand the interrelationships in the system. For example, as we saw in the
opening vignette of this chapter, employer groups often seek to address
skill and worker shortages via changes in immigration policy, rather than
by offering training or improving the terms and conditions of work. For
this reason, this book broadly defines labour-market training as policies, programs, and activities intended to result in an adequate number
of appropriately trained workers.

Training, Employment, and the Labour Market
In considering the operation of the Canadian training system, it is important to have a basic understanding of Canadian employment relationships
and the labour market. Employment—hiring a worker to do a job—is one
way for employers to get work done. There are other ways to accomplish
work. The use of slaves was common in the United States until only 150
years ago, for example, and Indigenous peoples in Canada have often
been compelled by the federal government to work in order to receive
income support.9 Employers might also use volunteers or a group of
workers might get together to form a co-operative. And many employers now contract work out in order to avoid the obligations and costs
of direct employment.10 But most work is still done by workers in an
employment relationship.
An employment relationship is an economic relationship, wherein
workers trade their time and skills to their employer in exchange for wages.

Canada’s Training System in Outline 7
 7
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Workers selling their capacity to work to an employer in the marketplace
is sometimes called the commodification of labour. Routinely selling one’s
labour as a commodity to others is a recent phenomenon and reflects
that other pathways to accessing the necessities of life (e.g., agricultural
work) have becoming largely inaccessible to most workers. In Canada, this
exchange of labour for wages occurs in the context of a capitalist economy.
A capitalist economy is system of production and exchange characterized by the private ownership of capital (i.e., money, land, equipment,
and tools). Capitalists combine their capital with the efforts of workers
(sometimes called “labour”) in order to produce goods and services that
are sold in a marketplace in order to generate a profit.11
Box 1.1 unpacks the complexities of social class in capitalist economies. The notion that labour and capital have differing interests reflects
a class-based analysis of society. In this approach, class refers to a group
of individuals who share similar social, economic, educational, cultural
and/or political characteristics. Such efforts to categorize individuals is
always to some degree a subjective process (e.g., who really is a member
of the middle class?) and can obscure intra-group differences. That said,
grouping individuals together on the basis of certain characteristics (such
as their respective roles in the production process) can often help us identify broad patterns and common interests that are otherwise somewhat
hard to see. Box 1.1 presents a more nuanced examination of the capitalist
class structure in Canada.
Box 1.1  The Complexities of Class
It is often convenient to think about only two types (or classes) of
participants in the labour market: capitalists and labourers. This simple
typology is based upon ownership of the means of production and
belies the complexity of class structure. Considering ownership, specialized knowledge, and delegated authority suggests there are nine
classes in contemporary Canada. (Delegated authority exists when a
worker exercises managerial power on behalf of the actual owners of
the company.)
Capitalists can be usefully divided into the self-employed, small
employers, and large employers. The self-employed sell their labour
but own their own businesses. Small employers typically have a small

8  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

number of employees with the owner(s) actively managing the business (and perhaps working alongside their workers). Large employers
possess or direct significant amounts of capital, often acting through
intermediaries (such as managers and supervisors) and employing
significant numbers of workers.
There are also three categories of workers. Industrial workers
produce material goods, such as machinery and foodstuffs, and have
relatively little autonomy or discretion in their work. Service workers
provide a wide range of services but also lack autonomy. Some industrial or service workers may have significant specialized knowledge but
lack discretion in its use. Finally, there are workers who, by choice or
circumstances, are unemployed.
In between capitalists and labourers reside the intermediaries
described above: managers, supervisors, and professionals. Professionals have specialized knowledge, which grants them significant
discretion over how they do their work. That said, unless they are also
employers or are self-employed, they remain subordinate to employers. Employers also hire supervisors and, to manage them, managers.
Both of these groups ensure that workers meet employers’ goals.12

In an employment relationship, capitalists (or the managers they hire to
run their businesses) have significant power to direct how work is performed. This power stems from the legal rules that have developed around
employment. The common law of employment requires employees to
be obedient or risk summary dismissal. Employers’ legal power is buttressed by their labour-market power. Basically, there are usually more
workers than there are jobs, so workers always face the prospect of being
replaced—thereby losing their ability to feed, clothe, and shelter their
families—if they don’t follow their employers’ directions.
Various government programs developed in the middle of the twentieth century—such as Unemployment Insurance (renamed Employment
Insurance in 1996), and other income support programs—allowed workers to (at least partially) resist this whip of hunger. Such alternate sources
of income reduced employers’ labour-market power and increased their
labour costs. Since the late 1970s, Canadian governments have moved to
reduce access to social benefits, although this trend has occurred in fits
Canada’s Training System in Outline 9
 9
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

and starts. Declining levels of income support have, in turn, pressured
workers to sell their capacity to work on whatever terms employers are
prepared to offer.13 As we’ll see in Chapter 2, these reductions in government spending have made it more difficult for workers to access some
forms of labour-market training, given the rise in the costs associated with
post-secondary education.
The relative ability of workers to resist employers’ demands is
important because the interests of workers and employers often differ.
In a capitalist economy, employers must profit or they will go out of
business. This profit imperative pressures employers to minimize costs.
Labour is expensive and employers often seek to intensify work—getting
workers to complete more work per hour—in order to minimize labour
costs. Such management efforts can run contrary to workers’ interests.
Workers typically want to maximize their wages as well as control how
and how hard they work—the opposite of what most employers want.
Employers’ greater legal and labour-market power means that employers’ interests tend to prevail. What this tells us is that employment is
not only an economic relationship but also a social one. By accepting
employment, workers accept the employer’s authority and agree (however grudgingly) to do as they are told—even when doing so runs
contrary to their own interests.14
Employment relationships are formed in a labour market. Historically,
labour markets were physical places where employers sized up potential
workers, sometimes by physically poking and prodding them. Employers
and workers would then negotiate wages. Wage rates were determined by
the supply of and demand for workers. Modern-day labour markets are
more often imaginary places where employers find workers to perform
jobs, screening potential workers based on their education, experience,
and the results of standardized tests.
Yet, there remain striking similarities between historical and contemporary labour markets. Employers and workers each try to achieve the
best bargain that they can, and the price of work is greatly influenced by
supply and demand (see Box 1.2 for an explanation of how labour markets
operate). When the demand for workers outstrips the supply, wage rates
typically rise (this is often called a tight labour market). And when the
supply of workers exceeds demand, wages normally fall (this is called a
10  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

loose labour market). There are, however, a number of constraints on
wages. For example, employment contracts, collective agreements, and
legislation may fix wage rates and thereby shape the wage rate independently of supply and demand.15
Box 1.2  How Labour Markets Work
A labour market is a place where employers and workers negotiate the
price of labour. The price of labour (or wage rate) is determined by the
interaction of the demand for labour and the available supply. While
real-world labour markets are much more complex than the examples
below, the examples are useful because they help us understand why
certain training stakeholders act in the ways they do.
Broadly speaking, demand is the number of workers wanted by
employers. More specifically, demand is the number of hours of work
that employers want to purchase at a certain wage rate. Typically, as
the wage rate goes up, employers’ demand for work(ers) goes down.
This reflects that higher wages may make some work unprofitable (or
cheaper to have done by machinery) and, thus, employers’ need for
workers is reduced. Conversely, as the wage rate goes down, demand
for workers may well go up. The demand relationship is presented in
figure 1.1. The line (D for demand) represents demand for full-time
workers (let’s say truck drivers in Alberta). Notice how employers’
demand for workers decreases as wages increase.

$

D

0

#
Figure 1.1  Demand relationship.

Supply is the number of hours of work that workers are prepared to
provide at a given wage rate. As wages go up, workers who previously
opted out of work may choose to become available, and workers in
Canada’s Training System in Outline 11
 11
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

other jurisdictions may migrate to take high-wage jobs, so the supply
increases. Similarly, as wages go down, the number of workers available typically declines. This supply relationship is presented in figure
1.2. The line (S for supply) represents the supply of workers and the
supply increases as wages increase.
Figure 1.3 places the supply of and demand for workers on a single
chart. The point where the two lines intersect (point A) is known as the
equilibrium point. Here, the supply of workers equals the demand.
The wage rate at this point is approximately the “going” wage rate for
this occupation in this locality. If something changes that affects the
supply of or demand for labour, in theory the wage rate will change.
$

S

0

#
Figure 1.2  Supply relationship.

$

S

A

D
#

0

Figure 1.3  Labour supply and demand.
For example, imagine an economy where the supply of and demand
for truck drivers is at equilibrium (point A on figure 1.4). One day, the
price of oil goes up and employers want to hire more truck drivers as
part of their efforts to produce and sell more oil (the desired number
12  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

of truck drivers is point B). Looking at the supply line (line S), though,
we see that the demand for truck drivers will outstrip the supply at
the current wage rate. In order to get enough truck drivers, employers’ only option (in the short term) is to increase wages (to point C).
This shifts the demand line to the right (from D1 to D2), reflecting that
employers are prepared to pay more for a fixed amount of labour.
Given the profit imperative, employers may be reluctant to pay
higher wages in the long term. In order to reduce the wage rate in
figure 1.5 from the new equilibrium (point C) to the wage rate that they
desire (point D), employers need to somehow increase the supply of
workers prepared to work for the desired wage rate.
$

S

C
A
B
D1
0

D2
#

Figure 1.4  Supply and demand when labour demand increases.

S1

$

S2

C
D

D2
0

#

Figure 1. 5  Supply, demand, and wage suppression.
This shift of the supply line (from S1 to S2) might be achieved
through training more workers to drive trucks or accessing qualified
workers from other countries. We’ll explore some of these strategies in
Chapter 3.
Canada’s Training System in Outline 13
 13
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

While we often talk about “the labour market,” there are actually many
labour markets in Canada. Most labour markets have a geographical element to them. For example, the potential pool of workers for low-paying
retail jobs may be limited to those workers who live within reasonable
commuting distance of a specific workplace. Other labour markets may
centre on specific qualifications or skills, such as holding the professional
designation required to be nurse or being able to operate a crane. Geographical proximity may be less important in these labour markets. The
relative scarcity of such workers may cause employers to look further
afield to hire. And the higher wages associated with such jobs may mean
workers are prepared to relocate to take a job.
Workers may also commute significant distances to take such jobs.
Canadians often commute between municipalities and sometimes
provinces. Workers travelling to undertake employment are engaged
in employment-related geographic mobility. The propensity for
long-distance commuting is higher among men, younger workers, workers in Newfoundland and Labrador, and workers in specific industries,
such as mining or the oil and gas industry.16 These trends are evident
in Fort McMurray, Alberta. Local employers, who were operating in a
boom-and-bust economy based on extracting bitumen oil, met their seemingly insatiable demand for skilled workers during the first decade of this
century by using fly-in-fly-out workers. These workers would commute
from distant homes (often in Atlantic Canada) for two- or three-week
stretches of work (often living in employer-operated work camps) before
returning home.
As noted in Box 1.2, the supply of workers in the labour market is
not fixed. Workers, employers, and the government respond to signals
from the labour market. Imagine an occupation with unmet demand that
results in wage increases. Trained workers may return to the labour force
or geographically migrate to take such high-wage jobs. Untrained workers may also seek to become qualified for such jobs. Indeed, employers
may offer to train workers (or pressure governments to do so) in the
hope that an increase in the number of trained workers will reduce
their wage costs. Employers may also consider substituting capital (e.g.,
machinery) for workers to reduce demand for workers. This tells us that,
for employers, the goal of the labour-market training system is having
14  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

available an adequate number of appropriately trained workers at the
lowest possible cost.
Alternately, employers may redesign jobs to require less skill, in the
expectation that this will increase the pool of potential workers. Consider
how the job of a cashier has changed over time, as scanners and electronic
tills have reduced the memory and computation skills required of workers.
Deskilling work is not the only reason stores have implemented scanner systems. These systems also speed up cashiers’ work, facilitate better
inventory control, and allow just-in-time ordering that reduce on-site
storage space requirements. But reducing wages through deskilling has
played a role.17
Employers may also lobby governments to increase the ease with
which employers can bring appropriately skilled immigrant or temporary
foreign workers into the country. Accessing migrant workers can loosen
a tight labour market. Foreign workers may also be more productive than
domestic workers, reflecting that they are often younger, highly motivated
to work long hours, and less able to resist work intensification by employers.18 For their parts, governments often intervene to address shortages
of trained workers. Historically, governments have funded a variety of
training schemes, such as post-secondary institutions and apprenticeship
training systems. Governments can also adjust labour-market policy to
provide training and motivate workers to take it.
While workers often participate in training for vocational reasons,
this is not necessarily their only or most important motive. Cyril Houle’s
examination of the reasons adults participate in education revealed
three underlying motivational factors. Goal-oriented learners saw education as a means to achieve an end, be it in their work or personal
lives. Activity-oriented learners saw education as a social activity. And
learning-oriented workers were seeking knowledge for its own sake.
Learners may, of course, have multiple reasons for undertaking training.
A worker may hope that training will qualify her for a better job but may
also enjoy that training provides a break from her everyday routine and a
chance to socialize with her co-workers.19
Similarly, training providers may have motives beyond developing workers’ skills. Community groups, such as unions, may provide
health-and-safety training because they have a moral commitment to
Canada’s Training System in Outline 15
 15
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

undertake such work. They may also view such work as a way to build
member interest and loyalty as well as possibly political support for legislative change or workplace action. Governments may seek to develop
citizens’ basic literacy, numeracy, and computer skills (all of which have
utility in the labour market) because individuals need such skills to successfully manage their day-to-day lives—an outcome that also enhances
social stability and the legitimacy of a government.

Government Regulation of the Labour Market
It is also necessary to understand how government works in order to
grasp why governments intervene in the labour market and in the training
system as they do. While we often refer to a generalized “government” or
“government policy,” neither is monolithic. In Canada, there are different
orders (or levels) of government. In terms of labour-market training, the
two most important orders of government are (1) the federal government
and (2) the provincial and territorial governments.
The authority granted each order of government by the constitution
shapes how these governments intervene in matters of labour-market
training. Canada’s constitution grants different orders of government control over different fields of policy that are related to the labour market and
training. On some issues, the federal government is predominant while, on
others, provincial and territorial governments are predominant. And, in
some cases, there is shared or parallel authority. These different arrangements are summarized in Table 1.1.
In practice, the provinces and territories (the PTs) deliver most
labour-market training. Provinces and territories have virtually total
control over the operation of their post-secondary systems (which fall
within their jurisdiction). Much of the non-PSE labour-market training
that the PTs deliver is shaped by agreements with the federal government,
in part because much of the funding for this work comes from the federal government. Specific funding arrangements are discussed in detail
in Chapter 3. Both federal government funding and its control over the
Employment Insurance system has resulted in the development of broadly
similar training regimes across the country. Governments have also created various mechanisms for intergovernmental coordination, such as the

16  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

Forum of Labour Market Ministers (FLMM), but the effectiveness of such
efforts has been limited.20 A key source of diversity among the PTs is the
unique history of and political arrangements in Québec.21 A second source
of diversity is economic differences among the PTs (e.g., the decline of
the fisheries and coal mining in Atlantic Canada and manufacturing in
Ontario, the boom-and-bust nature of Alberta’s petroleum-based economy) that create pressure for different kinds of labour-market training
interventions.
Table 1.1  Jurisdiction of labour-market policy
Arrangement

Policy field

Federal role only
(or federal paramount)

Employment insurance
Immigration

Provincial/Territorial role only
(or paramount)

Workers’ compensation
Social assistance
K-12 and post-secondary education

Federal-provincial/
territorial overlap

Active labour market measures
Labour-market training

Federal-provincial/
territorial parallelism

Employment and labour law

Source: Adapted from Haddow, R. and Klassen, T. Partisanship, Globalization and
Canadian Labour Market Policy.

As we examine the responses of PTs to these sorts of pressures, it is
important to be cognizant that PTs are also not monolithic. Within each
provincial and territorial government, there are different departments
(e.g., post-secondary education, social assistance) that may have different
training stakeholders, objectives, and mechanisms that can spark policy
diversity and even intragovernmental conflict. It is also important to be
mindful of the differing interests of politicians (who set policy and come
and go with the electoral cycle) and public servants (who enact policy and
often have lengthy tenures). Differing perspectives and priorities can often
result in discrepancies between the policies that are set and the programs
that are delivered.

Canada’s Training System in Outline 17
 17
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Finally, it is important to note that government policy is not necessarily stable over time. Some changes reflect broad policy shifts, such as the
move from Keynesian to neoliberal economic policies detailed in Box 1.3.
Other changes reflect short-term policy changes following the election
of a new government or shifting priorities. Chapter 3 examines some of
the more recent changes in government training and immigration policy.
Box 1.3  Shifting Emphases in Labour-Market Training
Since about 1975, Canada has moved away from Keynesian economics and towards neoliberalism. Policies advocating full employment
gave way to policies designed to control inflation, and then to
reduce government expenditures. This, in turn, resulted in changes in
labour-market training policy. A useful way to think about changing
training policy is as a tension between developing the labour force on
one hand and making the labour market function effectively on the
other.
From the mid-1960s to the late 1980s, government intervention
in labour-market training increased with an eye to improving worker
skills. From the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, there were efforts to
reshape this system to better match training to the needs of capital. Since the mid-1990s, the federal government has increasingly
off-loaded responsibility for training on the PTs, which have, in turn,
focused on reducing the cost of training (in part by reducing duration)
and more closely linking training to address so-called skills shortages.22
One way to make this high-level narrative more concrete is to
simply examine the names given to the government department primarily responsible for labour-market training over time. The list below
reflects the names used by Alberta from 1971 to present and is typical
of other provinces and territories:
• 1971 Manpower
• 1986 Career Development and Employment
• 1992 Advanced Education and Career Development
• 1996 Human Resources and Employment
• 2006 Employment, Immigration and Industry
• 2008 Employment and Immigration
• 2011 Jobs, Skills, Training and Labour
• 2015 Labour23
18  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

What we see in this list is an early commitment to development of the
labour force and the labour market (e.g., developing “manpower” and
creating jobs). In the mid-1980s, there is a shift towards improving the
skills and labour-market attachment of individual workers through
career development. And, by the mid-1990s, there is a clear move
towards governments ensuring that the labour market functions properly, by developing human resources and aligning immigration policy
to the needs of the labour market.

Stakeholders and Their Interests
The Canadian training system has three main stakeholder groups: workers, employers, and the state. At a high level, all three groups benefit from
labour-market training, which is one component of the reproduction of
labour power. The reproduction of labour power refers to the various
tasks that must be accomplished in order to maintain a class of workers.
These activities include the very obviously reproductive activity of bearing and raising children. For example, someone (usually women) must
perform (usually for free) the day-to-day tasks associated with keeping
house and home, such as cooking, cleaning, and providing child care
and eldercare. And, of course, a working class needs to have an adequate
repertoire of KSAs in order to perform work, which requires education
and training. Less obviously, workers must also accept the inequities of
capitalism and their place within it.
Employers require a certain number of appropriately trained workers
in order to get work done. Consistent with the profit imperative, employers benefit when the cost of training is borne by someone else, such as
workers, the state, or even other employers. Employers also benefit when
the supply of qualified workers exceeds their needs because this tends to
depress wages (thereby lowering labour costs). This, in turn, suggests that
it is in employers’ economic interests to claim there is a skills shortage.
This self-interest should make us cautious about employer claims about
skills shortages. For example, rather than making jobs more attractive or
increasing their training efforts, employers have systematically restructured work to make it more precarious.

Canada’s Training System in Outline 19
 19
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Precarious work is “paid work characterized by limited social benefits
and statutory entitlements, job insecurity, low wages and high risks of ill
health.”24 Precarious work directly benefits employers by reducing their
upfront labour costs (or, rather, transferring these costs to the workers in
the form of greater insecurity) and has increased significantly over the past
twenty years.25 The long-term economic and health consequences of precarious employment for workers (which PSE can help workers to avoid)
make post-secondary education desirable. Training can also be a means
of career advancement for workers and can increase their job security and
control over their work. In this way, precarious work can also indirectly
reduce employers’ costs by externalizing the cost of training on workers.
The state has two main (and sometimes competing) interests in
capitalist societies: maintaining the processes of production and social
reproduction. Production is the process by which we make stuff (including profit). Social reproduction is the process that perpetuates the social
arrangements necessary for economic production. This includes ensuring
there are workers and consumers. It also means ensuring workers accept
being subordinate to employers in the production process.26 Training is
one way the state maintains the social-reproduction process. Developing
workers’ KSAs contributes to the reproduction of labour power, which is
a necessary condition for the perpetuation of production. The notion that
workers can, through the acquisition of KSAs, improve their positions in
society helps to frame worker dissatisfaction with their place in the production system as remediable via self-improvement (rather than political,
social, or economic reform).
Training providers—such as private companies, post-secondary institutions, and not-for-profit organizations—are also stakeholder groups in
the training system. Training providers typically have less ability to influence the shape of the training system than do governments and employers.
Indeed, they are frequently clients of, or otherwise dependent upon, the
state or employers. In this way, they tend to be minor actors in shaping
the training system. For these reasons, the interests of training providers
are dealt with in more detail in the chapters that follow.
The potentially conflicting interests of key stakeholders suggest there is
more to training than it simply being one way that individuals can improve
their skills, thereby advancing themselves and society as a whole. The
20  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

position taken by this book is that training may be more usefully understood as part of a system designed to maintain the status quo. The KSAs,
values, and preferences that are conveyed in training typically seek to
reinforce the operation of organizations and, more broadly, society: there
is no profit in training workers to be critical of the system or to act disruptively. The fact that training does allow (some) workers to improve
their life circumstances legitimizes existing social, economic, and political
arrangements. But this process of individual advancement and selection
also serves as a means of selecting out disruptive workers.27 In this way,
non-participation may reflect more than just the barriers workers face to
accessing training—non-participation may also be an act of intentional
resistance by workers.28
Conflicts among the interests of labour, capital, and the state are most
visible in three areas of training:
1. Who determines which workers can access training and how?
2. Who controls the content of training and how?
3. Who benefits from the training and how?
How these conflicts emerge and are managed in PSE, training and
immigration policy, workplace training, and community education are
addressed in the respective chapters that follow; however, a brief examination of each issue is useful.
Access to Training

One of three recurring questions in this book is, Who determines which
workers access training and how do they do so? This question matters
because training is unequally and inequitably distributed along several
different dimensions. For example, while men and women undertake
formal studies or training at similar rates (36.2 per cent and 35.9 per cent
respectively), men are more likely to receive employer support for doing
so (54.6 per cent versus 48.0 per cent for women).29 This gender difference becomes even starker when we look at employer-supported training
for low-wage workers and less-educated workers. Gendered access to
training reflects broader patterns of gender-based discrimination in the
labour force, such as the persistent wage gap between men and women
who perform similar work.30
Canada’s Training System in Outline 21
 21
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Gender is not, of course, the only identity factor that affects access
to training. Workers with university degrees typically participate in subsequent formal work-related training at three times the rate of workers
without high school diplomas. Unionized workers are also 50 per cent
more likely to participate in workplace learning than non-unionized workers.31 Similar differences can be discerned on the basis of age, language,
location (e.g., urban versus rural), heritage (which is sometimes called
culture, ethnicity, or race), and income. We will pay specific attention to
the experiences of Indigenous workers throughout this book.
The complex interaction of these identity factors causes overlapping
and interdependent systems of disadvantage, a phenomenon that is
referred to as intersectionality. Being aware of the cumulative effect of
each person’s various social identities allows us to better understand the
sometimes nuanced effect of intersecting identity factors. For example,
the labour-market and training experiences of rural and urban women or
the experiences of workers from the same cultural group—one with secure
employment and one employed precariously—may be quite different.
The differing levels of access to training experienced by workers based
upon their identities also suggest that training serves to reproduce a particular pattern of advantage and disadvantage. This is easiest to see if we
look at the tendency of university-educated workers (who often already
earn higher incomes and have more stable employment) to command
the greatest access to additional training. Essentially, the allocation of
training opportunities (through whatever means) helps the already well
off in society to maintain their position of privilege. If we add in another
personal characteristic (such as gender), we find that the difference in
access experienced by university-educated and non-university-educated
workers grows—to the advantage of university-educated men and to the
disadvantage of non-university-educated women.
Access to training is often examined in terms of the barriers that
workers face. For example, a 2003 Canadian study found the main
worker-reported barriers to accessing job-related training were cost (45
per cent) and time. Regarding time, 35 per cent of workers indicated they
were too busy at work, 27 per cent cited family responsibilities, and 27 per
cent identified conflicts between work and training schedules.32 As noted
in the earlier discussion of social reproduction, gender often shapes the
22  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

barriers workers face, with men in this study being more likely to report
that work demands are a barrier to training while women are more likely
to cite family responsibilities.33
Yet, it is also useful to think about the various structural mechanisms that have an impact on access to training. As we’ll see in Chapter 2,
access to PSE is controlled in several ways—such as entry requirements,
enrollment caps, and tuition fees—and the policy decisions underlying
them often reflect complex tradeoffs among the interests of stakeholder
groups. Location can also be an issue, with rural and northern students
having fewer locally available PSE options than urban and southern students. Access to training provided as part of government labour-market
programs is generally controlled by governments via criteria such as EI
eligibility. Such programs can also simply grant employers the power to
determine who receives training, as in the case of the Canada Job Grant
and the Québec training levy that we’ll examine in Chapter 3.
Employer control over access is clearest in workplace training. Chapter
4 looks at the various ways that employers may determine who gets what
kind of training. Key trends in workplace training are declining employer
support for training and a shift towards leadership training. We’ll conclude our look at access in Chapter 5 when we consider various forms
of community education. Some forms of community education require
membership—such as in a union. Other forms may have some form of participation fee (often cost recovery) or otherwise restrict access to specific
categories of individuals, such as the unemployed or immigrants.
Control of Training

The second recurring question is, Who determines what training is available, and how do they do so? The question matters because stakeholders
who control the content of training can (and do) use this control to
advance their interests at the expense of the interests of other stakeholders. For example, an employer’s interest in minimizing costs and
the risk of other employers poaching its staff may cause that employer
to favour extremely employer-specific (i.e., non-portable) training. The
employees, who likely view training as a way to get ahead, will likely
want broader training so their skills are more transferrable to other jobs

Canada’s Training System in Outline 23
 23
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

and employers. If the employer decides the content of the training, it will
likely be short, narrowly focused, and designed to improve the employer’s bottom line. Chapter 4 highlights this trend in the form of declining
employer investments in workplace training.
Of course, who controls the content of training and how they do so
varies across the components of the training system. In PSE, governments may exert control by limiting which programs of study are offered
and where. Governments can also shape enrollment in each program
via operational and infrastructure funding. Institutions can broadly control the content of programs through regulations, while instructors can
control the content of specific courses through pedagogical and course
material decisions. Employer input varies depending upon the nature of
the post-secondary education. In vocational training (such as the apprenticeship system), employers determine what is taught on the job and also
shape classroom curriculum. Students have relatively little input into these
PSE curricular decisions and may be reduced to voting with their feet.
Governments control the training provided through labour-market
policy. As we saw above, policymakers’ decision-making is influenced by
the sometimes competing demands of production and social reproduction. Literacy education offers an interesting example of how this plays
out. Historically, improving literacy levels was viewed as a way to improve
the social, political, and economic lives of Canadians. Programming was
often provided at, or in association with, workplaces as well as through
non-workplace, adult education programs.34 This broad framing of literacy work reflected the fact that federal and provincial literacy policy
served multiple purposes that met the vocational and non-vocational
needs of workers and employers. As we’ll see in Chapter 5, since the 1980s,
literacy has increasingly been framed as a means to economic growth.
This has profoundly reshaped what kind of and how literacy is taught in
government-funded programs, which increasingly frame literacy as an
individual responsibility and make funding conditional on a program’s
return on investment.35
The content of community education is usually shaped by the values
and goals of the group providing the education. Yet, the programs for
which funding can be found and the outcomes required by funders
place important constraints on what training is available. For example,
24  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

the Alberta Workers’ Health Centre (which we’ll read about in Chapter
5) is a not-for-profit organization that uses theatre to educate teenagers
about workplace dangers and rights. Students whose employers steal their
wages or expose them to hazards can respond in a variety of ways, such as
taking no action, quitting, complaining to the government, or organizing
their fellow workers to take direct action against the employer. Some
funders will be more comfortable than others with training that discusses
direct-action options. This (dis)comfort may, in turn, constrain the content of the offered training. Overall, we see the importance of the golden
rule (they who hold the gold make the rules) in the scope of training
available to Canadians.
Benefits of Training

The final recurring question this book will examine is, Who benefits from
training, and how do they do so? At a high level, the answers are obvious:
workers get the KSAs required for jobs, employers get trained employees,
and governments get social, economic, and political stability. Nevertheless, when we look deeper, we see that the return-on-investment logic
that permeates discussions of training often focuses on shifting the cost
of training from one group of stakeholders to another. Interestingly, these
discussions often frame training in two competing and contradictory
ways. Framing is the process of shaping public discourse through the
selection, interpretation, and presentation of information. Sometimes
the beneficiary of training is said to be individuals, and other times the
beneficiary is said to be the public.
Framing the beneficiary of training as individual students and workers implies that training yields economic benefits primarily to workers.
As Box 1.4 reveals, additional formal education clearly benefits workers.
We’re less able to accurately identify and allocate the financial benefits
of other forms of labour-market training among workers, employers, the
state, or society. Nevertheless, framing individuals as the primary beneficiaries of training justifies off-loading training costs onto workers, by such
means as increasing post-secondary tuition or reducing the availability of
state-funded skills training for the unemployed. It also excuses employers’
declining investment in workplace training. Interestingly, while workers

Canada’s Training System in Outline 25
 25
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

may be “consumers” of training, they have limited ability to influence what
training is available: they can only opt in (if they can afford it) or opt out
of whatever training is offered.
Box 1.4  Return on Investment from Training
Growing interest in the return on investment (ROI) from training is
shaping what training occurs and who benefits. This trend warrants
discussion because what we know about who receives what kind of
benefit from training is fairly limited. It is useful to break down the ROI
research into benefits for individuals, firms, and society.
• Individual ROI: Researchers have repeatedly found additional
years of full-time study result in higher individual incomes. This
effect varies by field and appears to be more pronounced for
women than for men. There is also evidence that employer-paid
training positively affects income. That said, it is often difficult to
determine the net effect of training other than formal PSE. The
impact of training appears to deteriorate over time.36
• Firm ROI: Employers rarely measure their ROI on training,
likely due to the complexity and cost of such measures.37 The
few firm-level studies that exist are beset by methodological
problems, such as incomplete data and various forms of bias
and error, and thus don’t provide any good basis from which to
generalize.38 A 2013 Canadian study that examined training ROI
at the industry level found that twelve out of fourteen industries
saw training yield increases in productivity. Yet, at the same
time, only four of those industries saw a positive financial ROI
for training expenditures.39 What this finding highlights is that
increasing a firm’s productivity does not necessarily increase the
firm’s profitability. It may be that the direct and indirect costs of
training exceed the increased value generated by the training.
• Societal ROI: Training may benefit society as a whole by generating a social return. A social return is a gain experienced by the
whole economy. Measuring such returns is difficult. Again, there
is consensus that increasing the average initial level of schooling yields a positive social return, but the social return on other
forms of training is uncertain.40

26  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

Overall, it is very unclear what the ROI of training is. It is important to
note that training provides many different kinds of benefits, not all of
which have an easily quantifiable monetary dimension. Training can
positively affect employees’ attitudes, morale, and motivation. Training
may also increase organizational adaptability and employee retention,
and improve an organization’s reputation
Finally, training may positively affect society via a spillover effect.
For example, literacy training enables workers to participate in the
democratic process. And workers with skills that have clear vocational
application—such as spreadsheeting—may also employ those skills in
the management of their own lives.41

By contrast, framing the beneficiary of training as the broader public
assumes that training contributes to the economic growth of the nation
through the development of human capital. Human capital is said to be
the cumulative stock of KSAs, intelligence, experience, and judgment of
an individual or a population. Human capital theory asserts that human
capital comprises a key input into the production process and that its
utility can be maintained or increased through education and training.
We’ll look more at this theory in Chapters 2 and 4.
If the beneficiaries of training are all Canadians, then the cost of training should be borne by public funding. But where does public funding
come from? Public spending is mostly funded from various forms of
taxes.42 Most tax revenue comes from personal income tax (49 per cent)
and consumption taxes and duties (17 per cent). By contrast, corporate
taxes comprise about 14 per cent of tax revenue.43 In effect, this “public
good” framing of training facilitates and legitimizes the reduction in
training costs paid directly by employers and capitalists, shifting it onto
individuals through income and consumption taxes.
The transfer of production costs from employers to other groups
(often called “externalizing cost”) is widespread. For example, the workers’ compensation system in each province and territory was created in
order to provide stable, predictable, and immediate wage-loss benefits to
injured workers. Employers pay insurance premiums to fund the cost of
this system. There are good reasons to believe that, over time, employers

Canada’s Training System in Outline 27
 27
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

have shifted the cost of workers’ compensation onto workers in the form
of foregone wage increases.44 Other examples of employers externalizing production costs onto the public include polluting the environment
(instead of employers remediating or eliminating pollution) and benefitting from publicly funded health care.
It is interesting to note (as we’ll see in Chapter 4) the wide agreement
that Canadian employers spend little on training (compared to other countries) and that this spending is declining over time. Yet there is little public
demand for, or government effort to require, greater employer spending
on training. Giving employers a “pass” on providing adequate training
may reflect the widespread adoption of a neoliberal view of society.
Neoliberalism is a set of political and economic prescriptions that centre
on minimizing government regulations, programs, and expenditures. In
the resulting laissez-faire economy, the role of the state is to maintain order
and provide infrastructure and services only when the market cannot.
Workers are expected to earn their crust by finding work, and income
support is reduced. As the primary beneficiary of training, workers are
also expected to bear the cost of it.45
As we’ll see in Chapter 3, Canadian government training policies have
increasingly become focused on supply-side measures, wherein the state
seeks to fast-track workers into jobs through short-term training. This
approach sits in contrast with previous demand-side measures, such as
job-creation and economic-development programs. The shift towards
supply-side solutions (and neoliberalism more generally) has coincided
with an increasing concentration of income, education, and opportunities
among the wealthiest group of citizens. This, in turn, suggests that externalizing the cost of training onto individuals reinforces and intensifies
the existing class structure. This growing inequality in opportunities and
outcomes is justified by framing greater employer provision of training as
unrealistic because doing so would purportedly reduce employer competitiveness.
According to this view, the remedy prescribed for so-called skills
shortages—as evident in the vignette that opened this chapter—includes
the further vocationalization of primary, secondary, and post-secondary
education; unspecified efforts to reduce barriers to workers joining the
labour market; tax breaks for employers that provide training (i.e., publicly
28  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

subsidized workplace training); and increasing access to hyper-exploitable
foreign workers. Again, the costs of training are externalized onto workers
and taxpayers.

Conclusion
So what are we to make of widespread employer claims of skills and labour
shortages? Employers may well be facing difficulty hiring an adequate
number of appropriately trained staff. But why is that? Is it that workers
don’t want to, or can’t, get training in the occupations or skills employers
demand? Blaming workers for workplace problems is a recurring theme in
Canada—consider the welfare bum or the workers’ compensation malingerer (who is too lazy to work) or the careless worker (who caused his
or her own injury)—but not a particularly helpful one. As we’ll see in
Chapter 2, access to post-secondary education and apprenticeship training is often constrained—both by what opportunities are available and
by the cost of PSE. Of particular interest is that the lack of skilled trades
workers may be caused by employers failing to offer an adequate number
of apprenticeships.
As we’ll see in Chapter 3, labour shortages do occur in Canada, but they
tend to be geographically isolated and occupation specific. This reality sits
uneasily with media coverage of skills shortages. In addition to overstating the degree of labour shortage that exists, media coverage often fails
to differentiate between absolute shortages (a situation where there are
no qualified potential workers available) or relative shortages (a situation where there are no qualified workers prepared to work for the wages
and working conditions on offer). Employers improving workers’ wages
and working conditions can remedy relative labour shortages. But such
changes are contrary to employers’ economic interests. Consequently, we
see (as in the opening of this chapter) employers seeking greater public
funding and policy changes in order to externalize costs.
The notion that there are conflicting interests helps us to understand
why the training system appears fragmented and clumsy. As workers
and employers jostle in pursuit of their own interests, the state tries to
ensure both production and social reproduction. While this tension exists
throughout the training system, it is perhaps easiest to grasp in the context

Canada’s Training System in Outline 29
 29
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

of training that occurs in specific workplaces. The implementation of fads
like learning organizations and/or the meaning of terms like “skill” and
“competency” provide concrete examples of conflicting interests, as we’ll
see in Chapter 4. There is also conflict within groups. For example, professional regulatory organizations constrain which workers may practise
in some occupations.
The role of professional regulatory organizations in controlling both
workplace training and entry to the professions is picked up in Chapter
5, which examines community-based training, such as literacy training,
settlement services for immigrants, and union-sponsored training. While
this training can have labour market benefits, the training often stands at
some remove from the labour market. Further, community education
often develops skills and knowledge that allow workers to engage in political activity, which may be disruptive to capital’s interests. This discussion
of the emancipatory tradition of adult education helps bring out the differing interests of training stakeholders.
This book concludes in Chapter 6, which identifies clear patterns in
training (around access, control, and benefit) and the conflicted and
sometimes dysfunctional nature of the so-called training system. This
final chapter then considers the degree to which the seemingly ad hoc
nature of the training system can be understood as the product of different stakeholders seeking to advance their (often competing) interests. Of
specific interest is the role that training plays in the reproduction of labour
power as well as in stabilizing and replicating Canada’s class-based social
and economic system.

