A social justice challenge for school leadership in Australia

Kimber,Megan

2019

Springer

School leadership in many countries is affected by multiple challenges. Some are specific to the local community, some emerge from the education system, and some originate from government policies. While most reforms center on “improving educational outcomes” (Kimber & Ehrich, 2011, p. 185) for all students, some reforms by their very nature, even if inadvertently, disrupt understandings of “democratic values.” When education reforms influence teachers’ professional and personal lives, as well as those of students, the scale of impact magnifies. School leaders’ decisions play an integral role in ameliorating that impact, not simply in implementing reform. Social justice can be viewed as a “democratic value” related to students, staff, and the school community (Cranston, Kimber, Mulford, Reid, & Keating, 2010; Kimber & Ehrich, 2011; Labaree, 1997). Thus a concern for school leaders is how they enhance “fairness and equity” (Blackmore, 2016, p. 62) for students and for staff. Here “parity of participation” – politically, economically, and socially (Ballard, 2012; Blackmore, 2016, pp. 9, 10, 14,15, 18, 52, 59, 75, 76, 77, 78, 81, 97, 102,103, 107, 109, 110; Bogotch, 2014; Fraser, 2009, p. 94; Keddie, 2017, pp. 377, 382, 385, 388; Valentini, 2010) – might be considered, such as how schooling is “distribut[ed,] … the nature of the service itself, and the consequences for society” (Connell, 2012, p. 681).

Similar to many other Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, Australian governments have been implementing reforms to increase educational outcomes for students. Drawing on earlier work using a theoretical framework known as the “democratic deficit” to examine reforms to public sector organizations (Kimber & Ehrich, 2011, 2015; Kimber & Maddox, 2003; Kimber, 2000), this chapter examines several reforms to school education in Australia to examine whether these reforms have “eroded” commitment to social justice (Kimber & Ehrich, 2011). Acknowledgment is made to earlier work by Kimber (2000) and Kimber and Maddox (2003), who used the “democratic deficit” to examine Australian Public Service reform. Particular acknowledgment is given to Kimber and Ehrich (2011), who used the “democratic deficit” to examine school-based management in Australia, concluding “that the democratic principles on which public schooling in Australia was founded [were] being eroded by managerial and market practices” (p. 179) and a move to a “democratic deficit” evident. Reference is also made to Cranston et al.’s (2010) work on federalism and “the purposes of schooling” in Australia and to Kimber and Ehrich’s (2015) work on the “democratic deficit” and universities.

This “democratic deficit” theoretical framework was devised to analyze the impact of managerial reforms on principles of representative and responsible parliamentary government (Kimber, 2000; Kimber & Maddox, 2003). These principles center on (1) how representative public institutions are of citizens and (2) to “individual and collective ministerial responsibility.” “Majority rule,” “equity,” “equality,” deliberation, “justice,” “respect for” and inclusion of those who are in the “minority,” “accountability,” and “the public interest” are some of the concepts that have been associated with these principles (Kimber, 2000, pp. 19–33). It is outlined to provide a different lens through which to view social justice challenges experienced by school leaders. Central to this theory are accountability, performance, and the “hollow state” (Kimber & Maddox, 2003. Also see Milward & Provan, 2000; Rhodes, 1994), which Kimber and Ehrich (2011, pp. 190, 192) extended to the metaphor of “hollow school.” Here, the “democratic deficit” is adapted, through reference to work on social justice (Connell, 2012, 2013; Fraser, 2009; Keddie, 2017) and applied to high-stakes testing, school autonomy, performance pay, and commercialization and marketization. It is argued that social justice might have been “eroded” in respect to the first and third elements of the democratic deficit (Kimber & Ehrich, 2011; Kimber & Maddox, 2003). Similar to Kimber and Ehrich (2011), it is suggested that contextual factors and the actions of school leaders have been ameliorating this “trend.”

To explore these ideas the “democratic deficit” is outlined. The three areas of contention between those who promote managerial and democratic deficit perspectives are highlighted – accountability, performance, and network governance. Two reforms are then considered. These are: (1) high-stakes testing for accountability, namely, the National Assessment Program – Literacy and Numeracy (NAPLAN) and the associated website, My School; and (2) Indpendent Public Schools (IPSs), as a form of school autonomy. It is suggested contextual factors such as the political structure, political ideology, socioeconomics, local community factors, and the weight school leaders attach to social justice (Kimber & Ehrich, 2011; Lingard & Lewis, 2017) contribute to a “nuanced” (Keddie et al., 2018, p. 378) understanding of the impact of the reforms to public schools in Australia. In Australia, use of NAPLAN and My School for accountability and “transparency” might be reducing commitment to social justice. IPSs, discussion about performance pay for teachers, and increased use of commercialization and marketization, however, might be viewed as a move to a democratic deficit. Yet, several Australian studies have highlighted school leaders’ understanding of these impacts and the ways in which some school leaders have sought to ameliorate them by promoting moral and professional responsibilities, particularly in relation to IPSs (Cranston, 2013; Ehrich, Harris, Klenowski, Smeed, & Ainscow, 2015; Gobby, Keddie, & Blackmore, 2018; Keddie, 2014; Keddie, Gobby, & Wilkinson, 2018; Kimber & Ehrich, 2011). These actions may illustrate that adherence to social justice has “moderated” this move to a “democratic deficit” (Kimber & Ehrich, 2011; Kimber & Maddox, 2003). This potential is further evident in: political commitment to (and thus experience of) IPSs differing across states and territories; and that there has been continued discussion, but no introduction, of performance pay for teachers.

Educational leadership

Educational sociology

Education -- Aims and objectives

English

978-3-319-74078-2 (online)

A Social Justice Challenge for School
Leadership in Australia
Megan Kimber

Contents
Managerialism, the “Democratic Deficit,” and Social Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Is Accountability Stronger or Weaker? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Has Performance Been Enhanced or Public Employees’ “Roles and Values” Been Worn Away?
Does “Networked Governance” Lead to a “Hollow State”? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
NAPLAN, My School, School Autonomy and Performance Pay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
NAPLAN and My School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Independent Public Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Performance Pay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Analyzing the Reforms: Social Justice, the “Democratic Deficit”, and School Leadership . . . .
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Abstract

School leadership in many countries is affected by multiple challenges. Some are
specific to the local community, some emerge from the education system, and
some come from government policies. While most reforms center on better
educational results for all students, whichever their specific area of focus, some
reforms by their very nature, even if inadvertently, disrupt understandings of
social justice. When educational reforms influence teachers’ professional and
personal lives, as well as those of students, the scale of impact magnifies.
School leaders’ decisions play an integral role in ameliorating that
impact, not simply in implementing reform. A theoretical framework based on
democratic theory is adapted and applied to high-stakes testing, school

