Warlike and peaceful societies : the interaction of genes and culture

Agner Fog

2017

Open Book Publishers

"Are humans violent or peaceful by nature? We are both. In this ambitious and wide-ranging book, Agner Fog presents a ground-breaking new argument that explains the existence of differently organised societies using evolutionary theory. It combines natural sciences and social sciences in a way that is rarely seen. According to a concept called regality theory, people show a preference for authoritarianism and strong leadership in times of war or collective danger, but desire egalitarian political systems in times of peace and safety. These individual impulses shape the way societies develop and organise themselves, and in this book Agner argues that there is an evolutionary mechanism behind this flexible psychology. Incorporating a wide range of ideas including evolutionary theory, game theory, and ecological theory, Agner analyses the conditions that make us either strident or docile. He tests this theory on data from contemporary and ancient societies, and provides a detailed explanation of the applications of regality theory to issues of war and peace, the rise and fall of empires, the mass media, economic instability, ecological crisis, and much more. Warlike and Peaceful Societies: The Interaction of Genes and Culture draws on many different fields of both the social sciences and the natural sciences. It will be of interest to academics and students in these fields, including anthropology, political science, history, conflict and peace research, social psychology, and more, as well as the natural sciences, including human biology, human evolution, and ecology."

Psychology

English

9781783744053

10.11647/OBP.0128

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

Warlike and Peaceful
Societies
The Interaction of Genes and Culture

AGNER FOG

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Warlike and Peaceful
Societies
The Interaction of Genes and Culture

Agner Fog

https://www.openbookpublishers.com
© 2017 Agner Fog

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Contents

1. Introduction

1

1.1. A different kind of social science

2

1.2. Overview of the book

5

2. The Theory of Regal and Kungic Cultures

7

2.1. In a nutshell: ‘regal’ and ‘kungic’ explained

7

2.2. Evolutionary basis for regality theory

9

2.3. An evolutionarily stable strategy

13

2.4. The behavior of the leader

15

2.5. Why are most warriors and chiefs men?

17

2.6. Cultural effects of regal and kungic tendencies

21

3. Contributions from Other Theories

27

3.1. Influence of the environment: Contributions from
ecological theory

27

3.2. Nature or nurture: Evolution of sociality

32

3.3. Fertility: Contributions from life history theory

34

3.4. Contributions from political demography

35

3.5. World view and personality: Authoritarianism
theory

39

3.6. Contributions from other social psychological
theories

42

3.7. Contributions from social values theories

45

3.8. The theory of tight and loose cultures and other
culture theories

48

3.9. Contributions from human empowerment theory

56

3.10. Moral panics: Contributions from the sociology of
deviance

59

4. Different Kinds of War in Human History

65

4.1. The rise of empires: Contributions from cultural
selection theory

65

4.2. The fall of empires: Contributions from historical
dynamics theory

69

4.3. General theories of war and peace

72

4.4. Changing patterns of war

76

4.5. Theories of revolution

88

5. Economic Determinants of Conflict and Fear
5.1. Fear is profitable: The economy of the mass media

93
93

5.2. Economic booms and busts

100

5.3. Greed or grievance: Economic theories of civil war

107

5.4. The resource curse

111

5.5. Example: Proxy war in Afghanistan

116

6. Strategic Uses of Fear

125

6.1. Terrorism conflicts

125

6.2. The strategy of tension in Italy and elsewhere

135

6.3. Fabrication of threats and conflicts

144

6.4. Example: Why World War II started

157

7. Regality Theory Applied to Ancient Cultures

163

7.1. Andamanese

166

7.2. Arrernte

170

7.3. Babylonians

173

7.4. Chiricahua Apache

176

7.5. Copper Inuit (Eskimo)

179

7.6. E De (Rhadé)

181

7.7. Ganda

183

7.8. Gilyak

188

7.9. Hausa

191

7.10. Inca

195

7.11. !Kung

198

7.12. Maasai

203

7.13. Mbuti

207

7.14. Somali

211

7.15. Warao

213

7.16. Yahgan

216

7.17. Yanomamo

218

7.18. Yi (Lolo, Nuosu)

222

8. Statistical Testing of Regality Theory

227

8.1. Problems of cross-cultural statistics

227

8.2. Ancient cultures, large sample

230

8.3. Subsample, 18 cultures

244

8.4. Contemporary cultures, large sample

252

8.5. Evidence from existing studies

267

8.6. Conclusion of the statistical tests

269

9. Discussion and Conclusion

271

9.1. Summary of findings

271

9.2. Three epochs in human history

273

9.3. The regal/kungic dynamics and human social
development

277

9.4. New explanations of well-known phenomena

279

9.5. Integration with other theories

281

9.6. Policy lessons

283

9.7. Supporting evidence

288

9.8. What regality theory can be used for

290

9.9. Further discussion

291

10. Bibliography

293

11. Illustrations

345

Index

349

1. Introduction

All through recorded history we have seen extreme differences
between different human societies. Some societies in some periods
have been warlike and cruel beyond comprehension, while other
societies in other times and places have been remarkably peaceful and
tolerant.
Societies that are warlike, hierarchical, and intolerant with strict
discipline are called regal. Societies that are peaceful, egalitarian, and
tolerant are called kungic. Many societies are something in between
these two extremes. The present book offers a new, groundbreaking
theory that explains this extreme variability in social organization and
culture based on evolutionary theory.
It has often been discussed whether such dramatic differences in
human behavior are due to genetic differences or cultural norms. One
aspect that is often missing in the genes-versus-culture debate is that
genes may code for flexibility. Our genes enable us to behave differently
under different conditions. This is called phenotypic plasticity.1
The theory presented here demonstrates that humans have a
plasticity that enables us to adapt to different conditions of war or
peace. Warlike or regal behavior has been adaptive under conditions
of collective danger that were sometimes present in our evolutionary
past, while conditions of collective security that were present at other
times and places made peaceful or kungic behavior optimal from an
evolutionary point of view. In other words, the potentials for both
warlike and peaceful behavior are present in our genetic makeup.
1 Bateson and Gluckman (2011, p. 31)

© 2017 Agner Fog, CC BY 4.0

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2

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

Nobody is born a devil or a saint. Depending on our living conditions,
we may become authoritarian and belligerent or peace-loving and
tolerant. The theory presented here explains a likely evolutionary
mechanism behind this flexible psychology and analyzes the conditions
that make us either strident or docile.
This theory, which will be called regality theory, can answer many
burning questions about both individual and collective behavior: Why
have so many tyrants fought cruel and unnecessary wars? Why do many
people support their tyrants? Why do some people hate foreigners
while other people readily embrace them? Why have people used their
apparently peaceful religion to justify some of the worst atrocities in
history? And why have other people dedicated their lives to the most
unselfish charitable causes based on the very same religions? Why do
some militants commit acts of terrorism against innocent people? And
why can a few acts of terrorism that cause a limited amount of harm
lead to dramatic changes in the political climate, while other events
that cause much more harm have no noticeable political effect?
The remarkable differences between warlike and peaceful societies
are reflected in many characteristics of culture, including aspects
that have no obvious relationship with war and peace, such as art
preferences and sexual morals. This book explores such side effects as
well and presents statistical evidence in support of the theory.

1.1. A different kind of social science
‘Scientific genius is extinct’, wrote Dean Simonton in Nature a few years
ago. In his view, the only kind of scientific progress we see today is
marginal improvements within old paradigms that have already been
thoroughly explored. Revolutionary new ideas either do not occur or
fail to be acknowledged.2 Scientists who are trained in one particular
paradigm are unlikely to understand and accept a new, radically
different paradigm.3 While everybody hails interdisciplinary research,
the reality today is that many scientists guard their own scientific

2 Simonton (2013)
3 Kuhn (1962, chapter 12)

1. Introduction



3

territory. Scientists today have little freedom to choose their own
subjects of research. The highly competitive funding system is more
likely to support old research areas than radically new ones because it
is controlled by established scientists through the peer review system.4
Most scientists start by specializing in one particular scientific
paradigm and then search for problems that this paradigm can be
applied to. The present book reflects the opposite approach. It starts
with a problem and then searches for paradigms that can contribute
to solving the problem. This includes paradigms from the natural
sciences, such as evolutionary biology and ecology, as well as from
the social sciences, such as anthropology, history, political science,
economics, and cultural studies.
Unfortunately, there is much animosity and little mutual
understanding between the natural and the social sciences. Many
regard it as impossible to establish something similar to the laws of the
natural sciences for social phenomena.5 Evolutionary theories of human
behavior are rejected by many sociologists on those grounds,6 and
some particularly fashionable branches of social studies are aversive to
any search for causal regularities in social and cultural systems.7 This
is not a good starting point for bridging the gap between the social
and the natural sciences. Fortunately, authors in other branches of the
social sciences have strongly defended the study of social phenomena
based on solid scientific principles.8 We have to rely in particular on
those social science traditions that explicitly search for regularities; for
example, comparative historical analysis9 and social systems theory.10
Too many studies of social phenomena have focused on an isolated
phenomenon, using a single theoretical framework that allows only
a single type of explanation. Such studies cannot account for the rich
complexity of human culture and social developments. We need a
4 Becher and Trowler (2001), Lucas (2006), van Arensbergen, van der Weijden and
van den Besselaar (2014)
5 Hayek (1967)
6 Horowitz, Yaworsky and Kickham (2014), O’Malley (2007)
7 Beed and Beed (2000)
8 Kincaid (1996, chapter 3)
9 Mahoney and Thelen (2015)
10 Richardson, G. (1991)