Notes
1  Quoted in Tencer, “Tech Jobs Will Boom in Canada.”
2  Information and Communications Technology Council, Digital Talent.
3  Arnason, “Farm Labour Shortfall Expected to Soar.”
4 Sears, Retooling the Mind Factory.
5  Grant, “Aligning Skills Development.”
6 Morgan, Images of Organization.
7  I was deeply pleased when I thought up this comparison. Sadly, it was not an
original thought, having been previously published in Cross, “Training vs.
Education.”

30  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

8  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Labour Market
Training,” Glossary of Statistical Terms.
9  Laliberte, “The ‘Grab-a-Hoe’ Indians.”
10  Vosko, “Precarious Employment.”
11 Yates, Naming the System.
12  Livingstone, “Starting with the Education-Jobs Gap.”
13  Broad and Hunter, “Work, Welfare, and the New Economy.”
14 Godard, Industrial Relations, the Economy and Society.
15  Drost and Hird, Introduction to the Canadian Labour Market.
16  Haan, Walsh, and Neis, “At the Crossroads.”
17  Basker, “Change at the Checkout.”
18  Preibisch, “BC-Grown.”
19  Merriam, Caffarella, and Baumgartner, Learning in Adulthood.
20  Wood, “Comparing Intergovernmental Institutions in Human Capital
Development.”
21  Haddow and Klassen, Partisanship, Globalization, and Canadian Labour
Market Policy.
22 McBride, Working? Employment Policy in Canada.
23  “List of Alberta Provincial Ministers,” Wikipedia.
24  Vosko, “Precarious Employment,” 4.
25  Lewchuk et al., It’s More than Poverty.
26 Mandel, Power and Money; Picchio, Social Reproduction.
27 Jarvis, The Sociology of Adult & Continuing Education.
28  Crowther, “Participation in Adult and Community Education.”
29  Canadian Council on Learning, Securing Prosperity through Canada’s
Human Infrastructure.
30 Turcotte, Women and Education; Cooke, Zeytinoglu, and Chowhan,
“Barriers to Training Access”; Status of Women Canada, Women in Canada
at a Glance.
31  Canadian Council on Learning, Securing Prosperity through Canada’s Human
Infrastructure.
32 Peters, Results of the 2003 Adult Education and Training Survey.
33  Merriam, Caffarella, and Baumgartner, Learning in Adulthood.
34 Morrison, Camps and Classrooms.
35  Smythe, “Ten Years of Adult Literacy Policy and Practice.”
36  Blundell et al., “Human Capital Investment.”
37  Bartel, “Measuring the Employer’s Return on Investments in Training.”
38  Tharenou, Saks, and Moore, “A Review and Critique of Research.”

Canada’s Training System in Outline 31
 31
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

39  Percival, Cozzarin, and Formaneck, “Return on Investment for Workplace
Training.”
40  Blundell et al., “Human Capital Investment.”
41  Aguinis and Kraiger, “Benefits of Training and Development.”
42  An exception to this rule is training funded through Part 2 benefits under
Employment Insurance. This training is funded by Employment Insurance
premiums, which are jointly paid by employers and workers. That said, the
majority of training funding is ultimately derived from federal taxation.
43  Department of Finance Canada, “Annual Financial Report.”
44 Barnetson, The Political Economy of Workplace Injury in Canada.
45 Sears, Retooling the Mind Factory.

32  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

C H A P T E R

T W O

Post-Secondary Education and the
Apprenticeship Training System

Learning Objectives
After reading this chapter, you will be able to:
➢➢ Explain the role of post-secondary education and apprenticeship
training in the Canadian training system.
➢➢ Describe how funding and governance arrangements affect access
to, control of, and benefit from training.
➢➢ Identify the hidden curriculum in K-12 and post-secondary
education.

As we saw in Chapter 1, many stakeholders criticize the Canadian training system for providing too few workers with the skills that employers
require. This critique is most often levelled at the post-secondary education system. For example, workers may be termed “overeducated but
underqualified,” thereby suggesting that there is a gap between formal
education and the skills required by work. Business leaders often use this
critique to advocate for greater business involvement in or control over
PSE. For example, according to Tom Jenkins, chair of OpenText Corporation and co-chair of the Business Council of Canada’s Business/Higher
Education Roundtable,
New technologies, disruptive innovation, demographic shifts and
intense global competition for talent are quickly raising skill requirements and changing expectations for new graduates. To ensure our
next generation can compete and succeed in the 21st century knowledge economy, we must take concrete steps towards a system in
which Canadian companies and institutions are more efficiently and
effectively connected.1

Proposals for improving PSE graduates’ ability to “compete and succeed” include mandatory work-experience programs for all college and
university students to “bridge the gap between the skills industries need
and what the workforce offers.”2 These recommendations frame PSE as
primarily labour-market training, thereby marginalizing its social and
cultural contributions. Government programs often reinforce this framing of PSE. For example, British Columbia’s EducationPlannerBC is an
online tool aimed at high school students. It integrates career planning,

 35
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

labour-market information, and the PSE application process and thereby
constructs PSE mainly as a pathway to employment.3
Employer assertions that PSE fails to provide students with useful
vocational skills helps reinforce the belief that there is a skills shortage
among Canadian workers. Although the notion that there is a significant
and persistent skills shortage is widely promoted by employers, this narrative is demonstrably false. While acknowledging that there are periodic
mismatches between the demand for and supply of workers with specific
skill sets (such as in the skilled trades), David Livingstone and his colleagues demonstrate that the employment-related knowledge and skills
of Canada’s labour force exceeds the capacity of employers to provide
jobs needing those skills.4 This phenomenon of underemployment—
wherein the KSAs of workers are underutilized in their jobs—reveals a
skills surplus. Underemployment is particularly pronounced for recent
immigrants, people of colour, and persons with disabilities.
There are several explanations for underemployment. On the supply
side, the number and proportion of workers with PSE has risen significantly over time. Worker participation in ongoing, informal education is
also high, although, as noted in Chapter 1, it is uneven. On the demand side,
employers have deskilled some jobs, including, for instance, by reducing
workers’ opportunity to make decisions about what to do and how to do
it. Not surprisingly, underemployment is less common among corporate executives, professionals, and managers and more common among
industrial and service workers. Employers’ tendency to use credentials
as selection tools for jobs (even though jobs may not require workers to
utilize all of the skills developed during PSE) may further contribute to
underemployment.5
As we consider questions of access, control, and benefit in
post-secondary education, it is important to keep in mind that the continued currency of the “overeducated but underqualified” narrative
serves the interests of employers in two ways. First, it suggests that the
declining economic fortunes of workers can be remedied through skill
training. Essentially, this narrative shifts blame for dissatisfying and precarious work onto workers and absolves employers of responsibility for
the consequences of their job-design decisions. This false attribution of
responsibility is a part of a broader “blame the worker” narrative that
36  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

appears in other contexts, such as workplace injury prevention. Second,
the skills-shortage narrative suggests that workers and taxpayers should
pay for additional training, because they will be the primary beneficiaries
of it. In reality, the employer’s prescription of “more training” will further flood an already loose labour market, thereby allowing employers to
decrease the wages of skilled workers.
This chapter begins with a brief examination of the role of primary
and secondary education in setting the stage for labour-market training.
We then turn our attention to the PSE system in Canada. Post-secondary
education is the largest component of the Canadian training system, with
approximately 2 million students enrolled annually. Among the most interesting trends evident in PSE is the continued influence of gender-based
occupational segregation on who takes which programs. A similar pattern
is evident in the Canadian apprenticeship system, which provides workplace training in skilled trades and occupations.

Primary and Secondary Education in Canada
Primary and secondary education (hereafter the “K-12 system”) is not
normally discussed as part of the Canadian training system. Yet, as we
saw in Chapter 1, employers often seek to influence the K-12 curriculum
(such as by demanding that computer training begin in kindergarten). One
government response to these kinds of demands is the introduction of
work-experience and apprenticeship programs that connect (usually high
school) students with the labour market. For example, apprenticeship
programs—such as the Ontario Youth Apprenticeship Program—make it
possible for students to complete high school while simultaneously working towards a trade certification.6
These programs aside, the K-12 system makes two main contributions to labour-market training. First, and most obviously, schools teach
(most) students basic reading, writing, and computational skills. These
skills are required for most jobs, and most subsequent labour-market
training programs assume basic numeracy and literacy. Second, and less
obviously, schools instill into students attitudes, ideas, habits, and expectations that employers find useful. This latter contribution to the training
system is often referred to as the hidden curriculum of schooling. The
term “hidden” can be a bit misleading. This process is not hidden in the
Post-Secondary Education and the Apprenticeship Training System 37
 37
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

sense that it is a secret conspiracy. Rather, this curriculum is hidden in
plain sight because it the accepted norm.7
Think back to your own K-12 experience. It likely entailed attending
a school five days per week for seven hours a day. In the classroom, the
teacher determined what happened, for how long, and what behaviour
was acceptable. Students were rewarded for carefully following directions and were punished for disrupting the work of others. Punishment
was applied via an amalgam of social pressure, loss of privileges, suspensions, and expulsion. Your performance was periodically assessed
using assignments and tests, although you may have noticed that some
students—perhaps those who were deemed “good” (by virtue of their
behaviour or because they belonged to a particular identity group)—
often received better grades than students who were “bad,” regardless
of their actual respective performances.
These structures and processes closely mirror those of a traditional
workplace. In this way, the school system teaches future workers that
their role is to be punctual, obedient, and diligent—characteristics that
most employers desire in workers. The K-12 system also teaches students to expect limited discretion in what they do during the day and
when and how they do it. Students learn that deviations from “the rules”
will result in punishment. Students also learn that who they are can
affect how they are treated and that their gender, heritage, and class can
affect what they can expect in life.8 The lengthy process of acculturation
that students face normalizes employers’ authority in the workplace,
including employers’ “right” to determine what training is required, who
should receive it, and how it should be delivered.

Post-Secondary Education in Canada
As noted in Chapter 1, Canada’s constitution vests authority over education in provincial and territorial governments. Each Canadian province
and territory operates a publicly funded post-secondary education
system. These public PSE institutions include colleges, universities, and
technical institutes as well as various specialized institutes, such as colleges
of art and design. Most provinces and territories also allow for (and in
some cases regulate) private PSE institutions. Some private institutions

38  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

are for-profit institutions that provide career training. Other private
institutions have a religious or cultural focus. Study at these institutions
typically results in the awarding of a credential. Box 2.1 outlines the most
commonly available PSE credentials.
Box 2.1  Post-Secondary Credentials
In English-speaking provinces and territories, students are able to
obtain a variety of PSE credentials. Although there is significant diversity among the provinces and territories, the following credentials are
commonly available:
• Certificates and Diplomas: These credentials normally require
one and two years (respectively) of full-time study to obtain, and
typically provide a basic understanding of a field or discipline,
often with a vocational focus.
• Baccalaureate (or bachelor’s) degrees: These “undergraduate” degrees typically require four years to obtain, although
three-year degrees are also available.
• Master’s degrees: These “graduate” degrees typically require one
to three years of additional years of study beyond the baccalaureate level to obtain.
• Doctoral degrees: These “postgraduate” degrees typically
require three or more additional years of study beyond the master’s level to obtain.
Most jurisdictions also offer apprenticeship training programs (see
below). Québec’s secondary and post-secondary system is significantly different from that of English Canada. Québec allows secondary
students to earn a variety of vocational credentials for which there are
no analogs in English Canada. Reflecting that secondary education is
shorter in Québec, entrance to the university system is normally mediated through Québec’s college system.

Public PSE institutions derive revenue from four main sources:
operating and capital grants provided by their provincial or territorial government, student tuition and fees, research-related grants, and

Post-Secondary Education and the Apprenticeship Training System 39
 39
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

various other income streams (including campus services and private
philanthropy). While each province and territory runs its own system, the
federal government provides a significant portion of funding through the
Canada Social Transfer. Overall, Canadian governments spend more than
$12 billion on PSE each year. Public funding accounts for approximately 52
per cent of PSE revenue, a percentage that has been in long-term decline.9
This decline in funding has been offset mostly by increases in student
tuition and fees.
While it can be difficult to make international comparisons due to
differences in PSE arrangements and terminology, among the sixteen
OECD countries to which Canada is most similar, Canada ranks second in
terms of the percentage of its gross domestic product (GDP) spent on PSE
institutions (behind only the United States). Canadian institutions receive
approximately 1.5 per cent of GDP as transfers from governments and 1.0
per cent of GDP from private sources (such as tuition fees), although there
are significant interprovincial differences in the proportion of public and
private funding.10
Post-secondary education is often subject to the blanket criticism that
it fails to provide training that leads to jobs (e.g., “If it is higher education,
why can’t you get hired?”). Setting aside the multiple aims of PSE, many
PSE credentials do have a strong labour-market orientation, specifically
aiming at preparing students for occupations. That said, as we’ll see in
Chapter 4, the right to practise some occupations is contingent upon
securing a licence from a professional regulatory organization.

Historical Development of PSE
Until the late nineteenth century, Canada’s post-secondary system was
dominated by private, church-sponsored colleges. Enrollments were
small, universities focused on educating political elites, and the relationships between provincial governments and individual institutions were
varied.11 In 1906, Ontario’s Flavelle Commission recommended a bicameral governance system at the University of Toronto: the government
would appoint a board of governors to manage the financial affairs of
the university while an academic body (today variously called an academic senate or general faculties council) would set academic policy. This

40  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

bicameral model of institutional governance was replicated as other provinces established and expanded universities.12
Following the Second World War, there was a significant expansion
of enrollments, fuelled first by returning veterans. During the 1960s,
most jurisdictions created new universities, and some jurisdictions supplemented existing technical institutes with colleges. Ontario opened
stand-alone colleges offering three-year technical programs, while
Alberta and British Columbia opened colleges offering vocational training and university transfer programs.13 As part of the Quiet Revolution,
Québec’s unique system emerged, driven in part by a desire to reduce
the influence of the Catholic Church over PSE. Colleges and technical
institutes often operated with less autonomy than universities, although
all PSE institutions were heavily dependent upon operating grants from
their respective provincial or territorial governments. Over time, the
distinctions between colleges and universities have started to blur in
some jurisdictions.
In addition to its public colleges, universities, and technical institutes,
Canada continues to have a variety of privately operated institutions. A
small number of colleges and universities are affiliated with a religious
denomination and may or may not receive public funding. There are also
over 1,300 regulated career colleges that provide vocational training
leading to a diploma or certificate to approximately 170,000 students per
year. These institutions often charge significantly higher rates of tuition
(due, in part, to the lack of public operating funds), offer compressed
programs (when compared with public colleges), and have a lower rate
of full-time employment among graduates.14 It is important to note that
state regulation is focused on financially protecting students (should the
institution suddenly close its doors) rather than on imposing any meaningful oversight over the quality, curriculum, or labour-market outcomes
of these programs.
Cost and Access to PSE

In 2014–15, there were slightly more than 2 million Canadians enrolled
in PSE (excluding apprentice programs). Many of these programs have
clear linkages to the labour market (see Table 2.1). Students from families

Post-Secondary Education and the Apprenticeship Training System 41
 41
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

with high socio-economic status (SES) are more likely to attend PSE
(specifically university) than students from families with middle and low
socio-economic status. The perceived cost of PSE appears to be a significant factor that limits some students’ plans.15 This suggests that tuition and
other costs are an important factor that controls access to PSE.
Table 2.1  PSE Students by Field of Study, 2014/15.
Field of study

Enrollment

Personal improvement and leisure

25,224

Education

99,474

Visual and performing arts, and communication
technologies

82,389

Humanities

308,139

Social and behaviour sciences and law

276,213

Business, management and public administration

377,931

Physical and life sciences and technologies

133,062

Mathematics, computer and information sciences
Architecture, engineering and related
technologies
Agriculture, natural resources and conservation
Health and related fields

66,207
216,066
29,397
251,874

Personal, protective and transportation services
Other instructional programs

42,900
146,061

Note. Approximately 56% of all PSE students were female. While gender
distribution by program broadly follows this average, there are a number of
notable exceptions as set out in Figure 2.1.
Source: Statistics Canada, “Post-Secondary Enrolments, by Program Type, Credential
Type, Classification of Instructional Programs, Primary Grouping (CIP_PG), Registration Status and Sex.”

42  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

Architecture, Engineering, and related technologies
80.4%

19.6%

Mathematics, Computer, and Information Sciences
74.4%

25.6%

Education
22.8%

77.2%

Health and Related Fields
26.2%

73.8%

Figure 2.1  Highly gendered fields of study. (Data from Statistics
Canada, “Post-Secondary Enrolments, by Program Type,
Credential Type, Classification of Instructional Programs, Primary
Grouping [CIP_PG], Registration Status and Sex.”)

These gendered patterns in PSE broadly mirror the gender distribution
in occupations. Gender-based occupational segregation has proven
surprisingly stable despite significant increases in female educational
achievement. For example, between 1991 and 2011, the percentage of
female university graduates (aged 24 to 35) working as nurses and teachers was stable at approximately 20 per cent. Occupational segregation
also appears more pronounced for workers who do not possess a university degree.16 As Box 2.2 shows, ethnicity and geography also affect
access to PSE.
Box 2.2  Indigenous Persons, PSE, and Geography
Indigenous peoples in Canada have faced a long history of systemic
racism and segregation. As a result, their levels of educational participation and attainment have lagged behind those of non-Indigenous
populations. Over time, PSE participation by people Indigenous to
Canada has increased significantly. And a number of institutions
explicitly focused on the needs of Indigenous populations have
developed, including Saskatchewan’s First Nations University, the University of Northern British Columbia, Manitoba’s University College of
the North, and Ontario’s Algoma College.17

Post-Secondary Education and the Apprenticeship Training System 43
 43
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

The 2011 National Household Survey (which used the term “Aboriginal identity”) found that 48.4 per cent of Canadians who reported an
Aboriginal identity also reported a PSE credential compared with 64.7
per cent of Canadians who self-reported as non-Aboriginal. The area
of greatest divergence in attainment was among university graduates.
Among those who identified as “Aboriginal,” 9.8 per cent held a university degree, while 26.5 per cent of non-”Aboriginal” Canadians reported
holding a university degree.18 Preliminary data analysis of the 2016
National Household Survey found a similar pattern.19
Geographical location appears to be a factor in Indigenous educational achievement. The highest levels of PSE achievement among
Indigenous people are reported among urban residents, then residents
of towns, rural residents, and, finally, Indigenous persons resident on
reserves.20 (A similar pattern emerges for non-Indigenous students,
with rural students being less likely than urban students to attend
post-secondary education.) Indigenous persons located on reserves or
in other isolated locations may have limited access to adequate high
school preparation.
There are a number of explanations for this pattern. Securing
adequate PSE preparation can entail leaving behind non-PSE-bound
peers and even students’ communities. Indigenous peoples in Canada
also face limited access to local PSE institutions, higher financial and
social costs, and limited opportunity in such communities for employment in jobs requiring PSE (particularly university degrees). Further,
Indigenous students may follow non-linear pathways through the
education system, prioritizing family and community obligations over
moving quickly from high school to PSE to a job.21

The cost of tuition, fees, and supplies affects who can access PSE. As
noted in Box 2.2, students without a local PSE institution (or whose local
institution does not offer the program they want) may also face costs associated with relocating. Over time, the cost of tuition in Canada has risen
significantly. For example, students in degree programs in 2016–17 paid
approximately 40 per cent more in tuition and compulsory fees than they
would have ten years earlier.22 The rapid escalation of tuition fees began in
the mid-1990s when the federal government reduced transfer payments to
provincial governments. Provincial governments responded by reducing
44  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

institutional operating grants.23 For example, Alberta reduced operating
grants to public PSE institutions by 21 per cent between 1994 and 1997.
Reducing public funding of PSE shifts the cost of the reproduction of
labour power from employers and taxpayers to students and their families
in the form of higher tuition fees.
Governments have sought to assist individuals to manage tuition costs
in three main ways. Federal registered educational savings plans (RESPs)
allow contributions made in the name of a minor to grow tax-deferred. The
federal government also partially matches RESP contributions. Nevertheless, only about half of parents have opened RESPs, perhaps because
many parents cannot afford to do so.24 Combined with differences in participation rates by SES, the limited uptake on RESPs suggests that tuition
reinforces the intergenerational transfer of advantage and disadvantage:
future workers whose parents are better off are more likely to be able to
access PSE, which, in turn, provides them with access to higher-paying
and more stable jobs.
Federal and provincial governments also operate various loan, scholarship, and bursary programs. Loans are sometimes framed as a way
for students to “invest” in themselves in order to achieve better occupational outcomes. Between 2009 and 2014, the total value of federal loans
owed rose from $12.3 billion to $15.7 billion.25 This data does not capture
the value of loans provided by provincial or territorial governments or
through private lenders. Students’ use of loans differ depending upon
their SES. Both Canadian and US research suggests that students whose
parents are in the highest income brackets are less likely than average to
access loans, presumably drawing on family resources to defray tuition
costs. Similarly, students whose parents are in the lowest income brackets
are also less likely than average to access loans, perhaps suggesting debt
aversion (at least for PSE costs). Middle-class students are the most likely
to take on debt.26
Workers can also temporarily withdraw money from their Registered
Retirement Savings Plans to fund full-time post-secondary education for
themselves or their spouse or partner through the Lifelong Learning Plan
(LLP). Such withdrawals are not considered income for tax purposes so
long as they are repaid over time.27 The very small amount of research on
LLP usage suggests very limited usage (<0.5 per cent of tax filers).28 While
Post-Secondary Education and the Apprenticeship Training System 45
 45
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

scholarships and bursaries are also a source of funding for post-secondary
education, Canada ranks as one of the least generous OECD countries in
terms of the overall dollar value of scholarships and bursaries available.29
On the surface, RESPs, LLPs, and student loans appear to ameliorate
an important barrier to PSE attendance by providing students from middle
and lower SES backgrounds with the opportunity to attend PSE. In this
way, RESPs, LLPs, and student loans seemingly legitimize the transfer of
PSE costs from taxpayers to individual students by maintaining the perception that ability (and not SES) is the key factor that determines PSE
participation. The notion that access to PSE is based on intellectual merit
sits uneasily with the fact that, despite the availability of RESPs, LLPs, and
student loans, students from lower SES backgrounds still attend university
at only half the rate of students from the highest SES background. This
pattern indicates that RESPs, LLPs, and student loans only partly address
the cost barriers. Legitimizing high tuition costs serves to reinforce the
intergenerational transfer of advantage and disadvantage.
Admission requirements also affect who can access post-secondary
education. Most PSE institutions have admission requirements, such as
completion of specific prerequisite courses. Some programs of study may
also have non-academic prerequisites (e.g., successful interview, prior
work experience, medical fitness, criminal record check). When there
are more applicants than spaces, an institution may prioritize applicants
based upon some criteria (such as prior grades). These criteria reinforce
the notion that access to PSE is based upon merit. It is worth considering
whether there are systemic factors (e.g., bias based on age, gender, ethnicity, and class) that might limit certain groups from obtaining required
prerequisites or influence how candidates are rated in more subjective
screening methods, such as interviews.
Curricular Control of PSE

Who controls what is taught in PSE is a complicated question because
control is exercised at several levels. Government and institutions jointly
determine the suite of courses and programs offered by a PSE institution. The criteria governments use when assessing institutional proposals
vary, but they broadly mirror those set out by British Columbia, including

46  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

whether a proposed program “meets criteria related to the institution’s
mandate and strategic plan, system consultation and coordination, labour
market need and student demand.”30
In some cases, governments have sought to influence the creation
or expansion of programs, ostensibly to better align programming with
labour market needs. For example, during the 1990s, Alberta made available additional funding to institutions, provided the funding was used to
expand enrollment in fields with (putatively) high labour-market demand.
Alberta also created a new credential (the applied bachelor’s degree),
which included a year of work experience. And the government sought
to increase industry input into program design and delivery, in part by
ensuring that employers numerically dominated institutional boards of
governors.31
The regulatory power of government gives it significant high-level
control over what is taught in PSE, especially given that governments
also appoint most of the members of institutional boards of governors.
This is not say that PSEs have no ability to act independently or advocate
for policies that are in their interests. Rather, it simply acknowledges that
the power of PSEs is, at least partly, circumscribed by the operation of
their governance structures and their reliance upon government largesse.
As noted above, governments have often used this power to try to align
PSE offerings with the needs of the labour market. Things are not entirely
one-sided, however. Faculty members at institutions also have significant
power to shape curriculum. As a group, faculty members tend to dominate academic decision-making (in academic senates or general faculties
councils), which includes establishing the focus, curriculum, and admission requirements for programs. Faculty members also have significant
individual control over what is taught in their classrooms. An important
limitation on that freedom can come from professional organizations that
regulate some occupations (see Box 2.3).
Box 2.3  Curricular Influence of Regulatory and Professional
Associations
Some occupations, such as nursing, are regulated in order to protect
the public. To practise, an individual must meet certain requirements

Post-Secondary Education and the Apprenticeship Training System 47
 47
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

set out by government-established Professional Regulatory Organizations (PROs). Each province and territory has its own set of PROs,
reflecting that regulation falls within provincial and territorial jurisdiction. PROs have many different names (e.g., the Law Society of Upper
Canada, the College and Association of Registered Nurses of Alberta).
The requirements that must be met to practise in a profession vary
and typically include a combination of education, experience, and
passing of an examination. PROs also typically investigate complaints
against registered professionals and may discipline members, including
through prohibiting them from practising.
These organizations have a powerful influence on the content of
training in some occupations. This influence stems from PROs’ ability
to require that graduates seeking to practise meet certain requirements (e.g., passing specific tests of knowledge). That instructors
are (and often must be) members of the PRO in their field is another
source of influence over curriculum.
Other occupations have professional associations that offer
non-mandatory accreditation. For example, there are territorial and
provincial associations that offer accreditation for human resource
practitioners. The Chartered Professionals in Human Resources (CPHR)
designation is awarded to applicants who have a degree and adequate
experience and who can pass an exam (with each phase of the
accreditation process involving a hefty fee paid to the association).
Non-regulated professional associations can seek to influence
curriculum in different ways than PROs. For example, most Canadian
human resource associations will offer to waive the examination for
graduates of degree programs who meet certain criteria. This benefit,
coupled with the potential reputational risk of not being accredited by
a human resource association, may pressure institutions to alter their
curriculum.
An interesting question about non-regulated professional associations is what value they provide. While these associations often assert
they are protecting the public interest, the reluctance of the government to make human resources a regulated profession suggests that
there is little public risk associated with HR practices.
The designations offered by these associations may provide
employers with a potentially useful applicant screening tool. Yet
the costs associated with gaining accreditation constrain the labour

48  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

supply, thereby increasing wages. Whether employers will see this
additional cost as beneficial is an open question.

The Benefits of Post-Secondary Education
The PSE system provides a number of benefits to different stakeholders.
Workers with post-secondary education attain higher wages than those
who do not complete PSE. Among PSE graduates, university graduates
receive returns of 11.5 per cent (men) and 14.1 per cent (women) on every
dollar they invest in PSE.32 Post-secondary graduates are also more likely
to work full time and less likely to be unemployed, and these benefits
increase as workers’ level of PSE increases.33 These effects vary by jurisdiction and other factors. For example, Indigenous people in Canada earn
less than non-Indigenous people with the same qualifications.34
Post-secondary education is also associated with better health outcomes, likely because level of education is highly correlated with other
employment factors (e.g., income, employment security, and working
conditions) that contribute to health.35 Together, these positive outcomes of PSE bolster the narrative that training is workers’ responsibility
(because they are the main beneficiaries), thereby excusing employers’
limited investment in training. Making individuals responsible for their
own training is consistent with human capital theory as set out in Box 2.4.
Box 2.4  Human Capital Theory
Human capital theory asserts a relationship between labour-market
training and national economic performance. Essentially, the KSAs
of the workforce are said to represent a form of capital (human) that
can be used by employers to create goods and services. Education
and training increase the value that can be realized from this human
capital.36
The idea that increasing education levels will increase national
economic performance is widely accepted. Yet it sits uneasily with the
finding by Livingstone and his colleagues mentioned above. Specifically, if a significant portion of the workforce is already overqualified for
the jobs that they hold, will additional education yield any benefit to
them or the economy?

Post-Secondary Education and the Apprenticeship Training System 49
 49
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Paul Bouchard poses a number of difficult questions about human
capital theory. For example, how can workers invest in education when
businesses are unable to accurately predict skill demands or shortages?
How will more training be useful in offsetting jobs lost to offshoring or
automation? And, as we’ll see below, what good is training if other factors, such as gender and racial discrimination, create insurmountable
barriers to entry into the workforce for many workers?37
Perhaps the key reason that human capital theory has found such
a ready audience among employers and policy-makers is that it serves
an important legitimation function. Specifically, human capital theory
creates the perception (among workers) that prosperity is just around
the corner (if people could only get “enough” of the “right” skills). A
corollary of this view is that the responsibility for any failure to obtain
prosperity lies with the individual workers.
Further, human capital theory creates an environment of competition over jobs in which individuals pay for the opportunity to become
the most skilled and the most likely to be hired, even in the face of
significant unemployment and underemployment among the highly
skilled. This keeps skill levels high and wage levels comparatively low, a
scenario that benefits employers, rather than workers.

The most obvious benefit of PSE for employers is that they have access to
an educated workforce at relatively low cost (to the employers). Among
similar OECD countries, Canada has the highest proportion of its labour
force with a PSE credential, reflecting in part its extensive college system
as well as its immigration policies.38 A second benefit of PSE is the maintenance of an oversupply of highly skilled workers. As noted above, the
high level of underemployment among Canadian workers suggests that
employers are not using the KSAs of the workforce. In this situation, maintaining the number of PSE graduates sustains a loose labour market. As we
saw in Chapter 1, this puts downward pressure on wages in oversupplied
occupations.
The state benefits from PSE in a number of ways. Post-secondary
education is politically beneficial because institutions are sources of both
regional prestige and increased economic activity. For example, Canada’s
public colleges and universities reported total revenue of $37.4 billion in

50  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

2009, most of which was spent locally on employee salaries.39 The state
also benefits from PSE because it contributes to production. Employers
require a trained workforce in order to operate and, historically, the state
has delivered much of that training through the K-12 and PSE systems.
Post-secondary education also contributes to social reproduction.
For example, PSE reinforces the notion that jobs are allocated based
upon candidates’ specific credentials rather than immutable personal
characteristics or personal connections. This belief reinforces the idea
that Canadian society is a meritocracy. This belief often rubs up against
reality. For example, the significant gender segregation evident in some
fields seems to cry out for explanation. One possible (albeit incorrect)
explanation is that women are bad at math and men are bad at caring for
others, and thus gender segregation is the outcome of merit-based hiring.
A more plausible explanation is that there is some other factor (such as
gender-based socialization and discrimination) at play.
Box 2.5  Why Does PSE Get the Largest Portion of the Pie?
The $12 billion that governments spend on post-secondary education each year represents Canada’s single largest investment in
labour-market training. There are a number of explanations for why
PSE gets the largest portion of the labour-market training pie. Young
adults transitioning from high school to the workforce represent the
largest group in society in need of labour-market training. This creates
significant demand for PSE, which governments have reinforced over
time by increasing access to it.
Further, those students most likely to enroll in PSE typically come
from economically better off (and thus politically more powerful) families. In this way, PSE replicates the existing class structure in a way that
is comfortable to politicians (e.g., PSE instructors and students act and
talk like politicians because they typically come from the same class of
society). These factors (size and power) help explain why public spending on PSE is so relatively large.
The economic impact of PSE also helps to create a feedback loop
to ensure PSE continues to receive the lion’s share of labour-market
training funds. As noted above, post-secondary institutions are often
important employers in local communities. And some institutions
go out of their way to publicize their role in ensuring that there is an
Post-Secondary Education and the Apprenticeship Training System 51
 51
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

adequate supply of trained workers available. For example, the Northern Alberta Institute of Technology (NAIT) brands itself as “Essential to
Alberta,” noting that it is the largest apprenticeship trainer in Canada,
98 per cent of employers would hire a NAIT graduate again, and
90 per cent of NAIT graduates have jobs soon after they finish their
exams.40 Politicians, who are usually graduates of PSE, are predisposed
to accepting this line of argument because it accords with their own
experiences.
Post-secondary institutions are also easier for governments to hold
to account for money granted to them than other training providers.
Unlike grants to private employers (such as the Canada Job Grant that
we’ll read about in Chapter 3), post-secondary funding can more easily
be linked to achievement of certain outcomes—and when those outcomes are not met, sanctions can be imposed. This element of control
is highly appealing to politicians who must navigate claims that public
spending is wasteful. Together, these factors combine to make PSE an
attractive way for governments to spend public labour-market training
dollars.

The idea that society remains profoundly unjust for female workers is
socially destabilizing: workers are less likely to support a system that distributes resources and rewards in a way that appears to be unfair. The idea
that merit drives this distribution is more palatable than the notion that
heritage, class, and gender do. Indeed, much of the structure of PSE—
including admission criteria and competitive admission processes, the
awarding and curving of grades, and high drop-out rates—reinforces the
notion that PSE (and, more broadly, society) is a meritocracy. Reinforcing
the view that society is a meritocracy may be the central lesson in the
hidden curriculum of PSE.

The Apprenticeship System in Canada
Employers have routinely raised concerns about the availability of an
adequate pool of skilled trades workers. Skilled trades workers (plumbers,
chefs, electricians, etc.) are produced by Canada’s apprenticeship system.
Historically, governments have also used immigration as a way to increase
the supply of skilled tradespeople. This history of using immigration as a
52  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

substitute for labour-market training is examined in Box 2.5 below. Current approaches to labour migration are discussed in Chapters 3 and 5.
An apprenticeship is a multi-year form of labour-market training that
relies heavily on workplace training, supplemented by four to eight weeks
of annual classroom instruction. An apprenticeship entails a fixed-term
contract between an employer and an apprentice, wherein the employer
provides wages and training in exchange for the apprentice’s labour. At
the end of an apprenticeship, a worker may choose to take exams for
their trade qualification (TQ) and, if successful, is often referred to as a
“journeyperson” (or, historically, a “journeyman”).41
In keeping with the constitutional division of powers discussed in
Chapter 1, each province and territory runs its own apprenticeship training system. Canada-wide, there are approximately 200 apprenticeable
trades, although this number varies by jurisdiction. About three-quarters
of these trades are found in the construction, manufacturing, and resource
industries. Generally speaking, a government-appointed apprenticeship
board provides advice to the government on apprenticeship matters. The
apprenticeship board may also influence the membership of trade- or
sector-specific advisory committees that help establish the curriculum
of each trade or occupation.
As part of each provincial or territorial apprenticeship system, the
government will designate certain trades and occupations as either
compulsory or optional certification trades. Compulsory trades or
occupations are those where employment is restricted to registered
apprentices and journeypersons. By contrast, optional certification trades
or occupations may be performed by anyone whom an employer deems
to be competent to perform the work. Interprovincial labour mobility
is aided by the Red Seal program, which allows qualified trades people
in more than fifty trades to have their trade qualifications recognized in
other provinces and territories, provided they pass examinations. Figure
2.2 illustrates the percentage of apprentices in each jurisdiction.
Apprenticeships are most common in the skilled trades (e.g., plumbing, electrical work) but also exist in food and service trades. In 2015
(the most recent year for which data is available), there were 453,543
registered apprentices in Canada. Table 2.2 outlines the distribution of
apprentices by trade.
Post-Secondary Education and the Apprenticeship Training System 53
 53
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

0.1%

0.03%

0.1%

1.7%

11.8%
20.1%

3.2%
24.7%

0.3%

32.3%
2.9%

1.6%

1.2%

Figure 2.2  Percentage of apprentices by jurisdiction, 2015. (Data
from Statistics Canada, “Registered Apprenticeship Training, by Sex
and by Province and Territory.”)