M. Kimber (*)
Faculty of Education,
Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, QLD, Australia
e-mail: m.kimber@qut.edu.au
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019
R. Papa (ed.), Handbook on Promoting Social Justice in Education,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74078-2_97-1

1

2

M. Kimber

autonomy, performance pay, and commericalization and marketization to
consider their impact on social justice.
Keywords

Commercialization · Democratic deficit · High-stakes testing · Hollow state ·
Performance · School autonomy · Social justice

School leadership in many countries is affected by multiple challenges. Some are
specific to the local community, some emerge from the education system, and some
originate from government policies. While most reforms center on “improving
educational outcomes” (Kimber & Ehrich, 2011, p. 185) for all students,
some reforms by their very nature, even if inadvertently, disrupt understandings of
“democratic values.” When education reforms influence teachers’ professional
and personal lives, as well as those of students, the scale of impact magnifies.
School leaders’ decisions play an integral role in ameliorating that impact, not
simply in implementing reform. Social justice can be viewed as a “democratic
value” related to students, staff, and the school community (Cranston, Kimber,
Mulford, Reid, & Keating, 2010; Kimber & Ehrich, 2011; Labaree, 1997). Thus a
concern for school leaders is how they enhance “fairness and equity” (Blackmore,
2016, p. 62) for students and for staff. Here “parity of participation” – politically,
economically, and socially (Ballard, 2012; Blackmore, 2016, pp. 9, 10, 14,15, 18,
52, 59, 75, 76, 77, 78, 81, 97, 102,103, 107, 109, 110; Bogotch, 2014; Fraser, 2009,
p. 94; Keddie, 2017, pp. 377, 382, 385, 388; Valentini, 2010) – might be considered,
such as how schooling is “distribut[ed,] . . . the nature of the service itself, and the
consequences for society” (Connell, 2012, p. 681).
Similar to many other Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, Australian governments have been implementing reforms
to increase educational outcomes for students. Drawing on earlier work using a
theoretical framework known as the “democratic deficit” to examine reforms to
public sector organizations (Kimber & Ehrich, 2011, 2015; Kimber & Maddox,
2003; Kimber, 2000), this chapter examines several reforms to school education in
Australia to examine whether these reforms have “eroded” commitment to social
justice (Kimber & Ehrich, 2011). Acknowledgment is made to earlier work
by Kimber (2000) and Kimber and Maddox (2003), who used the “democratic
deficit” to examine Australian Public Service reform. Particular acknowledgment
is given to Kimber and Ehrich (2011), who used the “democratic deficit” to examine
school-based management in Australia, concluding “that the democratic principles
on which public schooling in Australia was founded [were] being eroded
by managerial and market practices” (p. 179) and a move to a “democratic deficit”
evident. Reference is also made to Cranston et al.’s (2010) work on federalism
and “the purposes of schooling” in Australia and to Kimber and Ehrich’s (2015)
work on the “democratic deficit” and universities.
This “democratic deficit” theoretical framework was devised to analyze
the impact of managerial reforms on principles of representative and responsible

A Social Justice Challenge for School Leadership in Australia

3

parliamentary government (Kimber, 2000; Kimber & Maddox, 2003). These principles center on (1) how representative public institutions are of citizens and (2) to
“individual and collective ministerial responsibility.” “Majority rule,” “equity,”
“equality,” deliberation, “justice,” “respect for” and inclusion of those who are in
the “minority,” “accountability,” and “the public interest” are some of the concepts
that have been associated with these principles (Kimber, 2000, pp. 19–33). It is
outlined to provide a different lens through which to view social justice challenges
experienced by school leaders. Central to this theory are accountability, performance, and the “hollow state” (Kimber & Maddox, 2003. Also see Milward &
Provan, 2000; Rhodes, 1994), which Kimber and Ehrich (2011, pp. 190, 192)
extended to the metaphor of “hollow school.” Here, the “democratic deficit” is
adapted, through reference to work on social justice (Connell, 2012, 2013; Fraser,
2009; Keddie, 2017) and applied to high-stakes testing, school autonomy,
performance pay, and commercialization and marketization. It is argued that social
justice might have been “eroded” in respect to the first and third elements of
the democratic deficit (Kimber & Ehrich, 2011; Kimber & Maddox, 2003).
Similar to Kimber and Ehrich (2011), it is suggested that contextual factors
and the actions of school leaders have been ameliorating this “trend.”
To explore these ideas the “democratic deficit” is outlined. The three areas
of contention between those who promote managerial and democratic deficit perspectives are highlighted – accountability, performance, and network governance.
Two reforms are then considered. These are: (1) high-stakes testing for accountability, namely, the National Assessment Program – Literacy and Numeracy (NAPLAN)
and the associated website, My School; and (2) Indpendent Public Schools (IPSs), as
a form of school autonomy. It is suggested contextual factors such as the political
structure, political ideology, socioeconomics, local community factors, and the
weight school leaders attach to social justice (Kimber & Ehrich, 2011; Lingard &
Lewis, 2017) contribute to a “nuanced” (Keddie et al., 2018, p. 378) understanding
of the impact of the reforms to public schools in Australia. In Australia, use of
NAPLAN and My School for accountability and “transparency” might be reducing
commitment to social justice. IPSs, discussion about performance pay for teachers,
and increased use of commercialization and marketization, however, might be
viewed as a move to a democratic deficit. Yet, several Australian studies have
highlighted school leaders’ understanding of these impacts and the ways in which
some school leaders have sought to ameliorate them by promoting moral and
professional responsibilities, particularly in relation to IPSs (Cranston, 2013; Ehrich,
Harris, Klenowski, Smeed, & Ainscow, 2015; Gobby, Keddie, & Blackmore, 2018;
Keddie, 2014; Keddie, Gobby, & Wilkinson, 2018; Kimber & Ehrich, 2011). These
actions may illustrate that adherence to social justice has “moderated” this move to a
“democratic deficit” (Kimber & Ehrich, 2011; Kimber & Maddox, 2003). This
potential is further evident in: political commitment to (and thus experience of)
IPSs differing across states and territories; and that there has been continued
discussion, but no introduction, of performance pay for teachers.

4

M. Kimber

Managerialism, the “Democratic Deficit,” and Social Justice
The debate between those who promote reforms based on neoliberal/managerial
thinking (neo-classical economics and New Public Management) – where individual
freedom and the market are stressed – and those who draw on democratic principles
to critique these reforms has been discussed at length elsewhere (Kimber, 2000;
Kimber & Ehrich, 2011, 2015; Kimber & Maddox, 2003). This debate centers on
three questions about whether accountability is “strengthened’ or “weakened,” use
of performance practices enhances “efficiency” or denies “the roles and values of
public employees” (Kimber & Ehrich, 2011, p. 179), and “networked governance”
(Ferlie, Musselin, & Andresani, 2008) and a concentration on customers clarifies
“accountability lines” and better serves citizens or led to a “hollow state” (Kimber &
Ehrich, 2011, p. 180). These three questions are considered below.