4

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

social science that combines the insights of many different scientific
disciplines to better understand the interactions between individual
and collective action, between planned and unintended developments,
between human action and structural causes, between endogenous
and exogenous factors, and so on. The present book strives towards
this goal of multicausal explanations.
The large number of different scientific disciplines involved in this
book makes it impossible to go into deep details for each discipline.
For example, the text does not go into details with historical examples,
but instead discusses the specific aspects of historical events that
are relevant to the theoretical discussion. Readers who want to go
deeper into a particular subject are referred to the literature references
(chapter 10).
In sciences like physics and mathematics, a theory is called
‘beautiful’ if it can solve a broad range of problems using one simple
formula and if it can be applied to problems other than the one that
prompted the development of the theory. Regality theory is a beautiful
theory in this sense. What started as an attempt to explain morals
by cultural selection ends up as an evolutionary psychology theory
of collective action that can explain a broad range of phenomena:
individual characteristics such as authoritarianism, xenophobia, or
tolerance; social phenomena such as political hierarchy, bellicosity,
discipline, or egalitarianism; and even cultural phenomena such as
religiosity, music genres, and architectural style. Regality theory is
not a ‘grand theory’, though. It can contribute to the explanation of
many interesting phenomena, but it needs to be combined with other
theories in order to fully explain these phenomena.
Some branches of social studies readily mix science and ideology.
That is a dangerous course. Regality theory is useful for explaining
many different political phenomena, and the theory may be useful for
guiding political decisions, but this must be a one-way interaction.
The present book is based on the principle that science may influence
politics but politics should not influence science. The fundamental
science should be immune to political and ideological influences even
if the research should reveal politically inconvenient truths.

1. Introduction



5

1.2. Overview of the book
This book relies on many different scientific disciplines from both the
natural sciences and the social sciences. Many concepts are briefly
explained because one cannot expect the reader to be competent in such
a broad range of different disciplines, but you should still be prepared
to look up unfamiliar words and concepts. The good news is that it is
not necessary to read and understand all the chapters in order to get a
basic understanding of the theory.
Chapter 2.1 gives a short introduction to regality theory. It is
necessary to read this chapter first in order to understand the rest of the
book. You may read the remaining chapters in any way you like. You
may focus on the chapters that are most relevant to your field of interest
and skip other chapters or read them later. There are cross-references
throughout the book where one chapter relates to another.
Chapter 2.2 explains the evolutionary mechanism that regality theory
is based on. This is the theoretical justification for the theory. Chapters
2.3, 2.4, and 2.5 contain further discussion of evolutionary aspects of the
theory. Chapter 2.6 relates the theory to common cultural phenomena.
Chapter 3 and its subsections discuss how regality theory can
benefit from contributions from other scientific disciplines. Regality
theory cannot stand alone. We are dealing with social, cultural, and
psychological phenomena that are influenced by a complex interplay
of many different causes and mechanisms. Such a complex system
cannot be described adequately by a single theory. We need to look
into such diverse disciplines as ecology, demography, anthropology,
history, political science, economics, social psychology, cultural studies,
media studies, and many others in order to get a full understanding
of the complex social phenomena of warlike and peaceful behavior.
The subsections of chapter 3 discuss relevant findings from a number
of disciplines that can be combined with regality theory to provide a
more complete understanding of the social, cultural, and psychological
phenomena we want to study.
Many different academic traditions have made observations about
different kinds of societies and cultures or different kinds of personalities

6

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

and psychological reactions that have important similarities with
regality theory. However, they have done so without the same degree
of theoretical understanding of fundamental causes and mechanisms.
Chapter 3 also discusses how such findings from other areas of study
can be integrated with regality theory.
Chapter 4 looks at different theories about the causes of war and
peace as well as the dynamic processes behind different kinds of violent
conflicts.
Chapter 5 and 6 analyze various aspects of contemporary cultures.
Chapter 5 looks at a number of economic factors that produce regal
cultures, perhaps unintentionally, through fear and collective danger.
The commercial mass media profit from fear. Economic instability
causes insecurity and conflicts. Changing economic conditions have
changed the patterns of war and violent conflicts so that proxy
war, insurgency, and terrorism have mainly replaced conventional
interstate war.
Chapter 6 looks at cases where fear and conflict are used
intentionally as strategic weapons by powerful nations as well as by
smaller insurgent groups.
The psychological plasticity that regality theory describes has its
origins in a distant evolutionary past, and we cannot be certain that
it is still adaptive (in the evolutionary sense) in a modern setting. We
may gain more insight by looking at non-modern cultures that are
more similar to our evolutionary past. Chapter 7 describes a number
of ancient cultures, ranging from the most peaceful to the most warlike,
and living under very different ecological environments. In connection
with each culture is a discussion of how it relates to the predictions of
regality theory.
While examples are useful for illustrating a theory, we cannot rule out
the possibility that the agreement between a theory and a few examples
is just a coincidence. Chapter 8 contains a number of statistical tests to
distinguish between random coincidence and significant correlations.
Various methods are used for testing the predictions of regality theory
at both the individual level and the level of whole societies in both
modern and ancient non-industrial societies.
Chapter 9 concludes the book with a discussion and summary of the
findings and possible applications of regality theory.

2. The Theory of Regal and
Kungic Cultures

2.1. In a nutshell: ‘regal’ and ‘kungic’ explained
It is easy to observe that some cultures are warlike and totalitarian
while other cultures are peaceful and tolerant.1 It is more difficult to
explain why. Regality theory seeks to explain such cultural differences
as adaptations to the different levels of danger and conflict that societies
are exposed to.2 Nobody is born belligerent or peaceful, according to
this theory. Instead, humans have evolved a psychological plasticity
that shapes our personalities to fit the environments we live in. This
psychological mechanism makes people prefer a strong leader and strict
discipline in the event of war or other collective danger.
The mechanism explained here is an interplay between genes and
culture. The genes code for a flexibility that allows the psychological
sentiments of each person to respond to the level of war and the need for
collective action. The zeitgeist and culture adapts to these sentiments in
such a way that the society becomes well prepared to meet any external
threats.
Fighting in war is hard and dangerous, and it would be more attractive
for the individual not to fight and to let others do the fighting. This
is the well-known collective action problem. Regality theory proposes
1 Russell (1972)
2 Fog (1999, p. 91)
© 2017 Agner Fog, CC BY 4.0

https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0128.02

8

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

that the collective action problem can be overcome by installing a
strong leader who can reward brave warriors and punish defectors. If
the leader has enough support, then he3 can coerce everybody to fight
and let everybody benefit from the collective fighting. If no leader has
enough support, then nobody will fight and everybody will suffer from
the resulting collective defeat. But in neither situation will an individual
have to fight alone and let others free ride on the benefits he makes
for his group. Everybody will benefit from having a strong leader in
the case of war, and therefore everybody should desire a strong leader
when facing collective danger.
However, a strong leader is a disadvantage in the absence of war,
because a tyrannical leader can exploit his followers and suppress
their freedom. Therefore, it is advantageous to have a psychological
plasticity that makes us prefer a strong leader in the event of war, but
not in the event of peace. Regality theory proposes that such a plasticity
has evolved by natural selection. People will prefer a strong leader and
strict discipline when the probability of war or other collective danger is
perceived to be high, while people will prefer an egalitarian society with
more lax discipline when there is no collective danger.
If the majority of the members of a tribe or other group desire a
strong leader and strict discipline, then, surely, this will be what they
get. They will develop a hierarchical political structure and a very
punitive system of discipline. It has been observed that this affects not
only the political structure but many other aspects of the culture as well.
People will develop a strong feeling of tribal or national identity, and
their world view will be more polarized between friends and enemies.
Tolerance of strangers and deviants will go down. Religion will be used
as a means to keep people in line. And, perhaps most surprisingly, it
has been observed that styles of art and music will gradually change so
as to achieve psychological congruence with the sociopolitical structure
and the world view.
Such a culture is called regal. We will use the word ‘regal’ to denote
the psychological preferences of the individuals as well as the political
structure and the culture and artifacts that are characteristic of a
society with frequent wars, threats of war, or other collective dangers

3 
Chapter 2.5 explains why most war leaders in history were men.

2. The Theory of Regal and Kungic Cultures



9

that require collective action. The opposite of regal is kungic. A kungic
culture is peaceful, egalitarian, and tolerant. The characteristics of regal
and kungic cultures will be explained in more detail in chapter 2.6.
The word ‘regal’ comes from the Latin regalis, which means ‘royal’.
The word ‘kungic’ is coined after the !Kung bushmen, who have the
most kungic culture found in the present study. War and other collective
dangers (perceived or real) that push a society towards a more regal
structure are called regalizing factors, and this process is called regalization.