Table 2.2  Apprentices by trade, 2015.
Automotive service

43,194

Carpenters

45,276

Community and social service workers

3,543

Construction workers (other)

3,945

Early childhood educators and assistants

7,716

Electricians

72,912

Electronics and instrumentation

7,263

Exterior finishing

13,602

54  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

Food service

22,200

Hairstylists and estheticians

17,550

Heavy duty equipment mechanics

15,648

Heavy equipment and crane operators

14,337

Interior finishing

18,735

Landscape and horticulture technicians and specialists

4,938

Machinists

9,582

Metal workers (other)

12,777

Millwrights

13,035

Oil and gas well drillers, servicers, testers and related
workers
Plumbers, pipefitters and steamfitters

3,681
46,500

Refrigeration and air conditioning mechanics

8,862

Sheet metal workers

8,451

Stationary engineers and power plant operators

4,467

User support technicians

16,269

Welders

19,998

Other major trade groups

19,071

Source: Statistics Canada, “Registered Apprenticeship Training, Registrations, by
Age Groups, Sex and Major Trade Groups.”

Approximately 46 per cent of apprentices were registered in only four
trades, training as plumbers/pipefitters, electricians, carpenters, and automotive service technicians. Women represent 13.5 per cent of all registered
apprentices. New apprenticeship registrations and completions generally
rose between 2000 and 2013, although new registrations dropped slightly
during the 2008 recession. Yet, over time, the number of completers who
were issued trade qualifications remained static.42
Box 2.6  Recruiting Skilled Workers through Immigration
Training is one way that Canada has met its need for workers with
specific skills. A second strategy has been to seek out skilled workers
in other countries. Until the 1930s, Canada’s immigration policy sought
Post-Secondary Education and the Apprenticeship Training System 55
 55
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

to attract farmers, farm workers, and female domestic servants of
European ancestry. As Canadian unemployment rose during the early
1930s, the federal government sharply curtailed immigration. After
the Second World War, the government encouraged a resumption of
immigration (mostly from Europe), with the intention of expanding the
population and domestic economy.
A recurring tension in immigration policy has been between the government’s use of immigration to generate short-term “fixes” to address
specific labour-market shortages (historically, the goal of the Department of Labour) and the government’s longer-term priorities, such as
family reunification and the expansion of Canada’s population (historically, the goal of the Department of Immigration and Citizenship).
These departments were amalgamated in 1966 and, in theory,
addressing domestic labour-market pressures became the
pre-eminent goal. Consequently, beginning in 1967, immigration
decisions were based upon a “point” system that assessed individual’s
characteristics, such as age, language skills, education, and skill.43
Despite this policy shift, recurring labour shortages continued.
As we’ll see in Chapter 3, Canada also began recruiting seasonal
migrant workers at this time. Migrant workers reside in Canada on
a temporary basis in order to meet specific labour-market needs,
although some migrant workers have been granted a pathway to
become permanent residents. These programs (which initially focused
on bringing in migrant agricultural workers from Mexico and Caribbean countries) were significantly expanded in the 1990s through the
labour-mobility provisions of various free trade agreements as well as
through policy change in the early 2000s.

Access to Apprenticeship
Employers exert almost complete control over access to the apprenticeship system. Would-be apprentices must secure a job with an employer
who is prepared to both provide on-the-job training and release the
apprentice for periodic classroom study. Apprenticeship enrollments rise
and fall with the employment rate. During an economic boom, employers
expand operations and will offer employment to apprentices. During a
bust, apprentices may be unable to secure apprenticeships, resulting in
high dropout rates. What this suggests is that the number of apprentices
56  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

and, ultimately, the number of trade qualification holders are largely determined by employers’ (un)willingness to take on apprentices, rather than
by the supply of potential apprentices.44
This boom-and-bust cycle of apprenticeship opportunities also suggests that employers are directly responsible for any shortage of skilled
trades people. Even during a boom, only about 19 per cent of employers
that hire workers in designated trades and occupations bother to train
apprentices.45 That employers are responsible for the shortage of journeypersons and apprentices sits uneasily with the usual “skills shortage”
recommendations of employers, who demand governments do more
to channel young people into trades and, in the meantime, increase the
supply of skilled foreign workers. No amount of recruiting among high
school students will affect the supply of tradespeople if employers collectively offer too few apprenticeship opportunities.
Employers also constrain women’s access to apprenticeship. As noted
above, only 13.5 per cent of registered apprentices in Canada are female,
ranging from 2 per cent in Nunavut to 24 per cent in Ontario. As illustrated
in figure 2.3, there is significant occupational segregation by gender in
the trades. While there are a number of potential explanations for low
female participation and gender segmentation, the direct and indirect
behaviour of employers appears to be key. Female apprentices are much
more likely than male apprentices to report discrimination by employers
when seeking out a sponsor for their apprenticeships. Among those who
completed their apprenticeship, 13 per cent of women (versus 1.3 per cent
of men) reported hiring discrimination. Among female apprentices who
had decided not to complete their apprenticeship, reports of discrimination are almost double that number.46
Female apprentices also report high levels of on-the-job harassment,
a lack of facilities for women, and schedules and work practices that
are more difficult for women to manage than for men—all factors that
are within the control of employers.47 While we’ll return to the issue of
gender-based discrimination in industries such as construction in Chapter
6, this evidence suggests that employer behaviours (and the behaviours
that employers tolerate) profoundly shape women’s access to apprenticeship training.

Post-Secondary Education and the Apprenticeship Training System 57
 57
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Carpentry
3.4%

96.6%

Plumbing/Pipefitting
97.2%

2.8%

Early Childhood Education
6.8%

93.2%

Hairstylists and Estheticians
11.2%

88.8%

Figure 2.3  Occupational segregation by gender in the trades.
(Data from Statistics Canada, “Registered Apprenticeship Training,
Registrations, by Age Groups, Sex and Major Trade Groups.”)

Curriculum Control of and Benefit from Apprenticeship

Employers exercise significant curricular control in apprenticeship systems. Apprentices spend between 85 and 90 per cent of their time in the
workplace, and employers largely determine what on-the-job training
they receive. Employers also sit on various committees that provide advice
about (or determine) skill and competency standards for certification,
course outlines, and what training is recognized towards certification.
While there are other stakeholders in the system, employers are generally
the most numerous and, combined with delivering on-the-job training,
the most influential. This influence may reflect the most significant direct
investment made by employers who train apprentices.
Not surprisingly, employers are also the greatest beneficiaries of the
apprenticeship system, which provides employers with workers who have
the KSAs that employers deem to be important. The low apprenticeship
participation rate among employers suggests that there is a significant
free-rider problem, whereby only one-fifth of firms carry much of the cost
of training the journeypersons that all employers eventually hire. Workers
also benefit from the apprenticeship system, which typically yield reasonably well-paying jobs. That said, there is a significant gendered effect.
Relatively few women enroll in and complete apprenticeships. Those
women who do participate in the apprenticeship system are clustered in

58  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

the lowest-paid occupations and trades (e.g., hair styling, food services,
child care).
Interestingly, older workers with prior labour-market experience
are increasingly the beneficiaries of apprenticeships. In 2013, 53 per
cent of new apprentices were over the age of 25, and the proportion of
middle-aged apprentices is growing rapidly.48 The tendency of workers to
enroll as apprentices later in their careers suggests that employer efforts
to attract younger apprentices through work-experience programs in the
K-12 sector may not be effective. Given the high rate of injury to apprentices in K-12 apprenticeship programs, limited apprenticeship uptake
among K-12 students may be a positive outcome.49

Conclusion
Almost 2.5 million Canadians are enrolled in either a PSE program or
an apprenticeship at any one time. For many of these learners, such a
program will be the first and most significant instance of labour-market
training in their working lives. The most obvious outcome of such training
is an enhanced ability to secure well-paying and stable jobs (although that
isn’t the outcome for every PSE graduate or journeyperson). This benefit
is often used to justify high and escalating tuition costs—a cost-shifting
policy that benefits employers and the state.
An important consequence of high tuition costs is uneven access
to PSE. Despite state efforts to help workers and their families afford
PSE, workers from lower SES families are less likely to enroll in PSE. A
second issue around access is gender segregation by programs, which
appears to replicate the gendered occupational segregation in the workforce. This is particularly pronounced in apprenticeships, where there
are few women overall and these women are clustered in the lowest-paid
trades. While employers continue to bemoan the existence of a skills
shortage (particularly in the skilled trades), it is important to recognize
that this skills-shortage narrative is false in two ways. First, evidence of
underemployment suggests that there is, in fact, a surplus of skills in the
workforce. And the shortage is actually found in jobs that allow workers
to use the skills they possess. Second, where there may be sector-specific
shortages (e.g., in the apprenticeable trades), the shortages often are the
result of employers failing to do their part in training (e.g., hire apprentices).
Post-Secondary Education and the Apprenticeship Training System 59
 59
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

The PSE and apprenticeship systems play a key role in the reproduction of labour power. In addition to teaching KSAs, there is a hidden
curriculum in education systems. At the K-12 level, the hidden curriculum centres on teaching workers to be docile, obedient, and punctual,
deferring to authority in all things. In PSE and apprenticeship, the hidden
curriculum centres on perpetuating the myth that society is a meritocracy,
wherein skill and hard work determine reward. While skill and hard work
certainly play a role, emphasizing merit ignores that identity factors (age,
gender, heritage, socio-economic status) often shape the options workers
have and their success in the workplace.

Notes
1  Business Council of Canada. “Every University and College Student Should
Have Access to Work-Integrated Learning.”
2  Ballantyne, “Move to Mandatory Work Experience for Ontario Students
Requires Buy-in from Employers, Increased Resources for Schools.”
3  EducationPlannerBC, “Plan. Search. Apply.”
4 Livingstone, Education & Jobs.
5  Livingstone and Scholtz, “Contradictions of Labour Processes and Workers’
Use of Skills in Advanced Capitalist Economies.”
6 Taylor, Vocational Education in Canada.
7  Vallance, “Hiding the Hidden Curriculum.”
8  Anyon, “Social Class and the Hidden Curriculum of Work.”
9  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Education at a
Glance 2016.
10  Lalonde and McKean, Canada’s Post-Secondary Education Performance.
11  Neatby, “The Historical Perspective.”
12  Jones, “An Introduction to Higher Education in Canada.”
13  Dennison and Gallagher, Canada’s Community Colleges.
14  Martin and MacLaine, The Role and Value of Private Career Colleges in
Canada.
15  Looker and Lowe, “Post-Secondary Access and Student Financial Aid in
Canada.”
16  Uppal and LaRochelle-Côté, “Changes in the Occupational Profile of Young
Men and Women in Canada.”
17  Jones, “An Introduction to Higher Education in Canada.”
18  Statistics Canada, “The Educational Attainment of Aboriginal Peoples in
Canada.”
60  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

19  Statistics Canada, “Education in Canada.”
20 Mendelson, Aboriginal Peoples and Post-Secondary Education in Canada.
21  Taylor and Steinhauer, “Evolving Constraints and Life ‘Choices.’”
22  Statistics Canada, “Tuition Fees for Degree Programs, 2016/17.”
23  Jones, “An Introduction to Higher Education in Canada.”
24  Marr, “The Tax-free Account that Canadian Parents Forgot About.”
25  Employment and Social Development Canada, “Statistical Review.”
26  Houle, “Disparities in Debt”; Tandem Social Research Consulting,
Literature Review of Postsecondary Affordability in Canada.
27  Canada Revenue Agency, “Lifelong Learning Plan.”
28  Statistics Canada, “Canada’s Retirement Income Programs.”
29  Lalonde and McKean, Canada’s Post-Secondary Education Performance.
30  Government of British Columbia, “New Degree Programs.”
31  Barnetson and Boberg, “Resource Allocation and Public Policy in Alberta’s
Postsecondary System.”
32  Moussaly-Segieh and Vaillancourt, “Extra Earning Power.”
33  Statistics Canada, “Labour Force Survey Estimates by Employment, Sex and
Age Group.”
34  Pendakur and Pendakur, “Aboriginal Income Disparity in Canada.”
35  Mikkonen and Raphael, “Social Determinants of Health: The Canadian
Facts.”
36  Bouchard, “Training and Work: Some Myths about Human Capital Theory.”
37 Ibid.
38  Lalonde and McKean, Canada’s Post-Secondary Education Performance.
39  Grant, “The Economic Impact of Post-secondary Education in Canada.”
40  Northern Alberta Institute of Technology, “We Are Essential.”
41  Sharpe and Gibson, “The Apprenticeship System in Canada.”
42  Canadian Apprenticeship Training Forum, “Apprenticeship in Canada: 2016
Report.”
43  Green and Green, “The Economic Goals of Canada’s Immigration Policy.”
44  Sharpe and Gibson, “The Apprenticeship System in Canada.”
45  Canadian Apprenticeship Training Forum, “Apprenticeship in Canada: 2016
Report.”
46  Arrowsmith, “Apprenticeship Analysis: Women and Apprenticeship in
Canada.”
47  Laryea and Medu, “National Apprenticeship Survey 2007.”
48  Canadian Apprenticeship Training Forum, “Apprenticeship in Canada: 2016
Report.”
49  Raykov and Taylor, “Health and Safety for Canadian Youth in Trades.”

Post-Secondary Education and the Apprenticeship Training System 61
 61
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

C H A P T E R

T H R E E

Government Training and
Immigration Policy

Learning Objectives
After reading this chapter, you will be able to:
➢➢ Identify the main programs and policies that governments have
enacted to ensure Canada has an adequately skilled labour force.
➢➢ Evaluate the effectiveness of these programs in terms of access to,
control of, and benefit from training.
➢➢ Differentiate active and passive labour-market policies and
describe the effects of active labour-market policies.

In addition to funding and operating the PSE and apprenticeship systems, Canadian governments also provide significant labour-market
training aimed at the unemployed and underemployed through various
labour-market policies and programs. In 2013, the federal government
announced the Canada Job Grant (CJG). The CJG allowed employers to apply for up to $10,000 in government matching funds (at a 1:2
employer-to-government ratio) to help pay for labour-market training.
The federal government covered its CJG costs by reducing other training
funding that it provided to the provinces and territories. Then-employment
minister Jason Kenney justified this very sudden change in funding by
saying,
There are some good provincial programs, but there are also many
that just don’t lead to jobs. The whole point of the job grant is it
will involve employers in selecting employees who they believe will
have the propensity to work, getting them specific training, and the
employers offer them a job at the end of it.1

As we’ll see below, the Canada Job Grant did give employers control over
who got what kind of training. But it was completely unsuccessful in getting unemployed Canadians training to help them attach to the labour
market. Instead, the CJG mostly funded training for men possessing PSE
credentials who already had high-skill jobs. The CJG was the centrepiece
of the Canada Job Fund (CJF), which was one of the three main federal
funding streams for labour-market training. The other two funding streams
focused on Employment Insurance recipients and Indigenous peoples.
Provincial and territorial governments deliver most of the labour-market

 65
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

training funded by these programs in addition to other provincially or
territorially funded training.
As we’ll see below, there has been a significant shift in labour-market
training policy over time. This change flows from the pronounced shift
in government labour-market policy that began in the 1980s. Following
the Second World War, Western governments generally pursued a policy
of full employment. To maintain full employment, governments utilized
demand-side measures to stimulate employment, such as job-creation and
economic-development initiatives and the expansion of statutory employment rights. By the 1980s, Canadian governments had largely abandoned
the goal of full employment. Consequently, government labour-market
policy has shifted from demand-side to supply-side measures.2 Supply-side
measures emphasize training to ensure there is an adequate supply of
appropriately skilled workers available to employers.
This neoliberal policy shift is often discussed in terms of government deregulation. Yet what has actually happened is that governments
have just changed the goal(s) of their regulatory activity. This process of
re-regulation means that policies and programs that used to be designed
to meet the needs of workers have given way to programs focused on
meeting the needs of employers (or “the market”). For example, the goals
of Alberta Works are to
• increase opportunities for Albertans to make successful transitions
from school to work, unemployment to employment, and from one
career path to another, and
• increase the capacity of Albertans to respond to changing skills,
knowledge, and abilities required by the economy.3
Such programs are also designed to change the behaviour of workers
in ways that align with the interests of employers. As noted in Chapter 1,
the profit imperative of capitalism means that a key employer interest is
minimizing labour costs. Government-funded training directly reduces
employers’ training costs. And income-replacement schemes (e.g.,
Employment Insurance, social assistance) that pressurize workers to take
whatever job is available increase the supply of workers. A larger pool
of workers reduces workers’ labour-market power and, thereby, lowers
wage costs.
66  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

The federal government also uses immigration and trade policy to
influence the size and skill level of Canada’s workforce. As noted in Chapter 2, Canada has a long tradition of seeking to meet employers’ demands
for workers through immigration and, more recently, temporary migrant
workers. Migrant workers may enter Canada on work permits or under
the labour-mobility provisions of various “free trade” agreements Canada
has signed with other countries. Some critics contend that immigration
policy is being used as a substitute to labour-market training and to flood
the labour market to reduce wages. Others note that the mechanisms of
these programs increasingly shift control over immigration to employers.
Examining government training and immigration policy together provides
an opportunity to better understand how the state manages the conflicting
interests of labour and capital and the implications this has for access,
control, and benefit.

Employment Insurance
The shared constitutional jurisdiction for labour-market training means
that both the federal and provincial/territorial governments formulate
labour-market training policy and deliver programs. The most significant
federal intervention in labour-market policy prior to 1945 was the creation
of the Unemployment Insurance (UI) system. UI (later renamed Employment Insurance) was designed to provide income support to families
during unemployment and ensure that communities were not destroyed
by job losses due to industrial change. It also sustained communities that
were dependent upon seasonal employment (e.g., fishing, logging).4
At present, Employment Insurance (EI) is funded by mandatory contributions from both employers and workers. The EI system provides
two main types of benefits. Most Canadians are familiar with “Part 1” EI
benefits, which are financial payments to formerly employed workers
who are without jobs. In 2016, financial support was calculated as 55 per
cent of the first $50,800 of an employee’s prior insurable earnings. This
yielded a maximum benefit of $537 per week. The duration of benefits and
the minimum numbers of weeks of employment required to qualify for
benefits varies by region, based upon the unemployment rate.5

Government Training and Immigration Policy 67
 67
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Relatively few Canadians are aware of “Part 2” EI benefits (called
Employment Benefits and Support Measures), which include funding for
training to enhance employability. Training funded under Part 2 benefits
typically must have a clear link to increasing an EI claimant’s employability
(i.e., training must yield job-specific skills that are in demand). Further,
EI claims have a maximum duration of fifty-two weeks.6 These criteria
generally preclude funding students to attend PSE programs, although
there are exceptions—such as claimants who receive EI financial benefits
while self-funding short PSE programs.
Provincial and territorial governments administer over $2 billion in
federal Part 2 training benefits under the authority of Labour Market
Development Agreements (LMDAs).7 For example, Employment
Ontario is a part of the Ontario Ministry of Advanced Education and Skills
Development. It administered approximately $1 billion in federal and
provincial funding in 2014–15 to provide and/or fund services for 1 million Ontarians, including skills-training, career-planning, and job-search
programs. Employment Ontario also administers the Canada-Ontario Job
Grant (see below), which partly funds employer-driven training.
Canada’s current EI arrangement began to take shape in 1985. The
federal Conservative government implemented the Canada Jobs Strategy (CJS), whereby funds (mostly in the form of a wage subsidy) were
provided to employers that offered work experience with a training
component (however limited). The key outcome of the CJS was cheap
labour for employers.8 Overall, federal spending on training fell under the
CJS, and the quality of training appeared to deteriorate. In 1989, the federal government implemented the Labour Force Development Strategy
(LFDS). The LFDS made it harder for workers to access EI benefits and
then used half of the savings to fund proactive training measures largely
directed by business interests and intended to help the unemployed adapt
to the jobs available to them.9
Canada’s current EI arrangement emerged in 1996. During this
time, many OECD governments were shifting from so-called passive
labour-market interventions to active labour-market policies. Passive
labour-market interventions protect individuals, employers, and communities from the vagaries of the labour market, particularly unemployment,
through income-replacement programs. Benefit entitlement is usually
68  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

based on current or past attachment to the labour market, and these
programs make few demands upon recipients. By contrast, active
labour-market policies (ALMPs) encourage or require action by individuals, employers, and communities, such as participation in training
programs or job-search activities.10
In theory, ALMPs can focus on either demand side or supply side.
Demand-side ALMPs seek to directly or indirectly create additional
employment opportunities when the supply of labour exceeds the demand
for labour. For example, a government may offer a wage subsidy (or other
financial inducement) for employers that create new jobs. Supply-side
ALMPs seek to increase the number of workers actively seeking employment and/or the quality of the existing supply of workers. For example,
the government may require workers to demonstrate that they are taking
specific actions towards finding a job. Most labour-market policies contain both active and passive elements. For example, EI has never been
an exclusively passive program: recipients have always been required to
be actively seeking employment or risk having their benefits terminated.
In 1994, the influential OECD Jobs Study was released. It encouraged
the adoption of active labour-market policies, including the use of disincentives or penalties to pressure workers to stay in or return to the labour
market, even if that meant lower wages and less favourable working conditions.11 The OECD Jobs Study represented a profound shift in the emphasis
of and rhetoric around labour-market policy. Gone was any discussion
about the lack of jobs. In its place was a training-based diagnosis: the problem in the labour market and even the economy was that workers lacked
the skills necessary to fill existing vacancies and to generate economic
growth. The prescription to solve this problem was more education and
training and a greater willingness on the part of workers to adapt their
expectations to the so-called realities of the labour market.
ALMPs nicely fit with the ideology of neoliberalism, as they build on
the notion that the best social program is gainful employment and that
the best place for gaining skills and learning how to work is the workplace
itself. Employers are invited to define the parameters for acceptable skills
and reasonable work requirements. Largely gone is the notion that there
is a balance to be achieved between the needs of labour and capital and
between equity and the unfettered pursuit of economic growth. Especially
Government Training and Immigration Policy 69
 69
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

silenced are the voices of those who argue that some groups, such as
women and racialized groups, should receive preferential treatment to
redress the historical biases in the labour market. The effectiveness of
ALMPs is discussed in Box 3.1.
Box 3.1  Are Active Labour-Market Policies Effective?
Research on the effectiveness of ALMPs is inconclusive. Overall, the
short-term impacts of ALMPs are not stellar, and the long-term ones
are difficult to assess.12 A meta-analysis of nearly 100 studies found
that classroom and on-the-job training programs often have little
short-term effect on employment but some positive effect after two
years (although the cost effectiveness of training programs was not
assessed).13 There are, of course, many different forms of ALMPs. For
example, an analysis of the United Kingdom’s ALMP concludes that
its Work Programmes were designed to “facilitate the maintenance of
a large pool of workers willing—or resigned—to working in relatively
poor conditions” rather than address issues of inequality and underemployment.14
There is extensive research that suggests some segments of the
population may benefit from ALMP and training more so than other
segments. For example, older workers with long job tenure seem able
to re-enter the job market with minimal support (although the kind of
job they secure is unknown).15 The greatest effect of ALMP may be for
those recipients who are already partially ready for the labour market
and for women.16 Without solid evidence of overall employment
growth as a result of ALMPs, the effect of ALMPs is at most positional.
That is to say, it moves the recipient of the ALMP up the ranks of the
unemployed. This upward movement comes at the expense of displacing someone else downward, perhaps someone who did not gain
access to suitable interventions. This dynamic is quite evident in the
discussion of the Canada Job Grant below.
Assessment of the effectiveness of ALMPs in Canada reveals
uneven outcomes. A 2015 study found that federal reporting about
the outcomes of Part 2 EI benefits was insufficiently detailed to assess
whether ALMPs had any significant impact on workers’ trajectory
through the EI system. Provincial-level reporting does allow comparisons between workers who received Part 2 benefits and those who did

70  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

not in terms of earnings, hours worked, and weeks on EI. That said, the
nature of the comparisons suggests the results should be used with
caution.
The data suggests that, among workers who received Part 1
financial benefits and participated in Part 2 skills-development interventions, the broad trend was towards less time on EI and higher
wages. By contrast, Part 1 claimants who participated in wage-subsidy
interventions saw relatively little difference versus a matched set of
non-participators. Interventions focused on self-employment show
more variable but overall worse outcomes. Overall, there seem to be
some positive effects of ALMPs.17

Canadian governments have (slowly and unevenly) adopted ALMPs. In
1996 (as part of its deficit-and-debt reduction efforts), the federal Liberal
government implemented reforms to Employment Insurance that broadly
followed the ALMP prescription. The federal government continued to
deliver (largely passive) Part 1 financial benefits, but EI became more
focused on returning workers to employment, in part by reducing income
replacement and access to employment insurance to pressure workers to
take whatever jobs were available.18 The federal government also began
transferring responsibility for EI training benefits to the provinces and territories under LMDAs (in part to reduce friction with Québec in the wake
of the 1995 sovereignty referendum), an uneven process that was completed only in 2010.19 Further changes to EI in 2012 intensified pressure
on unemployed workers to take a wider variety of jobs at lower wages.20
Over time, there has been a precipitous drop in the ratio of EI beneficiaries to the overall unemployed (the B/U ratio). In 1990, 84 per cent of
unemployed Canadians received EI benefits. By 1998, the B/U ratio had
fallen to 44 per cent, and it has stayed at approximately this level since
then. This drop primarily reflects changes to EI rules as well as changing
patterns in the labour market (e.g., more long-term unemployed).21
Women were particularly disadvantaged by tighter access rules, with
only 32 per cent of unemployed women receiving EI benefits in 1999,
down from 70 per cent in 1989.22 Since eligibility to receive Part 2 training
benefits turns on eligibility for Part 1 financial benefits, this reduction in

Government Training and Immigration Policy 71
 71
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

female EI eligibility dramatically reduced women’s access to training.23 At
the same time, there has been a shift in how training benefits are allocated.
Funding for training comprises an amalgam of loans and grants. After
1996, jurisdictions have increasingly expected individuals to tap their own
resources and/or take out loans before receiving training grants.24
Overall, Part 2 EI benefits remain an important source of training for
formerly employed workers. Access is limited by the federal government’s
rules around EI eligibility; thus, the training benefits only previously
employed workers. New workers (or those who don’t qualify for EI for
some other reason) are not generally eligible for LMDA-funded training.
That said, in practice, things are not so neat. A worker who is ineligible
for LMDA-funded training but who is seeking to access a specific training
program may well still receive the training, with the provincial or territorial government simply billing the costs to a different (non-LMDA) source
of funding. Further, as of the summer of 2018, the federal government was
negotiating amendments to existing LMDAs that would expand eligibility
for Part 2 benefits to include some workers who are paying EI premiums
but who would not normally qualify to receive Part 1 benefits. These workers may be eligible for Part 2 benefits.25 This can be viewed as an effort
by governments to address the training needs of both new workers and
precariously employer workers.
Employers benefit from LMDA-funded training in two main ways.
First, EI subsidizes training, because worker premiums pay for half of
the costs of LMDA-funded training. Second, EI encourages workers to
accept employment even if the worker doesn’t particularly like the terms
that are offered. As we saw in Chapter 1, EI has historically contributed
to “decommodifying” labour by giving workers an alternate source of
income with which to purchase the necessities of life. This serves the
state’s goal of social reproduction by reducing employers’ ability to drive
exploitative wage-rate bargains. The degree of decommodification created by EI turns on both how accessible EI is and the level and duration
of benefit. Reducing the accessibility of EI increases the labour-market
power of employers to drive extremely hard wage-rate bargains in loose
labour markets. This, in turn, increases the potential for social instability
caused by workers being forced to choose between exploitative jobs
and poverty.
72  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

Labour Market and Workforce Development Agreements
In addition to revamping EI in 1996, the federal government also reduced
funding to train individuals who were ineligible for EI Part 2 benefits from
$2 billion to approximately $1 billion. This change left those Canadians
most in need of employment services inadequately served. Combined with
other policy changes during this period, women’s access to employment
supports were particularly hard hit.26 In 2002, provincial and territorial
governments asked the federal government for increased funding to meet
the skills-development needs of Indigenous peoples, youth, older workers, social assistance recipients, and persons with disabilities.27
The federal Conservative government’s 2006 economic plan contained
three key labour-market priorities that centred on meeting the demand for
workers during the economic boom of the day. The federal government
promised to increase the labour-market participation rate of traditionally under-represented groups (i.e., older Canadians, Indigenous people
and Canadians with disabilities) as well as increase employer access to
temporary foreign workers (see Immigration Policy and Foreign Workers below).28 The government also promised to reduce employer taxes
in order to increase the money that employers have available to invest in
training as well as make training more available to all Canadians.
The federal government’s 2008 announcement of six-year bilateral
Labour Market Agreements with each provincial and territorial government was part of its efforts to increase the labour-market participation of
traditionally under-represented groups (who typically could not access EI
benefits). The federal government agreed to provide $500 million per year
on top of existing provincial and territorial expenditures on labour-market
training. These LMA funds were intended to fund training for unemployed
workers who did not qualify for Part 2 Employment Insurance benefits
as well as low-skilled workers who were employed. An additional $500
million was committed between 2009 and 2011 to address the needs of
workers in communities particularly hard hit by the 2009 global economic
downturn.29
Provincial and territorial governments delivered (or provided via
contractors) LMA-funded services to approximately 360,000 Canadians annually, from 2008–14. Training-specific interventions included

Government Training and Immigration Policy 73
 73
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

workplace skills development for workers requiring literacy or essential skills training, formal training or academic upgrading programs, and
work-experience programs. The net effect of these interventions was to
increase employment levels of participants from 44 per cent to 86 per
cent. Some groups of workers continue to experience lower employment
levels, including participants aged 55 to 64 (64 per cent), participants with
disabilities (66 per cent), and Indigenous participants (68 per cent).30

Canada Job Fund Agreements
Despite the success of LMA programming at increasing and improving
employment, the federal government radically altered the LMAs during
renegotiation in 2014. In this process, LMAs were renamed Canada Job
Fund Agreements (except in Québec, which kept its LMA).31 The focus
of the Canada Job Fund Agreements (CJFAs) were clearly driven by concerns about a skills shortage:
There are too many jobs that go unfilled in Canada because employers cannot find workers with the right skills. Meanwhile, there are
still too many Canadians looking for work. Training in Canada is not
sufficiently aligned to the skills employers need, or to the jobs that are
actually available.32

The flagship program of the CJFAs was the Canada Job Grant (CJG).
Under the federal government’s proposed CJG, employers could spend
up to $5,000 for training and seek matching funds at a 1:2 ratio (up to
$10,000) from the government to offset training costs. The $300 million
federal portion of the proposed CJG was to be funded by reallocating
60 per cent of former LMA funding to CJG. Practically speaking, this
reallocation meant that provincial and territorial governments would
lose $300 million in federal funding, which they relied upon to provide
skills-development training. Further, provincial and territorial governments would also be expected to come up with an additional $300 million
to fund their half of the matching grants. Whatever remained of the former
LMA funding could be still be used by provinces and territories to fund
employment services for those not covered by EI Part 2 benefits.

74  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

Provincial and territorial governments objected to this reallocation
because it required them to either close or find new monies for existing
LMA-funded training. Further, by linking funding to employer sponsorship, the expected (and, as illustrated in Box 3.2, the ultimate) effect of
the CJG was to shift funding for training away from workers who were
“far” from being labour-market ready and towards workers who were
mostly likely already employed. This, in turn, would (and did) constrain
the supply of skilled workers by focusing training funding on already
trained workers.33
Critics of the CJG noted that there was no evidence of significant skills
shortages and, indeed, the federal government’s own research found skills
shortages only in fields requiring years of study; thus, these shortages
could not be remedied through the short-term training CJG funded. Further, employers’ historical reluctance to invest in training meant that the
CJG was likely to function primarily as a means to subsidize (i.e., reduce)
existing employer investments in training, not spark additional investment
in training.34
The CJG also represented a significant intrusion by the federal government into the realm of labour-market training after a lengthy transition
towards provincial and territorial responsibility. Eventually, a six-year
agreement was reached with each province and territory (except Québec)
to implement CJG, after the federal government agreed to a gradual
phase-in with matching dollars funded solely by federal money.35
Box 3.2  Canada Job Grant Benefits Mostly Employed and Educated
Men
The recent introduction of the CJG should make it difficult to draw
clear conclusions about its outcomes. Unfortunately, initial evaluations
of CJG raise profoundly troubling questions about the program. British
Columbia reported that, after two years of operating the Canada-BC
Job Grant, 99 per cent of participants were drawn from the ranks of
the already employed. This finding reveals that the CJG is not meeting
its goal of increasing labour-market attachment among unemployed
British Columbians.

Government Training and Immigration Policy 75
 75
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Additionally, the majority of participants already had some PSE and
most saw no wage increase following the training. Less than 4 per cent
of employer applications identified participants as youth, persons with
a disability, Indigenous persons, or new immigrants. Only 30 per cent
of participants were women. Finally, only a minority of employers used
the CJG to pay for new or additional training. Most employers used
CJG funding to offset existing training costs.36
Alberta reported a very similar experience, noting that the
Canada-Alberta Job Grant is being used mostly to train employed men
with PSE in skilled management and non-management occupations.
Manitoba concluded:
No evidence was found the Grant increased the supply of skilled
labour, increased participation of underrepresented groups, or
developed the long-term human resource capacity of employers.
Over the short term, training did not increase labour market attachment, as very few participants obtained or retained jobs as a direct
result of the training. The vast majority of training participants were
employed before receiving training (99%).37
The Northwest Territories was particularly critical of the impact of the
CJG on existing labour-market training programs:
The cost sharing element of the Job Grant also negatively impacted
funding for existing employment and training programs, particularly
those targeted for unemployed, and under-employed individuals who do not have a job offer, and for individuals entering or
re-entering the labour force. These impacts will increase as the Job
Grant is fully phased in to reach 60% of the Job Fund.38
While there are exceptions to this general pattern (as well as data
gaps in the evaluations), the CJG appears to redirect federal training
dollars towards already employed men in high-status and high-wage
occupations. The CJG funding model also shifts federal funding away
from assisting unemployed workers to become job ready. In these
ways, the CJG replicates existing patterns of advantage (and disadvantage). As noted below, the replacement of the CJFAs with Workforce
Development Agreements (WDA) may attenuate some of the worst
consequences of the CJG.

76  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

In terms of access, control, and benefit, the CJG privileged the interests
of employers. Employers determined which employees received what
kind of training under the CJG, because employers made applications for
the funding. Employers were the main beneficiaries of the CJG, receiving taxpayer-subsidized training for their employees. Workers may have
benefitted from this training, if it led to more satisfying or remunerative work, with either their current employer or another employer in the
future. The workers who received the most benefit from CJG were largely
well-educated men who were already employed in skilled occupations and
who didn’t identify as Indigenous, immigrant, or disabled. This inequitable distribution of CJG training broadly mirrors the distribution of other
forms of training. Further, the CJG focused training dollars on workers
who are essentially job ready, thereby disadvantaging Canadians with little
prospect of immediate labour-force attachment.
Provincial and territorial governments continue to operate programs historically funded by LMA (although perhaps on a lesser scale).
This programming tends to primarily benefit individual workers (who
become more employable) and the state (which sees workers move into
employment). While the employment rates of older workers, Indigenous
workers, and workers with disabilities continue to lag behind the average,
historically, LMA-funded training appears to provide greater benefits to
these groups of workers than does the CJG.
At the time of writing, the federal Liberal government is negotiating
a replacement for the CJFAs, along with the Labour Market Agreements
for Persons with Disabilities (LMAPD), and the Targeted Initiative for
Older Workers (TIOW). The new Workforce Development Agreements
(WDAs) will provide approximately $722 million in funding annually, plus
an additional $900 million (from 2017/18 to 2022/23) to PTs. (Currently,
only Ontario has announced it has completed negotiations.) The WDAs are
expected to allow provincial and territorial governments more flexibility
in how funding is allocated by eliminating specific funding requirements
associated with the Canada Job Grant and TIOW. Provinces and territories can continue to operate these programs or redeploy the funding
associated with them in different ways.39 By giving PTs more flexibility in
how they spend WDA funding, the federal government has shifted any

Government Training and Immigration Policy 77
 77
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

political costs of program changes to the PTs. Some jurisdictions may, for
example, desire to drop the Canada Job Grant program because, despite
its popularity with employers, it does not help unemployed workers to
attach to the labour market.