Is Accountability Stronger or Weaker?
Those who take a neoliberal/managerial perspective understand accountability in
terms of “responsiveness to the market” (Kimber & Ehrich, 2015, p. 83). They argue
that reforms based on private sector practices will “strengthen accountability”
through “responsiveness” and more recently also “transparency” (Koyama &
Kania, 2014; Shore, 2008, p. 278). By contrast, those who articulate a democratic
view of accountability use the “broader” concept of “responsibility” such as that
associated with responsible parliamentary government or to the wider community
(Kimber & Maddox, 2003; Pillay & Kimber, 2009). Hence, they ask if accountability is “weakened” (Kimber & Maddox, 2003). The importance accorded to generic
managers, the audit culture, and the reduction in on-going employment contracts are
considered. Focus in this chapter is on the audit culture. Within an “audit culture”,
accountability tends to be viewed as responsiveness, “quality,” “transparency[,]
and performance” (Kimber & Ehrich, 2015, pp. 87–88; Shore, 2008, p. 278).
It relates to “measuring, ranking and auditing performance” (Shore & Wright,
2015, p. 421). Here, “transparency” relates to “openness in operations . . . producing
particular kinds of information tailored to specific audiences” (Koyama & Kania,
2014, p. 144).
In education, “transparency” has come with more “standardization, quantification, competition, and large-scale comparison . . . through which various forms of
school data are made available to the public” (Koyama & Kania, 2014, p. 144) so
that schools can be improved. The audit culture may weaken professionalism (Shore
& Wright, 2015), diminish “ethics” (Samier, 2008, p. 12), and lessen “trust” between
managers and teachers (Kimber & Ehrich, 2015, p. 87). Thus an audit culture might
“challenge fundamental understandings of citizenship and democracy” (Apple,
2013, p. 383). Similarly, analying the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development’s (OECD) Programme for International Student Assessment
(PISA), Kim (2018) notes that PISA’s use can indicate reduced “interest in

A Social Justice Challenge for School Leadership in Australia

5

democratic values” (p. 85). However, PISA’s influence is “mediate[d]” (Keddie,
2014, p. 505) by the “political structure” in each OECD country (Lingard & Lewis,
2017, p. 266).

Has Performance Been Enhanced or Public Employees’ “Roles and
Values” Been Worn Away?
This second question relates to (in)appropriate use of “private sector performance
practices” such as performance indicators and performance management of
staff (Kimber & Maddox, 2003, p. 62). For those who take a “democratic deficit”
perspective, when these practices are not used appropriately, they can erode democratic principles resulting in a misunderstanding or even denying public sector
workers’ “roles and values” in a democratic system (Kimber, 2000, p. 33; Kimber
& Ehrich, 2011, p. 179, 181; Kimber & Maddox, 2003, p. 62). In the case of public
schools, teachers’ and school leaders’ “roles and values” “might be associated with
schooling’s “democratic values” such as social justice (Kimber & Ehrich, 2011, p.
180; Cranston, 2013, p. 134; Cranston et al., 2010, p. 183; Labaree, 1997).
Connecting with the audit culture, performance management is about regularly
measuring the performance of individuals and organizations (Diefenbach, 2009, p.
894). One element of performance management that has attracted much attention is
performance pay. Based on the view that teachers are self-interested, those who take
the managerial approach suggest teachers’ performance can be enhanced and their
“behaviour and interests” brought into line “with institutional goals” (Balach &
Springer, 2015, p. 114) if higher pay is tied to performance. It is argued that teachers
are “extrinsically motivated” (Park & Word, 2012, pp. 708, 711). However, the
OECD (2012) has noted that, while evidence about performance pay for teachers is
“inconclusive” (pp. 1, 2), there is a correlation between “well-paid” teachers and
higher “student performance” (OECD, 2012, p. 2).

Does “Networked Governance” Lead to a “Hollow State”?
Considering this third element of the “democratic deficit”, a central question
is, are “accountability lines” clearer and are citizens being served better – or
has a “hollow state” “emerged” (Kimber & Ehrich, 2011, 2015; Kimber & Maddox,
2003; Milward & Provan, 2000; Rhodes, 1994)? In the case of schools, this question
might be phrased as whether citizens, in their role of students (and their parents),
are receiving the education to which they are entitled so than they can
“lead fulfilling lives” or (a) have they been recast as customers and (b) has
“networked governance” led to a “hollow school” (Ferlie et al., 2008; Kimber &
Ehrich, 2011; Kimber & Maddox, 2003; Milward & Provan, 2000; Rhodes, 1994)?
Marketization, commercialization, corporatization, contracting out, purchaser/provider splits, Public Private Partnerships, and parental choice might be associated

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M. Kimber

with this question (Kimber & Ehrich, 2011, 2015; Kimber & Maddox, 2003;
Milward, 2012; Milward & Provan, 2000; Terry, 2005). Some researchers suggest
that “there can be a potential loss of legitimacy of government action” (Milward &
Provan, 2000, p. 363).
Hogan (2015, 2016; Hogan, Thompson, Stellar, & Lingard, 2018) draws attention
to the influence of “edu-businesses.” In the literature accessed for this chapter,
no definition of edu-business seemed to be provided. Based on Hogan’s (2016)
discussion, it is assumed that an edu-business is a private business that is focused on
developing and selling education products to schools for a profit and has become a
key actor in the “education policy network” (Hogan, 2016, p. 98). These businesses
may be involved in creating or sustaining a market for their products. A question is
whether “marketization – or privatization – of schools is at the expense of those who
are unable to pay” (Kimber & Ehrich, 2011, p. 180). Thus it might be suggested that
markets can “increase inequality” (Connell, 2013, p. 279).
Within education, governance structures have “social justice implications” in
terms of “policies,” “practices,” “opportunities,” and “outcomes” (Robertson &
Dale, 2013, p. 426). Thus not only does the political system, culture and history of
a jurisdiction influence what reforms are implemented and how they are
implemented, but the culture and history of schools may also play a part in how
reform measures are or are not implemented and the impact they have on leaders,
teachers, students, parents, and communities. Therefore, context can “mediate” the
impact of these reforms (Cranston et al., 2010; Keddie, 2014, 2017, pp. 504–505;
Lingard & Lewis, 2017). Location, history, culture, demography, economy, values,
and beliefs all play a part in how a reform is implemented and how it impacts on a
school and the community which it serves (Cranston et al., 2010; Keddie, 2019;
Lingard & Lewis, 2017). As Maasen (2017) puts it, how a “governance structure”
works in an organization depends on the organization’s “traditions,” “norms,” and
“cultures and codes of meaning,” all of which can limit reforms antithetical to that
organization’s “spirit and inherited practices” (p. 291). Attention now turns to
Australian school reforms.