2.2. Evolutionary basis for regality theory
It has often been observed that people prefer a strong leader and a
strong social group in times of crisis,4 and a number of scientists have
independently suggested that this may be an adaptive response to
the need for collective action.5 However, so far there has been little
discussion of why this would be adaptive.
The new theory proposed here relies on a psychological mechanism
that makes people prefer a strong leader in times of intergroup conflict
but not in times of peace and safety. Such a mechanism could be
adaptive because it reduces or eliminates the free rider problem in
collective fighting.
Several mechanisms have been proposed to explain the phenomenon
called parochial altruism—the fact that people are willing to fight
for their social group despite the fitness costs.6 The most important
evolutionary explanations that have previously been proposed
include kin selection,7 group selection,8 reciprocal selection,9 altruistic
punishment,10 prestige,11 sexual selection (women are attracted to brave
warriors),12 the opportunity of successful warriors to profit from the
4 Hastings and Shaffer (2008), Jugert and Duckitt (2009), Ladd (2007)
5 Fog (1997), Navarrete, Kurzban, Fessler and Kirkpatrick (2004), van Vugt (2006),
Hastings and Shaffer (2008), Kessler and Cohrs (2008), Glowacki and von Rueden
(2015)
6 Bowles and Gintis (2011), Nowak (2006)
7 Thayer (2004)
8 Crofoot and Wrangham (2010), Lehmann and Feldman (2008), Thayer (2004)
9 Tooby and Cosmides (1988, 2010)
10 Boyd, Gintis, Bowles and Richerson (2003)
11 Glowacki and Wrangham (2013)
12 Van der Dennen (1995), Wrangham (1999), Glowacki and Wrangham (2013)

10

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

spoils and to mate with captured women from the losing group,13 and
cultural group selection.14
It is a common characteristic of these proposed mechanisms that
the effects are relatively weak, and perhaps too weak to compensate
for the extremely high fitness costs of fighting.15 The fitness gain in the
form of increased mating opportunities does not necessarily go to the
people that have run the highest risks; and the mechanism of punishing
defectors involves the additional collective action problem of who
should bear the costs of being the punisher.16
The alternative explanation proposed here is a mechanism that may
have been important in the evolution of collective fighting in prehistory.
In the event of war, or imminent war, the members of a social group will
show a psychological preference for having a strong leader and a social
system with strict discipline. If enough members of the group express
these preferences, then the group will soon develop a hierarchical
political structure with a strong and powerful leader who can command
group members to fight, devise a strategy, reward brave warriors, and
punish defectors.
There is an important difference between being willing to fight for
one’s social group and being willing to support a strong leader. The
altruistic individual who volunteers to fight for his group will run a
high personal risk, while all the non-fighting members of his group will
benefit from his bravery. As the cost to the individual warrior is likely
higher than his share of the group-level gain, this behavior will not be
promoted by simple natural selection. But the strategy of supporting
a strong leader is different. If only a few members of the group desire
a strong leader, then there will be no strong leader and no collective
fighting. If enough group members support a strong leader, then this
leader will be able to dominate everybody, including the minority that
do not support him, and command them to fight. Thus, it is possible for
the group to suppress the fitness advantage of free riding by installing
a strong leader.17 The individual who shows the preference for a strong
13 Van der Dennen (1995), Chagnon (1990), Choi (2007), Glowacki and Wrangham
(2015)
14 Henrich (2004)
15 Bradley (1999)
16 Glowacki and von Rueden (2015), Fowler (2005)
17 Glowacki and von Rueden (2015), Hooper, Kaplan and Boone (2010)

2. The Theory of Regal and Kungic Cultures



11

leader will have to carry the costs of fighting, but he will also enjoy the
benefits of everybody else fighting. Either everybody fights or nobody
fights—there is no place for free riders. The group-level benefit of
everybody fighting in a coordinated way could very well be sufficiently
high to outweigh the individual fitness costs of fighting, even when the
benefit is divided between all the group members.
For promoting a complex task such as fighting, where extraordinary
above-average skills are particularly valuable, we can expect that a system
including both reward and punishment will be more efficient than a
system based on punishment alone. A system based on punishment only
would make warriors deliver the minimum performance necessary to
avoid punishment; and defectors might even avoid punishment if they
could convincingly fake illness. A punishment system could possibly
evolve by other mechanisms if the costs of punishing are sufficiently
low.18 However, we would expect rewards to be considerably more
costly to deliver than punishments and require a higher payback to
evolve.
We can imagine a Stone Age scenario like this: a tribal people
experiences frequent conflicts with a neighbor tribe. This makes the
people prefer a strong leader. Such a leader emerges, and his people trust
and support him. He will lead the battles, devise strategies, and appoint
people to various tasks. He may deliver rewards and punishments
himself, or he may delegate this task to persons of intermediate rank.
Rewards are particularly important for making it attractive for warriors
to fight to the best of their abilities. Brave warriors may be rewarded
with better food, weapons, protection, and other resources and—
perhaps most importantly—with prestige.19 A high prestige gives the
brave warrior access to an attractive wife and perhaps multiple wives.
This translates directly to biological fitness. Cowards who do not fight
wholeheartedly will get a bad reputation and low prestige. This will
give them a disadvantage in social exchanges and a disadvantage in
the search for a mate. Such a system gives the best fighters the highest
rewards and compensates for the risks of injury or death. The chances
of winning a war against a neighbor tribe are increased as a result. The
whole group is likely to support the leader, because everybody benefits
18 Fowler (2005)
19 Glowacki and Wrangham (2013), von Rueden, Gurven and Kaplan (2010)

12

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

from the increased chances of winning wars and there is no way of
achieving the same result without a strong leader.
There is a trade-off between the benefit of being part of a strong and
powerful political organization with a strong leader and the cost of
repression within this organization.20 This balance is likely to be tipped
in a peaceful environment where the need for collective protection
is low. The individual would have no reason to submit to a strong
leader in this case. On the contrary, the individual would most likely
see his own fitness reduced by a despotic male leader who could take
advantage of everybody else and even monopolize a large number of
women.21 Therefore, the optimal strategy for the individual must be to
have a flexible psychology, showing a preference for strong leadership
and strict discipline when intergroup conflicts are frequent or expected,
and a preference for an egalitarian social structure when intergroup
conflicts are perceived to be unlikely.22 The group-level effect of this
psychological flexibility is that the higher the level of intergroup conflict,
the more the group will invest in a strong organization that strengthens
its ability to organize collective fighting.
This is the basic hypothesis of regality theory. A high level of
intergroup conflict or perceived collective danger will activate a
psychological desire for a strong leader in the group members, and the
group will develop a hierarchical structure as a result. The opposite
situation is a group living under safe and peaceful conditions where
there is no neighbor group to fight with. People in this situation will
not accept a strong leader who limits their freedom. A leader who is too
strict will lose the support of his people and will not be able to stay in
power. The group will develop an egalitarian structure as a result.
To recapitulate, a regal group is a group that has developed strong
organization, discipline, and fighting spirit as a response to conflict or
danger. A kungic group is a group that has adjusted to a peaceful and
safe environment. The words ‘regal’ and ‘kungic’ are also used for the
individual psychological preferences that lead to strong or weak group
organization, respectively.

20 Summers (2005)
21 Betzig (2008)
22 Gavrilets and Fortunato (2014)

2. The Theory of Regal and Kungic Cultures



13

The regal and kungic forms of social organization can be considered
the extremes of a continuous scale, where most societies are placed
somewhere near the middle of this scale. We can call this the regality
scale or the regal-kungic scale. The regality of a culture is determined
by the frequency and severity of intergroup conflicts and other dangers
that require collective action.
It might be problematic to assign numerical values to the regalkungic scale when dealing with very different cultures under different
historical and environmental conditions. In many cases, it is more
useful to use it as a relative scale. For example, we may prefer to say
that culture A is more regal than culture B instead of saying that culture
A is regal or culture B is kungic. Likewise, it can be useful to follow a
particular culture over time and see if it is getting more regal or more
kungic.

2.3. An evolutionarily stable strategy
Some scientists have proposed that altruistic punishment may promote
cooperation in human societies. One or more altruists in the group will
bear the costs of punishing defectors. A recently published model of
evolutionary game theory indicates that conformity, cooperation, and
altruistic punishment in a social group are likely to be stronger when
the group is under threat than when it is not.23
Other models in evolutionary game theory show that cooperative
punishment is more stable than punishment administered by voluntary
individuals, and it has been suggested that a punishing institution
(policeman) might be evolutionarily stable in genetic or cultural
evolution.24 Regality theory proposes that this policeman can be replaced
by a leader (who may appoint a policeman). The leader is rewarded
with the fitness advantage of being a leader, and he can punish anybody
who does not support him. This overcomes the collective action problem
in the theory of altruistic punishment. Regality theory also allows the
leader to administer rewards, which would be hard to explain by other
theories because of the high costs of rewarding.