Training Programs for Indigenous Peoples in Canada
The federal government has long sought to increase employment levels
among Indigenous peoples. This has included providing labour-market
training and skills development. These training responsibilities were not
devolved to provinces and territories subsequent to 1996 because the
constitution allocates responsibility for “Indians and the lands reserved
to Indians” to the federal government.40 In 2010, the federal government launched a five-year Skills and Partnership Fund (SPF) to provide
$210 million in support for skills development, training, and employment among Indigenous people. The Aboriginal Skills and Employment
Training Strategy (ASETS) followed SPF in 2011, essentially rebranding existing training programs. ASETS was designed to increase the
employment of Indigenous people through the provision of skills development and training programs. ASETS-funded services are provided by
85 Indigenous-operated organizations across Canada. These programs
are intended to target regional labour-market needs and are provided
by or through Indigenous-operated organizations. Approximately $1.7
billion in funding was provided by the federal government and various
Indigenous-operated organizations over five years.41
A 2015 evaluation of these programs noted significant increases in
participants’ earnings and probability of employment. That said, the
assessment flagged a number of challenges to the effectiveness of training
programs. The lack of employment opportunities near isolated communities posed a barrier for many participants who were reluctant to leave
their communities. The generally lower level of educational attainment
among Indigenous peoples in Canada meant the training offered was often
inadequate to match employer demands. Employment also often required
significant cultural adjustments on the part of workers, which extended
the need for training beyond job-specific technical skills. Where there
were local employment opportunities, they were often in a single sector
subject to market and seasonal fluctuations. And employers often simply
78  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

declined to hire or provide work experience for Indigenous workers.42
Box 3.3 examines the effectiveness of short-term labour-market training
for Indigenous peoples in Canada.
Box 3.3  Is Short-Term Skills Training Effective for Indigenous Persons?
Supply-side labour-market policies emphasize matching workers
with jobs as quickly as possible. This agenda is evident in LMDA and
CJFA funding, which emphasizes short-term training to help workers
(re)attach to the labour market. Recent research suggests that this
approach is ineffective. The crux of the problem is that, on its own,
job-specific skills training is often inadequate to remedy the legacy of
colonialism.
Colonialism refers to the process by which European countries
exerted political control over the rest of the world between the sixteenth and twentieth centuries. For Indigenous peoples in Canada,
colonialism has meant more than two centuries of forced assimilation
and systemic racism. These policies have contributed to above-average
rates of poverty and incarceration. These factors can create multiple
barriers to labour-force attachment, including low levels of education,
lack of access to a social network, and complex family responsibilities.
Further, Indigenous peoples may be legitimately skeptical about the
value of labour-market attachment because of discriminatory hiring
and management practices.43
The effects of the (often intergenerational) exclusion of Indigenous people from the labour market are difficult for training providers
to address in the current policy environment. The neo-liberal training
prescription prioritizes (re)attaching workers to the labour market as
quickly as possible. This is evident in both LMDA and CJFA funding,
where the aim is explicitly to move workers who are “close” to employable into employment. The cost and duration of training required to
address low levels of education and multiple barriers is often too high.
Yet, absent such a commitment, the effectiveness of such programs is
likely to be low.

In 2018, the federal Liberal government announced that it would be
replacing ASETS with the Indigenous Skills and Employment Training

Government Training and Immigration Policy 79
 79
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

program (ISET). As of the summer of 2018, the program was still being
developed and included a $2 billion commitment over five years. Key
changes include the first increase in funding in 17 years to serve an additional 15,000 clients, longer-term agreements, and enhanced performance
measurement. The program is also expected to better reflect the differing
needs of First Nations, Inuit, Métis, and urban/non-affiliated Indigenous
peoples.44

Provincial and Territorial Training Programs
As noted in Chapter 1, the constitution creates a shared responsibility
for labour-market training policy. Federal jurisdiction is acknowledged
in matters of the economy, including Employment Insurance. Education
is an exclusively provincial preserve. While labour-market training likely
falls outside of what framers of the British North America Act had in mind
when they wrote about education, the Québec Court of Appeal has found
it to be an area of provincial jurisdiction.45 That said, the federal government continues to exercise significant influence through conditional
financial transfers, such as the 2013 transition from LMAs to the Canada
Job Fund Agreements.
All provinces and territories fund programming designed to address
specific training needs. Such programming is delivered through a combination of provincial and territorial PSE systems (see Chapter 2), private
providers, and government-operated programs. As with the discussion of
eligibility around LMDA-funded training above, the boundaries between
federally and provincially/territorially funded training are often blurry
and more a matter of whether training costs are billed to the Workforce
Development Agreement or a provincial/territorial funding source.
A key area of provincial/territorial labour market training includes
literacy and adult basic education (which is discussed at length in Chapter
5). A second area is labour-market training provided to social assistance
recipients (see Box 3.4). Governments may also provide training to
address specific, localized issues such as industry closures (e.g., the loss
of jobs in coal-fired electrical generating plants in rural communities) or
labour shortages (for instance, a lack of qualified teachers in remote and
northern communities).

80  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

Box 3.4  Labour-Market Training for Social Assistance Recipients
Beginning after the First World War, governments funded programming designed to alleviate poverty. Initially, such programs were
directed at the “deserving poor,” such as mothers abandoned by
husbands and the elderly. Over time, a broad system of social assistance (sometimes called welfare) developed, funded by both the federal
and provincial/territorial governments. At present, social assistance
programs offer a mixture of financial assistance and other benefits to
the unemployed and unemployable.46
Social assistance recipients are often stigmatized as lazy or
irresponsible. Such accusations are often intermingled with racism and
xenophobia, such as that directed at Indigenous peoples in Canada
and immigrants (particularly refugee claimants who are visible minorities). These stereotypes of the so-called welfare bum often belie
the complexity of social-assistance programming.47 Access to benefits is typically based upon income and asset testing. Consequently,
employed Canadians may be eligible for social assistance if their wages
fall below certain thresholds. For example, a worker with numerous
dependents who is employed part time at a minimum-wage job may
be eligible for wage top-up or other benefits. Other recipients may
be unemployed for various reasons, such as ill health, family circumstances, or disability.
Labour-market training is one of the benefits that social-assistance
recipients may be able to access. For example, Ontario Works provides
both financial and employment assistance to those in financial need.
Employment assistance can include job counselling, job-specific
training, workshops on resumé writing and interviewing, and access
to academic upgrading and language training. Normally, receipt of
financial assistance is conditional on participation in employment
training (although this requirement can be waived in cases of illness or
caregiving responsibilities).48 There is a long history of provincial and
territorial governments using social assistance to motivate workers
to (re)attach to the labour market. This approach is consistent with
ALMPs and is often expressed by former US President Ronald Reagan’s
slogan “The best social program is a job.”49

The province of Québec has a unique system of labour-market training.
In 1997, Québec established the Commission des partenaires du marché
Government Training and Immigration Policy 81
 81
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

du travail (Labour Market Partners Board), which brings together representatives from the business, labour, education, and community sectors
to advise the minister of employment and social solidarity about meeting labour-market training needs. In addition to LMDA-funded training,
Québec administers a unique workforce training levy program.
This levy on employers was introduced in 1995 to address concerns
that Québec employers provided much less labour-market training than
employers in other provinces. Québec’s levy requires all firms with payrolls in excess of $1 million to spend at least 1 per cent of revenue on
training or remit the difference to the province to fund training-related
research and projects.50 Training levies are designed to encourage
employer investment in training at a low administrative cost to the state.
France’s long-term training levy, for example, has generated a number of
effects. Fewer French employees receive training, but training is longer
and addresses a wider range of skills, and the return on training is higher
when compared to the levy-less United Kingdom.51
The evidence about the effectiveness of Québec’s training levy is mixed.
More than three-quarters of affected employers spend the required 1 per
cent on training, although this varies by firm size. Some researchers report
that job-related training rates rose after the levy was introduced, increasing from 20 per cent of workers in 1997 to 32 per cent in 2002 and thereby
erasing the earlier interprovincial difference.52 Other research finds that
Québec’s rate of on-the-job training continues to lag behind that of other
provinces, particularly in workplaces with fewer than 20 workers. Where
on-the-job training occurs in Québec, it results in a larger wage premium
than elsewhere. Finally, Québec firms are more likely to rely upon external
trainers than firms in other provinces.53
Québec’s unique system of workforce training, combined with the Stephen Harper government’s desire to make electoral headway in Québec,
allowed Québec to opt out of the CJFA and instead receive a transfer of
funds. This was justified because “the key principles behind the Canada
Job Fund Agreements—greater employer involvement and employer
investment in training—are already formally and legislatively entrenched
in the Québec training system.”54 In terms of access, control, and benefit,
Québec’s training levy incentivizes large employers to increase access
to labour-market training. Yet employers retain significant control over
82  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

which employees access training, and what training they take. As a result,
employers are likely to be the primary beneficiary of this levy.

Immigration Policy and Foreign Workers
As we saw in Chapter 2, Canada has a long history of the federal government using immigration policy in order to increase the supply of workers
with specific skills. During the mid- and late nineteenth century, the federal government facilitated the use of immigrant labourers for canal and
railway construction.55 Foreign workers were (and remain) an important source of live-in caregivers. Canada has also relied upon migrant
workers in agriculture.56 For example, Alberta continues to experience
racialized waves of migrant agricultural workers that began in the late
nineteenth century and has included migrant workers from Britain and
central Canada, internees, prisoners of war, Polish veterans, Indigenous
peoples, and Mexican Mennonites.
The federal Conservative government’s 2006 economic plan promised
to increase employer access to temporary foreign workers.
Our immigration policies should be more closely aligned with our
labour market needs . . . Particular attention should be given to skilled
temporary foreign workers with Canadian work experience and
foreign graduates from Canadian colleges and universities, as these
groups are well placed to adapt quickly to the Canadian economy.57

As we saw in Chapter 1, expanding the supply of workers typically benefits employers by reducing labour costs. Canada currently operates three
programs that bring temporary foreign workers to Canada:
1. The Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program (SAWP) brought
approximately 14,000 temporary agricultural workers to Canada
from Mexico and Carribean countries in 2015.
2. The Caregiver Program allowed approximately 8,300 live-in
caregivers to be resident in Canada in 2015. These workers provide
full-time care to children, seniors, or persons with disabilities and
may eventually be eligible for permanent residency.

Government Training and Immigration Policy 83
 83
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

3. The Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFWP) saw 37,750
temporary foreign workers (TFWs) resident in Canada in 2015
(down from a high of nearly 80,000 in 2013). Employers can
recruit TFWs if no qualified Canadian citizens are available to
perform the work.58
The TFWP is the largest of these programs. The explosive growth in
the number of TFWs in Canada (shown in figure 3.1) is almost entirely
due to changes in the TFWP. Until 2002, the TFWP was restricted to
higher-skilled occupations. In 2002, the federal Liberal government
extended the program to include lower-skilled workers. As set out in its
2006 economic plan, the federal Conservative government expanded the
program by establishing a list of “occupations under pressure” for Alberta
and British Columbia. This change made it easier for employers to acquire
permission to hire TFWs, and TFW numbers rose rapidly thereafter.59
Further changes in 2012 saw the federal government dramatically reduce
processing times for labour market opinion (LMO) applications, allow
employers to lower TFW wages, and waive the LMO (now called labour
market impact assessments) process altogether for American TFWs in
seven high-demand construction occupations.60
There has been significant public concern about the exploitation of
TFWs (see Boxes 3.5 and 6.1). These concerns as well as fear of job losses
pressured then-employment minister Jason Kenney to radically alter his
position on the TFWP.61 For example, in response to questions about why
over 200 TFWs were hired by seafood processors in Prince Edward Island
while hundreds of local fish plant workers were collecting EI (something
the TFWP should prohibit), Kenney admitted employers often prefer
TFWs because they increase employers’ profitability.
When people come in from abroad on a work permit, their immigration status is conditional on their work, so often those folks that come
in, the managers know they’re going to show up every day for work so
there’s a greater degree of reliability and in many respects, employers
have begun to see it as a more efficient workforce, but that is not what
it’s there for. It’s only there if it’s clear that no Canadians are available,
and this evidence that we’ve released today demonstrates there are
Canadians available in those jobs, in those regions.62
84  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

After defending the program as necessary for nearly a decade, Kenney
suggested that employers facing worker shortages should increase wages
and benefits as well as improve working conditions. The 2014 changes to
the program included looser rules regulating higher-skilled TFWs and
greater restrictions on lower-skilled TFWs, including phased-in quotas
for employers and a four-year residency limit for TFWs (this residency
limit was revoked by the federal Liberal government in 2016).
Box 3.5  Exploitation and Vulnerabilty among Migrant Workers
Migrant workers in Canada often have both precarious employment
and precarious legal status. Their employment is precarious because
they often hold low-wage jobs with limited job security and access
to social benefits. Their legal status is precarious because their right
to reside in Canada is contingent upon their continued employment
with a specific employer. Economic insecurity caused by precarious
employment, coupled with the threat of deportation, acts as a barrier
to exiting a job or asserting employment rights. Together, these factors
make migrant workers’ acutely vulnerable to wage theft, unsafe work,
terrible housing conditions, and outright abuse by employers.63
Employers understand these dynamics and often prefer foreign
workers to citizens because such workers are more compliant with
employer demands for increased productivity:
“We’re also dealing with a workforce for supervisors that end up
being malleable . . . . Because of the wage differences from India
and the Philippines to Canada, they’re very appreciative and prepared to work very hard to sustain their employment.”64
Employers also use TFWs to “motivate” Canadian workers through fear
of replacement:
“Whereas before it was such an employee-driven workforce that
they felt that, well we don’t have to work hard . . . I think it’s [TFW]
really brought some competition back into the workforce, which is
driving some good things.”65
Further, in some cases, such as the fruit and vegetable sector, migrant
workers are appreciably younger than the existing Canadian agricutural workforce and are physically capable of much higher levels of
productivity.66

Government Training and Immigration Policy 85
 85
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

It is important to note that migrant workers have agency and often
choose to work long hours and in difficult conditions because this
advances their goal of maximizing their earnings while in Canada.67
This choice, however, needs to be seen in its full context. The options
that migrant workers are choosing among are constrained by government policies that make them vulnerable to employers exploiting them
to maximize profitability.

In addition to the three streams of the TFWP, there are four other avenues
by which foreign nationals can work in Canada:
1. The International Experience Canada program entails 32 reciprocal youth-mobility agreements that provide short-term work and
travel permits to people aged 18 to 35.
2. The International Student Program provides foreign students and
PSE graduates with work permits.
3. Provincial Nominee Programs (PNP) vary by jurisdiction but
provide a way for TFWs to become permanent residents.
4. Canada has signed forty-one “free trade” agreements with other
governments that include reciprocal labour-mobility rights for
certain classes of workers.
Collectively, these programs are called international mobility programs
(IMPs). They differ from the various TFWP streams in that workers can
receive open work permits with no assessment of the labour-market
demand for their services or whether the jobs they hold are related to
their qualifications. IMPs are also bilateral (or multilateral) agreements,
the terms of which, unlike the TFWP, cannot be altered unilaterally by
Canada.68
As shown in figure 3.1, there has been a steady climb in the number of
migrant workers entering Canada under the TFW and IMP programs. In
2015, there were 60,138 TFWs in Canada, down from a high of 104,125 in
2013. The number of TFW began increasing rapidly following the 2006
changes to the TFW program. The number of foreign workers in Canada as
IMPs began a steady increase at about the same time, peaking at 259,339 in
2014. This pattern reflects, in part, the increasing number of bilateral trade
86  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

agreements signed by the Harper government beginning in 2006. Overall,
there are approximately 354,000 migrant workers legally employed in
Canada. There is no concrete data about the number of undocumented
(non-status or illegal) foreign workers in Canada.69
Total

IMPs

TFWs

400,000
350,000
300,000
250,000
200,000
150,000
100,000
50,000
0
1996

1998

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010

2012

2014

Figure 3.1  Migrant workers in Canada, 1996–2015. (Data from
Government of Canada, “Facts and Figures 2015.”)

While the TFWP gets the lion’s share of media attention, there has been
explosive growth in the numbers of workers entering Canada under IMPs.
At present, TFWs account for only one-third of migrant foreign workers
into Canada.70 Governments have, in part, justified increasing employer
access to employ foreign workers as a solution to a skills shortage.71 In this
view, migrant worker policy acts as a substitute for labour-market training.
There is some question about whether migrant workers are necessary
to address a skills shortage. Setting aside the question of whether specific
labour shortages reflect an absolute shortage of workers (i.e., there are
no workers available) or a relative shortage (i.e., there are no workers
prepared to work for the offered terms and conditions of employment),
the evidence suggests that most TFWs work in lower-skilled occupations.
Table 3.1 groups 2015 migrant worker numbers by skill level to demonstrate that 61 per cent of TFWs are low-skill workers.72
Government Training and Immigration Policy 87
 87
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Table 3.1  Migrant workers by skill level, 2015.
Low-skill occupations
Live-in caregivers

14,004

Seasonal agricultural workers

8,384

Low-skill TFWs

13,913

Total

36,301

High-skill occupations
High-skill TFWs

23,458

Source: Government of Canada, “Facts and Figures 2015: Immigration Overview Temporary Residents - Annual IRCC Updates.” Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2017.

Canada’s immigration policy is often used to supplement (or as a substitute for) labour-market training. Consequently, it is useful to consider
how it affects issues of access and benefit. As with the Canada Job Grant,
employers (through their hiring decisions) control which workers can
access Canadian job opportunities. These opportunities have been
unevenly distributed among workers. For example, while the majority
of TFWs and IMPs are men, there are clearly female preserves (such as
the Caregiver program) and male preserves (e.g., employment in the construction industry). Migrant workers also come from a small number of
nations. More than half of IMPs are from India, the United States, China,
France, and Australia, while more than one-third of TFWs are from the
Philippines.73
The growth in the number of TFWs is sometimes framed as a shift in
Canada’s immigration policy, away from multicultural citizenship and
towards partial citizenship. In partial citizenship, migrants are granted
access to certain aspects of citizenship (e.g., partial access to the labour
market) but excluded from other legal, political, and economic rights.74
Other critics note that the TFW and IMP programs increasingly shift
authority over migration from the state to employers. To be fair, employers’ exercise this power within a policy framework created by the federal
government (TFW) or negotiated with other states (IMP).
88  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

The benefits of labour migration are uneven and hard to quantify.
Migrant workers are obvious beneficiaries, through the provision of opportunities to work. But the structure of these opportunities often makes
such workers vulnerable to exploitation. To the degree that employer
access to migrant workers increases the supply of labour (thereby driving down wages and lessening workers’ labour market power), employer
use of migrant workers may disadvantage Canadian workers. Conversely,
the availability of low-cost and compliant migrant workers advantages
employers.
The state is placed in a conflicted position. To the degree that migrant
worker programs address real labour shortages, they help the state to
ensure the production process continues unimpeded. But, the threat (real
or perceived) posed by migrant workers to the job security of Canadians,
as well as the frequently poor treatment of these workers, undermines
the legitimacy of the state when it operates such programs. In this way,
migrant worker programs operate contrary to the goal of social reproduction. Maintaining legitimacy with the electorate is important and helps
explain the 2014 about-face on the TFW program by the federal Conservative government. The Conservative government also simply stopped
publishing information about the number of TFWs, perhaps as way to
reduce public concern over their numbers.

Conclusion
While there are differences between (and within!) governments around
labour-market training policy, several broad trends are evident. First, government policies and programs are increasingly focused on (re)attaching
workers to the labour market as quickly as possible. To this end, Employment Insurance has been altered to reduce the proportion of unemployed
workers who are eligible to receive financial support or training. Workers unable to access EI face significant pressure to take whatever jobs
are available, regardless of whether they find the jobs desirable. Those
workers who are eligible for EI benefits also face intensified pressure to
take whatever jobs become available or risk having their benefits terminated. Funded training is short term and must clearly increase claimants’
employability. Much like recent changes to Canada’s immigration policies

Government Training and Immigration Policy 89
 89
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

that increase employers’ access to foreign workers, these EI changes are
designed to increase the labour supply. And, because workers are less able
to negotiate wages and working condition improvements in loose labour
markets, this policy tends benefit employers.
Second, government-funded labour-market training increasingly
benefits workers who are already employed or are almost “job ready.”
LMDA-funded training is available only to those who have been recently
employed. And most of the funding for the CJFAs has been directed to
men who already have PSE credentials and who are employed in high-skill
jobs. Employers trained (and subsequently hired) virtually no unemployed workers during the first two years of CJG funding, despite this
being a key goal of the program. The funding for the CJG was secured
by cannibalizing LMA-funded programs, which are aimed at providing
training to workers who are further from the labour market, including
Indigenous peoples, social assistance recipients, and persons with disabilities. This policy direction is consistent with (re)attaching workers to
the labour market as quickly as possible. It also tends to reinforce existing
patterns of advantage and disadvantage in the labour market.
Third, employers are being granted increasing control over who
accesses what kind of government-funded training. This is most evident
in the structure of the CJG, where employers select which workers undertake what kind of training. While governments establish broad criteria
for matching grants, these criteria largely cede control to employers.
Québec’s training levy also leaves training decisions to employers. The
rules around TFWs and IMPs allow employers to choose between training
Canadian workers for jobs and seeking to hire migrant workers to do a job.
As figure 3.1 indicates, employers are increasingly choosing to hire migrant
workers. This trend externalizes training costs onto other jurisdictions.
These trends clearly indicate that Canadian governments—and particularly the federal government—have adopted a supply-side approach to
labour-market training. Unemployed Canadians are pressured to return to
(any) work as fast as possible, and training funding is allocated to workers
in or close to the labour market. While there are rhetorical commitments
to improving the labour-market prospects of workers who are further
from employability, funding has been shifted away from programs that
achieve this goal. (We’ll explore basic skills training in Chapter 5.) Further,
90  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

federal immigration policy alleviates employers’ need to train and hire
these workers by making migrant workers available.
There is notably less federal commitment to the social-reproduction
process. EI financial and training benefits buffer the effect of unemployment for some workers. The most significant federal efforts centre on
framing training as a way for workers to improve their lot in life. This
skills-shortage rhetoric shifts responsibility for unemployment away from
employers and onto workers and obviates the need for political, social,
or economic reform. Provincial and territorial governments—which are
constitutionally responsible for social assistance and often bear the brunt
of criticism about unemployment—have shown some willingness to resist
this framing (e.g., pushing back against the CJFA) but must balance their
greater interest in social reproduction against the allure of additional federal funding.

Notes
1  Mas, “Jason Kenney: Canada Job Grant Will Lead to Guaranteed Jobs.”
2  Albo, “What Comes Next?”
3  Alberta Works, “Employment and Training Programs and Services.”
4 Finkel, Social Policy and Practice in Canada.
5  Employment and Social Development Canada, “EI Regular Benefits—
Overview.”
6  There are certain exceptions to this maximum. During the recent downturn,
long-tenured workers in regions of high unemployment qualified for
additional weeks of benefits.
7  Government of Canada, “Labour Market Development Agreement.”
8  Albo, “What Comes Next?”
9  McBride, “The Political Economy of Training in Canada.”
10  Lönnroth, “Active Labour Market Policies.”
11  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD Jobs
Study.
12  Meager, “The Role of Training and Skills Development.”
13  Card, Kluve, and Weber, “Active Labour Market Policy Evaluations.”
14  Berry, “Quantity over Quality,” 594.
15  Jones, “The Effectiveness of Training.”
16  Kluve, “The Effectiveness of European Active Labor Market Policy.”
17  Brisson, “Employment Insurance and Active Labour Market Policies.”

Government Training and Immigration Policy 91
 91
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

18  Osberg, “Canada’s Declining Social Safety Net.”
19  Wood and Hayes, “Labour Market Agreements.”
20  Porter, “Austerity, Social Program Restructuring, and the Erosion of
Democracy.”
21  Gray and Busby, “Unequal Access.”
22  Critoph, “Who Wins, Who Loses.”
23  EI premium payers can also access Part 2 benefits if they have accessed
parental leave benefits in the last sixty months or regular Part 1 benefits in
the past thirty-six months.
24  Critoph, “Who Wins, Who Loses.”
25  Government of Canada, “Governments of Canada and Ontario Reach
Agreement.”
26 Ibid.
27  Provincial and Territorial Labour Market Ministers, Skills Investments for All
Canadians.
28  Department of Finance Canada, “Advantage Canada,” 48.
29  Wood, “Hollowing out the Middle.”
30  Employment and Social Development Canada, “Evaluation of Labour
Market Agreements.”
31  Wood and Hayes, “Labour Market Agreements.”
32  Government of Canada, “The New Canada Job Grant,” 2.
33  Hall, “Ottawa Digging In.”
34  Mendelson and Zon, “The Training Wheels Are Off.”
35  Mas, “Canada Job Grant Won’t Be in Place.”
36  Goss Gilroy Inc., “Canada Job Grant Year 2 Review.”
37  Ibid., 51.
38  Ibid., 65–66.
39  Government of Canada, “Workforce Development Agreements.”
40  Wood, “From Pathways to ‘ASETS.’”
41  Employment and Social Development Canada, “Evaluation of the
Aboriginal Skills and Employment Training Strategy.”
42 Ibid.
43 MacKinnon, Decolonizing Employment.
44  Government of Canada, “Budget 2018.”
45  Magali, “Federal-Provincial Overlap and Civil Servants.”
46  Haddow and Klassen, Partisanship, Globalization, and Canadian Labour
Market Policy.
47 Finkel, Social Policy and Practice in Canada.
48  Ontario Ministry of Community and Social Services, “Ontario Works.”

92  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

49 McBride, Working? Employment Policy in Canada.
50  Bélanger and Robitaille, Portrait of Work-Related Learning in Québec.
51  Greenhalgh, “Does an Employer Training Levy Work?”
52 Peters, Results of the 2003 Adult Education and Training Survey.
53  Gagnon and Smith, “The Effect of a Training Levy.”
54  Government of Canada and Government of Québec, “Preamble.”
55 Knowles, Strangers at our Gates.
56 Basok, Tortillas and Tomatoes.
57  Department of Finance, “Advantage Canada.”
58  Government of Canada, “Facts and Figures 2015.”
59  Fudge and MacPhail, “The Temporary Foreign Worker Program in Canada.”
60  Foster and Barnetson, “Exporting Oil, Importing Labour and Weakening
Democracy.”
61  Broadbent Institute, “Harper Government ‘Accelerated’ Unemployment.”
62  Wright, “Q&A: Employment Minister Jason Kenney.”
63  Hughes, “Costly Benefits and Gendered Costs.”
64  Taylor, Foster, and Cambre, “Temporary Foreign Workers,” 7.
65 Ibid.
66  Preibisch, “BC-Grown.”
67  Foster and Taylor, “In the Shadows.”
68  Mertins-Kirkwood, “The Hidden Growth.”
69  Government of Canada, “Facts and Figures 2015.”
70  Mertins-Kirkwood, “The Hidden Growth.”
71  Barnetson and Foster, “The Political Justification of Migrant Workers.”
72  Government of Canada, “Facts and Figures 2015.”
73 Ibid.
74 Vosko, Managing the Margins.

Government Training and Immigration Policy 93
 93
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

C H A P T E R

F O U R

Workplace Training and Learning

Learning Objectives
After reading this chapter, you will be able to:
➢➢ Identify the three main perspectives on labour relations and
explain how they affect workplace training and learning.
➢➢ Define and critically assess the concepts of human capital theory,
learning organizations, and skills and competencies.
➢➢ Evaluate workplace training in terms of access to, control of, and
benefit from training.

According to a report by job networking website LinkedIn, job-hopping
by college-educated American millennials is on the rise.1 The solution, says
Professor Jason Wingard, dean of Columbia University’s School of Professional Studies, is training. “By investing in corporate learning, employers
have the power to address millennial retention in three key areas: talent
attraction; job readiness; and culture change.”2 Before we buy into the
“more training” mantra proposed by Wingard, it is worthwhile to tease
apart whether these articles about workplace training are accurate.
Our first question should be whether the LinkedIn report’s conclusion about job-hopping is correct. The LinkedIn report sits at odds with
a longitudinal study of job tenure by the US Department of Labor that
suggests workers are, on average, staying with firms longer.3 To be fair,
the danger of using national statistics is that they can wash out differences
among subpopulations (e.g., the experiences of Indigenous peoples in
Canada). Given this, it is possible that college-educated millennials (who
graduated between 2001 and 2010) are job-hopping more than older
workers did after they graduated.
Looking at the LinkedIn report itself reveals numerous methodological
issues. The two most obvious problems are these:
1. The report’s dataset are jobs reported on LinkedIn profiles. This
data is not necessarily valid. For example, older respondents (who
are the comparator group) may have under-reported short-term
jobs at the beginning of their careers due to memory decay,
irrelevance, or a desire to make their careers appear focused and
stable.

 97
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

2. The dataset is not representative of the total population of
college-educated workers. It includes only college-educated workers who use LinkedIn. So our ability to generalize the experiences
of this sample to the overall population is limited.
The report acknowledges (and even tries to cope with) these issues
in the methodological fine print at the end of the article. But these profound methodological problems don’t temper the report’s claims, and
that should make us cautious about accepting them. Now let’s consider
Wingard’s prescription of greater investment in corporate training: “Millennials want to know whether they will have the opportunity to develop
a strong set of competencies and transferable skills that can not only be
useful now, for their current employer, but in the future, as well, as their
careers advance.”4
This may well be true. But will it reduce the rate of job-hopping? The
question that neither the LinkedIn report nor the Wingard article engages
is whether job-hopping behaviour (which may or may not be increasing)
is a worker choice or is driven by the greater job precarity facing millennials. If job-hopping is by choice, that behaviour may (or may not)
be something that companies can influence by providing more training
(assuming that a lack of training is driving the behaviour). If job-hopping
reflects that many millennials are hired on short-term contracts, then the
level of job-hopping has nothing to do with the level of training and won’t
be influenced by changes in it.
The value of the LinkedIn report and the Wingard article is that they
are fairly representative of how workplace training and learning is usually
presented to the public. The specific dynamic warranting our attention
is (1) a weak (or false) claim that (2) hints at a problem for employers
(3) stemming from undesirable worker behaviour that can (perhaps) be
solved by (4) employers increasing spending on training for (5) an already
privileged group of workers. The only clear beneficiaries of this questionable prescription are private training providers, who rely upon employers
purchasing their products and services. This tendency of the discourse
around workplace training to be focused on selling training services poses
a profound challenge to a meaningful assessment of what training is in
fact done in workplaces and what training ought to be done there. To
98  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

help sort the wheat from the chaff, it is necessary to recall from Chapter
1 that workplace training occurs in the context of a capitalist economy
that subjects employers to the profit imperative. The profit imperative
pressures employers to minimize labour costs in order to maximize overall profitability. Workplace training and learning are intended to support
organizations in achieving this end. While maximizing profitability isn’t
the only reason that organizations provide training to workers, it is an
overarching and powerful reason.
For that reason, this chapter begins by examining the differing perspectives that individuals have about employment and considering how these
perspectives affect workplace training. With these differing perspectives
in mind, we’ll then critically examine important concepts, such as human
capital theory, organizational learning and learning organizations, and
skills and competencies. As noted in Box 4.1, it is also useful to distinguish between formal, non-formal, and informal learning—all of which
are present in workplace learning. We’ll then consider the various forms
of workplace training in Canada before concluding with an examination
of the role and impact of Professional Regulatory Organizations on workplace training.
Box 4.1  Formal, Non-formal, and Informal Learning
While we often speak of training and learning in broad terms, it is
important to distinguish among them. As we saw in Chapter 1, training is the process of intentionally acquiring, modifying, or reinforcing
KSAs as well as values and preferences. There are different ways to
categorize training and a useful typology is based upon the degree of
formality.
Formal learning entails stated objectives, an organized curriculum,
and set requirements to demonstrate that skills and knowledge have
been acquired. Credentials earned through formal training serve as
evidence that the holder has certain skills and knowledge and can be
relied upon to be able to use those skills and knowledge effectively.
Formal learning encompasses K-12 education and PSE. Some forms of
workplace training also meet these criteria.
That said, much workplace training comprises non-formal learning in that there is less structure and, if a credential is issued, it isn’t

Workplace Training and Learning 99
 99
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

one that can be used as proof of a qualification or competency in a
particular skill. Non-formal learning is valuable in that it imparts KSAs
but often has limited portability because it is not directly linked with a
credential or certification.5
Informal learning is learning that may (or may not) be planned.
For example, watching how a co-worker tackles a job or uses a tool
may help us develop work-related skills. Informal learning can be a
very important way of developing new skills and competencies in the
workplace. A distinguishing feature of informal learning is that it is not
associated with any direct form of recognition of achievement or a
credential. That said, some PSE institutions do attempt to give workers
“credit” for informal learning through the process of prior learning
assessment.6
Typically, all three forms of learning can be found in workplaces.
For example, employees may be given a workplace orientation upon
arrival (non-formal learning). They may then be required to take and
pass a first-aid course (formal learning). Then they are assigned a
mentor who will show them the ropes (informal learning). As we’ll see
below, this informal learning can also be a source of important information about workplace norms and how work is actually done.

Perspectives on Employment and Training
How we view workplace training usually reflects the broader perspective we hold about employment relationships. As noted in Chapter 1, this
book takes the position that labour and capital have both converging and
diverging interests in the workplace. Not everyone shares that view. For
example, as we’ll see below, proponents of learning organizations largely
ignore the concept of class and conflicting interest in their prescription.
This section sets out the three main perspectives on employment relationships in Canada and how they apply to labour-market training.
The most commonly held view of employment relationships—especially among employers—is unitarism. Unitarism is premised on the belief
that an employee comes into the workplace to achieve the objectives of
the employer. A corollary of this view is that work organizations are held
together by common objectives that unite managers and workers (hence
“unitarism”). Unitarists do not acknowledge any fundamental conflicts

100  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

between the interests of employers and employees.7 Consequently, unitarists believe that industrial relations are good when there is an absence
of conflict.
A key problem for unitarists is that employer-worker conflict does
occur, although this can sometimes occur in muted forms such as high
turnover, absenteeism, theft, and sabotage. Unitarists explain both overt
and covert conflict as rooted in the irrationality of workers, the interference of an outside party (e.g., a union), poor communication between
management and labour, and a lack of leadership. There is little acceptance
that employers and employees might have legitimately differing interests.
Unitarism also assumes that workers will behave more rationally if they
have more knowledge of management’s need to (for example) improve
efficiency.
Unitarism is evident in workplace training, which is most often organized by employers to enhance workplace productivity. The employer
determines the content, delivery method, and timing of the training.
While some employers might seek input (or feedback) from their workers
on the training, the key decisions about what is taught to whom is made
by the employer with the employer’s economic interests top of mind. This
view on organizational training may help explain who gets what kind of
workplace training (see Box 4.2).
Box 4.2  Employer-Sponsored Training in Canada
For the most part, employers unilaterally determine who receives
how much and what kind of workplace training. Presumably, this
decision is driven by the expected benefit of training. Each year, only
about one-third of Canadians aged 25 to 64 participate in any form
of non-formal job-related education. While Canada’s training rate is
slightly higher than average among developed countries, looking at the
training rate masks that Canadian workers who receive training receive
fewer hours of training than workers in other countries. This, in turn,
reflects that Canadian employers reduced their training expenditure
per employee by 40 per cent between 1993 and 2013.8
It is unclear why employers have reduced their investment in training over the past 25 years. It seems unlikely employers are unaware
of the claim that training yields economic benefits. Perhaps, though,

Workplace Training and Learning 101
 101
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

many employers don’t believe these claims? Or perhaps these claims
apply to only certain kinds of businesses. For example, employers that
compete based on low labour costs (instead of competing based on
innovation or productivity) might see little value in providing training.
Employers might also be worried about competitors poaching trained
employees. And, given the profit imperative, they may prefer to externalize the costs of training on workers themselves or the state.
While workplace-training rates among men and women were
roughly equal in 2010 (31.2 per cent versus 30.1 per cent respectively),
men were more likely to receive employer support than women (54.6
per cent versus 46.0 per cent).9 As we saw in Chapter 1, workplace
training tends to be unevenly distributed, with workers who already
hold PSE credentials capturing a disproportionately high portion of
subsequent workplace training. Data on the precise kinds of workplace
training being offered is elusive, but there is some suggestion that
there is an increasing emphasis on leadership (i.e., management and
self-management) skills and a corresponding decline in basic workplace skills training.