NAPLAN, My School, School Autonomy and Performance Pay
Both Liberal-National Party Coalition and Australian Labor Party governments have
implemented school reforms to enhance educational outcomes for students, many of
which have been aimed at increasing equity and economic competitiveness (Cranston et al., 2010; Lingard & Lewis, 2017; Rizvi, 2013). The federal structure, federal
involvement in school policy (constitutionally schooling being a state responsibility), the “ideological commitment”s (Kimber & Maddox, 2003, p. 61) of governments, and the actions of school leaders and teachers have all played a part in
mediating the impact of reforms on democratic values such as social
justice (Cranston et al., 2010; Keddie, 2014, 2017). In this section, two reforms
are considered. First, NAPLAN and My School are discussed as an example of highstakes testing, ranking of schools’ results and accountability. Attention is drawn

A Social Justice Challenge for School Leadership in Australia

7

to the move from “quality and equity” (Gorur, 2013, p. 217) to “accountability
through transparency” (Australian Government, 2016, pp. 4, 13). Second, IPSs,
as an example of school autonomy, are then considered. Performance pay, as a
proposed reform, is also considered.

NAPLAN and My School
The use of high-stakes assessment is not new in jurisdictions such as Australia
(Thompson, 2013). Within the context of international tests such as PISA and
managerial-based practices, it is the use of high-stakes testing and public ranking
of results for accountability, the ranking and publication of their results, and the
impact that publication has on school leaders and teachers that are of interest (e.
g., Gorur, 2013; Thompson, 2013). NAPLAN and My School were introduced in
2008 and 2010 respectively. NAPLAN “has become a significant educational measure of school performance, especially with the introduction of public reporting
through the My School website” (Cumming, Wyatt-Smith, & Colbert, 2016, p. 126).
These reforms derive from the Rudd and Gillard Governments’ “Education Revolution” (Gorur, 2013, pp. 215, 216, 218, 220, 221, 223, 224, 226, 227; Thompson,
2013, pp. 62, 81).
Considering school reforms since the 1970s, there are both similarities and
divergences across Australian government policies. Cranston et al. (2010) note,
while schools are a state responsibility, there has been growing federal involvement
in school policy. Charting federal government policies from the Whitlam Labor
Government (1972–1975) to the Howard Coalition Government (1996–2007) highlights a stronger emphasis on “equity and social justice” (Cranston et al., 2010, p.
185) in Labor government policies, particularly those of the Whitlam Government,
and a more neoliberal stress in Coalition government policies. However, Cranston et
al. (2010) note expanding influence of neoliberal thinking in the Hawke and Keating
Labor Government’s (1983–1996) policies. Where the Hawke and Keating Governments moved from “equity and social justice” (Cranston et al., 2010, p. 185) to
“international economic competitiveness” (Cranston et al., 2010, p. 186), the Rudd
and Gillard Labor Governments’ initally stressed “quality and equity” (Gorur, 2013,
p. 217) to end “pockets of disadvantage” (Gorur, 2013, p. 218). It seems, however,
there has been some “confusion” about the intent of the reforms (Cumming et al.,
2016, p. 126). Some critics argue it has become the “quasi-market” “governance”
mechanism of My School, with comparisions enabled through NAPLAN (Gorur,
2013, p. 217; Thompson, 2013, p. 63). Such criticism implies a “trend to” a
“democratic deficit” (Kimber & Ehrich, 2011).
Reforms such as NAPLAN and My School might be viewed as aimed at “increas
[ing] accountability and transparency” (Thompson, 2013, p. 62). Introducing
My School, then Education Minister Julia Gillard described its purpose as “bring
[ing] clarity and simplicity to the job of improving teaching and thus student
performance” (Gorur, 2013, p. 225). For Gillard, it assisted “‘like’ schools’ to be
compared” (Gorur, 2013, p. 219). Such comments suggest My School portrays

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M. Kimber

a complex phenomenon as something that can be communicated as “clear and
reliable” (Gorur, 2013, p. 225). For those critical of NAPLAN and My School, the
“Education Revolution” (Gorur, 2013, p. 214) has come to be promoted as a tool to
increase economic competitiveness, which parallels the move from equity to equity
and “international economic competitiveness” (Cranston et al., 2010, p. 186) during
the period of the Hawke Labor Government.
Returning to Thompson’s (2013) point, in a 2016 document the Turnbull Coalition federal government (2015–2018) identifies “increasing accountability through
transparency” (Australian Government, 2016, p. 4) as one area for “future focus”
(Australian Government, 2016, p. 4). Linking to data about student “progress” in
“literacy and numeracy” including that on “My School,” the Australian Government
(2016, p.13) connects “transparency” to “public accountability for the way in which
funding is distributed, . . .used . . . and achievement of outcomes. This is critical in
understanding what works and what interventions deliver value-for-money.” The
federal government referenced PISA results to justify its support for the “Australian
Professional Standards for Teachers,” a “certification” for principals, and for school
autonomy, which is discussed below (Australian Government, 2016, p. 9).
Reporting on the results of a survey of almost 1000 teachers in public, independent and Catholic schools in Western Australia and South Australia about the impact
of NAPLAN on their classrooms, Thompson (2013) notes the majority of responses
were negative (but see Rogers, Barblett, & Robinson, 2016 on research in independent schools). Of interest are the impact on relationships with parents and students,
the “performance pressures felt by teachers and principals, and the desire to be
ranked highly” (Thompson, 2013, p. 82). For Thompson (2013), these negative
“effects” might “. . .outweigh . . . the supposed benefits of accountability and transparency in improving equity and outcomes” (pp. 82–83). Gorur (2013) makes a
similar point, highlighting that, as “a snapshot in time,” NAPLAN is “not a
completely reliable evaluation of a student’s ability or school’s effectiveness” (p.
225).
NAPLAN and My School can alter the relationship between teachers, on the one
hand, and parents and students, on the other hand (Cumming et al., 2016; Thompson,
2013, p. 82), potentially “com[ing] between parents and schools” (Gorur, 2013, p.
224). From this perspective, “pockets of disadvantage” can become “metrics, comparability and informed publics” (Gorur, 2013, p. 224). “[S]tudent differences and
disadvantage . . . are set aside, and focus is concentrated instead on
‘underperformance’” (Gorur, 2013, p. 227). If these outcomes have occurred it
might be suggested there has been a trend to a “democratic deficit,” with a focus
on what is measurable rather than on the qualitative dimensions of schooling such as
education for citizenship. If school staff “desire to be ranked highly” (Thompson,
2013, p. 82), then NAPLAN and My School might contribute to increased commitment to the competitive “logic of neoliberalism” (Giroux, 2011, p. 8) and a potential
corresponding erosion of commitment to social justice.
Cumming et al. (2016) and McQueen et al. (2018) note that different groups of
students are affected differently by NAPLAN. Drawing on data from interviews with
school leaders and teachers, Cumming et al. (2016, p. 128) note “principals’ . . .