23 Roos, Gelfand, Nau and Lun (2015)
24 Sigmund, de Silva, Traulsen and Hauert (2010), Jaffe and Zaballa (2010)

14

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

We will now discuss whether a strong leader is necessary to make
group members fight for their group in times of war. We will first
consider the hypothetical situation where there is no strong leader but
where group members are willing to fight for their group because they
have a genetic predisposition to do so. Members who fight for their
group are called altruists, while members who do not fight are called
egoists. A group mostly of altruists is likely to win over a group mostly
of egoists. This is called group selection. However, there is also selection
within the group. The altruists have a considerable risk of dying in
battle, while the egoists survive. Therefore, there will be more and more
egoists for each generation. A group that contains only altruists and no
egoists can thrive and grow, but it is vulnerable to invasion by egoists.
In other words, group selection is not effective if there is more than a
negligible rate of migration into the group.25 We know from history and
anthropology that conquered groups are rarely completely massacred.
Some members of a losing group, especially women and children, are
likely to survive and join the winning group. If the losing group in our
hypothetical scenario contains egoists, then some of these egoists will
survive and enter the winning group and eventually outcompete the
altruists.
We will now consider a second scenario where there is a strong
leader supported by the majority of group members. This is the scenario
that regality theory is based on. The leader can reward brave warriors
and punish defectors who do not fight for their group. We will assume
that these rewards and punishments are strong enough to compensate
for the fitness costs of fighting. For example, we can assume that the
bravest warriors get the most attractive wives and therefore have many
children, while the cowards get less attractive wives and therefore have
fewer children. Or perhaps the bravest warriors get multiple wives
while the cowards get none. Most warriors will fight to the best of their
abilities in order to get the most rewards.
A group with a strong leader who can organize this kind of reward
and punishment is likely to win battles against less organized groups
that have no strong leader. The successful group will win more territory,
which benefits all members of the group. Therefore, it will be attractive
for all members of the group to support the leader.
25 West, el Mouden and Gardner (2011)

2. The Theory of Regal and Kungic Cultures



15

Our first scenario (group selection) was not stable because it was
vulnerable to invasion by egoists. We will now discuss whether the
second scenario (regality) is vulnerable to invasion by individuals who
do not support the strong leader. If the majority of group members
support the leader, then the minority that do not support the leader
will be forced to fight anyway, and they will also be punished for not
supporting the leader. History is full of examples of tyrannical leaders
who punish anybody who does not support them. Therefore, there is
no fitness advantage to not supporting the leader. On the contrary,
there is likely severe persecution. If the non-supporters form a majority
strong enough to overthrow the strong leader and put a weak leader in
his place, then the whole group will be weakened and be less likely to
win wars. This benefits neither the supporters nor the non-supporters.
The conclusion must be that a group with a strong leader in wartime is
not vulnerable to invasion by non-supporters. Therefore, regality is an
evolutionarily stable strategy in a conflict-prone environment.
The preference for a strong leader is not activated in a permanently
peaceful and safe environment, according to regality theory. The
genotype that is not activated in phenotype is not subject to selection
but only to random genetic drift under these conditions.
The prediction from regality theory is that people will show regal
psychological reactions in the face of any collective danger that affects
them directly and that requires collective efforts to overcome. Due to the
weakness of group selection, we will expect the regal reaction of people
to be much weaker in the case of dangers that affect only unrelated
group members.

2.4. The behavior of the leader
So far we have discussed which strategy is most fit for ordinary group
members. Now we will look at the role of the leader and discuss how
we can expect the leader to act from a selfish fitness-maximizing point
of view. It is no surprise that people are willing to be leaders. There is
a large fitness advantage to being a leader or having a high position in
the hierarchy of a successful group.26 A powerful leader of a hierarchical

26 Summers (2005), Betzig (2008)

16

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

organization is typically able to take advantage of everybody else to
benefit himself and his family.27 Many of the most powerful leaders in
history have assembled enormous wealth and large numbers of wives or
concubines. Of course, everything must have been on a smaller scale in
prehistory, but even among chimpanzees and other social animals there
is a large advantage to being the alpha male.28
There are also costs to being a leader. The leader may have to take a
frontline role in battles, and there is a real risk of being killed by an enemy
group, by a rival for the leadership position, or by rebels who think
that the leader is too despotic. A leader can be expected to make higher
sacrifices or take higher risks in intergroup conflicts than low-ranking
members because he has more at stake.29 Nevertheless, we can assume
that the fitness benefits of being a leader are much higher than the costs.
Based on this, we can expect the fitness-maximizing strategies of
leaders to be very different from the strategies of followers. A typical
survival strategy for a low-ranking individual could involve being an
agreeable person, making friendships and alliances, and helping friends
in need in the hope that they will later return the favor.30 In contrast, we
can expect the optimal strategy for a leader to involve doing everything
to consolidate and increase his power, to weaken rivals for the position,
to amass resources and wealth for himself and his family, and to have
as many wives and concubines as he can get away with. The only thing
that limits his despotism is the risk of losing the support of his followers.
A person of intermediate rank or a person with chances of becoming a
leader will be likely to use any strategy that can enhance his rank.
Psychological research confirms that people of high rank behave
differently from people of low rank. Wealthy and high-ranking people
of both sexes behave more egoistically and are more likely to cheat or
behave unethically than other people.31 They tend to feel entitled to
their position.32 They tend to take side with other high-ranking people

27 Anderson and Willer (2014), Padilla, Hogan and Kaiser (2007)
28 Boesch, Kohou, Néné and Vigilant (2006)
29 Gavrilets and Fortunato (2014), Johnson (2015)
30 Kiyonari, Tanida and Yamagishi (2000)
31 Piff et al. (2012), Trautmann, van de Kuilen and Zeckhauser (2013), Bendahan,
Zehnder, Pralong and Antonakis (2014), Gino and Pierce (2009)
32 Piff (2014)

2. The Theory of Regal and Kungic Cultures



17

in conflicts.33 They have a higher tendency to sexual infidelity,34 they
are more self-sufficient,35 and they have less empathy for other people.36
The reduced empathy is not entirely bad, however. It enables the leader
to make more rational decisions that give higher weight to collective
interests than to the interests of single individuals.37
A leader can exploit his followers to enrich himself, the more so
the more power he has. The power of the leader is weakened if the
followers can easily leave the group and join another group with a more
agreeable leader. This explains why the most despotic leaders in history
have appeared in large agrarian societies from which it was difficult for
peasants to escape.38
The ability of a leader to exploit his followers is higher the more regal
his group is. We can therefore expect leaders to try to increase the regality
of their group by exaggerating dangers to the group and by fighting
unnecessary wars.39 Statistical studies of wars through history show such
a strong connection between empires and war that we may assume that
emperors need to fight wars to maintain their empires.40 Powerful leaders
may even fabricate enemies or fight fictitious dangers to maintain and
consolidate their power. For example, the Inquisition tried to uphold the
threatened monopoly of power of the Catholic Church in the Renaissance
through the persecution of heretics and witches.41 More examples of such
fabricated dangers are discussed in chapter 6.

2.5. Why are most warriors and chiefs men?
The reader may have noticed that I am referring to warriors and leaders
as ‘he’. There is a reason for this. Throughout history, most warriors
have been men and most leaders of warring societies have been men.
Obviously, culture and tradition plays a role here, but there is more to

33 Lammers and Yang (2012)
34 Lammers et al. (2011)
35 Vohs, Mead and Goode (Goode 2006)
36 Kraus et al. (2012), Haslam and Loughnan (2014)
37 Côté, Piff and Willer (2013)
38 Price and van Vugt (2014)
39 Price and van Vugt (2015)
40 Eckhardt (1992, p. 184)
41 Ben-Yehuda (1980)

18

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

it than that. A growing amount of research indicates that the traditional
division of labor between the sexes has biological roots. Many of the
differences between men and women are connected with the Darwinian
pursuit of reproductive success. The reproductive success of a man is
limited mainly by his access to mating with women. There is practically
no limit to how many children a man can sire if he can get enough
women to cooperate. The situation for women is very different. The
number of children that a woman can give birth to is limited mainly
by her physiology and energy uptake, while the number of sexual
partners plays only a minor role. Therefore, the reproductive strategies
of men and women are very different and this leads to many conflicts
of interest.42
Through most of our evolutionary history, our ancestors lived
as hunters and gatherers, where more men than women hunted big
animals, and where more women than men gathered fruits and roots
and hunted small animals. Investigations of hunter-gatherer societies
have found that the hunting of big game is not the most efficient way of
getting food. There may be several reasons why men hunt, but showing
off appears to be among the most important ones. This can be explained
by the so-called costly signaling theory. A successful hunt proves that a
man is strong and smart and therefore an attractive mating partner.
Successful hunters have higher prestige and status than other men, and
this translates into reproductive success.43 Anthropologists have found
that good hunters had higher prestige and more children than other
men in all of the societies investigated.44 A similar strategy for women
would probably not increase their reproductive success.
There are similar reasons why men go to war. In the Stone Age,
fighting and hunting were related activities that required some of the
same skills and tools.45 Brave warriors have high prestige, and there
is reason to believe that this gives them a reproductive advantage.46
The opportunity for capturing women from an enemy group further
contributes to the fitness of warriors.47 On the other hand, there are
42 Geary (2010), Chapman (2015)
43 Von Rueden and Jaeggi (2016)
44 Bird, R. (1999), Smith, E. (2004)
45 LeBlanc (2014)
46 Lehmann and Feldman (2008)
47 Van der Dennen (1995, p. 328)