The idea that employers should determine what training is required and
how it is provided in the workplace is the central premise in the hidden
curriculum of workplace training. Essentially, training becomes an extension of management’s right to organize and direct work. Employer-driven
training often ignores the interests or goals of workers. As we saw in
Chapter 1, workers may engage in learning to achieve a goal (e.g., career
advancement), engage in an activity (e.g., social interaction), or simply
to learn something new. Ignoring the legitimate interests of workers may
reduce workers’ engagement in and application of training.
Workers may be able to exert more control over training in unionized
workplaces if their union negotiates training entitlements into a collective
agreement. These entitlements may compel the employer to provide (or at
least fund) certain kinds of training. Employers may also be compelled to
provide (and perhaps fund) job-protected leave for workers undertaking
training. Unions and collective bargaining are most often associated with
the pluralist view of labour relations. Pluralism asserts that labour and
capital have both converging and conflicting interests in the workplace.
102  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

One way to manage such conflict is through the negotiation of a collective
agreement between a union and an employer.
The pluralist view of labour relations dominates public policy-making
and is evident in laws that allow workers to unionize and that provide
redress for unfair labour practices by employers. The term “pluralism” is borrowed from political science, where it refers to a system of
power-sharing among a number of political parties. Not surprisingly,
pluralist labour relations are often explained using political analogies. For
example, a collective agreement might be likened to a constitution, which
sets out the roles and powers of the government (or, in this analogy, the
employer). The union operates as the “opposition party,” and its primary
job is keep the “government” honest. This analogy tends to obscure the
fact that employers are not elected, they govern in the interests of the
employer (not the broader public interest), and unions are always cast in
the role of the opposition.
While most Canadian employment laws are pluralist (in that they recognize the conflicting interests of labour and capital), the enforcement
of these laws is often weak. This allows employers to exert their greater
power in the workplace to advance their own interests. Essentially, the
rules suggest a pluralist structure (wherein both sides have some power),
but the operation of the rules favours employers (thus reinforcing a unitarist system). We saw echoes of this dynamic in the training system in
Chapter 3’s discussion of the Canada Job Grant. Here, the federal government designed a funding system for labour-market training that should
have benefitted both employers and unemployed Canadians. But the
structure of the CJG allowed employers to appropriate this money and
use it to offset training costs for already employed workers. The absence
of any countervailing worker representation in the CJG meant that, in
practice, the interests of unemployed workers were ignored and employers did whatever they wanted with the CJG funding.
The final perspective on labour relations is a critical one, inspired by
the ideas of Karl Marx. Like pluralism, it views labour and capital as having
conflicting interests in the workplace. Unlike pluralism, this critical perspective is deeply skeptical that these conflicts can be resolved through
negotiations or regulation. Part of this skepticism stems from the tremendous structural advantage capitalists have and use to pursue their interests.
Workplace Training and Learning 103
 103
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

For example, this critical perspective suggests, in part, that trade unions
are a means by which employers and the state manage conflict in the workplace. Specifically, the incorporation thesis asserts that management
and unions have a symbiotic relationship that moderates the behaviour
of unions. Management supports the union by agreeing to union-security
provisions (e.g., an automatic dues check-off provision). In return, the
union supports management by agreeing to a management’s rights clause
(thereby guaranteeing management control over production). In this
arrangement, unions protect their members’ interests (by grieving violations of the contract) but they also ensure their members heed their
contractual obligations (by not striking during the term of the contract
and thereby disrupting production). This dynamic is sometimes referred
to as the central paradox of trade unionism: union power over its members is appropriated by management to serve management’s goals.10
This critique does not mean that union officials are management apologists or are engaged in a conspiracy against workers. Rather, this critical
perspective identifies a dilemma for union leaders. If the union collaborates too much with management, it risks rank-and-file revolt. Yet, if it is
too vigorous in pressing its demands and fails to police its membership, it
risks the loss of management and state support and/or legal penalties. This
critique also helps temper the claim that the establishment of collective
bargaining represents an unqualified victory for unions. This perspective on labour relations helps explain some unions’ willingness to cede to
employers significant control over what workplace training is provided to
whom. Unions do so in acknowledgement that employers have a need to
manage, even if that need is routinely operationalized in ways that monetarily disadvantage workers or important subgroups of workers. As we’ll
see in Chapter 5, some unions have responded by developing their own
training infrastructure.
Understanding the differing perspectives on labour relations is important because it helps us to better understand why individuals and groups
act the way they do. For example, an employer might announce mandatory staff training without consulting the workers who will receive the
training. From the employer’s (unitarist) perspective, it has bought the
workers’ time and can deploy those workers as it likes. Since the workers
are ultimately employed to help the employer earn a profit (which also
104  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

benefits the workers), it makes sense for the employer to decide what
training will occur, when, and how. But, from the (pluralist) perspective of the workers, you can see how such an announcement might be
greeted with disfavour. Their interests in what training occurs, when, and
how are being ignored. And the slogan that “people are our most valuable
resources” sits uneasily (perhaps even gallingly) with unilateral employer
decision-making around training.
Further, depending on the nature of the training involved, workers
might well worry that the training will come with changes in job design
that will make their jobs worse. For example, cross-training employees
(so they can fill in for one another) is often the first step to eliminating
some employees and assigning their tasks to the workers who remain
behind. This additional work will often violate the implicit psychological
contract (sometimes called the wage-effort bargain) that has developed
over time about how and how hard employees will work for the wages
that they are paid. More practically, it can also cut into rest periods available to workers under the current job design. These rest periods may be
important in allowing workers to physically or mentally manage the work
that they are required to do.
Box 4.3  Vocational Training for Injured Workers
Every year, hundreds of thousands of Canadians are injured on the job,
often seriously. As we saw in Chapter 1, each province and territory
has established a mandatory system of workers’ compensation that
provides wage-loss and other benefits to workers who are injured on
the job. As part of returning injured workers to employability, workers’
compensation boards (WCBs) may offer workers training. Much like the
training provided to social assistance recipients (see Box 3.4), the purpose of this training is to reattach injured workers to the labour market.
When a worker is unemployed because of a workplace injury,
the WCB may offer training focused on developing job-search and
interview skills. When a worker has injury-related job restrictions
due to a loss of ability or ongoing medical issues, the WCB may offer
vocational training. This might include assisting the worker to develop
KSAs that will allow them to do their date-of-injury job or occupation.
When a worker’s job restrictions preclude re-employment in their

Workplace Training and Learning 105
 105
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

date-of-injury occupation, a WCB may fund retraining to return the
worker to employability.
Injured workers’ experiences of vocational rehabilitation and
retraining tend to be mixed. Over time, some WCB’s (such as Alberta
and Ontario) have restructured their vocational rehabilitation with
an eye to minimizing its costs. Reducing operating costs reduces the
workers’ compensation premiums that employers pay and reflects
that employers have significant influence over WCB operations. One
result is that vocational services have been constrained.11 For example,
workers often report receiving very cursory job-search assistance and
then find themselves “deemed” to have acquired a job (even if they
haven’t or the job does not exist) and their wage-loss benefits reduced
accordingly.12

Human Capital Theory
Employers often view workplace training and learning as a way to
enhance an organization’s competitive advantage. This same view—writ
large—underlies human capital theory. As we saw in Chapter 1, human
capital theory asserts that the cumulative stock of KSAs, intelligence,
experience, and judgment of an individual or a population comprises a
key input into the production process. Thus, human capital can be maintained or increased through education and training. More contentiously,
some employers, politicians, and academics assert that both individual
labour-market outcomes and collective economic growth turn upon and
can be increased through additional education and training.
In this view, training is an investment by workers in their careers. This
view justifies shifting the cost of formal training onto individuals as well
as increasingly aligning formal education with the demands of the labour
market. Chapter 2 revealed that these trends are evident in Canadian PSE.
It is less clear whether or not training provides positive financial returns
for employers.13 Society may also experience social returns—a gain experienced by the economy as a whole—from training. For example, a trained
worker may be more likely to participate in society and may increase the
productivity of other, less trained workers. The evidence of a social return
is strongest for formal schooling, while the social return on subsequent
workplace training is more ambiguous.14
106  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

The limited empirical support for human capital theory may reflect that
the relationship between training and economic outcomes is complicated
and may be mediated by a variety of factors. For example, an absence of
good jobs will limit (in varying ways) the individual and employer returns
available from almost any form of training.15 In this way, precarious work
disincentivizes employer provision of training. Similarly, increasing workers’ KSAs without allowing them access to tools or job designs that allow
them to employ those skills to their best advantage can reduce or negate
the value of the training. Employees may also not be motivated to apply
training to its fullest extent because the outcome of doing so (layoffs,
higher workloads) may be contrary to their interests. Such a nuanced
view of human capital theory runs contrary to the interests of many training providers, whose own income depends upon selling employers and
workers on the idea that training is a panacea for individual, employer,
and social woes.
Human capital theory broadly supports the unitarist view of training.
The purpose of training (in human capital theory) is to increase productivity. If employers are best situated to know what additional human
capital will increase productivity, then it only makes sense that employers
determine the content of training. But the complexity of work in large
organizations undermines the assertion that employers know best in terms
of what training is needed or how it will affect work. In many fields, workers will know better what training is necessary to improve performance
or stay current in their fields. Further, workers may also have a better
appreciation of the degree to which training will actually (rather than
theoretically) increase productivity based upon an understanding of who
the workers are and how their interests will affect the way in which training is operationalized.

Learning Organizations
One of the most durable training concepts (and some would say fads) to
emerge in the late twentieth century is that of the learning organization.
A learning organization is one focused on increasing the capacity of its
employees through ongoing learning as a means by which to improve
organizational performance. The problem that learning organizations

Workplace Training and Learning 107
 107
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

seek to solve is the tendency of organizations to become inflexible as
they increase in size. Increasing employee skills is intended to make
organizations more nimble and responsive to the needs of customers
and clients and, thereby, provide a competitive advantage over other,
more bureaucratic organizations. In this way, the discourse around learning organizations nicely aligns with human capital theory.16 As Box 4.4
suggests, learning organizations are related to, but distinct from, organizational learning.
Box 4.4  Organizational Learning
Organizational learning and learning organization are interrelated concepts that are often used interchangeably. Organizational learning
usually refers to the way in which “organizations acquire, share, and
use knowledge to succeed.”17 One way to think about organizational
learning is as a set of behaviours undertaken by organizational actors.
For example, a team may assess a project to identify what has gone
well and what hasn’t in order to act differently in the future.
This approach is often associated with single-loop and double-loop
learning. Single-loop learning sees an actor or organization reflect on
a failure to achieve a goal and then change the behaviour that caused
the failure. Double-loop learning entails an actor or organization
rethinking their goal or beliefs about the situation before attempting
to change its behaviour. Double-loop learning is a more sophisticated
form of learning.18
Key barriers to single- and double-loop learning are the financial
and political costs of changing behaviour. Financial costs include
the staff and material costs associated with changing processes. The
political costs of change are more varied. They can include loss of face
and/or influence associated with acknowledging missteps. Depending
upon the nature of the change required, political costs can also
include resistance by stakeholders whose interests will be negatively
affected. For example, the solution to productivity and morale declines
due to a cumbersome new expense-claim system may be to abandon
that system. But those who implemented the system may resist such
an embarrassing reversal and instead recommend staff training as the
solution.

108  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

Another way to think about organizational learning is as a process
by which organizations attempt to codify organizational learning in
the form of policies, procedures, and other less formal documents so
that learning survives staff turnover. Large organizations with relatively stable operations—such as governments, fast-food franchises,
and large manufacturers—still use these techniques. Over time, the
accretion of these learnings is expected to make organizations more
efficient and operations more profitable.
The challenge of this (somewhat traditional) approach of organizational learning is that the pace of change faced by many organizations
suggests relying on past practice may have limited (or even negative)
utility. The idea that organizations are constantly learning (and should
be designed to) supports the notion of learning organizations. Yet not
all organizations that learn do so in ways that meet the definition of
a learning organization. Further, large and small organizations may
undertake organizational learning quite differently, reflecting that small
organizations may be less able to absorb the direct and indirect costs
of formal training.19

In his 1990 book The Fifth Discipline, academic and management guru
Peter Senge identifies five characteristics of learning organizations:
1. Personal Development: Organizations are collections of individuals. Learning occurs at an individual level first, although not every
individual is necessarily interested in actively learning. Learning
organizations both encourage individual learning and attempt to
capture that learning in order to change and benefit the organization.
2. Team Learning: Capturing and sharing individual learning results
in team learning. Team learning is facilitated by structures that
encourage individuals to develop shared understandings. These
knowledge-management structures can be physical things (for
example, databases) or social things (e.g., a culture of ongoing
formal and informal knowledge sharing).
3. Testing and Changing Assumptions: Individuals and organizations
develop norms and beliefs about what behaviours are effective.
Workplace Training and Learning 109
 109
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Sometimes, these norms and beliefs are untrue, or no longer true
or effective. Learning organizations develop ways to identify, challenge, and replace such norms and beliefs.
4. Shared Vision: The development of a vision shared by all organizational members is expected to motivate and focus individual and
organizational learning. Such efforts to create “bottom up” visioning seem to augur in favour of flat organizational structures where
decision-making power is devolved to the lowest organizational
level competent to make the decision.
5. Systems Thinking: Organizational components, processes, and
outcomes need to be clearly and fully understood (often through
the use of quantitative performance measures) in order for an
organization to make meaningful changes.20
While the idea of becoming a learning organization can generate broad
support within an organization, actually doing so can be challenging.
Some workers may be reluctant to engage in this process because they
identify these principles and practices as threatening to their interests. For
example, the move towards team learning can threaten workers’ ability to
shape their working conditions through their greater knowledge of how
work is done. As Box 4.5 suggests, employees have good reason to be
skeptical when an employer starts asking after their knowledge of work.
Box 4.5  Appropriation of Workers’ Knowledge
While a detailed history of labour is beyond the scope of this book, it
is worth noting the broad trend in the organization of work towards
employers appropriating the knowledge and power of workers in order
to increase profitability. For example, manufacturing and other forms
of work were concentrated in factories during the latter part of the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. There are two competing
explanations for the rise of factories:
1. Technological: Machinery was more efficient at producing
goods but required greater volume of work and workspace than
could be found in small workshops.

110  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

2. Control of the workforce: Factories were more efficient because
employers could demand longer and harder work from their
employees, who were economically dependent and could be
closely supervised.
The evidence suggests that factories predated technological change.
The reason for the creation of factories was increasing employer control over the production process and preventing embezzlement.21
This centralization of work facilitated knowledge appropriation
whereby employers learned how work was done. Frederick Taylor’s
time-motion studies (sometimes called scientific management or
Taylorism) gave employers a technology by which to understand how
work was actually done. By taking jobs, breaking them down into
component parts (which could be timed), and reconstructing the production process to maximize productivity, employers stripped workers
of control over the content and pace of work. The development of
rigid, highly efficient production processes also allowed employers to
substitute cheaper, unskilled labour. The introduction of the moving
assembly-line technology by Henry Ford further enhanced employers’
abilities to increase profitability by increasing the pace of the line.22
The profitability of Fordist production processes began to decline
in the 1970s, largely due to external economic and political factors.
While employers continued to maintain significant control over the
structure of work and job design, they sought to use their workers’
(often tacit) knowledge to find ways to maintain profitability. Various
techniques—such as business process re-engineering and total quality
management—have been used to mobilize workers’ knowledge in
service of the employer. As an added bonus, these techniques frame
workers as part of a team, thereby helping to obscure the differing
interests of workers and employers.
This analysis of workplace change is important because it highlights
that job design and other management interventions in the workplace
are not neutral technologies. Rather, they are tools employers use to
increase profitability, often by intensifying work for employees. This
analysis supports the pluralist and critical views of employment as
a relationship underlain by conflicting interests. It also helps frame
worker resistance to technologies (such as learning organizations) as
rational and self-interested actions, rather than being driven by worker
ignorance or laziness.

Workplace Training and Learning 111
 111
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Developing shared values can also be a stumbling block to the implementation of learning organizations. The profit imperative tends to play
a major role in the design of organizations and jobs. Individual workers
or classes or workers may have goals (e.g., job stability and control) that
run contrary to the profit imperative. Such class-based conflict tends to
be ignored in discussions of learning organizations, even though it can
be a major barrier for the development of a shared vision and the decentralization of power.
Organizational size can also pose a practical barrier to the development
of a learning organization. Organizations with more than 150 employees
tend to have greater internal task specialization and less cross-functional
communication.23 This dynamic poses a fundamental threat to developing
a shared vision and systems thinking. The result is ironic. On the one hand,
the putative purpose of learning organization is to increase the flexibility and responsiveness of large organizations. Yet, on the other hand, as
organizations grow larger, the effectiveness of primary mechanisms of
learning organizations (knowledge sharing) tends to diminish. While this
tension does not preclude the development of learning organizations, it
suggests that learning organizations are increasingly difficult to establish
in the very organizations where they are supposedly most needed and
effective.
A study of how the Swiss Postal Service attempted to become a learning organization suggests that attempting to transform an organization
solely by altering its culture will be ineffective. This is because organizational structure and job design are powerful factors in how organizations
operate and also tend to reflect environmental conditions and pressures,
which can be difficult to alter. Basically, organizations operate the way
they do, in part, for good reasons. This same study also suggests that it
is important (but difficult) to connect individual and team learning with
strategic organizational objectives.24
A recent survey of academic studies of learning organizations revealed
two of the largest knowledge gaps to be (1) what it means to be a learning
organization, and (2) whether learning organizations are effective.25 The
limited research conducted on these topics suggests that we exert caution
when confronted with claims that becoming a learning organization is a
pathway to organizational success. Perhaps the most compelling critique
112  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

of learning organizations is that real-life examples are hard to find. This
lack of examples does not necessarily invalidate the utility of the learning
organization as a model. We rarely see, for example, labour markets that
are perfect representations of the models outlined in Chapter 1. Yet that
idealized model of how labour markets work still has practical value. That
said, significant gaps between a model and reality suggest important limits
to a model’s utility.
Given the challenges associated with actually developing learning
organizations, it is useful to ask why the concept of learning organizations
retains currency some 30 years on. For organizational leaders, seeking to
create a learning organization may provide them with political capital. The
ill-defined but positive-sounding goal of creating a learning organization
can be used to generate buy-in (or lower resistance) to whatever organizational changes the leader wants to make. In effect, the utility of learning
organizations may be their use as a rhetorical strategy rather than any
inherent value they generate. Management consultants who are seeking
a steady supply of new clients may support such rhetorical efforts.
The concept of a learning organization also feeds into the quest of
human resource (HR) practitioners for increased organizational salience.
Historically, HR management has been viewed as comprising transactional
personnel-management functions (hiring and firing, record-keeping,
and payroll management). Such transactional work is easily outsourced.
Many HR practitioners seek to elevate their organizational status and
become “strategic partners” (which, in turn, makes it more difficult for
the employer to contract out their jobs). There are two main impediments
to efforts to make HR a strategic organizational partner. First, much HR
work continues to be transactional personnel-management work. Second,
other organizational actors may be reluctant to give up influence and control to HR. The work of implementing a learning organization often falls
to HR, thereby creating an opportunity for HR shops to expand their
organizational role and influence.

Skills, Competencies, and Knowledge
Workplace training is normally aimed at creating or improving workers’
skills, knowledge, or competencies in order to increase an organization’s

Workplace Training and Learning 113
 113
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

capacity (and, usually, profitability). Employers may also undertake
training in order to comply with certain legal requirements, such as
meeting their obligation to inform workers about the presence and safe
handling of hazardous chemicals. Such training may increase workers’
knowledge and skills, but that is not what motivates the employer to
provide the training.
A skill is the ability to perform a task. Being able to accurately saw
a board in half is a skill. Making change or reading a financial statement
are also skills. The acquisition of a skill usually builds upon other skills a
learner already possesses. As we’ll see in Chapter 5, academics and governments often subdivide skills into different categories and rank them
in order of complexity. For example, possessing basic skills (such as reading and writing) may be a prerequisite to developing general workplace
skills (such as problem solving) that, in turn, are prerequisites to learning
job-specific skills (such as operating the software an organization uses to
track customer emails and phone calls).
The term “skill” is often used interchangeably with the term “competency.” A competency is a collection of KSAs that allow someone to
perform a task or a job. For example, assisting a customer to resolve a
problem may require a worker to apply her knowledge of a product, her
communication skills, and her ability to calm a frustrated customer. Again,
there are numerous typologies of competencies. The key point is that
competencies tend to refer to an amalgam of KSAs employed to complete
more complex work.
“Knowledge” is also a term that is worthwhile unpacking. Knowledge
is information (i.e., facts) combined with experience and values that we
apply to situations and problems in our lives. Knowledge is often categorized as explicit and tacit knowledge. Explicit knowledge is fact-based
and relatively easy to transfer to learners. For example, it is fairly easy
to explain to someone how to operate a fire extinguisher. The steps are
straightforward and easy to distill into writing: pull the pin, aim nozzle
at base of fire, and squeeze trigger.
By contrast, tacit knowledge is more difficult to transfer. It encompasses knowledge that is often learned through experience and is very
difficult to codify. Continuing with the fire extinguisher example, while
it is easy to teach someone how to operate a fire extinguisher, it is harder
114  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

to teach to them when to use a fire extinguisher (versus evacuating the
area) or how to most effectively employ the fire extinguisher in particular
conditions (e.g., high winds, confined spaces). This kind of knowledge is
often imparted through practice and experience, often guided by more
experienced practitioners.26
What counts as knowledge, skill, or ability is often mediated by
personal characteristics, such as gender. For example, jobs traditionally held by men (e.g., construction worker, building superintendent)
often explicitly identify lifting as a required ability. By contrast, jobs
traditionally done by women (e.g., nursing, cleaning) often require lifting but this is rarely explicitly acknowledged in job descriptions. When
employers make activity (such as lifting) invisible, workers—predominantly women—are denied compensation as well as adequate training and
equipment to do the job safely.
Similarly, certain competencies are often ignored, even though they
are a key requirement of the job. Emotional labour, for example, is often
a component of female-dominated occupations. Emotional labour is an
occupational requirement to manage one’s feelings and to make occupationally appropriate emotional displays, regardless of one’s internal
feelings.27 Servers and caregivers may be expected to act in ways that
trigger positive feelings in others (e.g., exude warmth and compassion),
and women typically dominate these roles. This key competency is rarely
recognized or compensated, reflecting that emotional labour tends to be
the (unpaid) province of women, and that it often occurs in the home (i.e.,
it is part of the social reproduction).
The pluralist perspective on labour relations helps us explain why
employers and workers might disagree about what counts as knowledge or
as a skill or competency. Employers seek to minimize their labour costs, in
part by controlling the design of work. They have, historically, been better
able to control the design of traditionally female work because women
were less likely to overtly resist differential treatment. Over time, employers have shifted strategies from overt discrimination in female-dominated
occupations (although this still happens) towards deskilling work, thereby
allowing employers to increase a job’s precarity. But not all work can
be deskilled. Some occupations remain high-skill (and high-status and

Workplace Training and Learning 115
 115
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

high-wage) jobs. Many of these jobs require significant labour-market
training to secure and maintain the right to practise.

Professional Regulatory Organizations
As noted in Chapter 2, in some occupations, workers must be licensed
in order to legally practise. Examples include engineers, pharmacists,
teachers, lawyers, and nurses. Such occupations are often referred to as
regulated professions. In order to be licensed, an individual must meet
certain requirements. This licensure requirement is intended to protect
the public’s health and safety or other interests, which might be compromised from receiving services from unqualified practitioners. That
said, in some instances, jurisdictions have regulated professions where
the risk associated with non-licensed practitioners is questionable. This
suggests that the designation of which professionals are regulated is a
political decision, rather than a purely technical one. Other professions
may have voluntary certification.
Provincial and territorial governments often delegate responsibility
for establishing and administering licensure requirements to Professional
Regulatory Organizations (PROs). Each province has its own PRO for
each occupation and these organizations go by many names. For example,
the Law Society of Upper Canada regulates who can practise law in
Ontario. It sets out minimum educational, employment, and character
requirements as well as sets examinations that candidates must pass before
being permitted to practise law. As we saw in Chapter 2, there are differences (by gender, heritage, and socio-economic status) in access to
post-secondary education programs that are normally prerequisites to
professional licensure. By requiring specific PSE training, professional
licensure compounds patterns of advantage and disadvantage.
Some PROs also ensure that professionals meet other criteria, such as
having adequate insurance coverage. Maintaining licensure may also entail
undertaking periodic training (often called professional development,
although this term is often used broadly to mean any ongoing training in
non-regulated white-collar occupations). Meeting professional licensure
requirements has given rise to a large body of private training providers
that offer workshops and conferences (sometimes in exotic locations) to

116  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

help professionals meet their profession’s requirement. Workers unable to
achieve and maintain licensure are barred from practising the profession.
This power makes workers with certification very leery of opposing or
otherwise running afoul of their PRO.
In addition to regulating who may practise a profession in their province
or territory, PROs also typically investigate complaints against registered
professionals and may discipline members, including prohibiting them
from practising. The disciplinary function of PROs is intended to protect
the public from incompetent or unscrupulous conduct. The importance
of conduct reflects that the public is often profoundly vulnerable when
interacting with professionals and, absent a complaint process, would face
significant barriers to successfully pursue remedy. Sometimes, a single
organization will act as both a PRO and as a trade union (i.e., representing
workers in collective bargaining with employers); an example would be
the Alberta Teachers’ Association.
PROs are normally self-governing organizations. This means that the
PRO is created by an act of a provincial or territorial legislature. The PRO
then establishes rules, regulations, and guidelines to govern its operation.
Typically, a PRO will be governed by a board of directors (the precise
name will vary). Members of the board may be elected by and from the
membership of the profession, appointed by government, or chosen
by some combination of processes and often include members of the
public. The board then sets policy, which is carried out by staff members
employed by the PRO.
As we saw in Chapter 3, some workers engage in employment-related
geographic mobility. Historically, workers in some regulated professions
faced difficulties becoming reaccredited when they changed jurisdictions.
These difficulties are typically not as significant as those faced by foreign
trained immigrants (as we’ll see in Chapter 5). Over the past 10 years,
many provinces have entered into internal trade agreements that include
labour-mobility provisions. For example, British Columbia, Alberta,
Saskatchewan, and Manitoba have signed the “New West Partnership
Agreement.” This agreement requires that PROs in each province recognize professional accreditation issued in any of the other three provinces.28
There are many arguments for professional self-regulation. Members
of a profession are more likely to understand the nature and complexities
Workplace Training and Learning 117
 117
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

of practice than might a government agency tasked with oversight.
Self-regulation also creates a unique degree of normative (or peer) pressure to comply with regulations that may be less felt when dealing with
government regulators. Self-regulation also shifts the cost of regulation to
the professionals and (to some degree) insulates legislators from demands
to intervene or otherwise take action on issues specific to the profession.
Concerns about self-regulation tend to centre on the potential for a
conflict of interest. This might come in the form of a PRO protecting a
member from a public complaint. There is little evidence that this is a widespread problem, in part reflecting that it is in the reputational interests of
the PRO and its members to be seen to discipline and expel bad actors.
A more difficult criticism to dismiss is that a PRO is essentially a cartel. A
cartel is a group of producers that act in concert in ways that increase their
profits. Cartels are most often associated with price fixing, but other cartel
activity includes limiting the supply of a service available (thereby driving
up its price). As we’ll see in Chapter 5, many immigrants with professional
qualifications from other countries face significant delays and other barriers to entry to a profession. Some suggest that this pattern (particularly
since it appears to most significantly affect non-English speakers who are
visible minorities) is intended to limit the supply of professionals, which
economically advantages existing members.

Conclusion
Workplace training is driven by the belief that enhancing workers’ KSAs
will, in turn, enhance organizational performance and profitability in the
private sector. The evidence for this relationship is uncertain, suggesting
that not all training results in a return on investment. The potential for
conflict between labour and capital may play an important role in explaining the uneven gains that come from training. Workers may, for example,
choose not to use training if they feel it is going to be employed in a way
that is contrary to their interests (or their co-workers’ interests). Conversely, employers may arrange work such that workers have little ability
to implement training. The only people unquestionably benefitting from
workplace training are training providers!

118  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

One provocative way to think about workplace training is as a management technology that makes workers more governable.29 Human capital
theory is designed to lay responsibility for being adequately trained upon
workers (who are the primary beneficiaries of training). What KSAs are
needed are determined by employers through their hiring and training
decisions, thereby making workers more subservient to employers.
So-called revolutionary ideas (such as the learning organization) provide
a pretext to submerge intra-organizational conflict in order to advance
the interests of the employer. This includes developing a shared vision of
organizational goals and codifying employee knowledge so that it can be
appropriated by the employer to redesign work in more efficient ways.
Somewhere between 5 and 10 per cent of the workforce is employed
in regulated professions. Such professions typically have high status and
compensation, and maintaining the integrity of the profession (thereby
protecting the public) is the official role of professional regulatory bodies.
Yet there is another side to the role of PROs. By restricting access to the
profession, the PROs operate as a cartel, inducing (however indirectly)
a tighter supply of labour than would exist if there were no requirement
for licensure. In this way, PROs act both for and against the interests of
employers. Licensure allows employers to be confident employees are
competent (and give them a way to discipline incompetent employees),
but it also acts to drive up the price of labour. This tension plays out most
clearly in the labour-market experiences of foreign-trained professionals,
which we’ll consider in Chapter 5.

Notes
1  Berger and Yang, “Millennials Job-Hop More Than Previous Generations.”
2  Wingard, “Want Millennials to Stay?”
3  United States Department of Labor, “Employee Tenure News Release.”
4  Wingard, “Want Millennials to Stay?”
5 Spencer, The Purposes of Adult Education.
6  Livingstone, “Exploring the Icebergs of Adult Learning.”
7 Godard, Industrial Relations, the Economy and Society.
8  Munro, “Developing Skills.”
9  Statistics Canada, Women in Canada.
10 Hyman, The Political Economy of Industrial Relations.

Workplace Training and Learning 119
 119
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

11 Barnetson, The Political Economy of Workplace Injury.
12  Alberta Workers’ Health Centre, Injured Worker Case Study.
13  Percival, Cozzarin, and Formaneck, “Return on Investment for Workplace
Training.”
14  Blundell et al., “Human Capital Investment.”
15  Margison, “Rethinking Education, Work and ‘Employability.’”
16 Senge, The Fifth Discipline.
17 McShane, Organizational Behaviour. 23.
18  Argyris and Schön, Organizational Learning.
19  Percival, Cozzarin, and Formaneck. “Return on Investment for Workplace
Training.”
20 Senge, The Fifth Discipline.
21  Marglin, “What Do Bosses Do?”
22 Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital.
23  Serenko, Bontis, and Hardie, “Organizational Size and Knowledge Flow.”
24  Finger and Brand, “The Concept of the ‘Learning Organization.’”
25  Tuggle, “Gaps and Progress in our Knowledge of Learning Organizations.”
26  Sanchez, “‘Tacit Knowledge’ versus ‘Explicit Knowledge’ Approaches.”
27  James, “Emotional Labour.”
28  Canada’s New West Partnership, “New West Partnership Agreement.”
29 Townley, Reframing Human Resource Management.

120  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

C H A P T E R

F I V E

Community-Based Education and
Training

Learning Objectives
After reading this chapter, you will be able to:
➢➢ Identify four forms of community-based education and training.
➢➢ Explain how government policy affects community-based
education and training.
➢➢ Evaluate community education in terms of access to, control of,
and benefit from training.

Joy Chukwura, a 37-year-old single mom and Nigerian refugee living
in Vancouver, cleans hotel rooms to earn a living. She arrived in Canada
nearly 10 years ago, unable to speak English or read and write in any language. Over several years, she took night classes at Vancouver Community
College to bring her English proficiency up from a grade zero level to
grade 4. In time, Chukwura hoped to earn a high school diploma and
move into a better job.
BC fully funded adult basic education, high school, and language
courses, beginning in 2008. The $8 million cost was deemed too high
in 2012, and the provincial Liberal government reduced the number of
courses it would pay for.1 In 2014, the federal Conservative government
reduced funding for English as a Second Language (ESL) instruction and
adult basic education. The federal government also reduced funding for
Language Instruction for Newcomers to Canada (LINC). One consequence of these changes is that Chukwura was forced to pay $1,000 for
three months of night classes—a cost she simply could not afford.
“If they ask us not to go to school because we are not able to pay the
money, then how are we going to do more things in the future?” asks
Chukwura.2 While adults seeking to upgrade their education could apply
for grants in BC, the income threshold of $30,000 for a two-person family
excluded many potential students (including Chukwura) from accessing
funding. Grants were also available for only three years, which was often
too little time for students to significantly benefit from the training. Enrollment dropped by 35 per cent in the wake of these cuts. The election of a
New Democratic government in 2017 saw these cuts reversed, but whether
capacity to deliver such programs can be recovered after years of staff
layoffs and facility closures is unclear.3
 123
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Decreasing state support for literacy training has pushed many
Canadians to seek help from the not-for-profit sector. Not-for-profit
organizations already offer much of Canada’s literacy education but have
been beset by funding reductions. The near-universal requirement for literacy in employment means such programs are key to the reproduction of
labour power for workers who do not follow a traditional pathway through
the education system. This is particularly the case for Indigenous peoples,
who often drop out of school.4
In addition to literacy work, community groups also provide immigrant settlement services and public legal education to Canadians. These
programs contribute to social reproduction by allowing workers to interact with our complex society and, in some cases, aiding them in attaching
to the labour market. Trade unions also provide education and training,
for both their members and the broader public. While much union training is aimed at improving the contract negotiation and administration
skills of activists, unions also offer issue-based education and, in some
cases, vocational training.
While community-based education and training can have labour-market
benefits, community education also helps workers develop skills that they
can use to seek political, social, and economic reform. There is a long tradition of such emancipatory adult education in Canada. Helping Canadians
to identify their interests (as distinct from the interests of the state and
employers) has the potential to cause significant social disruption. The
potential social instability that can (and has) come from community-based
education may partly explain why state funding of community education
and training is low, uneven, and often tightly controlled. Similar reasoning
may explain employers’ lack of financial support for community training.
Employers may also see community education as a way to externalize
training costs.

Literacy Education
Literacy is “the ability to understand, evaluate, use, and engage with
written texts.”5 Being literate allows us to participate in society, secure
employment, and develop our KSAs. Individual literacy will vary from
someone who is unable to decode basic words and sentences to someone

124  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

who can comprehend, interpret, and evaluate complex texts. Since literacy
skills are used in specific contexts (e.g., following written instructions,
filling out a form), it is important to acknowledge that our functional
literacy (our ability to complete day-to-day tasks requiring literacy) may
differ from how we score on a literacy test. This difference is taken up
below in Box 5.2.
As we saw in Chapter 2, literacy is one of the key goals of the K-12
educational system. Despite these efforts, many adult Canadians seek to
improve their literacy later in life. Literacy education for adults is delivered
through an amalgam of formal educational institutions and community
groups in arrangements that vary among the provinces and territories.
Adult basic education (sometimes referred to as high school completion or academic upgrading) is usually offered through provincially or
territorially funded school boards and colleges. Governments may also
directly fund community-based literacy programs, often targeted at
specific groups, such as immigrants or Indigenous peoples. One example
is Ontario’s Literacy and Basic Skills Program (outlined in Box 5.1), which
targets unemployed Ontarians with low literacy and numeracy skills.
Box 5.1  Ontario’s Literacy and Basic Skills Program
Ontario’s Literacy and Basic Skills (LBS) program provides free training
to Ontarians whose reading, writing, and math skills are below the
grade 12 level. The program focuses on assisting unemployed Ontarians, with specific attention to those on income support. The program
is also available to employed Ontarians who need literacy or basic skills
training to maintain or improve work skills.6
A high proportion of LBS participants are unemployed, have not
completed high school, and have had an interrupted education. The
Ministry of Advanced Education and Skills Development funds delivery of LBS through community agencies, colleges, and school boards
at 274 sites across the province. In 2014–15, over 37,000 Ontarians
received training in person, and over 5,500 participated in blended
learning with an online component. These participants represent only
1 per cent of adult, working-age Ontarians whose literacy skills are typically viewed as inadequate.