A Social Justice Challenge for School Leadership in Australia

9

discretion to [provide] support [for] ‘students’” with a difference (whether a disability, social or emotional need, English as an Additional Language, or learning
difficulty) seems to have been reduced (p. 128). Cumming et al. (2016) “found
limited use of NAPLAN to improve student learning” (p. 129) for many respondents
across public and independent sectors, particularly in identifying “students at risk”
(p. 129). From this perspective, NAPLAN can contribute to labelling of students,
and reduce students’ feelings “of self-worth and self-esteem” (Cumming et al., 2016,
p. 135). Thus NAPLAN has the potential to reduce social justice.

Independent Public Schools
The influence of context and the changing impact of neoliberal/managerial thinking
on school reformers are evident in multiple versions of school autonomy across the
past few decades and across several countries. Such differences have led Hanushek,
Link, and Woessmann (2013) to take school autonomy to be principals’ capacity to
make decisions about the “courses [that they] offered . . . [the] course content . . .
which textbooks are used . . . selecting teachers . . . teachers’ starting salaries . . . and
deciding on budget allocations within the school” (p. 216). School autonomy is
supported by the OECD and the World Bank (Hanushek et al., 2013; Keddie, 2017,
2019). Through school-based management in particular, school autonomy in Australia dates from the early 1970s, with differences across states and territories, and
becoming more influenced by neoliberal thinking over time (Cranston et al., 2010;
Keddie, 2017; Kimber & Ehrich, 2011), Keddie (2017, p. 374) notes that IPSs form
“the most recent version” of school autonomy in Australia. Some researchers view
neoliberal/managerial thinking to be stronger in IPSs than in school-based management. “Charter schools in the USA” and “academies in England” are two further
current examples of school autonomy (Keddie, 2014, 2016, 2017, p. 374). Keddie
(2017) asserts that, in countries such as Australia, New Zealand, and the UK,
government calls for greater school autonomy for public schools have been based
on the argument that providing school managers with more “freedom” “will drive up
academic standards” (Keddie, 2017, p. 374), which, might be viewed as higher
scores on standardized tests (Keddie, 2017).
Examining an academy in England, Keddie (2014) considers the link between
school autonomy and the audit culture, highlighting “re-regulat[ing]” rather than
“de-regulat[ing]” (p. 504) schools. Keddie (2014) notes how school leaders “can
navigate their autonomy in ways that mediate some of the negative effects of the
audit culture . . . [such as] greater networking and less competition . . ..” (pp.
504–505). Such actions might be interpreted as limiting the wearing down of social
justice. It can be argued that neoliberal practices and school leaders working to
ameliorate their impact are also evident in Australia.
IPSs have been used in Western Australia, Queensland and the Northern Territory
in particular. They have been promoted federally (Keddie, 2017), with the Coalition
federal government having provided “$70 million” to states and territories for IPSs
(Australian Government, 2016, p. 4). Drawing attention to the influence of

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M. Kimber

neoliberal thinking in IPSs, and similar to the more neoliberal version of schoolbased management examined by Kimber and Ehrich (2011), devolution and
“choice” are prominent features of IPSs. “School improvement” and local communities are also stressed in government documents. For instance, the federal government believes IPSs can increase “choice” and “control” for schools (Australian
Government, Department of Education, 2014, p. 1). From this perspective, IPSs
can assist in strengthening “links between schools, parents and the local community”
(Australian Government, 2016, p. 4). Further, “school autonomy and decisionmaking coupled with transparency and accountability” are “characteristic[s] of
effective international education systems” (Australian Government, 2016, p. 4). It
might be suggested that the words “freedom,” “choice,” “autonomy,” “flexibility,”
and “transparency” fit with the neoliberal/managerial paradigm, while an emphasis
on “the local community” might be seen to fit with both neoliberalism and democracy (Cranston et al., 2010; Labaree, 1997).
The federal nature of the Australian political system has contributed to the
implementation and impact of IPSs varying across jurisdictions, with IPSs having
the longest history and being more extensive in Western Australia. Western Australia
and Queensland are considered briefly as there is more literature regarding the IPS
experience in these states. Western Australia adopted an IPSs policy in 2009. It
entailed devolving “to principals” “responsibilities” for some elements of “curriculum, student support, human resources, recruitment and selection, payroll, financial
management, and building and facilities, while centralization largely remains in such
areas as policy and strategic direction, performance monitoring and measurement,
and curriculum ” (Gobby, 2013a, p. 19). Schools apply to become IPSs (Gobby,
Keddie, & Blackmore, 2018, p. 164). In 2017, more than “80% of public schools in”
Western Australia were IPSs (Fitzgerald et al., 2018, p. 663).
Perhaps reflecting the increasing role of private organizations in school policy
networks, according to Hamilton Associates (2015), in their review of IPSs, note
“strengthened accountability” was viewed as “a performance agreement between the
Director General, the principal and the Chair of the School Board along with a
periodic external school review by an agency independent of the Department of
Education” (Hamilton Associates, 2015, p. 8). Hamilton Associates (2015) identified
10 “themes” about the benefits of IPSs in Western Australia. These focused on
“school improvement” (pp. 15, 19) and “increased accountability” (pp. 17, 27–28).
Principals and staff discussed improved resource use (p. 28), increased “trust” (p.
25), principals having greater “confidence” and staff having increased “capability”
(pp. 5, 30, 31, 33, 34), and altered relationships with “external stakeholders” (p. 30).
The experience of IPSs has been different in Queensland. IPSs policy was
introduced by the Liberal National Party Government in 2013 as “a catalyst for
positive system-wide change” (Queensland Government. Department of Education,
n.d., p. 4). In 2018, review initiated by the Labor Government (Caldwell, 2018) led
this government to “not commit to keeping [IPSs] beyond October 2020” (Brown,
2018, para 4). That this pulling back from IPSs might represent commitment to
social justice is suggested by this government releasing a new “inclusive education
policy” during 2018 (Queensland Government. Department of Education, 2018).