2. The Theory of Regal and Kungic Cultures



19

examples where any advantage to the individual warrior is outweighed
by the increased mortality.48 If some male warriors die, then there will
be an excess of women in the group, and this will lead to an increased
reproductive fitness of the surviving men if polygamy is allowed. The
total number of children produced by the group will be almost the same
if a few men are lost. In other words, there is a fitness loss to the unlucky
warriors who die but a fitness gain to the survivors, so the average
fitness of the men in the group is almost unaffected by the deaths of a
few warriors. If all men in a group fight and the deaths are randomly
and unpredictably distributed among them, then natural selection can
still favor fighting, because the risk of dying is offset by the chance of
getting an extra wife if you survive. This would certainly not be the
case if women were warriors. A woman dying is a lost opportunity
for reproduction for the whole group, and the fitness of the surviving
women would not be increased much by polyandry.49
Men are physically stronger than women on average, and the
differences between the sexes are particularly marked in skills that are
relevant to hunting and fighting, such as throwing distance. It has been
suggested that such differences are the result of evolutionary forces that
have favored these skills in men more than in women.50
It was argued above that social rewards are necessary for making
people fight for their group. Men are more sensitive than women to
social rewards because they have more potential for gaining fitness.51
We can therefore assume that it has been easier to persuade men than
women to fight throughout our evolutionary history. Psychological
experiments confirm that men are more willing than women to make
sacrifices for their group in situations of intergroup conflict, and this
confirms the so-called male warrior hypothesis.52 Of course, there are
also practical reasons behind the tradition that war is the domain of
men rather than women. Women in hunter-gatherer societies often
breastfeed their babies for several years, and it would be unwise to carry
an unweaned baby to the battlefield.
48 Beckerman et al. (2009)
49 Van der Dennen (1995, p. 325)
50 Geary (2010, p. 290)
51 Geary (2010)
52 Van Vugt, de Cremer and Janssen (2007), McDonald, Navarrete and van Vugt
(2012)

20

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

In wartime, it seems logical to choose an experienced warrior as
leader, and this would normally mean a man. But even in peaceful
societies we can observe that most leaders are men. There is a large
fitness advantage to having high status, and this advantage is higher for
men than for women because the reproductive success of men is more
variable.53 We can therefore assume that men are willing to work hard
and make large sacrifices in order to increase their social status, and
more so than women. This is confirmed by anthropological evidence.
Almost all known societies have more male than female leaders.54
The advantage of being a leader is higher in regal than in kungic
societies. We can therefore predict that regal cultures will be more maledominated than kungic cultures. Psychological studies have found that
people prefer a masculine leader in times of intergroup conflict, while
they prefer a feminine leader in situations of within-group competition.
This confirms the traditional roles of men as war leaders and women as
peace brokers.55
Cultural theorists have often mentioned examples of cultures with
unusual sex roles to prove their theory that sex roles and male dominance
are culturally determined. Sociologist Steven Goldberg investigated
these examples by studying the original ethnographic sources, and
he found that in all of these cases there are more men than women in
influential positions. This supports the theory that men are willing to
sacrifice more to increase their status than women are.56 However, it
would be foolish to deny the huge cultural differences in the level of
male dominance. Proponents of cultural explanations have emphasized
cultural differences, while proponents of biological explanations
have ignored them. Here, regality theory may actually contribute to
resolving this long-standing disagreement. Regal societies are generally
more male-dominated than kungic societies, as the examples in chapter
7 show. We can therefore confirm that there are some cultures with high
male domination and other cultures with more equality between the
sexes, and that these cultural differences can be explained to a large

53 Von Rueden, Gurven and Kaplan (2010), von Rueden and Jaeggi (2016)
54 Goldberg (1993)
55 Van Vugt and Spisak (2008), Spisak and Dekker (2012)
56 Goldberg (1993, chapter 2)

2. The Theory of Regal and Kungic Cultures



21

extent by differences in the level of war or collective danger, according
to regality theory.
While women are rarely engaged in direct combat, they may
contribute to warfare by other means. The outcome of a war is important
for the entire group, women as well as men. We can therefore expect
women as well as men to support a strong leader when this is necessary
for success in war. Regality theory applies to women and men alike,
and we can expect everybody to desire a strong leader in times of war
or collective danger.

2.6. Cultural effects of regal and kungic tendencies
Studies have revealed many interesting differences between warlike and
peaceful cultures. Some of these differences are obvious, others are quite
surprising. Here we will discuss some of the cultural tendencies that are
characteristic of regal and kungic cultures, respectively, according to
regality theory.57
When most or all members of a society desire a strong leader, it
is hardly surprising that they tend to build a hierarchical political
system with a powerful leader at the top. We can also predict that
they will develop a strict system of discipline and punishment. These
developments may be due to psychological preferences, cultural
selection, or rational decision making, and most likely a combination
of all three.
Military success requires a strong morale and group spirit or fighting
spirit. Regal societies tend to develop a strong feeling of group identity
and a world view of friends versus enemies, while some of the most
kungic cultures do not even have a name for their own social group.
Likewise, regal societies tend to be quite xenophobic and intolerant of
all kinds of deviants, while kungic groups are very tolerant.
The ideology, philosophy, and religion of regal societies are typically
used as tools for strengthening the morale and group spirit. For example,
the ideology of a regal society may state that individuals exist for the
benefit of the society, while kungic societies tend to have the opposite
ideology, namely that the society exists for the benefit of the individuals.

57 Fog (1999, p. 101)

22

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

Political and religious leaders in regal societies often support each
other to strengthen their power if they are not in fact the same person.
Emperors often claim to have divine status. Religion is often used as
a means to discipline people, for example by threatening supernatural
punishment or promising rewards after death.58 The religious world of
supernatural beings typically reflects or emphasizes important aspects
of the social structure of the mundane world.59
Regal societies typically also have strict discipline in the area of
sexuality. Strict sexual morals may force young people to marry early
and have many children since alternative (non-reproductive) outlets
for their sexual drive are prohibited.60 The strict sexual morals do not,
however, prevent high-ranking men from having multiple wives or
concubines. Kungic societies typically have more permissive sexual
morals and lower birth rates.
A possible consequence of the regal ideology that individuals exist
for the benefit of the society is that the rate of suicide is low. People
do not have the right to take their own lives. This, of course, does not
preclude suicide for culturally prescribed reasons, such as shame or selfsacrifice in battle. We can expect kungic societies to have a higher rate
of the kind of suicide that Émile Durkheim has called ‘anomic suicide’.61
Interestingly, the differences between regal and kungic cultures in
social structure and worldview are also reflected in art, fiction, music,
architecture, and other forms of art. People tend to prefer psychological
congruence between the different aspects of their culture, and this also
applies to artistic taste. Various forms of art are efficient means for
communicating ideological values and cultural unity.62 Musical style,
in particular, has been observed to correlate with social structure,
lifestyle, personality, and political preferences.63 It cannot be ruled
out, though, that some of the observed correlations are due to cultural
diffusion.64

58 Watts et al. (2015), McNamara, Norenzayan and Henrich (2014)
59 Moor, Ultee and Need (2007)
60 Garcia and Kruger (2010), van Ussel (1970)
61 Durkheim (1897)
62 Sütterlin (1998)
63 Lomax (1968), Delsing, ter Bogt, Engels and Meeus (2008), North and Hargreaves
(2007), Zweigenhaft (2008)
64 Erickson (1976)

2. The Theory of Regal and Kungic Cultures



23

Regal cultures tend to produce pictorial art that is highly perfectionist
and embellished with endless repetition of meticulous ornamentation
and thus reflects the glory of gods or kings. Regal fiction often glorifies
gods or kings with clear distinctions between good and evil, friends
and enemies. The architecture of regal societies is often particularly
conspicuous: large and pompous palaces and religious buildings
with luxurious ornamentation and oversized gates that make visitors
feel humble (see figure 1). Regal music is also highly embellished and
sometimes pompous.

Figure 1. Example of regal architecture. Cologne Cathedral
(Kölner Dom). Built 1248–1880. Photo by Tobi 87, 2009.65
65 CC BY 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:K%C3%B6lner_Dom.jpg

24

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

The architecture, art, and music of kungic cultures is less rule-bound and
more individualistic, with appreciation of fantasy and innovativeness
and a broad range of themes (see figure 2).

Figure 2. Example of kungic architecture. Residential buildings, Bispebjerg
Bakke, Copenhagen. Built 2004–2007. Photo by Agner Fog, 2017.