Community-Based Education and Training 125
 125
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

One of the more interesting findings of the program is that the
structure of the program applies significant financial pressure to
service providers. Consequently, providers are often forced to look for
ways to game the system in order to financially survive. This includes
strategies such as teaching towards the test and structuring learner’s
experiences so they complete milestones in each of agencies’ financial
reporting periods.
A 2016 review of the system found that, while the system has been
effective in providing learners with reading, writing, and math skills,
declining funding levels (in real dollars) are placing significant strains
on this system. And the government accountability and reporting
requirements divert resources away from serving learners and into
administrative work.

There are a number of reasons why governments use not-for-profit
agencies to deliver this programming. Such agencies may have better connections to and more legitimacy with the group targeted by the program
than the government does. This can aid in program design and uptake.
Such agencies can also often deliver programming at a lower cost than
is possible through direct government funding. Government employees are more likely to be unionized and have permanent jobs, while the
not-for-profit sector is known for precarious staff employment conditions
(often driven by short-term and low levels of government funding). This
dynamic reveals that governments may use community education to meet
the demands of production and social reproduction at the lowest possible
cost. In doing so, they externalize some of the cost of training onto the
very workers who are delivering it.
There is no coherent government policy guiding literacy programming,
although there are clear trends if you follow the funding.7 In examining literacy funding, it is important to recognize that there is no legal obligation
for governments to fund literacy work. The federal government originally
began funding literacy work in the early 1960s in the hope of alleviating
unemployment by increasing workers’ skills. The structure of the program
also administratively converted a number of unemployed into “trainees,”
thereby reducing the apparently level of unemployment. Limited success
in converting literacy training into employment saw a decline in federal
126  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

interest in the 1970s, and responsibility slowly shifted to the provinces
(who are mandated to deliver education). Renewed federal interest in the
mid-1980s resulted in federal funding of literacy work.8
The 2013 introduction of the Canada Job Fund Agreements eliminated some federal funding for community literacy work. Subsequently,
in 2014, the federal Conservative government eliminated funding for the
Canadian Literacy and Learning Network (CLLN) and a number of provincial literacy associations that same year. The result was that, by 2016,
six of Canada’s 15 literacy coalitions (which provided literacy training and
coordination) had ceased operations.9 The National Adult Literacy Database—which provided new readers, libraries, and grassroots organizations
with high-quality literacy materials—was also closed.10
According to a spokesperson for then-Minister of Employment and
Social Development Jason Kenney, “Our government is committed to
ensuring that federal funding for literacy is no longer spent on administration and countless research papers, but instead is invested in projects
that result in Canadians receiving the literacy skills they need to obtain
jobs.”11 In effect, state-funded literacy education contracted and became
more closely aligned with providing job-ready workers for employers.
This broadly mirrors the trajectory of the other federal labour-market
training policies we reviewed in Chapter 3.

Literacy and Basic Skills
Literacy is one component of basic skills. The other components include
numeracy and the ability to learn. As noted in Chapter 4, these basic
skills are the foundation of workplace skills that include generic technical
skills, problem-solving skills, and interpersonal skills. Workers can carry
both basic and workplace skills with them from job to job. Firm- and
job-specific skills are built on top of basic and workplace skills and are not
generally portable. This relationship is outlined in figure 5.1.
The federal government has adopted an essential skills model. This
model asserts there are nine essential skills that “provide a foundation
for learning all other skills and enable people to better prepare for, get
and keep a job, and adapt and succeed at work.”12 This approach directly
links skills and skill development with employment outcomes, again a

Community-Based Education and Training 127
 127
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

pattern consistent with the federal training policies reviewed in Chapter 3.
In addition to literacy skills (reading, writing, and document use), Canada’s essential skills include numeracy, oral communications, thinking,
digital skills, working with others, and the skills associated with continuous learning. Each skill can be performed at one of five levels (basic to
advanced), and the federal government has developed skill profiles of
over 350 occupations.

Firm
and job
specific skills
NOT P O R TA B L E

Generic
technical

Analytic
problem
solving

WO R K P L AC E S K I L L S

Workplace
interpersonal

-

Motor skills
Mathematics

P O R TA B L E

Ability to learn
Reading
and writing

BASIC SKILLS

-

Communications
P O R TA B L E

Figure 5.1  Skills pyramid. Adapted from Ontario Premier’s Council,
People and Skills in the New Global Economy.

The belief underlying Canada’s essential skills model is that individuals can acquire generic, decontextualized skills. Constructing skills as
discrete, observable, and individual performances or behaviours ignores
the fact that skilled tasks are often jointly performed between two or more
workers in specific work contexts, each drawing on multiple abilities
that are used in unobservable ways. This suggests that efforts to develop
generic skills outside of a specific context may fail to adequately engage
with the difference between explicit knowledge and tacit knowledge (see
Chapter 4). A second line of critique of essential skills is that the skills

128  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

tend to have a bias towards white-collar jobs in the so-called knowledge
economy (which are a significant minority of all jobs).13
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) surveyed the skills of adults (aged 16 to 65) in 24 countries and
regions in 2011–12. It found literacy, numeracy, and problem-solving skills
were positively associated with access to basic services, employment and
income levels, and opportunities to secure better jobs and additional training and education. Workers with lower levels of literacy also reported
poorer health, a lower sense of political efficacy, less community involvement, and lower levels of trust in others.14 It is important to note that
association (i.e., two things happening at the same time or in proximity
to one another) does not necessarily mean there is causation (i.e., one
thing causing another). Further, causation is not necessarily a one-way
dynamic (e.g., A causes B). Complex phenomena may involve a feedback
loop (A causes B, which intensifies A, which causes more of B) that we
sometimes call virtuous and vicious cycles.
The 2011–12 OECD Survey of Adult Skills sorted respondents into
five categories based upon their successful completion of a series of
literacy-related tasks. Respondents were presented with several tasks at
each level to determine their ability to work at that level. Examples of the
tasks respondents had to complete at each level included the following:
• Level 1: Respondents were required to read a short newspaper article and answer a brief question requiring fact-finding and a simple
inference.
• Level 2: Respondents were required to navigate a basic website and
find contact information under the “Contact Us” page.
• Level 3: Respondents were required to look through a bibliography
and identify the author of a specific book.
• Level 4: Respondents were required to search a bibliography and
identify a book that made arguments for and against a proposition,
based on the book’s title.15
Figure 5.2 presents Canada’s results, which were about average when
compared to other OECD countries. Interestingly, Canada had
higher-than-average percentages of its population at the highest and
Community-Based Education and Training 129
 129
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

lowest levels of literacy. Literacy is highest among those aged 25 to 34
and among workers in managerial or professional occupations. 16
40

37.3%

35

31.7%

30
25
20
13.7%

12.8%

15
10
5

3.8%

0
below level 1

level 1

level 2

level 3

level 4/5

Figure 5.2  Literacy level in Canada, 2011–12. (Data from Statistics
Canada, “Skills in Canada.”)

Off-reserve First Nations, Métis, and Inuit peoples typically have lower literacy rates than non-Indigenous Canadians, with particularly pronounced
differences in the Territories. One-third of off-reserve First Nations people
had literacy scores at Level 3 or higher, versus 50 per cent of Métis and 57
per cent of non-Indigenous Canadians.17 These differences likely reflect
opportunities to learn and apply literacy as well as the colonial legacy
in Canada’s education and employment systems that were discussed in
Chapter 3.
One of the challenges in discussing literacy education is the measure used. The percentage of Canadians that have attained each level of
literacy in figure 5.2 look concrete and present a compelling case for
funding additional literacy education. Yet, as we see in Box 5.2, many
practitioners raise profound critiques of such measures and the purposes
to which they are put.

130  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

Box 5.2  Are Literacy Measures Valid?
Literacy testing is subject to a number of criticisms. An important
criticism is that literacy tests don’t necessarily describe actual literacy
as practised by adults: those who score poorly on tests might still
function quite effectively in their lives and work.18 A second criticism
is that literacy measures are often manipulated to drive specific policy
agendas. For example, in 2005, the federal government combined the
results of Levels 1 and 2 to conclude that 48 per cent of adult Canadians had lower-than-desired literacy levels. Business groups (such as
the Conference Board of Canada) seized on this oversimplification to
(incorrectly) pronounce, “Four out of ten Canadian adults have literacy
skills too low to be fully competent in most jobs in our modern economy.”19 This assertion sits uneasily with results from the same survey
wherein many so-called illiterate people believe they have adequate
literacy skills for their lives.
A more technical criticism of literacy measures is how they can
be misused. The Adult Literacy and Lifeskills (ALL) Survey (from which
this data was derived) was designed to describe the distribution of
skills across the population (e.g., X per cent of the population reads at
Level 3). It was not designed to diagnose individual literacy levels (for
example, Kelly reads at Level 3). Over time, though, the ALLs results
have been used to do just that. For example, Ontario’s Literacy and
Basic Skills tutor manual describes so-called Level 1 learners as having
“very poor literacy skills, where the individual may, for example, be
unable to determine the correct amount of medicine to give a child
from information printed on the package.”20 Using broad categories to
label individuals ignores significant variability in functional literacy.
These two practices are sometimes combined to shape policy
decisions. For example, Level 3 has been arbitrarily selected as the
desired level of competence. There is no evidence of a meaningful and
hard cutoff at Level 3. Indeed, many workers with Level 2 are gainfully
employed, especially given the propensity of employers to create
low-skill jobs. Nevertheless, the Conference Board has used the Level
3 goal to argue that literacy training should be aimed at individuals in
the upper range of Level 2 in order to make them employable, leaving
individuals at Literacy Level 1 out in the cold.21

Community-Based Education and Training 131
 131
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Government funding decisions have a profound impact on access to literacy education. As the opening vignette suggests, some Canadians who
wish to access literacy education cannot afford literacy classes (which are
increasingly being offered on a cost-recovery basis). Further, the least
literate may require lengthy instruction that takes them far beyond the
support offered by governments in the form of bursaries or other funding.
That said, as shown by Ontario’s Literacy and Basic Skills program, some
governments have made an effort to provide greater access to literacy
training.
The Literacy and Basic Skills program is clearly linked to enhancing
participant’s employability. As we saw in Chapter 2, this trend to linking
education and training to employment outcomes is also evident in the
formal PSE system. An important impact of this trend is that not-for-profit
organizations that continue to offer literacy education must often frame
funding applications in ways that explicitly address labour-market outcomes (even if the link is weak or participants will struggle to achieve
such outcomes). Box 5.3 considers the historic commitment of the adult
educators to literacy as a path to social justice—a tradition that is being
eroded by this focus on literacy for employability.
Box 5.3  Adult Education and Literacy
Canada has a long tradition of adult education initiatives that used
literacy education as a way to improve worker’s lives. For example,
Frontier College began in 1899 as the Reading Tent Association. It
provided literacy training to young men (often immigrants) working
in isolated lumber camps in northern Ontario. Over time, it expanded
its operations to include rail gangs and mining camps, with literacy
education offered by fellow workers in the evenings.22 More recently,
Frontier College has provided literacy education and services to
migrant farm workers in southwestern Ontario and to Indigenous
communities, where physical isolation limits access to literacy programming.
Many adult educators have believed that literacy is a foundational
skill for individuals seeking greater control over their lives. In the
early twentieth century, the Antigonish movement combined adult
education with economic literacy to empower rural Maritimers (whose

132  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

economy was largely based on commodities such as seafood and coal)
to resist exploitation by moneylenders and product marketers. Mass
meetings raised the possibility of citizens taking greater control of their
economic lives. These meetings led to study clubs wherein members
identified factors keeping them poor, explored possible solutions, and
considered how to bring those solutions about.23
Worker-owned co-operatives were a frequent outcome of such
meetings. A co-operative might operate a factory, store, or credit union
for the benefit of the co-operative members (who were also key suppliers or customers). These arrangements saw workers realize a much
greater share of the value that they produced fishing or farming or
mining. Such co-operative arrangements persist today (such as Mountain Equipment Co-op or Desjardins, which offers banking and insurance
services), offering an alternative to profit-driven organizations.
Many contemporary adult educators look to historical examples
for inspiration and guidance when providing literacy education to
individuals. One of the challenges this poses is that the emancipatory tradition of adult education often runs contrary to the economic
interests of employers and the state’s desire for social stability. Consequently, programs in such traditions can find it difficult to secure
financial support, particularly in light of the declining public funding
for literacy education and the tendency to frame such training as a
pathway to employability.

Individuals are key beneficiaries of literacy education in terms of greater
literacy and access to jobs, but these benefits may be spread less evenly
than they previously have been. This employability framing of literacy
emboldens employer-friendly groups (such as the Conference Board
of Canada) to advocate for focusing literacy efforts on the “nearly
employable” at the expense of those Canadians who will require greater
investments to improve their literacy. This return-on-investment approach
makes sense when training is viewed primarily as a way of maintaining
the production process.
Employers benefit from a greater proportion of workers achieving
Level 3 literacy because this increases the pool of potential workers with
this skill. As we saw in Chapter 1, an increase in the numbers of workers

Community-Based Education and Training 133
 133
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

tends to drive down wages and allows employers to make previously
“good” white-collar jobs more precarious. Greater literacy also benefits governments by providing workers greater access to (often poorer)
jobs. Literacy training also legitimizes capitalist social formation because
it creates pathways (however ephemeral) to employability. This shifts
responsibility for unemployment and underemployment onto workers
and away from employers and the state. To the degree that literacy allows
workers to hold even poor jobs, literacy education also reduces pressure
on state-funded income support systems.

Immigrant Settlement Services
In 2015, more than 270,000 persons were granted permanent-resident
status in Canada. Almost 63 per cent of these immigrants are economic
immigrants (i.e., being granted residency based upon their potential contribution to Canada). Roughly 24 per cent of immigrants arrived through
the family-reunification stream, and 13 per cent were granted permission
to enter the country on humanitarian grounds (including as refugees).24
These immigrants are in addition to the migrant workers granted permission to work temporarily in Canada.
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, Canada has long used immigration
to fill skill and labour shortages. While most immigrants have a working
knowledge of English or French (or both), approximately 23 per cent of
new permanent residents (mostly refugees and spouses and dependents
of economic immigrants) know neither language. For these immigrants,
English as a Second Language (ESL) or English as an Additional Language (EAL) instruction is an important component of settlement.
Immigrants (even those with high degrees of fluency) may require other
forms of settlement services.
Immigrant settlement services include information about accessing
health, education, housing, and transportation resources; help in interacting with the state (e.g., assistance filling out forms); and document
translation and job-search assistance. The federal government funds a network of immigrant-serving agencies (often not-for-profit organizations)
to provide these kinds of support. Provincial and territorial governments
may also fund immigrant settlement services. And informal (although

134  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

sometimes highly organized) community-specific services may also exist
in locations where large communities of a specific culture or religion exist.
The level of settlement services available in any given location is highly
variable. Immigrants in large, urban centres generally have greater access
to such programming than do immigrants in rural and northern locations.
Historically, immigrants had relatively little difficulty finding manual
labour. The disappearance of many of such jobs means that newcomers
to Canada today often face difficulty in attaching to the labour market.25
While immigrants face a number of barriers to securing employment, an
important issue related to labour-market training is foreign credential
recognition. Credential recognition entails having educational qualifications above the high-school level that have been achieved in another
country evaluated and granted a Canadian equivalency. Credential recognition is performed by many different organizations for different purposes
(e.g., PSE institutions, provincial or territorial credential evaluation
services, employers, and professional regulatory bodies) and can affect
immigrants’ access to education and jobs.
An interesting tension in Canada’s immigration system is that the federal government selects workers on the basis of their educational and
occupational characteristics, yet many immigrants find themselves unable
to work in their profession upon arrival. As we saw in Chapter 4, entry to
some occupations is restricted in the public interest (for instance, nursing,
law, medicine, and engineering). In these regulated occupations, professional regulatory organizations (PROs) set certain criteria (including
educational qualifications) that must be met before a worker is allowed to
practise their profession. Immigrants may need to recertify in their profession, and this process can include having credentials evaluated, taking
examinations, and obtaining Canadian experience.
There is significant evidence that immigrants struggle to have foreign
credentials and work experience recognized in Canada. One effect of this
dynamic is that it channels immigrants into jobs shunned by Canadian
workers.26 There is also evidence that workers whose ethnicity is readily
visible (based on their skin colour or accent) have greater difficulty securing employment (particularly in their pre-immigration occupation). This
difficulty, in turn, can further impede their efforts to secure the right to
practise in their pre-immigration profession. Together, these preferences
Community-Based Education and Training 135
 135
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

(by employers, educators, and regulators) comprise systemic racism.27
Systemic racism exists when policies and practices embedded in institutions result in differential treatment of specific groups. It is important to be
mindful that there are programs designed to enable immigrants to utilize
their credentials, such as the program described in Box 5.4.
Box 5.4  Bredin Centre of Learning
The Bredin Centre for Learning is a not-for-profit agency operating
primarily in the Edmonton region of Alberta. It has historically provided
programming, mostly funded by governments, designed to connect
unemployed or underemployed Albertans to the labour market. Many
of these programs focus on workers who have multiple barriers to
employment, such as a skills deficiency or language barrier.28
One of Bredin’s main areas of programming is assisting internationally trained professionals to acquire professional certification in
their field (or related work). The Centre for Skilled and Internationally
Trained Professionals provides immigrants with information about
professional licensure and accessing the Canadian labour market
(including job search and interview coaching), and provides formalized on-the-job and internship training placements for those who lack
Canadian experience.
Between 2011 and 2015, Bredin helped 811 internationally trained
professionals find employment, of whom 739 remained employed six
months later. The occupations with the largest number of employed
professionals included engineers, doctors, and nurses. This work was
funded primarily by Alberta’s then-Department of Community and
Social Services and served to help immigrants navigate the professional
licensure process operated by PROs under the auspices of Alberta’s
then-Department of Jobs, Skills, Training, and Labour.
Bredin also delivers a tuition-based 41-week International Pharmacy
Bridging program to help internationally trained pharmacists acquire an
Alberta licence. The program includes seminars, workshops, and clinical
role-play scenarios as well as 500 hours of structured practical training. Students may be able to access grants and/or loans to help defray
the tuition cost. This arrangement is consistent with the move towards
self-funded labour-market training outlined in Chapter 3.29

136  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

Settlement services and credential recognition reveal that we can find
conflicting interests between stakeholder groups and also within them.
For example, the federal government selects immigrants based upon their
ability to contribute to the economy and funds settlement services in
order to socially and economically integrate new immigrants into Canadian society. Yet, highly skilled immigrants face discrimination that keeps
them from employment in their profession. The key player keeping these
immigrants out of the profession is PROs, which are creatures of statute
created by provincial and territorial governments. Here we see different
levels of government potentially working at cross purposes. The need (in
Box 5.4) for one Government of Alberta department to help immigrants
navigate a process overseen by another department suggests that, even
at a single level, governments are not monolithic actors.
One factor contributing to PROs’ reluctance to license some immigrants is concern about flooding the(ir) labour market. While limiting the
ability of immigrants to practise is often couched as protecting the public
interest (and sometimes the public interest is genuinely protected), keeping immigrants out of regulated occupations is also an instance of powerful
(Canadian) workers limiting the job prospects of less powerful (immigrant) workers and thereby keeping the wages of the powerful higher
than they otherwise would be.30 Provincial and territorial governments
happily allow PROs significant latitude in regulating their own profession
because it insulates legislators from problems (such as allegations of systemic racism) and keeps powerful groups of workers happy (and reliant
upon the government).
Most employers benefit from this arrangement because it makes available to them highly qualified workers forced to accept underemployment.
Underemployed skilled workers can comprise a highly productive and
profitable workforce. This arrangement does mean that those employers who truly need access to the skills that professionals have need to
compete for credentialed workers via higher wages and/or seek out temporary migrant workers. The ability of immigrants to enter Canada and
receive settlement services masks the systemic racism they face once here,
thereby making immigrants’ difficulty in the labour market appear to be
the fault of immigrants themselves.

Community-Based Education and Training 137
 137
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Public Legal Education
Canadian society is complex. Workers often have to navigate a variety
of processes and institutions in order to address basic home-and-hearth
issues, such as marriage and divorce as well as landlord-and-tenant disputes and other contractual matters. Workers may also need to act in
their own interests in the realm of employment and labour law. The legal
complexity of society generally benefits the powerful, who are more likely
to have personal knowledge of such rules and systems (by way of their
education and employment) and the resources necessary to hire competent advisors.
The term “legal education” most often refers to training provided to
lawyers (or future lawyers) and other professional employees in order to
develop and maintain their knowledge of the law. Public legal education (PLE) focuses on assisting individuals to develop legal knowledge
and skills to manage and/or improve their lives. There are many forms of
PLE. For example, a blog or poster about the degree to which individuals
have to co-operate with police carding (i.e., a demand for identification
unrelated to any specific crime) expands readers’ awareness of their rights.
By contrast, a study group or conference may both develop participants’
skills and knowledge and generate new knowledge.
Public legal education is delivered by a number of groups, including non-profit agencies, governments and the courts, unions, the K-12
and PSE systems, and individual law firms and lawyers. For example,
the Public Legal Education Association of Saskatchewan (PLEA) provides general legal information (but not legal advice) about the laws of
Canada and Saskatchewan and also provides law-related resources used
in K-12 courses.31 Other not-for-profits have more specific foci. The Aspen
Foundation for Labour Education provides instructional resources for
teachers, addressing work and social justice issues tailored to fit in with
Alberta’s K-12 curriculum.32 The Alberta Workers’ Health Centre provides
theatre-based public legal education to junior and senior high school students (see Box 5.5).

138  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

Box 5.5  AWHC Theatre-Based Workplace Rights Education
The Alberta Workers’ Health Centre (AWHC) is a union-funded
resource centre that provides a variety of services related to workplace health and safety and workplace injuries. The Work Plays
Schools Program (WPSP) has been operating since 2003 and offers
free theatre-based employment rights education to 10,000 junior and
senior high school students in Alberta annually. The program is mostly
funded by the Law Foundation of Alberta.
Two travelling productions are mounted each year, using professional actors and stage crews. Each 60-minute play dramatizes
common workplace issues faced by students. At the end of the play,
there is a facilitated discussion about the issues and solutions, and
additional classroom materials are offered to teachers.
The play “Working It Out” is set in a restaurant and dramatizes the unsafe work, wage theft, and workplace harassment
that many young people experience. The play is aimed at high
school students and explores issues covered in Alberta Education’s
career-and-life-management and work-experience courses.
“Tackling issues through the medium of a play allows students to
talk about things they otherwise would likely keep to themselves,” says
AWHC executive director Jared Matsunaga-Turnbull. Gina Puntil, WPSP
Program Coordinator, adds, “The degree of unsafe and unfair work we
hear about from teenagers while we’re on the road is astounding.”33

Access to PLE is largely determined by the funding made available. Key
funders of legal education include provincial and territorial law foundations, justice departments (either directly or through the redirection
of fines), and trade unions. While the Internet has expanded the reach
of PLE, most organizations offering it are based in large urban centres.
This pattern in PLE replicates that of the availability of legal services and
institutions, which are often difficult for rural and northern residents
(including many Indigenous persons) to access.34 The result is that northern and rural residents typically have a more difficult time managing the
legal aspects of their lives than those in urban areas.
Even in urban areas, differences in individual financial resources may
result in differential access to public legal education. The growth of online
Community-Based Education and Training 139
 139
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

information still requires that individuals have some way to access that
information (e.g., a smartphone or other Internet connection). While
public libraries normally offer free Internet access, access to libraries (with
limited locations and hours) can itself pose a barrier.
Individual workers are the primary beneficiaries of PLE. The main
benefits include a greater ability to make informed decisions and take
actions at lower cost as they navigate the complex legal landscape of
contemporary society. The state also benefits from PLE, because greater
worker skill facilitates social reproduction (for example, in smoothing
child-custody and financial-support arrangements following divorce).
Making it easier for workers to enter into contracts benefits employers,
as it facilitates workers acting as consumers.
Workers may also use what they learn in public legal education on the
job. If workers use this information in carrying out their duties, this may
benefit their employers. Workers may also employ their skills and knowledge in ways that are disruptive to the employer. For example, young
workers who participated in the AWHCs Work Plays program (Box 5.5)
may apply their new-found knowledge about the right to refuse unsafe
work or to be free from sexual harassment in the workplace to improve
their working conditions. Such efforts may entail greater costs to employers (assuming they decide to comply with their legal obligations). This
cost may help to explain the limited participation of employers in public
legal education.

Union Education
Since their inception, unions have offered education and training to their
members.35 Presently, some union training is narrowly vocational (skills
development and safety courses) while other forms of union-sponsored
education has broader application, such as literacy classes. Still other
union training efforts are more overtly political. Courses that develop
members’ collective bargaining and grievance-handling skills (sometimes
called steward training or “tools” courses) are both necessary for unions
to operate and can help to alter the balance of power in a workplace.
Providing members with an introduction to contemporary political and
economic topics (e.g., international trade agreements and equity issues)
may have a broader societal impact.
140  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

As noted in Chapter 4, some unions also negotiate specific training
entitlements into their collective agreements. The form of such entitlements varies by industrial sector. Some training provisions may be related
to job- or skill-ladders within operations. Other may be more open-ended
“learning accounts” that employees can access to take training the workers want or job-protected leave allowing workers time off to undertake
training. While these entitlements are undoubtedly of benefit to workers,
a critical perspective on such entitlements is that they are evidence of the
incorporation thesis.
As we saw in Chapter 4, the incorporation thesis asserts that union
demands are shaped in ways that are acceptable (and sometimes useful) to
employers. For example, unions know that they are unlikely to be successful seeking significant curtailment of managerial decision-making power
in the workplace. Employers have historically been less likely to resist
monetary demands by unions (e.g., higher pay and more benefits). This
pattern pressures unions (which need to make gains to maintain member
support) to monetize their member’s demands—converting demands for
power into demands for money.36 The incorporation thesis manifests itself
in labour-market training as union demands for employer-sponsored training (or training funds). This demand is largely a monetary one (employers
don’t lose any meaningful managerial authority), and a better-trained
workforce has the potential to benefit the employer. If workers have
traded potential wage increases for better training provisions, employers
will have succeeded in externalizing production costs onto the workers.
Securing additional training entitlements for workers does benefit
workers. It is, however, important to be mindful that such entitlements
often leave the specifics of the training to the employer. And, thinking
back to the different kinds of skills that workers can develop, as shown
in figure 5.1, employers are most likely to provide firm- and job-specific
skill training. Such training is beneficial to employers, both because it
is specific to the employers’ needs and because it is less portable than
other kinds of training (thus reducing the risk that trained workers will
be poached by other employers).
Unions may also provide education to the members. Box 5.6 details
the educational offerings that the United Food and Commercial Workers
(UFCW) provides to its members. Unions (or groups of unions) may also
Community-Based Education and Training 141
 141
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

offer labour schools, which are often intensive residential experiences
designed to provide additional training to union activists. The hidden
curriculum of much union training is simple but profoundly destabilizing: workers have the ability to seek accommodation of their interests
by resisting employers’ demands (including through withholding their
labour).
Box 5.6  UFCW webCampus Courses
The United Food and Commercial Workers represents a quarter of a
million Canadian workers. In addition to offering face-to-face training to its members, UFCW operates a webCampus. The webCampus
provides over 150 online courses free of charge to UFCW members and
their families.
webCampus includes traditional steward training and union
tools courses, including an extensive collection of health and safety
courses. These courses allow the union to provide basic training to
both members and union activists. But the majority of webCampus
courses are designed to improve job-related skills for UCFW members.
These include a suite of courses aimed at developing computer skills
as well as a cluster of job-specific skills modules in fields where UFCW
represents members. These courses reflect that many UFCW members
are often employed precariously and may need to retrain to find secure
employment.
UFCW also offers personal development courses tailored to address
the non-work roles that workers take on. These courses range from
money management and retirement planning to media literacy and
end-of-life planning. In the 2015–16 academic year, there were 7,979
registrations by UFCW members and family members in these courses.
Women comprised 69 per cent of all course participants.37
webCampus offers members five different non-credit certificates
for the completion of particular groups of courses. UFCW has also
entered into transfer credit arrangements with post-secondary institutions. Participants in webCampus can transfer some of their courses
to Brock University, Athabasca University, and Conestoga College.
UFCW’s occupational health and safety courses also transfer to the
Ontario Worker Health and Safety Centre, and workers can receive a
training card.

142  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

Research demonstrates that unionized Canadian workers are more
likely to participate in formal training than non-unionized workers. This
advantage is seen in aggregate measures (32 per cent versus 25 per cent)
as well as job-related courses (24 per cent versus 18 per cent) and in
employer-sponsored training (27 per cent versus 20 per cent). This “union
effect” differs by gender, with unionized women having much larger gains
in participation than men. As we saw in Chapter 1, workers with more
formal education are more likely to participate in formal workplace training. Although unionized workers are, on average, more educated than
non-unionized workers, the beneficial impact of union membership on
training participation holds true at all levels of formal education. Unionized workers are also more likely to participate in informal learning with
co-workers, both around job-tasks and workplace rights issues.38
A number of unions have developed partnerships with post-secondary
institutions. These partnerships allow union members who have completed certain union education courses to receive academic credit for
those courses. As we saw in Box 5.6, both Athabasca University and Brock
University provide transfer credit to UFCW members who have completed
union courses. Athabasca University also has a transfer arrangement with
the Alberta Union of Provincial Employees to recognize the significant
learning that goes on in union steward classes.
The amount of money spent by unions on providing training is normally determined by the union membership, either directly through a
budget vote or indirectly through the election of union officers. What kind
of training is offered tends to be a decision reserved to union officers and
training staff. The most common kinds of training are steward or tools
courses. These courses make a direct contribution to the operation of the
union. Access to courses is controlled by unions by, for example, allocating
training spots to union locals.

Conclusion
Community education is something of a grab bag, perhaps best reflecting
how the conflicting interests in Canada’s training system play out in practice. Where governments directly fund community-based education (such
as literacy training), there is a tendency for this training to be structured
to meet the needs of production. Funding is increasingly targeted at the
Community-Based Education and Training 143
 143
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

“nearly employable,” a trend that is consistent with other government
labour-market training that we read about in Chapter 3. Funding also tends
to be finite and linked to outcomes measured. Where possible, the cost of
training is externalized onto community groups that, in turn, pass these
costs onto their workers in the form of precarious employment. This funding structure reflects that, while training providers are stakeholders in the
training system, they typically lack the power to significantly influence
policy direction. They may, however, have greater influence in program
design and delivery.
Literacy training also advances the state’s goal of social reproduction. The complexity of modern society requires most individuals to be
functionally literate in order to access basic services and support themselves—all necessary aspects of the reproduction of labour power. For
workers, literacy is also a necessary precondition for advancing their own
interests in society and in the workplace—whether those interests be
simply getting ahead in their jobs or seeking fundamental social, political,
and economic reform. That literacy education is so often linked to simply
getting ahead constrains (but does not preclude) the more emancipatory
agenda that many adult educators have advanced over the years.
Many of the settlement services offered to new immigrants are also
delivered through community education. In addition to language instruction, settlement services tend to focus on helping new immigrants socially
acclimatize and attach to the labour market. A recurring challenge for
highly skilled immigrants is that foreign educational credentials are often
devalued. This can result in dramatic underemployment by immigrants.
This dynamic highlights intragroup conflict among stakeholders. For
example, the federal government selects economic immigrants based
upon their education. But provincially and territorially governed educational institutions and professional regulatory organizations may refuse
to recognize these same credentials.
The difficulties common in foreign credential recognition reflect that
recognizing foreign credentials expands the pool of licensed professionals
and is, thus, contrary to the economic interests of existing professionals
(who benefit from the labour shortage). Provincial and territorial governments may be reluctant to intervene in such decisions because of the
potential political backlash they might experience from highly regarded
144  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

workers. The key point here is that stakeholder groups are not monolithic
and that intragroup conflict must also be considered in any review of the
Canadian training system.
The educational activities supported by unions are also characterized
by mixed motives. Perhaps the most significant union intervention in
the labour-market training system is securing training entitlements from
individual employers to union members. These entitlements tend to be
focused on developing workplace skills and are often associated with
internal job- or skill-ladders. While these entitlements are undoubtedly
of benefit to workers, a critical perspective on such entitlements is that
they are evidence of the incorporation thesis, whereby workers’ interests
tend to be converted into forms that (1) don’t fundamentally affect the
power of employers, and (2) sometimes provide benefit to the employer
as well as the workers. Unions also offer significant training around the
negotiation and administration of collective agreements. Such training
is necessary to maintain the operation of the unions themselves. Unions
may also offer other forms of education and training, such as that which
UFCW provides through its webCampus.

Notes
1  Hyslop, “NDP Government Restores Funding.”
2  Culbert and Sherlock, “BC’s Working Poor.”
3  Hyslop, “NDP Government Restores Funding.”
4  Taylor and Steinhauer, “Evolving Constraints and Life ‘Choices.’”
5  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Survey of Adult
Skills, 2.
6  Cathexis Consulting, “Evaluation of the Literacy and Basic Skills (LBs)
Program.”
7  Smythe, “Ten Years of Adult Literacy Policy and Practice.”
8 Darville, Adult Literacy Work in Canada.
9  Atlantic Literacy Coalitions, “Submission to the House of Commons
Standing Committee.”
10  Goar, “Mainstay of Canada’s Literacy Movement Topples.”
11  Pearson, “Literacy Organizations Say Federal Government Abandoning
Them.”
12  Employment and Social Development Canada, “Understanding Essential
Skills.”
Community-Based Education and Training 145
 145
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

13  Fenwick, “Control, Contradiction and Ambivalence.”
14  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD Skills
Outlook 2013.
15 Ibid.
16  Statistics Canada, Employment and Social Development Canada, and the
Council of Ministers of Education, Canada, “Skills in Canada: First Results.”
17  Arriagada and Hango, “Literacy and Numeracy among Off-Reserve First
Nations People and Metis.”
18  Darville, “Unfolding the Adult Literacy Regime.”
19  Conference Board of Canada, “Adult Literacy Rate.”
20  As cited in Smythe, “Ten Years of Adult Literacy Policy and Practice,” 9.
21  Conference Board of Canada, “Adult Literacy Rate.”
22 Morrison, Camps and Classrooms.
23 Coady, Masters of Their Own Destiny.
24  Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada, “Annual Report to
Parliament.”
25 McBride, Working? Employment Policy in Canada.
26  Heibert, “Winning, Losing and Still Playing the Game.”
27  Guo, “Difference, Deficiency, and Devaluation.”
28  Bredin Centre for Learning, “Edmonton Center Offers.”
29  D. Green, Executive Director, Bredin Centre for Learning, personal
communication with author, June 6, 2017.
30  Bauder, “‘Brain Abuse.’”
31  Public Legal Education Association of Saskatchewan, “About PLEA.”
32  Aspen Foundation for Labour Education, “About Us.”
33  J. Matsunaga-Turnbull and G. Puntil, personal communication with author,
May 17, 2017.
34  Ally, Dewhurst, and Zariski, “Expanding Access to Legal Services.”
35 Taylor, Union Learning.
36 Hyman, The Political Economy of Industrial Relations.
37  UFCW webmaster, personal communication with author, May 12, 2017.
38  Livingstone and Raykov, “Union Influence.”

146  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

C H A P T E R

S I X

Reproducing Patterns of Advantage
and Disadvantage through Training

Learning Objectives
After reading this chapter, you will be able to:
➢➢ Explain the purposes that the Canadian training system serves.
➢➢ Identify patterns in terms of access to, control of, and benefits
from training.
➢➢ Explain how and why the Canadian training system reproduces
patterns of advantage and disadvantage.