A Social Justice Challenge for School Leadership in Australia

11

Negative impacts of IPSs have been identified in Western Australia. Research has
centered on school leaders, with “some principals . . . experiencing a lack of support
and resources that impose[d] constraints in their capacity to innovate and problemsolve” (Gobby, 2013a, p. 19). Fitzgerald et al. (2018) use interviews to focus on the
impact on staff. They compared two schools in “disadvantaged” areas, one being an
IPS and one not (p. 663). They argued that IPSs policy, while promoting devolution,
increased flexibility and greater community involvement, seemed to be “contributing
to a market of schools within the public sector, with residualizing effects for
remaining non-IP schools” (Fitzgerald et al., 2018, p. 663). At the same time, staff
at the school viewed as “successful” felt “overwork[ed]” in an increasingly “overwhelming” climate (Fitzgerald et al., 2018, p. 677). Fitzgerald et al. (2018) conclude
that, when devolution policies “attract . . . ‘entrepreneurial’ leadership . . . the question . . . of just what it might mean, in this system, to be a ‘winner’” is raised (p. 677).
An implication of this finding is that marketization has the potential to reduce social
justice.
The differing social justice impacts of school autonomy on schools are also
evident in a case study of a high school serving a predominately low SES community
in regional Queensland (Keddie, Gobby, & Wilkins, 2018). Notions of accountability are evident in the need for IPSs to comply “with external audits” (Keddie et al.,
2018, p. 390). Yet commitment to social justice might also be evident if there is
attention to “student voice” (Keddie et al., 2018, p. 390). In relation to the earlier
discussion about the negative impact of NAPLAN on particular groups of students,
this school had a “high” enrolment of students from Indigenous backgrounds
(Keddie et al., 2018, p. 384). Keddie et al. (2018, p. 378) conclude that a “more
nuanced” understanding of school autonomy is needed. Perhaps echoing the understandings of audit culture and of social justice mentioned earlier, for the two school
leaders of their case study school in Queensland, obtaining IPS status provided
“confidence” in the school’s “performance” (Keddie et al., 2018, p. 386). The school
leaders stressed care not only “for students[’] . . . academic learning, but also on their
personal wellbeing” (Keddie et al., 2018, p. 388). These school leaders viewed this
purpose as having “improved” as a result of attaining IPS status (p. 388). They
praised the “financial flexibility” and “independence in . . . staff recruitment”
(Keddie et al., 2018, pp. 385, 389), as they felt it enabled them to fulfill the school’s
“social and moral purpose” to its Indigenous students (p. 389). These school leaders
saw little “conflict” between the “competition and compliance” elements of IPS
status and their “school’s moral purpose” (Keddie et al., 2018, p. 390). For Keddie et
al. (2018), the way in which the leaders at this school used IPS status to further
this “purpose” might “not necessarily be the case with all IP schools” (p. 390).
Comparing charter schools in the USA and IPSs in Queensland and Western
Australia, Keddie (2016) noted greater regulation, centralization, and “policy provision to support the goals of public ownership, equity and access and public
purpose” in Australia (p. 267). Thus not only context but also school leaders’ values
and actions can have an impact on neoliberal/managerial reforms, potentially
slowing the diminution of social justice.

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M. Kimber

Similarly, Gobby et al. (2018, p. 167) provide a case study of a
Western Australian primary school “principal” whose comments about NAPLAN
indicate a way in which school leaders can emphasize teachers’ “professionalism”
(p. 167). While some “principals” of IPSs schools in Western Australia viewed
themselves as “CEOs” (Gobby, 2013b, p. 282), others thought “and act[ed] innovatively about local problems and constraints that their schools face” (p. 281). These
school leaders’ comments indicate greater differentiation within school autonomy
than its advocates and detractors suggest, implying that its impact on commitment to
social justice and thus influence on a democratic deficit might vary across contexts.

Performance Pay
The way in which different political parties have interpreted the reform agenda
over the past decade is perhaps evident in the two recent reviews into school
education, both led by David Gonski (David Gonski is an Australian businessman
and philanthropist), but commissioned by and reported to federal governments from
different political persuasions (Cranston et al., 2010). The first Gonski review,
Review of funding for schooling – Final Report (Gonski et al., 2011), was commissioned by and reported to the Rudd and Gillard Labor Governments. Reflecting the
government’s focus on equity, Gonski et al. (2011, p. 52) recommended increasing
and “redistributing funding” to reduce socio-economic disadvantage. Thus it could
be argued that social justice was one dimension in the recommendations. Kenway
(2013) has analyzed the benefits and “limitations” of this “Gonski Report,” drawing
attention to “social segregation between schools” (p. 286), arguing that the review’s
writers gave insufficient attention to the relationship between schools and sectors (p.
294). The second review led by Gonski was commissioned by and reported to the
Turnbull Liberal-National Coalition Government in 2018. In their discussion, the
review writers stressed falling PISA ranking, “individualis[ing]” “student achievement” (Gonski et al., 2018, pp. xiii, 28, 73, 77), “revis[ing] . . . the Australian
Curriculum” (p. xiii), and “incentivis[ing]” (pp. ix, 73, 77) teachers, which may
imply performance pay. Such a focus might suggest reducing commitment to social
justice.
Over the past 11 years performance pay has been considered at both federal and
state level. It has, however, never been implemented (OECD, 2012; Kimber &
Ehrich, 2011). Researchers have identified a range of implementation, public sector
specific and equity issues in the failure of performance pay in the public sector
(Balach & Springer, 2015; Bryson, Stokes, & Wilkinson, 2018; Hawke, 2012;
Kimber & Ehrich, 2011; Kimber & Maddox, 2003; Marsden, 2010; Taylor, 2015;
Tirivayi, Maasen van den Bring, & Groot, 2014). To these forementioned issues, that
Australian “teachers are relatively well-paid” “in comparision with” the OECD
average, might be added (OECD, 2012, p. 2; Also see OECD, 2018).
Federally, Kimber and Ehrich (2011, p. 188) note some consideration of
performance pay for teachers during “the federal Howard [Coalition] government.”
It was not implemented at this time. Performance pay was proposed by the Labor

A Social Justice Challenge for School Leadership in Australia

13

government in 2011 (Thompson, 2011) and canvassed in an Australian Government
(2016) document during the period of the Turnbull Coalition Government.
In its 2016 document, the Government appeared to suggest having an element of
performance pay for teachers “to link pay progress . . . to the nationally agreed
Australian Professional Standards for Teachers” (Australian Government, 2016, p.
10). The Australian Government (2016, p. 10) argued that “[r]esearch has shown that
teacher effectivenes can be increased by” connecting teacher’s “performance to
higher bands of pay” (p. 10). This comment is interesting as the literatue reported
above suggests that the evidence is either inconclusive or negative. Yet, the suggestion to “incentivize” teachers in the recent Gonski et al. (2018, p. 77) report indicates
growing interest in performance pay. An Internet search indicates that at the time of
writing, at state and territory level, performance pay does not appear to be used. The
Victorian government proposed but, following negotiation with unions, did not
introduce performance pay for teachers (Preiss, 2014).