There is a systematic asymmetry in the human cultural heritage. Regal
societies are sometimes quite intolerant of art that is not congruent with
their culture, and they may even destroy art from previous more kungic
periods. For example, the government in Nazi Germany systematically
destroyed what they called ‘degenerate art’66 and the Taliban in
Afghanistan destroyed the great Buddha statues in Bamiyan.67 Kungic
cultures (including our own modern culture) on the other hand, are very
tolerant and even admiring of foreign art and often go to great lengths
to preserve the magnificent art and architecture of previous more regal
times.
It appears that there was a similar difference between regal and
kungic art in prehistoric times. Kungic cultures have produced
smaller artifacts of perishable materials, while regal cultures have
typically produced large and impressive artifacts of durable materials
and perhaps destroyed any remaining artifacts of previous kungic
times. This effect most likely causes a systematic sampling bias in the
archaeological record.68
66 Goggin (1991)
67 Francioni and Lenzerini (2006)
68 Fog (2006)

2. The Theory of Regal and Kungic Cultures



25

The cultural characteristics that are typical for regal and kungic
societies are listed in table 1. It has been observed that societies can
reshape these characteristics, not only as a response to changing threats
of war but also as a response to other dangers that threaten the social
group as a whole, such as economic crisis, famine, natural disasters,69
and even imaginary dangers such as witches and devils.70 It is therefore
possible that the observed psychological response is a general mechanism
of adaptation to the level of danger that threatens the social group as a
whole, or perhaps even to any problem that requires collective effort
to solve.71 The effects of dangers to the individual may be different, as
discussed in chapter 3.3.
Regal societies
A hierarchical political system with a
strong leader
Strong feelings of national or tribal
identity
Strict discipline and punishment of
deviants
Xenophobia
The world is seen as full of dangers
and enemies
Belief that individuals exist for the
benefit of society
Strict religion
Strict sexual morals
High birth rate
Low parental investment, i.e. short
childhood and low education
Low suicide rate (except for culturally
prescribed reasons)
Art and music is perfectionist, highly
embellished, and follows specific
schemes

Kungic societies
A flat and egalitarian political system
High individualism
Lax discipline and high tolerance of
deviants
Tolerance of foreigners
The world is seen as peaceful and safe
with little or no distinction between
us and them
Belief that society exists for the
benefit of individuals
Religion has little or no disciplining
power
High sexual freedom
Low birth rate
Long childhood and education
High rate of anomic suicide
Art and music express individual
fantasy with appreciation of
individuality and innovativeness

Table 1. Regal and kungic cultural indicators.

69 Ember and Ember (1992), Kirch (1984)
70 Ben-Yehuda (1990, p. 123)
71 Fog (1999)

3. Contributions from Other
Theories

3.1. Influence of the environment: Contributions
from ecological theory
In ecology and niche theory, the competitive exclusion principle says that
complete competitors cannot coexist indefinitely.1 While this principle
has mostly been applied to the areas of ecology and economics, other
aspects of niche theory have been successfully applied to eco-cultural
specialization.2 We cannot expect two social groups in close proximity
to live in peace if they are adapted to the same environment and depend
on the same resources. The two competing groups may merge, separate,
differentiate, or fight. But they may not coexist indefinitely unless
something prevents them from fighting, such as geographic barriers,
technical difficulties, or third party intervention.
The competitive exclusion principle applies to humans as well as to
animals with territorial groups. It has been observed that chimpanzees
often attack and kill members of neighbor groups and gradually steal
their territory.3 The intensity of intergroup conflict among chimpanzees
increases with the population density and the number of males.4 The
1 Hardin (1960)
2 Banks et al. (2006), Maffi (2005)
3 Boesch (2010)
4 Wilson et al. (2014)
© 2017 Agner Fog, CC BY 4.0

https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0128.03

28

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

closely related species, the bonobo, is much more peaceful, although it
is very similar to the chimpanzee in other respects. The reason why the
chimpanzee is violent while the bonobo is peaceful may be that there
is a patchy distribution of food north of the Congo River, where the
chimpanzees live, but a more scattered distribution south of this river,
where the bonobos live. A concentration of food or other resources in
small patches leads to contest competition, where the strongest individuals
get the most. A more scattered distribution of food leads to scramble
competition, where the individual that finds a piece of food first will get
it. There is no reason to fight over access to food in an environment of
scramble competition.5
Chimpanzees and bonobos are our closest relatives among the
animals. Humans are equally closely related to both species because
the evolutionary split between chimpanzees and bonobos occurred
later than the split between humans and the great apes. This has led
many scientists to speculate whether human nature is violent like the
chimpanzee or peaceful like the bonobo.6
Anthropologists have turned to ethnographic and archaeological
evidence in order to find out whether warfare was common among early
humans, but the evidence is elusive. The few hunter-gatherer groups
that have survived long enough to be studied by anthropologists live in
marginal areas where the population density is too low for large-scale
warfare and where there are no defendable resources to fight over.7 The
victims of warfare among prehistoric nomadic hunters and gatherers
were unlikely to be buried, so archaeological traces of injured skeletons
may be hard to find.8
Some scientists have claimed that humans are peaceful by nature
and that the limited evidence of prehistoric violence can be explained as
small-scale feuds and raids.9 Others claim that lethal intergroup violence
has been common throughout the evolutionary history of humans.10

5 White (2013)
6 Wrangham (2012)
7 Gat (2006, p. 14)
8 LeBlanc (2014), Lahr et al. (2016)
9 Fry (2009), Ellingson (2001)
10 Keeley (1996), Guilaine and Zammit (2008), Allen and Jones (2014)

3. Contributions from Other Theories



29

Figure 3. Prehistoric cave painting showing warfare. Bhimbetka, India.
Photo by Nikhil2789, 2008.11

An increasing amount of evidence indicates that there might have been
violent intergroup fighting throughout human prehistory.12 A study of
nomadic Australian aborigines has found that the level of violence was
independent of the population density,13 while studies in many other
areas have found that the level of violence depends on ecological and
environmental factors such as the concentration and defendability of
resources.14 Mass killings took place mainly in sedentary cultures and
most markedly in connection with agriculture or otherwise defendable
resources.15 Recent archaeological findings show evidence of mass
killing among hunter-gatherers near a fertile lakeshore in the late
Pleistocene or early Holocene.16
11 CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Cave_Painting-_War_Bhi
mbetika_caves.jpg
12 Lahr (2016), Keeley (1996), Guilaine and Zammit (2008), Allen and Jones (2014), Gat
(2015)
13 Gat (2015)
14 Boone (1992), Thorpe (2003)
15 Boone (1992), Martin and Frayer (1997, p. 334)
16 Lahr (2016)

30

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

Nomadic hunter-gatherers would flee more often than fight, and
thus rarely die in a battlefield but more likely die from malnutrition
and diseases after fleeing to an inferior territory. Systematic studies
of nomadic hunter-gatherer groups show that intergroup violence is
common. A review of published examples of peaceful hunter-gatherer
groups finds that most of these cases can be explained by their isolation,
pacification, or being surrounded by cultures with a different ecology.
Typically, the peaceful hunter-gatherer groups were surrounded by
agricultural societies whom they would never attack.17 This confirms the
competitive exclusion principle: Hunter–gatherer groups surrounded
by other hunter-gatherers will fight, at least occasionally, while huntergatherer groups living in their own niche surrounded by groups with a
different means of subsistence can exist peacefully. While the peaceful
hunter-gatherer societies had little or no intergroup violence, they
had plenty of interpersonal violence.18 The distinction between groupinternal and external violence is important here.
We can now answer the long-debated question of whether humans
are violent or peaceful by nature: it depends on the environment. A
sedentary culture concentrated around defendable resources invites
conflict, while a nomadic lifestyle in an environment of sparse resources
leads to scramble competition rather than fighting. Regality theory
posits that humans have a flexible psychology that allows fast adaption
to a peaceful or warlike environment and culture.
It may be possible to roughly predict the degree of intergroup
conflict for a particular culture if we study the ecology, mode of
subsistence, available technology, and geography. We will expect
conflicts to be unlikely for a social group that has adapted to its own
specialized niche, but likely for a group that depends on the same niche
as a nearby neighbor group. Conflicts can be impeded if traveling is
difficult because of geographic barriers or if it is technically difficult to
collect and transport sufficient food and water for supporting a troop of
warriors.
If food is sparse, and consequently the population density is low,
then it will be difficult to assemble a sufficiently large group of warriors
to attack an enemy, the warriors will have a long way to travel, and it
17 Wrangham and Glowacki (2012)
18 Kelly (2000)

3. Contributions from Other Theories



31

will be difficult to supply enough food for them. Some people find it
counterintuitive that low food supply should lead to peace. However,
we have to distinguish between a low but stable food supply and a
fluctuating food supply. If the food supply is permanently low but
stable, then the population density will necessarily be low. Imagine a
landscape where food is sparsely distributed and people live in small
villages or camps far from each other. How would it be possible to
assemble enough warriors from allied neighbor groups to attack an
enemy, travel together to the distant enemy territory, and provide and
transport enough food and other necessities for the traveling troops?
The logistic problems simply make large-scale war impossible in the
absence of technological means for food preservation and transport.
In any case, there would be little reason for warfare among nomadic
peoples in sparsely populated areas, because they would have few
possessions worth plundering and territories would be too large to
defend.19
However, if food is plentiful or concentrated in rich and fertile
patches, then the population density will soon become high, geographical
distances between enemy groups are likely to be shorter, and it will
be easier to organize larger political groups. If, furthermore, the food
supply is fluctuating and unpredictable, then there will be occasional
periods of famine where contest competition prevails and people fight
over the insufficient supply of food. Anthropologists and archaeologists
have found evidence of higher levels of conflict connected with
settlements in fertile areas such as river valleys. Along with the higher
levels of conflict came also alliance formation, peacemaking efforts, and
exchange of prestige goods.20
In conclusion, we predict that the level of intergroup conflict will be
low in areas where food is sparse or where mountains, dense vegetation,
aridity, or other environmental factors make traveling difficult. On
the other hand, we can expect frequent wars where food production
is efficient and concentrated in defendable patches, and where there
are efficient means of traveling and food preservation. It has been
observed that efficient food production and food storage is connected

19 Roscoe (2014), Fry and Söderberg (2013)
20 Dye (2013)

32

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

with conformity,21 which we may interpret as a sign of regality. The
predictability of the food supply is also important. Unpredictable
famine and natural disasters are factors likely to cause war.22
The anthropologist Kirk Endicott has suggested that it might be
possible to predict whether a population is violent or peaceful based
on the environment. As an example, he describes the Moriori of the
Chatham Islands near New Zealand, who changed from violent to
peaceful after living a few hundred years in isolation.23 We will test the
feasibility of this kind of prediction in chapters 7 and 8.