Occupational segregation by gender means that women are often
under-represented in occupations and industries such as construction. Nationally, women make up less than 5 per cent of workers in
construction occupations.1 Indigenous peoples in Canada and immigrants are also under-represented in the skilled trades.2 Employers have
periodically expressed interest in drawing workers from traditionally
under-represented groups into the skilled trades to address worker shortages, but such efforts have not been particularly successful.
In 2007, only 8 per cent of Canada’s female apprentices apprenticed
in construction trades. While women comprised 3.7 per cent of all
building-trades apprentices, those women who completed the apprenticeship represented only 1.8 per cent of all completions, suggesting
disproportionately high attrition among female apprentices.3 The Alberta
government developed a 2007 workforce strategy with Alberta’s construction industry that emphasized increasing the participation of traditionally
under-represented groups through promotional activities and training,
and by altering workplaces to become more welcoming to such groups.
This strategy also advocated increasing employer access to temporary
foreign workers.4
One of the stakeholders involved in developing this strategy was the
training provider Women Building Futures (WBF). This not-for-profit
was established in 1998 to prepare women for employment in traditionally
male-dominated industries, such as construction. In 2016, several hundred women took programs and/or courses through WBF (28 per cent
being Indigenous women) with 93 per cent of graduates being employed
in the construction industry within six months of graduation.5 According
to WBF CEO Kathy Kimpton:
 149
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

When we started, there were few women working in the trades. In
those early years, employers were mainly looking to hire women to
provide some diversity in their workplaces. Now, those same employers and more are hiring our graduates because they are well trained
and prepared.6

While the training offered by WBF clearly helps individual women attach
to the labour market, an interesting question is whether such programs
meaningfully alter the overall composition of the workforce. Analysis
of who is employed in Alberta construction occupations between 2003
and 2014 suggests the answer is no. Men remained the primary labour
source for construction employers. While the overall number of workers
employed in the industry went up during this time period, women, youth,
Indigenous persons, and immigrants did not see their relative share of
employment increase significantly.7
The finding of little change in the participation rates of women, youth,
Indigenous persons, and immigrants in the construction sector over a
12-year period strongly suggests that the Alberta government’s 10-year
labour-force strategy and the efforts by construction industry partners to
increase recruitment and retention for these groups were unsuccessful.
An important question is, why did this plan yield no change in the gender
composition of the workforce? There are likely two explanations.
First, employers continued to organize construction work in ways that
pose barriers to women. Work continues to require long and unpredictable hours, often in remote locations. This arrangement maximizes
employer profitability and negatively affects women’s ability to manage
social reproductive obligations. Second, construction employers tolerate
a hyper-masculinized culture where women (and other non-traditional
groups) face discrimination and harassment. This hyper-masculinization is
also a result of employers seeking to maximize profitability. Construction
employment is very precarious: jobs are often short term, with workers
moving from employer to employer. This precarity pressures workers to
constantly demonstrate their utility to the employer and also denigrate
the work of others in order to demonstrate that they themselves should
be kept on. Women and workers of colour are easy to “other” because of
their physical differences and lack of social power in the predominantly

150  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

white and male workplace. Employers tolerate this discrimination because
it is an acceptable cost of having a workforce that is highly motivated by
its precarious employment.8
One result of these factors is that women typically experienced a
last-hired–first-fired relationship with construction employers. When the
labour supply tightens, women workers become relatively more attractive
to employers, and their rate of employment increases. However, these
gains are ephemeral, as their job losses are more severe when the labour
market loosens and men are once again available. A part of the loosening
of the labour market in Alberta was due to the federal government’s
efforts to increase the availability of temporary foreign workers (who, in
construction, are mostly male). What these dynamics mean is that while
training is likely helpful to individual female workers to develop skills
(which may make them more marketable relative to other women), it is
unlikely to change the overall rate of female employment in the construction industry, because a lack of training is not the only (or most significant)
barrier to employment.
Emphasizing training makes it look like government and industry are
taking action on this issue. Emphasizing training also frames women’s
occupational segregation as the result of skills deficiencies (i.e., the workers’ fault) rather than as the result of systemic discrimination (i.e., the
employers’ fault). This framing perpetuates a structure that advantages
employers, who minimize labour costs. It also advantages male workers,
who keep a source of additional construction workers out of the labour
pool (thereby potentially improving their own wages and job security).
But there is not a perfect accord of interests between employers and
male workers: employers have loosened the labour market by seeking
access to temporary foreign workers, which has the effect of displacing
male Canadian workers. What this example suggests is that the Canadian
labour-market training system serves multiple functions and is riven by
conflicting interests among stakeholder groups.

Functions of the Training System
The preceding chapters have shown that the Canadian training system
serves three main functions:

Reproducing Patterns of Advantage and Disadvantage through Training 151
 151
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

it reproduces labour power,
it creates docile and obedient workers, and
it maintains and legitimizes capitalist social formation.

It is not surprising that one of the functions of the training system is to
create, maintain, and improve workers’ KSAs. As we’ve seen, the training system does such a good job of reproducing labour power that many
Canadian workers find themselves overqualified for the jobs that they
hold. This conclusion sits at odds with most media coverage of training.
Media coverage typically emphasizes the presence and effect of (largely
fictional) skills shortages. It would be more accurate and socially useful
for the media to cover how the allocation of labour-market training is
profoundly uneven. Specifically, workers’ access to training is affected
by their gender, heritage, socio-economic status, and geographic location. The result of discriminatory access to training is a replication of
historic patterns of advantage and disadvantage in the Canadian labour
market and, more broadly, society. But such coverage sits at odds with
the interests of capitalists (i.e., the owners of media corporations) who
use the skill-shortage narrative to help loosen the labour market via more
government-subsidized training and greater access to foreign workers.
One of the less obvious effects of the training system is that it contributes to the creation and maintenance of certain values and preferences.
Of particular interest is the way in which the training system contributes
to creating and maintaining a docile and obedient workforce. The K-12
system inculcates rules and rule-following behaviour into future workers
quite directly. Employers use the threat of unemployment as a stick to
reinforce obedience and docility. But some also use training as a carrot—
rewarding “good” employees with skills development. What skills and
competencies are developed remains largely in the control of employers,
which reinforces their existing legal and labour-market power (framed as
“management rights”) in the workplace.
The prospect of obtaining a better job via training also helps maintain
the legitimacy of capitalist social formation. It is easy to see that workers
with training (especially formal training that leads to a credential) are
more likely to secure high-paying jobs with good working conditions and
more job security than workers without such training. The existence of
152  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

this (ever-lengthening) pathway to a good job incentivizes workers to
seek training. It also subtly suggests that workers are to blame when they
cannot secure good employment—a belief consistent with the notion that
Canada is a meritocracy.
That access to training continues to be inequitably distributed is largely
ignored. So too are employer efforts to make jobs increasingly precarious
and ensure that the labour market is as loose as possible. Workers have
little ability to alter the basic structure of capitalism, which ensures that
(1) many workers will not have good jobs, no matter what they do, and,
as a result, (2) employers will benefit at the expense of workers. The most
sensible option for individual workers is to seek more training to secure
one of the fewer and fewer good jobs that are available. Yet, in doing so,
they are also helping to further loosen the labour market and drive down
their own wages.
The broad stability of the Canadian training system over time reflects
that it meets (in at least a minimal way) the needs of each of the major
stakeholders. Employers get, for the most part, an adequate number of
appropriately trained workers at low cost. Workers have a pathway to
securing good jobs, although many will not be successful in navigating it.
And government has a system that contributes to ensuring that both the
production process and the social-reproduction process continue more
or less uninterrupted. Yet the broad stability of the training system does
not mean that there are no changes afoot.
Three important trends in the Canadian training system are:
1. Shifting training costs away from employers and onto workers,
2. giving employers greater power to determine what workers learn,
and
3. advancing the economic interests of employers at the expense of
workers.

Shifting Labour-Market Training Costs
The shifting of training costs onto workers is most evident in escalating
PSE tuition costs. Rising tuition has the effect of making PSE (which
is, in part, a form of labour-market training) less accessible to students,
particularly those whose families have a lower socio-economic status.
Reproducing Patterns of Advantage and Disadvantage through Training 153
 153
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Governments have also shifted costs of training onto (other) workers by
increasingly relying upon community groups to provide some kinds of
labour-market training. Employees in not-for-profit agencies often have
low wages and/or high workloads. As discussed below, government is not
monolithic and, thus, not every government policy pushes this agenda
(e.g., Québec’s training levy or Alberta’s recent tuition freeze). But, overall, the broad and long-term trend is towards shifting training costs to
workers.
Given that holding formal PSE credentials is positively associated with
greater workplace training later in life, the rising cost of PSE is a significant contributor to the intergenerational transfer of advantage (and
disadvantage). Those who can afford initial PSE also tend to receive the
most subsequent workplace training. The idea that who you are (your
socio-economic status) is a greater determinant of your success in life than
is your effort to better yourself sits uneasily with the broadly held belief
that Canada is (mostly) a meritocracy. Advancing policies that undermine
the meritocracy narrative—and which demonstrate that training reproduces existing patterns of advantage and disadvantage—has the potential
to profoundly damage the legitimacy of both government and capitalist
social formation. Given this risk, why then would governments engage in
such behaviour? There are several, interrelated explanations as to why governments support off-loading labour-market training costs onto workers.
First, the relationship between shifting the cost of labour-market
training onto individuals and the hardening of class boundaries in Canada
is difficult to see. The shifting of cost is immediate and visible. But the
effect it has on individuals’ life prospects takes years to unfold and occurs
mostly in private. Further, the relationship between cost shifting and life
outcomes is imperfect. There are many factors mediating labour-market
success, and some people will succeed (or fail) regardless of their level
of (dis)advantage. Anecdotal evidence of success in the face of adversity
(e.g., one or two stories of people overcoming the odds) is a powerful
rhetorical tool. It aligns with the broadly held belief that Canada is a meritocracy. And most people fail to grasp that anecdotal evidence emphasizes
exceptions rather than the norm (because everyday happenings elicit little
comment). As a result, anecdotal evidence is routinely given vastly more
weight than it warrants. In short, the murky causality and long latency
154  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

periods between cost shifting and life outcomes, combined with efforts
to obscure this relationship, dramatically reduce the risk to government
(and to social stability) associated with such policies.
Second, there are significant political pressures on governments to
minimize public spending. The neoliberal prescription of the 1980s and
1990s profoundly shaped public expectations around government spending and provision of services. Governments that increase taxes in order
to maintain services are frequently assailed by employer lobby groups,
right-wing think tanks and politicians, and the media. Faced with political
consequences for raising taxes and the framing (in human capital theory)
of labour-market training as primarily benefitting individuals, the path of
least resistance for governments is to off-load training costs onto workers
wherever possible. Such efforts avoid negative publicity and may even
attract praise from politically powerful groups.
Where this shift creates (or reinforces) inequities, governments can
sometimes manage the issue through rhetorical strategies. For example,
the virtual absence of women in the skilled trades suggests that there is
systemic sexism. As we saw in the opening vignette of this chapter, both
the government and employers often make very public promises about
remedying this issue. Task forces are struck, and the key players agree to
plans to resolve matters. But such reports often fail to identify the real
factors driving the problem, such as workplace culture and job design, that
are barriers to greater female participation. Instead, attention is focused
on educating workers about careers in the trades and developing their
skills. These strategies suggest workers’ ignorance or skill deficiencies are
the root cause of low female participation. Providing career counselling
and skill training then allows employers to blame workers for low participation rates. This, in turn, allows governments to justify policies (such as
expanding the temporary foreign worker program) that serve to eliminate
structural pressures on employers (i.e., a tight labour market) that might
otherwise cause employers to make cultural and job design changes in the
workplace that would attract more women.
The third explanation for governments off-loading labour-market
training costs onto workers is that those who are opposed to such policies
are less powerful than those supporting it. Consider PSE tuition increases.
The largest opponents of tuition increases are students from middle and
Reproducing Patterns of Advantage and Disadvantage through Training 155
 155
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

lower socio-economic backgrounds. For them, tuition increases create a
significant barrier to accessing labour-market training. These students have
limited political power for several reasons. University students are viewed
as a relatively privileged group (which, in aggregate, is probably correct);
thus, they may have a hard time gaining the sympathy and support of
other Canadians (many of whom will not have had PSE opportunities).
Students are also most often speaking in their own interest, behaviour
that, rightly or wrongly, tends to undermine the credibility of any claim.
And even a small number of student voices supporting tuition increases
further undermines the sense that students may be right about the effect
or desirability of tuition increases.
A more compelling case against off-loading labour-market training
costs might be made by those Canadians excluded from PSE (or other
labour-market training) entirely. Such voices are rarely heard because
there are few mechanisms by which such opinions can be aggregated
and articulated. Further, such Canadians may have little time to engage
in policy discussions (as they are most likely working). And they may be
disinclined to undertake such advocacy work. This disinclination perhaps reflects their expectation that advocacy would yield little benefit
to them and might entail some risk to their own employment. Further,
the meritocracy narrative is a powerful one, and many Canadians may
be convinced that their level of success is commensurate with their
worth or effort.

Controlling Content of Training
Control over the content of Canadian labour-market training is shared
among all stakeholders—except workers. Governments, PSE institutions,
and faculty members shape the content of labour-market training offered
by PSE institutions, with students having little curricular input. Governments also determine what kinds of state-funded labour-market training
is available to workers, although the agencies responsible for delivering
training may have some discretion over what specifically is taught and
learned. Employers largely shape the content of apprenticeship training.
And, except where constrained by a collective agreement, employers also
control what workplace training occurs. Other than the few instances

156  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

where unions deliver training, workers have little official control over the
content of training.
This lack of control over the content of labour-market training is
not surprising. Training is a microcosm of capitalist employment relationships. Employers dominate the employment relationship, and their
control over training content is just an extension of their so-called
management rights. Even where governments mandate employer spending on training (e.g., Québec), they won’t mandate employers sharing
power over what kind of training is on offer. An exception to this general
rule might be when governments require employers to provide training
around hazardous materials and other workplace hazards.
In some cases, governments have ceded what little control they have
over training to employers. The Canada Job Grant we read about in Chapter 3 saw the federal government shift funding from government-driven
labour-market training to employer-directed training under the CJG.
The result was almost complete employer control over how a significant
portion of publicly funded labour-market training was spent. There was
no compelling rationale for this decision; it was simply a sop given to
employers by the federal Conservative government. The ceding of power
to employers under the CJG broadly parallels the federal Liberal and Conservative governments’ ceding of control over immigration to employers
through expansion of the temporary foreign worker program. Not surprisingly, employers took advantage of inadequate federal screening to flood
the labour market with TFWs, whom they often mistreated.
The willingness of governments to increase employers’ already significant control over training suggests that governments (1) prioritize
the needs of employers over those of the workers and (2) accommodate
workers’ needs only when absolutely necessary and to the minimum
degree possible. What this, in turn, suggests is that the state is not a neutral referee in matters of labour and training. Rather, the state frequently
acts as the handmaiden of capitalists—enabling them to maximize profit.
Only when employers act in ways so egregious that the legitimacy of the
government or capitalist social formation is at stake—such as the brazen
exploitation of migrant workers—will the state usually act to contain
employers’ behaviour.

Reproducing Patterns of Advantage and Disadvantage through Training 157
 157
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Box 6.1  New Rules for Migrant Agricultural Workers
A significant portion of Canada’s agricultural workforce—particularly
in labour intensive sectors such as fruit and vegetable production—is
made up of migrant workers. As we saw in Chapter 3, migrant workers
are often exploited and endangered by their employers. Over the past
10 years, reports of mistreatment of agricultural workers have become
commonplace. For example, a 2016 article in the Vancouver Sun
quotes Raul Gatica, executive director of the Migrant Workers’ Dignity
Association and author of a 40-page report on agricultural workers,
who “shared a story of a farm worker in Surrey who nearly had his
finger cut off in a machine that peels and grinds carrots. His employer’s
main concern was for the machine, said the farm worker, who was told
to put a glove on and get back to work.”
Gatica’s report also includes quotes from a worker who said his
employer sprayed pesticide while workers were out in the fields
without providing them with safety gear, and another worker who
recounted living in a small house with 40 other people.9
Slowly, the federal government has begun to tighten long-standing
loopholes in the regulatory frameworks that cover migrant workers.
Effective January 1, 2018, employers seeking to hire foreign agricultural
workers will have to submit an inspection report for worker housing
that proves it meets standards, such as weatherproofed walls and
adequate shower and toilet facilities. While such improved standards
are a good sign, they reflect that, left unchecked, employers have subjected foreign workers to atrocious living conditions.10
One explanation for the lengthy history of poor employment
conditions for migrant workers is that governments can make errors
when intervening in complex matters. It is possible that government
policy-makers—many of whom lead relatively privileged lives—would
never consider that employers might exploit migrant workers so
ruthlessly. Yet the lengthy delay in meaningful government action on
this issue also suggests that governments can be reluctant to intervene
when doing so might cause political pushback from employers.

Workers’ power over training also parallels workers’ power in the broader
field of labour relations. Workers can negotiate training content, funding,
and job-protected leaves with their employer. Such negotiations tend to
158  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

be limited to unionized worksites. Workers can resist training they don’t
care for by not learning or practising what they have been taught. This
response mirrors workers’ abilities to resist other forms of management
direction via absenteeism, presenteeism, sabotage, or theft. Basically, it
constitutes direct action to resist employer directions—an approach that
can result in workers being fired for insubordination. Workers can also
seek out or organize their own training, assuming they have the resources
required to do so.

Advancing Employers’ Economic Interests
There is no doubt that labour-market training can (and often does)
improve the lives of workers. Training is often the best pathway available to workers seeking higher wages, better working conditions, and
greater job security. As we’ve seen in earlier chapters, workers’ access to
training appears to systematically differ, depending upon their gender,
heritage, socio-economic status, and location. Further, the intersection
of these characteristics often has a compounding and negative effect on
workers’ experiences. This dynamic is perhaps most clearly visible in the
labour-market and training experiences of Indigenous peoples in Canada,
which, while improving, remain markedly worse than average.
Society at large also benefits from labour-market training. There isn’t
much evidence that training directly results in economic growth. This may
reflect that employers consistently fail to provide jobs that take advantage
of the skills that Canadians already have. That said, labour-market training
(particularly literacy, public legal education, and settlement services) may
have positive social effects, because it allows workers to better manage
their lives and interact with an increasingly complex society. There is a
clear link between increasing levels of formal education and overall health,
social engagement, and happiness.
The main beneficiary of labour-market training is, of course, employers. The Canadian training system generally provides employers with
access to an appropriate number of adequately skilled workers at low
cost. Most of the training required to develop these skills and competencies have been paid for directly by the worker or indirectly by the
worker through the tax system. In this way, the training system represents

Reproducing Patterns of Advantage and Disadvantage through Training 159
 159
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

a significant business subsidy for employers. It is notable that employers
rarely acknowledge this generous subsidy.
Instead, employers clamour for greater public funding of training and
greater access to foreign workers while complaining of non-existent skills
and worker shortages. It is important to recognize these claims as statements made by employers in their self-interest. Essentially, employers are
seeking to further lower labour costs in order to increase their profitability.
The resulting contradictions (e.g., employers demanding more training
while reducing their own training expenditures) generally go unremarked
and ignored. Given this, workers, policymakers, and academics should
subject employer claims and demands around training to searching analysis before accepting them.

Conflict Among and Within Stakeholder Groups
The major site of conflict in capitalist economies is between the interests
of labour and capital. While the state will sometimes step in to protect the
interests of workers, this intervention tends to be restricted to instances
where employer behaviour is so egregious that it threatens some aspect of
production or social reproduction. And government intervention is often
tempered by a desire to minimally impair employer latitude in organizing production in the way that is maximally profitable. Consequently,
governments will often adopt strategies designed to deflect conflict into
manageable dispute-resolution processes. In the opening vignette of
this chapter, the government addressed the issue of women’s inability to
access jobs in the construction sector through a workforce plan that was
non-binding, contained actions (increasing access to TFWs) that undermined other actions (hiring more women), and the success of which was
never publicly evaluated.
Conflict can also emerge among stakeholders, reflecting that “workers”
and “employers” are categories comprising many actors with differing
interests. For example, a 50-year-old male psychologist might well view
high licensing standards as in the interests of both himself and society at
large. A 35-year-old female immigrant with a foreign credential might well
agree that high licensing standards, which prohibit her from entering the
profession, are in the interests of existing psychologists but not necessarily

160  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

society in general or herself in particular. Similarly, the training needs
and approach of a very large and a very small employer will be different.
In order to develop more nuanced understanding of the politics of the
Canadian training system, it is important to acknowledge that intragroup
conflict exists.
For example, “government” is not monolithic. Rather, there are
multiple governments involved in labour-market training. The result is
that there can be conflict between different orders of government (e.g.,
between the federal government and its provincial and territorial counterparts). A part of this conflict includes efforts to shift blame for problems
to other orders of government. As we saw in Chapter 3, when the federal
government announced the CJG in 2014, provinces and territories raised
two main concerns:
1. The CJG shifted control over which workers could access what
kind of labour-market training from governments to employers.
2. The CJG redirected existing LMA funding away from programs
aimed at workers facing multiple barriers to labour-market attachment and towards workers who were job ready. Although the
federal government made some compromises around CJG, these
concerns went largely unaddressed. The result was that provinces
and territories funded labour-market training for workers facing
multiple barriers to employment themselves and/or curtailed such
programming. Employers used the redirected federal funding
to offset existing training costs, mostly to the benefit of already
employed men in high-skill jobs and possessing PSE credentials.
There is also sometimes conflict (albeit muted and difficult to observe)
within a specific government or between government policies. We saw this
kind of conflict play out over foreign credential recognition and professional licensure in Chapters 4 and 5. Governments grant PROs authority
to determine who can practise in some occupations. One outcome of
this policy is that foreign-trained professionals often have great difficulty
gaining licensure. Rather than addressing this systemic problem, a government will instead fund programming designed to help foreign-trained
professionals navigate the (problematic) system.

Reproducing Patterns of Advantage and Disadvantage through Training 161
 161
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Conclusion
So what, at the end of the day, can we conclude about Canada’s
labour-market training system? Well, first, we know that the major criticism of the training system (that it has resulted in skills shortages) is
mostly untrue. Indeed, if there is a training problem, it is that employers
are failing to fully utilize the existing skills of workers. There is also little
evidence of worker shortages more generally. Employers that find themselves unable to hire may wish to consider whether improving the wages
and working conditions on offer might attract more (or new) workers
into their workplaces. This conclusion—that employers sometimes shade
the truth in their own interest—should cause us to be skeptical of claims
that training is a panacea for problems in a workplace or the workforce.
It is also true that Canada’s training system is sprawling and uneven,
often with limited connections between its major components. What is
unclear is whether this is a problem or whether it is indicative of a system
that responds to the (often conflicting) interests of various stakeholders.
While a system that pushes individuals towards careers at an early age and
presents a clear, step-by-step process to becoming qualified in a specific
occupation may sound appealing on grounds of efficiency and simplicity, such a system is largely unworkable. Employers and governments
are unable to accurately predict labour-force requirements in the future.
And workers (quite understandably) might resist being pigeonholed into
a career at a young age. Such a system (that is essentially one of central
planning) also sits uneasily with the notion that Canada has a free-market
economy, wherein individuals can make, remake, and accept responsibility for their occupational choices.
As suggested in the introduction, it is more useful to think of the
training system as a political system (where conflicting and converging
interests result in certain institutional forms and arrangements) than as a
machine. For example, understanding that employers want trained workers at the lowest possible price helps us to understand why they minimize
their own investments and push governments to socialize or externalize
costs. The stability of such a system depends upon the relative power of
the key stakeholders. If one stakeholder group becomes more powerful (or colludes with another stakeholder), then changes—perhaps large
ones—may occur.
162  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

Absent changes in power, the system tends towards stability. A training system is based upon the existing power structure in society, and this
reproduces not just labour power but also existing patterns of advantage
and disadvantage. We see this in the differing levels of training access and
labour-market success that specific worker groups have (resulting in the
intergenerational transfer of advantage and disadvantage) as well as the
training system’s tendency to respond to employers’ demands more than
to workers’ demands. Essentially, the training system is part of the broader
system of labour relations that operates to keep those in control powerful
and everyone else weak.
The fact that change tends to flow from (and reinforce) power shifts
suggests that technocratic efforts to “fix” the training system will likely
be unsuccessful unless they happen to align with existing interests and
power distribution. Prescriptions such as starting computer training in
kindergarten don’t recognize the power that professionals (such as teachers) have to resist such bad and self-interested ideas. Similarly, fads like
the learning organization tend to founder, because they ignore structural
imperatives and political compromises within organizations (i.e., there
are often practical reasons for why organizations are the way they are).
As we read about at the beginning of this chapter, the failed strategy to
increase women’s participation in Alberta’s construction industry can
be seen as an effort to fix a problem without altering the political economy that gave rise to the problem. Not surprisingly, this approach was
unsuccessful—although some individual workers may have benefitted
from training investments—and was quietly swept under the rug.
Finally, we need to recognize that government intervention in
labour-market training (and labour relations more broadly) is not necessarily benevolent. Governments often “play” for the employer’s team
because problems with the production process appear more quickly and
generate more focused political pressure on governments than do issues
around social reproduction. It is also important to be mindful that government interventions are not necessarily competent: the labour-market
training system is complex, and governments may not fully appreciate
the interplay of interests. Both the Canada Job Grant and the temporary
foreign worker program demonstrate that the federal government routinely underestimates how far employers will go in order to maximize their
Reproducing Patterns of Advantage and Disadvantage through Training 163
 163
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

profitability. And the tepid and ineffective response by the government to
both problems suggest that governments often find it politically difficult
to extricate themselves from failing projects and policies.

Notes
1  Construction Sector Council, State of Women in Construction.
2  Ibid.; Yssaad, Immigrant Labour Force Analysis Series.
3  Construction Sector Council, State of Women in Construction.
4  Government of Alberta, “A Workforce Strategy.”
5  Women Building Futures, “Report to the Community: 2015 & 2016.”
6  Love, “Women Building Futures’ Success.”
7  Foster and Barnetson, “Who’s on Secondary?”
8 Paap, Working Construction.
9  Chan, “Foreign Farm Workers in BC.”
10  Stueck, “In British Columbia, Employers Brace for Changes.”

164  Canada’s Labour Market Training System
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

Glossary

Acculturation: The process of modifying the assumptions, beliefs,
expectations, and values of individuals and groups.
Active labour-market policies: Government policies that encourage or
require action by unemployed individuals, employers, and communities (such as participation in training programs or job-search
activities) to address unemployment.
Adult basic education: Training aimed at adults and intended to
develop literacy, numeracy, and other knowledge and skills to the
high-school level.
Antigonish movement: An early twentieth-century movement that
combined adult education with economic literacy to empower rural
Maritime Canadians to resist exploitation by moneylenders and
product marketers.
Apprenticeship: A multi-year form of labour-market training that relies
heavily on workplace training, supplemented by four to eight weeks
of annual classroom instruction, entailing a fixed-term contract
between an employer and an apprentice, wherein the employer provides wages and training in exchange for the apprentice’s labour.
Association: Two phenomena that typically happen at the same time
or in proximity to one another.
Basic skills: Skills such as literacy, numeracy, and the ability to learn
that form the foundation of workplace skills.

 165
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Bicameral governance: A system of post-secondary governance
wherein decision-making is shared between a Board of Governors
and General Faculties Council.
Blame the worker: Attributing responsibility for negative outcomes
(usually incorrectly) to action or inaction by workers, while ignoring
the contribution of other factors and actors.
Canada Job Grant: A federal labour-market training program, introduced in 2013, providing grants to employers who fund workplace
training.
Canadian labour-market training system: A system that provides
labour-market training to Canadians, compromising four main
components: post-secondary education, government training and
immigration policy, workplace training, and community-based
education.
Capital: Resources such as money, land, equipment, and tools that can
be deployed in order to produce goods and services. Also, sometimes a term used to refer to the group of people who own these
resources.
Capitalist economy: A system of production and exchange characterized by the private ownership of capital.
Cartel: A group of independent producers who co-operate to increase
their profits, such as by restricting the supply of labour.
Causation: A relationship between two phenomena wherein one
causes the other.
Central paradox of trade unionism: The tendency of union power over
its members to be appropriated by management to serve management’s goals.
Class structure: A hierarchy of classes based upon their relationship to
the production process.
Collective agreement: An employment contract negotiated by a union
between an employer and a group of workers.

166 
166 Glossary
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

Colonialism: The process by which European countries exerted political control over the rest of the world between the sixteenth and
twentieth centuries. In Canada, this process has subjected Indigenous people to forced assimilation and systemic racism.
Commodification of labour: The process of rendering workers’ labour
as a commodity that can be bought and sold in a labour market.
Competency: A collection of knowledge, skills, and abilities that, when
used together, allow a worker to perform a complex task or a job.
Compulsory trades or occupations: Occupations where employment
is restricted to registered apprentices and journeypersons.
Demand: The number of hours of work that employers want to purchase at a certain wage rate.
Demand-side measures: Efforts (usually by the state) to alleviate
unemployment by increasing the demand for workers by such
means as job-creation and economic-development activities.
Emotional labour: An occupational requirement to manage one’s
feelings and to make occupationally appropriate emotional displays,
regardless of one’s internal feelings; emotional labour is most often
performed by women.
Employment Insurance: A federal program providing income support
and labour-market training to formerly employed Canadians.
Employment relationship: A relationship in which workers trade their
time and skills to their employer in exchange for wages, whereby the
employer is allowed to direct the work of employees.
Employment-related geographic mobility: Travel by workers related
to employment, such as commuting between municipalities, provinces and territories, or countries.
English as a Second Language (ESL): Education designed to develop
oral and written communication skills in English. Sometimes also
called English as an Additional Language.
Equilibrium point: The wage rate at which the supply of workers
equals the demand for workers.

Glossary 167
 167
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Essential skills: Nine essential skills that the federal government asserts
provide a foundation for learning all other skills and enable people
to better prepare for, get, and keep a job; and to adapt and succeed
at work.
Explicit knowledge: Fact-based knowledge that is relatively easy to
transfer to learners.
Feedback loop: A dynamic wherein one phenomenon causes another
which then reinforces or intensifies the first phenomenon. Often
called a virtuous or vicious cycle.
Fly-in-fly-out workers: Workers who periodically commute significant
distances (often by plane) to work for significant stretches of time
before returning home for a period of rest.
Foreign credential recognition: The process of having educational
qualifications above the high-school level that have been achieved in
another country evaluated and granted a Canadian equivalency.
Fordist production: Industrialized mass production processes based
upon scientific management, most often associated with standardized components assembled by workers on a mechanized
production line.
Formal learning: Learning that entails stated objectives, an organized
curriculum, and set requirements to demonstrate that skills and
knowledge have been acquired.
Framing: The process of shaping public discourse through the selection, interpretation, and presentation of information.
Functional literacy: The ability to complete day-to-day tasks requiring
literacy.
Generalize: To draw broad inferences from specific observations.
Hidden curriculum: Widely held assumptions, beliefs, expectations,
and values that are inculcated into the recipients of education and
training.
Human capital: The cumulative stock of KSAs, intelligence, experience, and judgment of an individual or a population.

168 
168 Glossary
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

Human capital theory: A theory asserting a direct relationship
between the levels of labour-market training and national economic
performance.
Immigrant settlement services: Programming providing immigrants
with information about and assistance in (1) accessing health, education, housing, and transportation resources, (2) interacting with the
state (e.g., assistance filling out forms), and (3) document translation
and job searches.
Incorporation thesis: A theory asserting that management and unions
have a symbiotic relationship in the workplace and that this relationship moderates the behaviour of unions.
Informal learning: Uncredentialed learning that often occurs in the
course of doing something (or observing it being done).
Intergenerational transfer of (dis)advantage: A process by which
socio-economic status is carried forward from one generation to the
next, often through inequitable access to education, labour-market
training, and jobs based upon resources available to an individual’s
family of origin.
International mobility programs (IMP): Programs negotiated in
free-trade agreements that permit various degrees of worker labour
mobility between countries.
Intersectionality: The interaction of identity factors that can cause
overlapping and interdependent systems of (dis)advantage for individual workers.
Journeyperson: A worker who has successfully completed an
apprenticeship program and met the requirements to hold a trade
qualification.
Knowledge: Information (i.e., facts) combined with experience and
values that workers apply to situations and problems on the job or in
everyday life.
Knowledge appropriation: Employer efforts to identify and codify
worker knowledge about the process of work, usually in an effort to
increase employer control and profitability.
Glossary 169
 169
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Labour: A term referring to the group of people who must trade their
effort for wages in order to purchase the necessities of life.
Labour market: The place where employers and workers negotiate the
terms and conditions of employment.
Labour Market Agreements: Agreements between the federal government and provinces and territories whereby the federal government
funded labour-market training offered by the provinces and territories and aimed at workers ineligible for training funded through
Employment Insurance.
Labour Market Development Agreements: Agreements between the
federal government and provinces and territories that devolve the
delivery of Employment Insurance–funded training to the provinces
and territories.
Labour-market power: A form of power for employers and workers
derived from the relative scarcity of workers in an economy.
Labour-market training: Policies, programs, and activities intended to
result in an adequate number of appropriately trained workers.
Labour schools: Intensive residential experiences designed to provide
additional training to union activists.
Learning organization: An organization focused on increasing the capacity of its employees through ongoing learning as a means by which
to improve organizational performance.
Literacy: The ability to understand, evaluate, use, and engage with
written texts.
Mechanical metaphor: A way of viewing an organization, in this case as
a machine comprising interlinked parts that work together towards a
common purpose.
Monetize: Process by which unions convert member demands
for power into demands for money, often under pressure from
employers.

170 
170 Glossary
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

Neoliberalism: A set of political and economic prescriptions that
centre on minimizing government regulations, programs, and
expenditures.
Non-formal learning: Learning where explicit objectives, set curriculum, and requirements to demonstrate skills and knowledge are
modest or absent.
Occupational segregation: The tendency of occupations to be
populated by particular kinds of workers, such as the tendency
of construction workers to be male and child-care workers to be
female.
Organizational learning: The way in which organizations acquire,
share, and use knowledge to succeed.
Pluralism: A view of employment that asserts employers and workers
have both converging and diverging interests in the workplace.
Political costs: Consequences that one actor can impose upon another
when their interests are being ignored or harmed, such as passive
forms of resistance.
Political metaphor: Viewing an organization as a political system
wherein the components of the system reflect the interplay of actors,
who use power to advance their interests.
Post-secondary education: A system of colleges, universities, and
technical institutes as well as various specialized institutes, which
provide formal training that usually leads to credentials.
Precarious legal status: A condition affecting workers whose right to
reside in Canada is contingent upon their continued employment,
which makes these workers vulnerable to employer exploitation.
Precarious work: Paid work characterized by limited social benefits
and statutory entitlements, job insecurity, low wages, and high risks
of ill health.
Prior learning assessment: An effort to evaluate informal and
non-formal learning in order to grant credit for such learning
towards a formal educational credential.

Glossary 171
 171
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Professionals: Workers who possess specialized knowledge that gives
them significant discretion over how they do their work.
Professional development: Periodic training required of members of
regulated professions. Also a common synonym for ongoing training
in white-collar occupations.
Professional regulatory organization: A government-appointed body
that regulates the right of workers to practise in certain occupations.
Professional self-regulation: The regulation of an occupation by
members of that occupation, generally operationalized through a
professional regulatory organization.
Profit imperative: The pressure that capitalists face to realize a profit
from their businesses and that helps shape their decision-making.
Psychological contract: A set of worker expectations, which sits alongside formal employment contracts, about workload and treatment
by the employer.
Public legal education: Training focused on assisting individuals to
develop legal knowledge and skills to manage and/or improve their
lives.
Red Seal program: A program of interprovincial recognition of trade
qualifications designed to increase labour mobility among workers.
Regulated career colleges: Private vocational colleges regulated by
governments to protect the financial interests of students.
Reproduction of labour power: The various tasks that must be accomplished in order to maintain a class of workers.
Return on investment: The (usually) economic gain caused by the
expenditures of money.
Scientific management: An approach to workplace management that
analyzes work processes and reorders them to maximize efficiency.
Skill: An ability to perform a task.
Skills shortage: The situation that exists when there is an inadequate
number of workers who possess the knowledge, skills, or abilities

172 
172 Glossary
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

that employers require and who are willing to make themselves
available to work given the prevailing wage and working conditions.
Social reproduction: The process of perpetuating the social arrangements necessary for economic production, including ensuring that
there is an adequate number of appropriately trained workers who
accept being subordinate to employers in the production process.
Socio-economic status: An individual’s position within a social hierarchy based upon their education, occupation, income and wealth,
and place of residence.
State: The supreme civil power within a country or subnational region.
Steward training: Union-sponsored training that develops members’
collective bargaining and grievance-handling skills, sometimes also
called “tools” courses.
Supply: The number of hours of work that workers are prepared to
provide at a given wage rate.
Supply-side measures: Efforts (usually by the state) to alleviate
unemployment by providing training to workers to help them attach
to the labour market.
Systemic racism: Racism embedded in social institutions, structures,
and social relations within our society that is often most visible
in the inequitable outcomes faced by specific ethnic and cultural
groups.
Tacit knowledge: Knowledge that is often learned through experience
and is very difficult to codify.
Temporary foreign workers (TFWs): Non-citizens who are permitted
to work in Canada for a fixed period of time and whose residency is
contingent upon their employment.
Trade qualification: A formal educational credential denoting that the
holder (often called a journeyperson) is qualified to practise a trade
or occupation.
Training: The process of intentionally acquiring, modifying, or reinforcing knowledge, skills, and abilities as well as values and references.