Analyzing the Reforms: Social Justice, the “Democratic Deficit”,
and School Leadership
From the literature presented here, it might be suggested that the extent to which
social justice may have been worn away and a “democratic deficit” emerged has
varied. It could be proposed that school leaders’ context and commitment to
democratic values have contributed to this outcome. Researchers have documented
where school leaders drew attention to their work meeting the needs of their students
and their communities. Thus, while school leaders need to work within the context,
they can find ways to act that promote values such as social justice.
When NAPLAN and My School are viewed in terms of audit culture, it might
be argued that the change from the aim to enhance both “quality and equity” (Gorur,
2013, p. 217) to seeking to improve students’ results via “accountability through
transparency” (Australian Government, 2016, p. 4) might indicate a move to the first
area of the “democratic deficit”. Those who suggest a “democratic deficit” is
emerging may argue that accountability is broader than transparency and “valuefor-money” (Australian Government, 2016, p. 13); however, they may also recognize that governments need to ensure that taxpayers’ money is being used appropriately (Australian Government, 2016). Thus governments and school leaders may
take a more complex view of audit culture than the arguments advanced by its
advocates and critics (Keddie, 2017; Kimber & Ehrich, 2011).
One question is whether this trend over the past decade has reduced commitment
to social justice. Several of the researchers cited in this chapter note that NAPLAN
does not have the same impact on different groups of students and different
groups of staff, with less negative impact in independent schools than in public
schools (Rogers et al., 2016; Thompson, 2013). However, from the responses from
teachers and school leaders in their studies, it also seems students who are
already disadvantaged have been impacted more negatively than those students
who are not, with some students also becoming “at risk” through NAPLAN

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M. Kimber

(Cumming et al., 2016, 129; McQueen et al., 2018; Thompson, 2013). Thompson’s
(2013) respondents noted “increased pressure on” schools, teachers and school
leaders (p. 71), and altered “relationships” (p. 82) among students, teachers and
parents as a possible consequence of My School. These findings suggest that
NAPLAN and My School could undermine social justice and may contribute to a
slide towards the first element of a “democratic deficit” as the “consequences” of the
test seem to differ for different groups of students, teachers and leaders in some
schools feel more “pressure” to “perform” (Thompson, 2013, pp. 71, 72, 82), and the
relationship between schools and parents has altered in some cases (Gorur, 2013;
Thompson, 2013). Such points raise Keddie’s (2014) suggestion that the audit
culture might be contributing to “social and moral learning” being “sidelined” and
“levels of segregation and stratification within the education system” increased (p.
504). For Keddie (2014), this outcome is resulting from “the publication of exam
results and league tables” (p. 504). Drawing on, and agreeing with, Cranston (2013),
Ehrich et al. (2015), Kimber and Ehrich (2011), and Keddie (2014, 2017), one
challenge for school leaders comes from competition among contractual, professional, and moral accountabilities and responsibilities. Teachers’ and school leaders’
responses in several of the articles cited here suggest some Australian school leaders
are seeking to address this challenge.
It could be argued that neoliberal/managerial thinking has become more pronounced in school autonomy policies in Australia (e.g., Cranston et al., 2010;
Keddie, 2017; Kimber & Ehrich, 2011) and thus the potential for weakening of
social justice heightened. Yet experience has varied across jurisdictions, among
schools and over time. In Western Australia, with the longer history and more
extensive use of IPSs, Fitzgerald et al. (2018) argue that “residualization” has
become evident. By contrast, in Queensland, a change from a Liberal-National to
a Labor government saw reduced commitment to IPSs. Keddie et al.’s (2018) and
Gobby et al.’s (2018) case studies of school leaders in both states illustrate how
school leaders’ commitment to what they considered the social purposes of their
schools, and to teacher professionalism has “moderated” this drift (Kimber &
Ehrich, 2011; Kimber & Maddox, 2003).
Comparing school autonomy in the UK, USA, and Australia, Keddie (2017)
observes, rather than “improved academic attainment” (p. 374), there appears to be
“increasing social injustice in schools and education systems” (p. 374), as it is about
reduced resources and increased accountability (p. 374). Yet the findings
documented by Fitzgerald et al. (2018), Gobby (2013a, b, Gobby et al., 2018), and
Keddie et al. (2018) indicate that the experience of IPSs, similar to that of schoolbased management, has varied across school and across states. By identifying
potential “residualization” of “non-IPSs” (Fitzgerald et al., 2018, p. 662) in Western
Australia and the negative impacts on staff at the IPS school they examined,
Fitzgerald et al.’s (2018) work suggests possible “erosion” of social justice and
move to a “democratic deficit.” Yet the actions of the school leaders in Keddie et
al.’s (2018) and Gobby et al.’s (2018) case study schools suggest that, in some
contexts, school leaders can lessen such trends. Such actions might be assisted by
government policies. Australian governments have continued to acknowledge and

A Social Justice Challenge for School Leadership in Australia

15

provide “additional” funding for students from disadvantaged backgrounds (Australian Government, 2016, p. 12) and promote inclusive education (MCEETYA,
2008; Queensland, Department of Education, 2018). Therefore, similar to Kimber
and Ehrich (2011) and Kimber and Maddox (2003), it is suggested here that
federalism, competing accountabilities, and the actions of school leaders have
been “moderating” the undermining of social justice and drifting to a “democratic
deficit.”
Turning to the second element of the “democratic deficit”, performance pay has
remained of interest to some Australian governments. That it has not been
implemented might indicate a commitment to social justice has been limiting
move to a “democratic deficit.” The “mediating” effect of federalism, the differing
“ideological commitments” of governments, and the role of unions and business
groups may have also tempered this trend (Cranston et al., 2010; Keddie, 2014;
Kimber & Maddox, 2003; Lingard & Lewis, 2017). Future actions of state and
territory governments, as well as federal governments, will play a role in whether
there is a slide to this element of the “democratic deficit.”
Turning to the third area of the “democratic deficit,” it might be argued that,
through My School and IPSs, Australian schools are increasingly competing with
one another and “[p]arents are [being] encouraged to choose a school” (Fitzgerald et
al., 2018, p. 663). In this sense, there is potential for reduced commitment to
social justice. “Marketization,” “competition,” and an imperative to “choose a
school” (Fitzgerald et al., 2018, p. 663) seem particularly evident in Western
Australia, where it has been argued that, while some IPSs have greater ability “to
respond to” their students’ needs, some “non-IPSs” are being “residualised” (Fitzgerald et al., 2018, p. 663). This “residualization effect” is “a relational process
whereby some [public] schools . . . [need] to cater increasingly complex and disadvantaged student cohorts, as schools compete to have more middle-class, and less
‘difficult’ enrolments within their schools” (Fitzgerald et al., 2018, p. 663).
Residualization might connect with Connell’s (2013) and Lindblom’s (1995)
argument that, due to the “distributional inequities” (Kimber, 2000, p. 154) within
the market, consumers are only “free to explore the box in which they are confined”
(Lindblom, 1995, p. 685). Connell (2013) states that markets “increase inequality”
(p. 279) as “services and resources have to be rationed . . . To motivate parents to buy
privatised services, losers have to be created and publicised . . . NAPLAN testing and
the My School website” (Connell, 2013, p. 279) have been used for this purpose.
From this viewpoint, marketization can decrease commitment to social justice and
contribute to a “democratic deficit.”
Commercialization and marketization, then, form a further element in whether
there has been a “hollowing out of the state” (Rhodes, 1994, p. 138) or, in this case,
of schools (Kimber & Ehrich, 2011, p. 190). Kimber and Ehrich (2011) suggest, “[r]
ather than clarifying accountability lines, those who implement managerial and
market practices into the public sector remove public goods and services from it”
(p. 190), which might be viewed as one form of privatization (Hogan, Thompson,
Sellar, & Lingard, 2018; Kimber & Ehrich, 2011). Schools (and teachers and school
leaders) become “providers” and citizens become “customers” (Blackmore, 2004, p.