3.2. Nature or nurture: Evolution of sociality
Collaboration between biologists, archaeologists, and anthropologists
has led to new insights into human social behavior. The modern human
species has evolved a large brain in parallel with a more complex social
organization. The brain size of our ancestors has tripled over a period
of two million years. It is generally believed that the increased brain
capacity has been necessary for dealing with more complex social
structures, for advanced language, and for developing culture.24
Culture is information that is transmitted from person to person
through teaching, observation, and imitation. Culture can evolve just
like genes evolve, but cultural evolution is much more efficient than
genetic evolution because it can involve goal-directed innovation and
intelligent problem-solving. New inventions can also be transmitted
from any person to any other person, unlike genes, which are transmitted
only from parent to child.25 While many animals are able to learn from
conspecifics, the human capacity for culture is far more complex than that
of any animal. The huge advantage that cultural evolution gives has
only been possible through the evolution of a large and efficient brain.26
Neuroscientists have found that specific regions of the human
brain are involved in various aspects of social behavior and cognition,
such as empathy, cooperation, identification with an arbitrary group,
21 Berry (1967)
22 Ember and Ember (1992)
23 Endicott (2013)
24 Dunbar, Gamble and Gowlett (2010)
25 Richerson and Boyd (2008, p. 60), Fog (1999, p. 52)
26 Richerson and Boyd (2008, p. 7)

3. Contributions from Other Theories



33

distinction between in-group and out-group, in-group favoritism,
group competition, and recognition of social status.27 A hormone
and neurotransmitter called oxytocin, which is involved in many
aspects of social behavior in animals and humans, has been found to
increase in-group favoritism in humans.28 These findings support the
theory that social organization, hierarchy, and intergroup conflict are
important factors that have influenced human evolution and shaped the
functioning of our brains. They also show that culture plays an important
role, because it is demonstrated that humans are able to identify easily
with an arbitrary group of people of mixed races.29
Several studies have confirmed that test persons show more
cooperation and in-group favoritism when given oxytocin.30
Interestingly, the effects of oxytocin are different for men and women.
The hormone increases the perception of competition in men and the
perception of kinship in women. This finding throws new light on the
male warrior hypothesis, according to which men are more adapted for
fighting and competition than women are.31
However, oxytocin is not unambiguously connected with regality,
because it does not increase punitiveness.32 It would be naive to think
that we can find a single biological signal for regality. What the new
findings of neuroscience tell us, however, is that behaviors that are
relevant for regality theory, such as group identification, ethnocentrism,
and intergroup conflict, can be influenced by biological signals without
the persons being conscious of any such influence. We can therefore reject
the theory that violent conflict is caused solely by culture and rational
decision-making.33 While biological processes have a strong influence on
social behavior, the opposite is also true. There is plenty of evidence that
social processes and cultural differences can influence the human brain
and hormonal processes.34 The role of culture in the shaping of regal
psychological reactions is further discussed in chapter 4.1.

27 Cikara and van Bavel (2014)
28 De Dreu et al. (2011)
29 Cikara and van Bavel (2014)
30 De Dreu (2012), Sheng et al. (2013), Stallen et al. (2012)
31 Fischer-Shofty, Levkovitz and Shamay-Tsoory (2013)
32 Krueger et al. (2013)
33 Durrant (2011)
34 Kim and Sasaki (2014)

34

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

3.3. Fertility: Contributions from life history theory
The regal versus kungic culture dimension has an interesting connection
with the r versus K strategy dimension in evolutionary ecology, which
applies to both animals and humans. An r-strategy means that individuals
start early to reproduce, have many children, and care little for each
child. A K-strategy means a high age at first reproduction, few children,
and a high investment in the care and upbringing of each child. The r
versus K strategy parameter (also called ‘fast’ versus ‘slow’ strategy) is
a simplification of a more complex set of parameters in biological life
history theory, but this simplification will be sufficient for the current
purpose.35
Humans have a typical K-strategy compared with most animals.36
This strategy is not completely fixed, however. Recent research
has shown that there is some room for individual differences and
adjustment to the environment. Several studies have found that humans
choose a more r-like strategy when they live in an environment where
the mortality and morbidity of adults is high. A more K-like strategy
is chosen where the mortality is low, where resources are predictable
and defendable, and where the population density is near the carrying
capacity of the environment.37 Economic factors and education also
influence the strategy.38
While the r versus K life history theory sees reproductive strategy
from the point of view of the individual, the regal versus kungic culture
theory is more concerned with a social-level perspective. The optimal
strategy from the perspective of the social group in times of war is
to produce many children and to raise them as quickly as possible to
become fierce warriors. In times of peace, the optimal strategy from
the group’s perspective is to produce few children in order to avoid
overexploitation of the environment and ecological collapse. Group
selection theory has not provided a satisfactory explanation of why
35 Stearns (1992, p. 207)
36 Mueller (1997)
37 Belsky, Schlomer and Ellis (2012), Ellis, Figueredo, Brumbach and Schlomer (2009),
Griskevicius, Delton, Robertson and Tybur (2011), Low (1990), McAllister, Pepper,
Virgo and Coall (2016)
38 Shenk (2009)

3. Contributions from Other Theories



35

reproduction is limited, but life history theory seems to provide at least
part of the explanation.
In times of war, mortality is high and individuals will choose an r-like
strategy. In times of peace and stability, we can expect the population
density to match the carrying capacity of the environment, and we can
expect to see a K-like strategy. The interesting observation is that there
is a fairly good agreement between the interests of the group according
to regality theory and the interests of the individual according to the
r/K life history theory. There is some degree of synergy between the
two mechanisms and we will expect a positive correlation between
the regal/kungic culture dimension and the r/K life history strategy
dimension. The names regal and kungic were in fact chosen to reflect
the resemblance with r/K life history theory, although the analogy
should not be taken too far.
There is one important difference between the predictions of the two
theories. Regality theory predicts that fertility will go up as a response to
collective danger that requires collective action, while the r/K life history
theory predicts that fertility will go up as a response to any danger,
including dangers that affect only the individual.
We will return to the connection between regality theory and r/K
theory in chapter 4.1.

3.4. Contributions from political demography
Political developments, including war and peace, depend on
demographic factors. Many momentous historical events are related
to the so-called demographic transition, which is illustrated in figure 4.
Throughout most of human history, the birth rate and death rate have
been almost equally high, so that the total population was constant or
growing only slowly. At a certain time in history, the death rate began
to decline due to improvements in sanitation, hygiene, medicine,
nutrition, and living conditions. The higher life expectancy gave parents
confidence that they did not need so many children, and after several
decades the birth rate began to decrease as well. In Europe, the birth rate
began to fall rapidly in the 1960s. In the 1990s, the birth rate had fallen
to the same level as the death rate, and population growth stagnated

36

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

in Europe.39 This pattern of demographic transition has since been
repeated in other parts of the world, including Asia and the Americas,
and we are now beginning to see a demographic transition in Africa as
well. We can see in figure 5 that the population size has reached a peak
in Europe and that the growth rate is tapering off in Asia, America, and
Oceania. The growth rate has hardly begun to decrease in Africa.40
The fact that the death rate begins to fall first while the birth rate
decreases only several decades later has the consequence that we see
a very rapid population growth in the intermediate period, where the
death rate is low and the birth rate is still high.41

Figure 4. Demographic transition. By Max Roser, 2016.42

The demographic transition can be interpreted as a shift in reproductive
strategy from r-strategy to K-strategy, relatively speaking, as explained
in chapter 3.3. It is necessary to have many children as long as the death
rate is high. As the death rate falls and improvements in living conditions
make it possible to feed more people, the population grows until the new
carrying capacity has been reached. Rapid population growth does not

39 Goldstone (2012)
40 Green (2012)
41 Goldstone (2012)
42 CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Demographic-Transition
OWID.png