Glossary 173
 173
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Training levy: A compulsory level of training expenditures required of
employers by the state and intended to increase workplace training.
Underemployment: A situation where a worker’s KSAs are underutilized in a job.
Unitarism: A view of employment that asserts that common (and
employer-determined) objectives unite the efforts of employers and
workers in the workplace.
Workplace skills: Generic technical skills, problem-solving skills, and
interpersonal skills that form the foundation of firm- or job-specific
skill.

174 
174 Glossary
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

Bibliography

Aguinis, H., and K. Kraiger. “Benefits of Training and Development for
Individuals and Teams, Organizations, and Society.” Annual Review of
Psychology 60 (2009): 451–474.
Alberta Workers’ Health Centre. Injured Worker Case Study. Edmonton:
Alberta Workers’ Health Centre, 2017. http://www.workershealthcentre.ca/
uploads/InjuredWorkerCaseStudyNAW.pdf
Alberta Works. “Employment and Training Programs and Services: Overview.”
Accessed March 28, 2017, http://www.humanservices.alberta.ca/AWonline/
ETS/4324.html
Albo, G. “What Comes Next? Canadian Employment Policies.” In Production,
Space, Identity: Political Economy Faces the 21st Century, edited by J. Jenson, R.
Mahon, and M. Beinefeld, 111–140. Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press, 1993.
Ally, M., D. Dewhurst, and A. Zariski. “Expanding Access to Legal Services
in Alberta through E-Learning.” Report to the Alberta Law Foundation.
Athabasca: Athabasca University and the Alberta Law Foundation, 2012.
Anyon, J. “Social Class and the Hidden Curriculum of Work.” Journal of
Education 162, no. 1 (1980): 67–92.
Argyris, C., and D. A. Schön. Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action
Perspective. Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1978.
Arnason, R. “Farm Labour Shortfall Expected to Soar.” The Western Producer,
December 12, 2016. http://www.producer.com/2016/12/farm-labourshortfall-expected-to-soar/
Arriagada, P., and D. Hango. “Literacy and Numeracy among Off-Reserve First
Nations People and Metis: Do Higher Skill Levels Improve Labour Market
Outcomes?” Insights on Canadian Society. Catalogue no. 75-006-X. Ottawa:
Statistics Canada, 2016.

 175
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Arrowsmith, E. Apprenticeship Analysis: Women and Apprenticeship in Canada.
Ottawa: Canadian Apprenticeship Training Forum, 2016.
Aspen Foundation for Labour Education. “About Us.” Accessed May 11, 2017,
http://www.afle.ca/about-us.html
Atlantic Literacy Coalitions. Submission to the House of Commons Standing
Committee on Finance Pre-budget Consultations 2016–2017. Charlottetown:
Atlantic Literacy Coalitions, 2016.
Ballantyne, C. “Move to Mandatory Work Experience for Ontario Students
Requires Buy-in from Employers, Increased Resources for Schools.”
Exchange Magazine, January 24, 2017. http://exchangemagazine.com/2017/
week4/Tuesday/17012419.htm
Barnetson, B. The Political Economy of Workplace Injury in Canada. Edmonton:
Athabasca University Press, 2010.
Barnetson, B., and A. Boberg. “Resource Allocation and Public Policy in
Alberta’s Postsecondary System.” Canadian Journal of Higher Education 30,
no. 2 (1999): 57–86.
Barnetson, B., and J. Foster. “The Political Justification of Migrant Workers in
Alberta, Canada.” Journal of International Migration and Integration 15, no. 2
(2014): 349–370.
Bartel, A. “Measuring the Employer’s Return on Investments in Training:
Evidence from the Literature.” Industrial Relations 39, no. 3 (2000): 502–524.
Basker, E. “Change at the Checkout: Tracing the Impact of a Process
Innovation.” Journal of Industrial Economics 63, no. 2 (2015): 339–370.
Basok, T. Tortillas and Tomatoes: Transmigrant Mexican Harvesters in Canada.
Montréal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002.
Bauder, H. “‘Brain Abuse,’ or the Devaluation of Immigrant Labour in Canada.”
Antipode 35, no. 4 (2003): 699–717.
Bélanger, P., and M. Robitaille. A Portrait of Work-related Learning in Quebec.
Montréal: Work and Learning Knowledge Centre, 2008.
Berger, G., and G. Yang. “Millennials Job-hop More Than Previous Generations,
& They Aren’t Slowing Down.” LinkedIn, April 12, 2016. https://www.
linkedin.com/pulse/millennials-job-hop-more-than-previous-generationsguy-berger-ph-d-?trk=pulse-det-nav_art
Berry, C. “Quantity over Quality: A Political Economy of ‘Active Labour
Market Policy’ in the UK.” Policy Studies 35, no. 6 (2014): 592–610.

176 
176 Bibliography
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

Blundell, R., L. Dearden, C. Meghir, and B. Siansei. “Human Capital
Investment: The Returns from Education and Training to the Individual, the
Firm and the Economy.” Fiscal Studies 20, no. 1 (1999): 1–23.
Bouchard, P. “Training and Work: Some Myths about Human Capital Theory.”
In A Canadian Reader in Adult Education, edited by B. Spencer and S. Scott,
33–68. Toronto: Thompson, 1998.
Braverman, H. Labor and Monopoly Capital. New York: Monthly Review Press,
1974.
Bredin Centre for Learning. “Edmonton Center Offers.” Accessed May 18, 2017,
http://www.bredin.ca/edmonton-programs-and-services
Brisson, M. “Employment Insurance and Active Labour Market Policies in
Canada.” Major Research Paper, University of Ottawa, 2015. https://ruor.
uottawa.ca/bitstream/10393/32604/1/BRISSON%2C%20Michael%2020155.pdf
Broadbent Institute. “Harper Government ‘Accelerated’ Unemployment
by Expanding TFW Program.” Press Progress, April 24, 2014. http://
www.broadbentinstitute.ca/en/post/harper-government-acceleratedunemployment-expanding-tfw-program-study
Broad, D., and G. Hunter. “Work, Welfare, and the New Economy: The
Commodification of Everything.” In Interrogating the New Economy:
Restructuring Work in the 21st Century, edited by N. Pupo and M. Thomas,
21–42. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010.
Business Council of Canada. “Every University and College Student Should
Have Access to Work-Integrated Learning, Business and Post-Secondary
Leaders Say.” Accessed February 8, 2017, http://thebusinesscouncil.ca/
news/every-university-and-college-student-should-have-access-to-workintegrated-learning-business-and-post-secondary-leaders-say/
Canadian Apprenticeship Training Forum. “Apprenticeship in Canada: 2016
Report.” Ottawa: Canadian Apprenticeship Training Forum, 2016.
Canadian Council on Learning. Securing Prosperity through Canada’s Human
Infrastructure: The State of Adult Learning and Workplace Training in Canada.
Ottawa: Canadian Council on Learning, 2009.
Canada Revenue Agency. “Lifelong Learning Plan.” Ottawa: Canada Revenue
Agency, 2017.
Canada’s New West Partnership. “New West Partnership Agreement, 2010.”
Accessed June 12, 2017, http://newwestpartnership.ca/New%20West%20
Partnership%20-%20Agreement.pdf

Bibliography 177
 177
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Card, D., J. Kluve, and A. Weber. “Active Labour Market Policy Evaluations: A
Meta-Analysis.” The Economics Journal 120 (2010): F452–F477.
Cathexis Consulting. Evaluation of the Literacy and Basic Skills (LBs) Program:
Final Report. Toronto: Cathexis, 2016. http://www.tcu.gov.on.ca/eng/eopg/
publications/lbs-eval-report-2016-en.pdf
Chan, C. “Foreign Farm Workers in BC Face Poor Living and Working
Conditions: Report.” Vancouver Sun, December 18, 2016. http://
vancouversun.com/news/local-news/foreign-farm-workers-in-b-c-facepoor-working-and-living-conditions-report
Coady, M. Masters of Their Own Destiny: The Story of the Antigonish Movement
of Adult Education through Economic Cooperation. New York: Harper, 1939.
Conference Board of Canada. “Adult Literacy Rate—Low-level Skills.” Ottawa:
Conference Board of Canada, 2017. http://www.conferenceboard.ca/hcp/
details/education/adult-literacy-rate-low-skills.aspx
Construction Sector Council. The State of Women in Construction in Canada.
Ottawa: Construction Sector Council, 2010.
———. A Study of Aboriginal Participation in the Construction Industry. Ottawa:
Construction Sector Council, 2005.
Cooke, G., I. Zeytinoglu, and C. Chowhan. “Barriers to Training Access.”
Perspectives on Labour and Income, 14–25. Catalogue no. 75-001-X. Ottawa:
Statistics Canada, 2009.
Critoph, U. “Who Wins, Who Loses: The Real Story of the Transfer of Training
to the Provinces and its Impact on Women.” In Training the Excluded
for Work: Access and Equity for Women, Immigrants, First Nations, Youth
and People with Low Income, edited by M. G. Cohen, 14–33. Vancouver:
University of British Columbia Press, 2003.
Cross, J. “Training vs. Education: A Distinction that Makes a Difference.”
Bank Securities Journal, 1996. https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/265575993_Training_vs_Education_A_Distinction_That_
Makes_A_Difference
Crowther, J. “Participation in Adult and Community Education: A Discourse
of Diminishing Returns.” International Journal of Lifelong Education 19, no. 6
(2000): 479–492.
Culbert, L., and T. Sherlock. “BC’s Working Poor: Education Essential to
Better Opportunities.” Vancouver Sun, March 29, 2017. http://vancouversun.
com/news/local-news/b-c-s-working-poor-education-essential-to-betteropportunities

178 
178 Bibliography
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

Darville, R. “Unfolding the Adult Literacy Regime.” Adult Education Research
Conference, Conference Proceedings, 2011. http://newprairiepress.org/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=3149&context=aerc
———. Adult Literacy Work in Canada. Toronto: Canadian Association for Adult
Education, 1992.
Dennison, J., and P. Gallagher. Canada’s Community Colleges: A Critical
Analysis. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1986.
Department of Finance Canada. “Annual Financial Report of the Government
of Canada: Fiscal Year 2015–2016.” Ottawa: Department of Finance Canada,
2016. https://www.fin.gc.ca/afr-rfa/2016/report-rapport-eng.asp#_
Toc463249478
———. Advantage Canada: Building a Strong Economy for Canadians. Ottawa:
Department of Finance Canada, 2006.
Drost, H., and R. Hird. Introduction to the Canadian Labour Market. 2nd ed.
Scarborough, ON: Nelson, 2005.
EducationPlannerBC. “Plan. Search. Apply.” Accessed February 16, 2017,
educationplannerbc.ca
Employment and Social Development Canada. “EI Regular Benefits—
Overview.” Ottawa: Employment and Social Development Canada, 2016.
http://www.esdc.gc.ca/en/ei/regular_benefit/index.page
———. Evaluation of the Aboriginal Skills and Employment Training Strategy
and the Skills and Partnership Fund. Ottawa: Employment and Social
Development Canada, 2015.
———. “Statistical Review: Canada Student Loans Program 2013–2014.” Ottawa:
Employment and Social Development Canada, 2015.
———. Understanding Essential Skills. Ottawa: Employment and Social
Development Canada, 2015. https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-socialdevelopment/programs/essential-skills/definitions.html
———. “Evaluation of Labour Market Agreements.” Ottawa: Employment and
Social Development Canada, 2013.
Fenwick, T. “Control, Contradiction and Ambivalence: Skill Initiatives in
Canada.” Paper presented at the Canadian Association for the Study of Adult
Education Conference, Toronto, ON, May 28–30, 2006.
Finger, M., and S. Brand. “The Concept of the ‘Learning Organization’ Applied
to the Transformation of the Public Sector.” In Organizational Learning and
the Learning Organization, edited by M. Easterby-Smith, L. Araujo, and J.
Burgoyne, 130–156. London: Sage, 1999.
Bibliography 179
 179
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Finkel, A. Social Policy and Practice in Canada: A History. Waterloo, ON:
Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2006.
Foster, J., and B. Barnetson. “Who’s on Secondary?: The Impact of Temporary
Foreign Workers on Alberta Construction Employment Patterns.” Labour/Le
Travail 80 (2017): 27–53.
———. “Exporting Oil, Importing Labour and Weakening Democracy: The
Use of Foreign Migrant Workers in Alberta.” Alberta Oil and the Decline of
Democracy in Canada, edited by M. Shrivastava and L. Stefanick, 249–274.
Edmonton: Athabasca University Press, 2015.
Foster, J., and A. Taylor. “In the Shadows: Exploring the Notion of
‘Community’ for Temporary Foreign Workers in a Boom Town.” Canadian
Journal of Sociology 38, no. 2 (2013): 167–190.
Fudge, J., and F. MacPhail. “The Temporary Foreign Worker Program in
Canada: Low-skilled Workers as an Extreme Form of Flexible Labor.”
Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal 31, no. 1 (2009): 5–45.
Gagnon, M-E., and M. Smith. “The Effect of a Training Levy on Training
Characteristics and Outcomes: The Case of Quebec.” Relations Industrielles/
Industrial Relations 68, no. 1 (2013): 120–141.
Goar, C. “Mainstay of Canada’s Literacy Movement Topples: Goar.”
Toronto Star, July 3, 2017. https://www.thestar.com/opinion/
commentary/2014/07/03/mainstay_of_canadas_literacy_movement_
topples_goar.html
Godard, J. Industrial Relations, the Economy and Society. 4th ed. Concord, ON:
Captus, 2011.
Goss Gilroy Inc. Canada Job Grant Year 2 Review: Pan-Canadian Report.
Ottawa: Forum of Labour Market Ministers, 2016.
Government of Alberta. “A Workforce Strategy for Alberta’s Construction
Industry.” Edmonton: Employment, Immigration and Industry, 2010.
Government of British Columbia. “New Degree Programs.” Accessed
February 16, 2017, http://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/education-training/
post-secondary-education/institution-resources-administration/degreeauthorization/assessment-criteria-process/new-degree-programs
Government of Canada. Budget 2018. Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2018.
———. “Governments of Canada and Ontario Reach Agreement to Give
More People the Tools They Need to Find and Keep Good Jobs.” Ottawa:
Government of Canada, 2018. https://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/

180 
180 Bibliography
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

governments-of-canada-and-ontario-reach-agreement-to-give-more-peoplethe-tools-they-need-to-find-and-keep-good-jobs-681496621.html
———.Workforce Development Agreements. Ottawa: Government of Canada,
2018. https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/
programs/training-agreements/workforce-development-agreements.html
———. Budget 2017. Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2017.
———. “Facts and Figures 2015: Immigration Overview–Temporary Residents–
Annual IRCC Updates.” Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2017. http://open.
canada.ca/data/en/dataset/052642bb-3fd9-4828-b608-c81dff7e539c
———. Labour Market Development Agreement. Ottawa: Government of
Canada, 2017. https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/
programs/training-agreements/lmda.html
———. “The New Canada Job Grant: Economic Action Plan 2013.” Ottawa:
Government of Canada, 2013.
Government of Canada and Government of Quebec. “Preamble” to “CanadaQuebec Agreement 2014–2020.” Ottawa: Government of Canada and
Government of Quebec, 2014.
Grant, M. “Aligning Skills Development with Labour Market Needs.” Ottawa:
Conference Board of Canada, 2016.
———. “The Economic Impact of Post-Secondary Education in Canada.”
Ottawa: Conference Board of Canada, 2013.
Gray, D., and C. Busby. Unequal Access; Making Sense of EI Eligibility Rules
and How to Improve Them.” Toronto: C. D. Howe Institute, 2016.
Green, A., and D. Green. “The Economic Goals of Canada’s Immigration
Policy: Past and Present.” Canadian Public Policy 25, no. 4 (1999): 425–451.
Greenhalgh, C. “Does an Employer Training Levy Work? The Incidence of and
Returns to Adult Vocational Training in France and Britain.” Fiscal Studies 23
(2002): 223–263.
Guo, S. “Difference, Deficiency, and Devaluation: Tracing the Roots of Nonrecognition of Foreign Credentials for Immigrant Professionals in Canada.”
Canadian Journal for the Study of Adult Education 22, no. 1 (2009): 37–52.
Haan, M., D. Walsh, and B. Neis. “At the Crossroads: Geography, Gender
and Occupational Sector in Employment-related Geographical Mobility.”
Canadian Studies in Population 41, no. 3–4 (2014): 6–21.
Haddow, R., and T. Klassen. Partisanship, Globalization, and Canadian Labour
Market Policy: Four Provinces in Comparative Perspective. Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 2006.
Bibliography 181
 181
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Hall, Chris. “Ottawa Digging in for Canada Job Grant Fight with Premiers.”
CBC News, November 15, 2013. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/ottawadigging-in-for-canada-job-grant-fight-with-premiers-1.2427209
Heibert, D. “Winning, Losing and Still Playing the Game: The Political
Economy of Immigration in Canada.” Tijdschrift Voor Economische en Sociale
Geografie 97, no. 1 (2006): 38–48.
Houle, J. “Disparities in Debt: Parents’ Socioeconomic Resources and Young
Adult Student Loan Debt.” Sociology of Education 87, no. 1 (2013): 53–69.
Hughes, C. “Costly Benefits and Gendered Costs: Guatemalans’ Experiences of
Canada’s ‘Low-Skill Pilot Project.’” Legislated Inequality: Temporary Labour
Migration in Canada, edited by P. Lenard and C. Straehle, 139–157. Montréal
and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012.
Hyman, R. The Political Economy of Industrial Relations: Theory and Practice in
a Cold Climate. London: MacMillan, 1989.
Hyslop, K. “NDP Government Restores Funding for Adult Ed and English
Courses.” The Tyee, August 8, 2017. https://thetyee.ca/News/2017/08/08/
NDP-Restores-Funding-Adult-Ed-English-Language-Courses/
Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada. Annual Report to Parliament on
Immigration. Ottawa: Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada, 2016.
Information and Communications Technology Council. Digital Talent: The
Road to 2020 and Beyond. Ottawa: Information and Communications
Technology Council, 2016.
James, N. “Emotional Labour: Skill and Work in the Social Regulation of
Feelings.” The Sociological Review 37, no. 1 (1989): 15–42.
Jarvis, P. The Sociology of Adult & Continuing Education. New York: Routledge,
1985.
Jones, G. “An Introduction to Higher Education in Canada.” In Higher
Education across Nations, edited by K. Joshi and S. Paivandi, 1–38. Delhi: B.
R. Publishing, 2014.
Jones, S. The Effectiveness of Training for Displaced Workers with Long Job
Tenure. Ottawa: Mowat Centre EI Task Force, 2011.
Kluve, J. “The Effectiveness of European Active Labor Market Policy.” IZA
Discussion Paper No. 2018; RWI Discussion Paper No. 37. Bonn, Germany:
Institute for the Study of Labor, 2006.
Knowles, V. Strangers at Our Gates: Canadian Immigration and Immigration
Policy, 1540–2007. Rev. ed. Toronto: Dundurn, 2007.

182 
182 Bibliography
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

Laliberte, R. “The ‘Grab-a-Hoe’ Indians: The Canadian State and the
Procurement of Aboriginal Labour for the Southern Alberta Sugar Beet
Industry.” Prairie Forum 31, no. 2 (2006): 305–324.
Lalonde, M., and M. McKean. Canada’s Post-Secondary Education Performance:
An International Comparison. Ottawa: Conference Board of Canada, 2017.
Laryea, S., and K. Medu. National Apprenticeship Survey 2007: Participation of
Women, Immigrants and Aboriginal People in Apprenticeship. Ottawa: Human
Resources and Skills Development Canada, 2010.
Lewchuk, W., M. Lafleche, D. Dyson, L. Goldring, A. Meisner, S. Procyk,
D. Rosen, J. Shields, P. Viducis, and S. Vrankulj. “It’s More than Poverty:
Employment Precarity and Household Well-being.” Toronto and Hamilton:
Poverty and Employment Precarity in Southern Ontario (PEPSO) Research
Group, 2013. https://pepsouwt.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/its-more-thanpoverty-feb-2013.pdf
“List of Alberta Provincial Ministers.” Wikipedia. Accessed January 1,
2018, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Alberta_provincial_
ministers#Minister_of_Employment_and_Immigration
Livingstone, D. W., ed. Education & Jobs: Exploring the Gaps. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2007.
Livingstone, D. W. “Starting with the Education-Jobs Gap.” In Education
& Jobs: Exploring the Gaps, edited by D. W. Livingstone, 51–63. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2007.
———. “Exploring the Icebergs of Adult Learning: Findings of the First
Canadian Survey of Informal Learning Practices.” CJSAE 13, no. 2 (1999):
49–72.
Livingstone, D. W., and A. Scholtz. “Contradictions of Labour Processes
and Workers’ Use of Skills in Advanced Capitalist Economies.” In Work in
Tumultuous Times: Critical Perspectives, edited by V. Shalla and W. Clement,
131–162. Montréal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007.
Livingstone, D. W., and M. Raykov. “Union Influence on Worker Education and
Training in Canada during Tough Times.” Just Labour 5 (2005): 50–64.
Looker, D., and G. Lowe. “Post-Secondary Access and Student Financial Aid in
Canada: Current Knowledge and Research Gaps.” Ottawa: Canadian Policy
Research Networks, 2001.
Lönnroth, K. J. “Active Labour Market Policies: Continuity and Change.” In
Policies towards Full Employment, 175–190. Paris: OECD, 2000.

Bibliography 183
 183
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Love, M. “Women Building Futures’ Success Leads to Footprint Expansion.”
Journal of Commerce, June 12, 2017. https://canada.constructconnect.com/
joc/news/associations/2017/06/women-building-futures-success-leads-tofootprint-expansion
MacKinnon, S. Decolonizing Employment: Aboriginal Inclusion in Canada’s
Labour Market. Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2015.
Magali, M. “Federal-Provincial Overlap and Civil Servants: The Case
of Occupational Training in Quebec and Ontario.” Canadian Public
Administration 48, no. 1 (2005): 35–52.
Mandel, E. Power and Money: A Marxist Theory of Bureaucracy. New York:
Verso, 1992.
Margison, S. “Rethinking Education, Work and ‘Employability’: Foundational
Problems of Human Capital Theory.” Paper presented at the SHRE
Conference. Newport, Wales, December 9, 2015.
Marglin, S. “What Do Bosses Do? The Origins and Functions of Hierarchy in
Capitalist Production.” Review of Radical Political Economy 6 (1974): 60–112.
Marr, G. “RESP: The Tax-free Account that Canadian Parents Forgot About.”
Financial Post, April 28, 2015. http://business.financialpost.com/personalfinance/resp-the-tax-free-account-canadian-parents-forgot-about
Martin, E., and C. MacLaine. The Role and Value of Private Career Colleges in
Canada. Ottawa: Conference Board of Canada, 2015.
Mas, S. “Canada Job Grant Won’t Be in Place July 1 in Most Provinces.” CBC
News, June 29, 2014. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-job-grantwon-t-be-in-place-july-1-in-most-provinces-1.2690173
———. “Jason Kenney: Canada Job Grant Will Lead to Guaranteed Jobs.” CBC
News, February 14, 2014. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/jason-kenneycanada-job-grant-will-lead-to-guaranteed-jobs-1.2533961
McBride, S. Working? Employment Policy in Canada. Oakville, ON: Rock’s Mills
Press, 2017.
———. “The Political Economy of Training in Canada.” Paper presented at the
2nd Annual Conference of the Labour Education and Training Research
Network.” May 24–26, 1998.
McShane, S. Organizational Behaviour. 5th ed. Toronto, ON: McGraw-Hill
Ryerson, 2004.
Meager, N. “The Role of Training and Skills Development in Active Labour
Market Policies.” International Journal of Training and Development 13, no. 1
(2009): 1–18.
184 
184 Bibliography
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

Mendelson, M. Aboriginal Peoples and Post-Secondary Education in Canada.
Ottawa: Caledon Institute, 2006.
Mendelson, M., and N. Zon. The Training Wheels Are Off: A Closer Look at the
Canada Job Grant. Toronto: Mowat Centre, 2013.
Merriam, S., R. Caffarella, and L. Baumgartner. Learning in Adulthood: A
Comprehensive Guide. 3rd ed. San Francisco: John Wiley & Sons, 2012.
Mertins-Kirkwood, H. “The Hidden Growth of Canada’s Migrant Labour
Force.” In The Harper Record 2008-2015, edited by T. Healy and S. Trew,
149–158. Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2016.
Mikkonen, J., and D. Raphael. “Social Determinants of Health: The Canadian
Facts.” Toronto: York University School of Health Policy and Management,
2010.
Morgan, G. Images of Organization. Rev. ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2006.
Morrison, J. Camps and Classrooms: A Pictorial History of Frontier College.
Toronto: Frontier College Press, 1989.
Moussaly-Segieh, K., and F. Vaillancourt. “Extra Earning Power: The Financial
Return on Post-Secondary Education in Canada.” Ottawa: CD Howe
Institute, 2009.
Munro, D. “Developing Skills: Where Are Canada’s Employers?” Conference
Board of Canada, March 20, 2014. https://www.conferenceboard.ca/
newsletter/archive/2014/jan2014/hot-topics-in-education/2014/03/20/
Developing_Skills_Where_Are_Canada_s_Employers.aspx
Neatby, B. “The Historical Perspective.” In Governments and Higher
Education: The Legitimacy of Intervention, edited by C. Watson, 19–40.
Toronto: Higher Education Group, Ontario Institute for Studies in
Education, 1987.
Northern Alberta Institute of Technology. “We Are Essential.” Accessed
January 9, 2018, http://www.nait.ca/44315.htm
Ontario Ministry of Community and Social Services. “Ontario Works.”
Accessed January 20, 2018, https://www.mcss.gov.on.ca/en/mcss/
programs/social/ow/
Ontario Premier’s Council. People and Skills in the New Global Economy:
Premier’s Council Report. Toronto: Ontario Premier’s Council, 1990.
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. “Labour Market
Training.” Glossary of Statistical Terms. Accessed January 20, 2018, https://
stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1488

Bibliography 185
 185
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

———. Education at a Glance 2016: OECD Indicators. Paris: OECD Publishing,
2016.
———. OECD Skills Outlook 2013: First Results from the Survey of Adult Skills.
Paris: OECD Publishing, 2013.
———. The Survey of Adult Skills: Reader’s Companion. Geneva: OECD
Publishing, 2013.
———. The OECD Jobs Study. Paris: OECD Publishing, 1994.
Osberg, L. “Canada’s Declining Social Safety Net: EI Reform of the 2009
Budget.” Paper presented at the 2009 Federal Budget: Challenge, Response
and Retrospect, Kingston, ON, 2009.
Paap, K. Working Construction: Why White Working-Class Men Put Themselves—
and the Labor Movement—in Harm’s Way. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 2006.
Pearson, M. “Literacy Organizations Say Federal Government Abandoning
Them.” Ottawa Citizen, May 20, 2014. http://ottawacitizen.com/news/localnews/literacy-organizations-say-federal-government-abandoning-them
Pendakur, R., and K. Pendakur. “Aboriginal Income Disparity in Canada.”
Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2013. https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/DAM/
DAM-INTER-HQ-AI/STAGING/texte-text/rs_re_brief_incomedisparityPDF_1378400531873_eng.pdf
Percival, J., B. Cozzarin, and S. Formaneck. “Return on Investment for
Workplace Training: The Canadian Experience.” International Journal of
Training and Development 17, no. 1 (2013): 20–32.
Peters, V. Results of the 2003 Adult Education and Training Survey. Ottawa:
Statistics Canada, 2004.
Picchio, A. Social Reproduction: The Political Economy of the Labour Market.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
Porter, A. “Austerity, Social Program Restructuring, and the Erosion of
Democracy: Examining the 2012 Employment Insurance Reforms.” Canadian
Review of Social Policy 71, no. 1 (2015): 21–52.
Preibisch, K. “BC-Grown: Examining the Place-embeddedness of Managed
Migration and Farm Labour Markets in British Columbia.” In Farmworkers
in Western Canada: Injustice and Activism, edited by S. McDonald and B.
Barnetson, 167–186. Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 2016.
Provincial and Territorial Labour Market Ministers. Skills Investments for
All Canadians: The Future of the Labour Market Development Agreements.
Ottawa: Provincial and Territorial Labour Market Ministers, 2002.
186 
186 Bibliography
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

Public Legal Education Association of Saskatchewan. “About PLEA.” Accessed
May 11, 2017, http://plea.org/about/
Raykov, M., and A. Taylor. “Health and Safety for Canadian Youth in Trades.”
Just Labour 20 (2013): 33–50.
Sanchez, R. “‘Tacit Knowledge’ versus ‘Explicit Knowledge’ Approaches to
Knowledge Management Practice.” In Handbook on the Knowledge Economy,
edited by D. Rooney, G. Hearn, and A. Ninan, 191–203. Cheltenham, UK:
Elgar, 2005.
Sears, A. Retooling the Mind Factory: Education in a Lean State. Aurora, ON:
Garamond, 2003.
Senge, P. The Fifth Discipline. London: Century Business, 1990.
Serenko, A., N. Bontis, and T. Hardie, “Organizational Size and Knowledge
Flow: A Proposed Theoretical Link.” Journal of Intellectual Capital 8, no. 4
(2007): 610–627.
Sharpe, A., and G. Gibson. “The Apprenticeship System in Canada: Trends and
Issues.” Ottawa: Centre for the Study of Living Standards, 2005.
Smythe, S. “Ten Years of Adult Literacy Policy and Practice in Canada: Literacy
Policy Tensions and Workarounds.” Language and Literacy 17, no. 2 (2015):
4–21.
Spencer, B. The Purposes of Adult Education: A Short Introduction. Toronto:
Thompson, 2006.
Statistics Canada. “Education in Canada: Key Results from the 2016 Census.”
Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2017.
———. “Labour Force Survey Estimates by Employment, Sex and Age Group.”
CANSIM Table 282-0004. Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2017.
———. “Post-Secondary Enrolments, by Program Type, Credential Type,
Classification of Instructional Programs, Primary Grouping (CIP_PG),
Registration Status and Sex.” CANSIM Table 477-0029. Ottawa: Statistics
Canada, 2017.
———. “Registered Apprenticeship Training, by Sex and by Province and
Territory.” Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2017.
———. “Registered Apprenticeship Training, Registrations, by Age Groups, Sex
and Major Trade Groups.” CANSIM 477-0053. Ottawa: Statistics Canada,
2017.
———. “Tuition Fees for Degree Programs, 2016/17.” Ottawa: Statistics Canada,
2016.

Bibliography 187
 187
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

———. “The Educational Attainment of Aboriginal Peoples in Canada.” The
National Household Survey, Catalogue no. 99-012-X2011003. Ottawa:
Statistics Canada, 2011.
———. Women in Canada—A Gender-based Statistical Report. Ottawa: Statistics
Canada, 2010.
———. “Canada’s Retirement Income Programs.” The Daily, February 7. Ottawa:
Statistics Canada, 2006.
Statistics Canada, Employment and Social Development Canada, and
the Council of Ministers of Education, Canada. “Skills in Canada: First
Results from the Programme for the International Assessment of Adult
Competencies.” Catalogue no. 89-555-X. Ottawa: Statistics Canada,
Employment and Social Development Canada, and the Council of Ministers
of Education, 2013.
Status of Women Canada. Women in Canada at a Glance: Statistical Highlights.
Ottawa: Status of Women Canada, 2012.
Stueck, W. “In British Columbia, Employers Brace for Changes to Rules
Governing Seasonal Workers.” Globe and Mail, December 3, 2017. https://
www.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-columbia/in-british-columbiaemployers-brace-for-changes-to-rules-governing-seasonal-workers/
article37175446/
Tandem Social Research Consulting. Literature Review of Postsecondary
Affordability in Canada. Toronto: Council of Ministers of Education, Canada,
2007.
Taylor, A. Vocational Education in Canada. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University
Press, 2015.
Taylor, A., J. Foster, and C. Cambre. “Temporary Foreign Workers in Trades in
Alberta.” Edmonton: Work and Learning Network, 2013.
Taylor, A., and E. Steinhauer. “Evolving Constraints and Life ‘Choices’:
Understanding the Career Pathways of Students in First Nations
Communities.” In Challenging Transitions in Learning and Work: Reflections
on Policy and Practices, edited by P. Sawchuk and A. Taylor, 65–84. Boston:
Sense Publishers, 2010.
Taylor, J. Union Learning: Canadian Labour Education in the Twentieth Century.
Toronto: Thompson, 2001.
Tencer, D. “Tech Jobs Will Boom in Canada, but Country Lacks People to Fill
Them: Study.” Huffington Post, March 12, 2016. http://www.huffingtonpost.
ca/2016/03/12/it-jobs-skills-shortage-canada_n_9440872.html

188 
188 Bibliography
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System

Tharenou, P., A. Saks, and C. Moore. “A Review and Critique of Research on
Training and Organization-level Outcomes.” Human Resource Management
Review 17, no. 3 (2007): 251–273.
Townley, B. Reframing Human Resource Management: Power, Ethics and the
Subject of Work. London: Sage, 1994.
Tuggle, F. “Gaps and Progress in our Knowledge of Learning Organizations.”
The Learning Organization 23, no. 6 (2016): 444–457.
Turcotte, M. Women and Education. Catalogue no. 89-503-X. Ottawa: Ministry
of Industry, 2011.
United States Department of Labor. “Employee Tenure News Release.” Bureau
of Labor Statistics, Economic News Release, September 18, 2014. https://
www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/tenure_09182014.htm
Uppal, S., and S. LaRochelle-Côté. “Changes in the Occupational Profile of
Young Men and Women in Canada.” Insights on Canadian Society. Ottawa:
Statistics Canada, 2014.
Vallance, E. “Hiding the Hidden Curriculum: An Interpretation of the
Language of Justification in Nineteenth-Century Educational Reform.”
Curriculum Theory Network 4, no. 1 (1973–74): 5–21.
Vosko, L. Managing the Margins: Gender, Citizenship, and the International
Regulation of Precarious Employment. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.
———. “Precarious Employment: Towards an Improved Understanding of
Labour Market Insecurity.” In Precarious Employment: Understanding
Labour Market Insecurity in Canada, edited by L. Vosko, 3–39. Montréal and
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006.
Wingard, J. “Want Millennials to Stay? Invest in Corporate Learning.” Huff Post,
May 2, 2016. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jason-wingard/wantmillennials-to-stay_b_9824258.html
Women Building Futures. “Report to the Community: 2015 & 2016.” Accessed
June 6, 2017, http://files.clickdimensions.com/womenbuildingfuturescomatdyk/files/wbf-2017_report_to_the_community_webfinal.pdf
Wood, D. “Comparing Intergovernmental Institutions in Human Capital
Development.” In Canada and the State of the Federation 2012: Regions,
Resources and Resiliency, edited by L. Berdahl, A. Juneau, and C. Hughes Tuohy,
119–144. Montréal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2015.
Wood, D. “From Pathways to ‘ASETS’ in Aboriginal Employment
Programming.” In How Ottawa Spends, 2015–2016, edited by C. Stoney and B.
Doern, 398–445. Ottawa: Carleton University, 2016.
Bibliography 189
 189
Canada’s Labour Market Training System

doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Wood, D. “Hollowing out the Middle: Recasting Federal Workforce
Development Programs under the Harper Government.” In The Harper
Record: 2008–2015, edited by T. Healy and S. Trew, 183–200. Ottawa:
Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2016.
Wood, D., and B. Hayes. Labour Market Agreements: What Did They Really Do?
Ottawa: Caledon Institute, 2016.
Wright, T. “Q&A: Employment Minister Jason Kenney on EI and TFW.”
The Guardian, September 19, 2014. http://www.theguardian.pe.ca/news/
local/2014/9/19/strong-q-a-strong-employment-ministe-3875241.html
Yates, M. Naming the System: Inequality and Work in the Global Economy. New
York: Monthly Review Press, 2003.
Yssaad, L. The Immigrant Labour Force Analysis Series: The Canadian Immigrant
Labour Market, 2008–2011. Catalogue no. 71-606-X. Ottawa: Statistics
Canada, 2012.

190 
190 Bibliography
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992411.01

Canada’s Labour Market Training System