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M. Kimber

273; Blackmore, 2016; Kimber & Ehrich, 2011, p. 190), again connecting with
Connell’s (2013) and Lindblom’s (1995) argument.
Hogan et al. (2018) identify the “fine line” (p. 141) between what might benefit
schools and what may become “perilous” (p. 141), particularly where questions
about “the deprofessionalisation of teachers” and ethics (pp. 141, 142) arise.
For Hogan et al. (2018), commercialization within the public school context is
creating, “marketing” and selling “products to schools” (p. 154) for a profit. Such
products include “curriculum content, assessment services, data infrastructure. . .
remedial instruction, professional development, and school administration support”
(p. 141). Hogan et al. (2018) contend “the growth of commercial involvement
in public schools blurs the line between the roles, relationships and purposes of
public and private organisations that are involved in schooling” (p. 143), which
might be viewed as the opposite of the managerial desire to clarify accountability
(Kimber, 2000). Hogan et al. (2018) note little being known about the “extent” to
which “teaching and learning processes” have been commercialized (p. 144).
Hogan (2015, 2016; Hogan et al., 2018) draws attention to “the influence of edubusiness[es such as the publisher, Pearson] on education policy processes” (Hogan,
2015, p. 302). Yet Hogan seems not to define “edu-business.” Indeed, in the
literature accessed for this analysis, edu-business did not seem to be defined.
Looking at Pearson and the Australian Council for Educational Research within
“the NAPLAN policy network” (Hogan, 2016, pp. 93, 100), Hogan (2016, p. 96),
like Kimber and Ehrich (2011), raised concern about the potential for privatized
policy. Hogan (2016) contends these businesses are “working to construct policy
problems they can subsequently solve through their commercial activities. . . . and
NAPLAN [is] a vector privatisation” (p. 96), which can increase inequity (Hogan et
al., 2018). Connell (2013, p. 280) argues that “neoliberalism” is about widening
“existing markets” and creating “new” ones, for business, a point reinforced by
Hogan et al. (2018, pp. 122–123). For Connell (2013), “Neoliberalism” is about
“commodification of services . . . The most dramatic form is the privatisation of
public assets and services” (p. 280).
Edu-businesses appear to have a larger market within independent schools
(McCuaig, Enright, Rossi, Macdonald, & Hansen, 2016). From their analysis of
interviews with school leaders, teachers, and leaders in external providers of health
programs, McCuaig et al. (2016) draw attention to the increasing visibility of edubusiness with respect to Health and Physical Education curriculum, particularly
within independent schools which are likely to have the resources to “purchase”
such programs. They note how “external providers” use “workshops, conferences,
videos, online newsletters, and academic and professional literature” to provide
“teacher professional development” (McCuaig et al., 2016, p. 160). Drawing attention to social justice, McCuaig et al. (2016) note the “purchase” these providers
“have found . . . within independent Australian schools” (p. 161) might be a consequence of the resources these schools yet may also be connected with “their
positioning within a highly competitive school market requires differentiation as
well as care for the children of busy, aspirational parents” (p. 161), which might draw
attention to the challenge to navigate the benefit/danger “line” Hogan et al. (2018, p.

A Social Justice Challenge for School Leadership in Australia

17

141) note. Similarly, analyzing schools across the independent, public, and Catholic
sectors in Geelong, Victoria in terms of the first Gonski report, Kenway (2013)
suggests “education is [not] open and fair and . . . choice is . . . fiction” (p. 301).
While there is insufficient information to determine the degree to which public
schools have been hollowed out in Australia, it seems commercialization and
marketization have expanded. This expansion, in turn, seems to be increasing
inequality through more reliance on the market, thus potentially eroding social
justice and contributing to the move to a “democratic deficit” (Kimber & Ehrich,
2011).

Conclusion
The “democratic deficit” has been used to examine whether there has been “erosion”
(Kimber, 2000; Kimber & Ehrich, 2011; Kimber & Maddox, 2003) of social
justice as a consequence of policies and practices influenced by neoliberal/managerial thinking. Similar to Kimber and Ehrich (2011), it is concluded that a deep
“erosion” of social justice and slide to a “democratic deficit” was minimized by
federalism, adherence to social justice, and school leaders’ actions. Commitment to
social justice may have been reduced through NAPLAN, My School, IPSs, and
marketization. The change in language at a federal level from “quality and equity”
(Gorur, 2013, p. 217) to “accountability through transparency” (Australian Government, 2016, pp. 4, 13) reflects this potential reduction. Diverse groups of students
have been impacted differently by NAPLAN and My School. My School is altering
the relationship among students, parents and schools in some schools and some
sectors. Kenway’s (2013) and Fitzgerald et al.’s (2018) findings about parental
choice and “residualization” add to this argument. McCuaig et al.’s (2016) findings
about independent schools having greater ability to purchase from edu-businesses
and continued interest in performance pay further indicates a potential “erosion” of
social justice. These findings might raise Connell’s (2013) and Lindblom’s (1995)
argument about markets being unequal and generating inequality. However, it could
be argued that this “erosion” was minimized through: (1) different state IPS policies
and experiences in Western Australia and Queensland; (2) school leaders’ actions
in these states to promote their school’s social goals or to promote teacher
professionalism (Gobby et al., 2018; Keddie et al., 2018); and (3) performance
pay for teachers, while remaining of interest to governments, continues not to be
implemented.
This “erosion” and its minimizing parallel Kimber and Ehrich’s (2011) evaluation
about the experience of the neoliberal version of school-based management and
the “democratic deficit” in Australia. Analysis of the literature presented here
indicates a narrow understanding of accountability with a focus on transparency
within federal government policy. Stress on parents choosing schools and the
seeming growth of edu-businesses suggest commercialization and marketization
have expanded. However, as noted above, government policies and school leaders’
values and actions seem to have lessened “move to” a “democratic deficit” (Kimber

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M. Kimber

& Ehrich, 2011; Kimber & Maddox, 2003). Further research, particularly into
commercialization and marketization, can illuminate the extent and impact of
these reforms.

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– Giving schools more choice [PDF file]. Retrieved from https://docs.education.gov.au/docu
ments/independent-public-schools-giving-schools-more-choice
Australian Government. (2016, May). Quality schools, quality outcomes [PDF file]. Retrieved from
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