3. Contributions from Other Theories



37

necessarily lead to violent conflicts,43 but the new situation with a larger
population and growing urbanization makes life more competitive.
The optimal strategy for parents in this new crowded environment is
to have fewer children and to invest more in the education of these few
children—in other words, a more K-like strategy. When these children
grow up, they have to spend their most fertile years competing for social
positions rather than raising large families.44

Figure 5. World population by year. Millions, logarithmic scale.
By Agner Fog, 2017. Data from UN.45
43 Urdal (2005)
44 Heinsohn (2003, p. 46)
45 United Nations Data Retrieval System. ‘World Population Prospects: The 2015
Revision’, http://data.un.org/

38

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

A period of rapid population growth leaves a cohort of people that
is much more numerous than the parent generation. The bulge in the
population pyramid that is seen when a large cohort reaches maturity
is called a youth bulge. The young people in a youth bulge are likely to
have problems finding a suitable social position. If tradition dictates that
the family inheritance goes to the oldest son, then the subsequent sons
are likely to feel superfluous and they will have to fight hard to get a
position that matches their expectations. This causes political instability.
Disinherited, jobless, unmarried young men are often willing to take
high risks in their attempts to find their place in life because they have
nothing to lose.46 Such youth bulges of frustrated young men have fueled
many violent conflicts in history. In fact, violent conflicts can hardly be
fought without a surplus of venturesome young men.47
The European population could not have colonized half the world
if they had not had a surplus of young men. In fact, most of the major
wars, conquests, and revolutions in European history happened after
periods of rapid population growth.48
When a large surplus of young people combined with economic
stagnation leads to underemployment and low wages, the likely
reaction is social discontent and cycles of rebellion and repression.49 This
can destabilize any political system. The frustrated young people will
always be able to find a political or religious ideology that can justify
their need to fight against a social system that has no place for them.50
This can lead to revolution and rebellion against a dictatorship, but it
can just as well lead to rebellion against a democratic system. Statistical
studies show that civil conflicts are much more likely to break out, and
democracies to become unstable, in times with large youth cohorts.51
The sharply declining fertility rate in the last stage of a demographic
transition provides a window of opportunity for economic development
called a demographic dividend. Savings increase as the number of people

46 Wilson and Daly (1985)
47 Goldstone (2012), Heinsohn (2003)
48 Heinsohn (2003, p. 72)
49 Urdal (2006), Cincotta and Doces (2012)
50 Heinsohn (2003, p. 40)
51 Cincotta and Leahy (2007), Cincotta and Doces (2012), Weber (2013)

3. Contributions from Other Theories



39

of working age increases and the number of dependents decreases. This
is likely to lead not only to economic prosperity but also to political
stability and democracy.52
We can conclude that a youth bulge can drive political changes in
any direction, depending on the conditions. Youth bulges have been
connected with ethnic conflicts53 and even large territorial conflicts such
as the two world wars,54 but also with rebellions that have their origin in
social and economic factors, such as the French Revolution, the Iranian
Revolution, and the Arab Spring.55 It appears that a surplus of fearless
young people is necessary for the regal process of building an empire as
well as for the kungic process of breaking it down.

3.5. World view and personality:
Authoritarianism theory
The psychological characteristics that we call regal have a striking
similarity with the phenomenon that social psychologists call
authoritarianism, and in fact many of the findings of the current study
could possibly be explained with the theory of authoritarianism.
Authoritarianism was originally regarded as a mainly fixed part
of a person’s personality that is formed in childhood.56 Later studies
contradict this and find that authoritarianism is influenced by threats,
danger, and uncertainty.57 Interestingly, it is found that threats to a
group that the person belongs to have stronger effect than threats to
the person as an individual, and that this increases group cohesion,
exactly as predicted by regality theory.58 However, the evidence is
somewhat mixed on the question of individual versus collective threat.
Some studies show no authoritarian effect on the test persons unless

52 Lechler (2015)
53 Esty et al. (1995), Goldstone et al. (2000)
54 Hvistendahl (2011)
55 LaGraffe (2012), Yair and Miodownik (2016), Apt (2014, chapter 3)
56 Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford (1950)
57 Van Hiel, Pandelaere, and Duriez (2004)
58 Jugert and Duckitt (2009), Feldman and Stenner (1997), Duckitt and Fisher (2003),
Hogg (1992, p. 35)

40

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

they are personally affected by the (collective) threat.59 There are also
disagreements among theorists about the role of predispositions and
the direction of causality.60
Given the importance of group threat and collective action, it is
peculiar that most studies regard authoritarianism as an individual
phenomenon and only a few studies treat it as a group phenomenon.61
There are many different theories about how authoritarianism is
generated. Some of these theories are in accordance with the predictions
of regality theory, others are not.
A newer version of authoritarianism theory distinguishes between
two measures called right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social
dominance orientation (SDO), each of which is connected with certain
characteristic world views.62 RWA is linked with the view of the world
as a dangerous place, and SDO is linked with the view of the world as a
competitive jungle where might is right. RWA leads to social conformity
and SDO leads to tough-mindedness, according to this theory, and both
lead to negative attitudes towards out-groups.63
RWA and SDO are often regarded as two different forms of
authoritarianism, where RWA represents authoritarian submission, while
SDO represents authoritarian dominance.64 Both lead to discrimination
against minorities but for different reasons. People with high RWA
discriminate because of fear, while people with high SDO discriminate
because this gives them a higher status than those they discriminate
against.65
The RWA theory is particularly relevant for regality theory because
the view of the world as a dangerous place in RWA theory can be
regarded as very similar to perceived collective danger in regality
theory. People with high RWA make society more hierarchical, while
people with high SDO use this hierarchy to their personal advantage.
59 Asbrock and Fritsche (2013)
60 Cohrs (2013)
61 Duckitt (1989), Stellmacher (2005)
62 Duckitt (2001), Perry (2013)
63 
Duckitt (2001), Sibley, Wilson and Duckitt (2007), Sibley and Duckitt (2008),
McFarland (2010)
64 Van Hiel, Pandelaere, and Duriez (2004), Altemeyer (1998)
65 Altemeyer (1998)

3. Contributions from Other Theories



41

Research in these theories has led to results that are in good agreement
with regality theory because they link social conformity, punitiveness,
and xenophobia to collective danger. Evidently, authoritarianism theory
and regality theory are two different paradigms looking at the same
phenomenon. However, many of the predictions of regality theory that
are tested in the present study would have been difficult to make from
authoritarianism theory because the latter has more focus on individual
psychology than on social and cultural structures.
The area of authoritarianism research is rich in experimental
studies.66 Many of these studies have found that authoritarian responses
can be elicited by quite small stimuli, such as making known threats
more salient or even by asking the test persons to imagine a particular
threatening scenario. The experimental methods that have been
developed in the area of authoritarianism research might be useful
for testing the effects of different kinds of threats in connection with
regality theory.
My main criticism of authoritarianism theory relates to its poor
theoretical foundation. Authoritarianism theory has its roots in
psychoanalytic theories, which are not falsifiable,67 though modern
versions such as RWA and SDO theories have little or no connection
to psychoanalysis. The theoretical model behind traditional
authoritarianism theory has limited empirical support, and the theory
has often been criticized for political bias.68 The term ‘right-wing
authoritarianism’ is ill chosen because of its inherent political bias, and
also because the concept of right-wing ideology makes sense only in a
certain cultural context. In fact, some studies have found the same kind
of authoritarianism among communists, who by definition must be
called left wing.69 One researcher even made the contradictory finding
that some persons who scored high on the right-wing authoritarianism
scale also scored high on a ‘left-wing authoritarianism’ scale.70

66 Duckitt (2013)
67 Popper (1963, p. 37)
68 Stellmacher and Petzel (2005), Sibley and Duckitt (2008), Eckhardt (1991), Ray, J.
(1989)
69 McFarland, Ageyev and Abalakina (1993)
70 Altemeyer (1998)

42

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

While many authoritarianism theorists regard certain political
ideologies as undesired psychological aberrations, regality theory sees
the same ideologies as adaptive responses to perceived collective danger
(or, at least, would-be adaptive in the environment of evolutionary
adaptation). The evolutionary theory is less likely to lead to biased and
ethnocentric thinking, and we should bear this in mind in our choice
of terminology. While authoritarianism theory certainly needs revision
and a change of terminology, it builds on a research tradition that has
produced many interesting experimental results that may be valuable
when reinterpreted in the light of regality theory.71

3.6. Contributions from other social
psychological theories
There are several other theories that resemble authoritarianism theory
but avoid some of the problems mentioned above.
The influential realistic group conflict theory finds that hostility
between groups is likely to occur when their goals conflict or when they
are competing for the same resources.72
Integrated threat theory finds that several different kinds of threat can
lead to hostility towards outgroups. Realistic group conflict is one of
them, symbolic threat is another. Symbolic threat occurs, for example,
when immigrants with different values, norms, and beliefs are perceived
to threaten one’s own culture. Some cases of prejudice are caused
mostly by realistic conflicts, while other cases are caused mostly by
symbolic conflicts. Other kinds of threats include negative stereotyping
and intergroup anxiety, which may be regarded as independent factors
in some models.73
The theory of group-based control restoration finds that people tend
to show in-group favoritism in times of social or personal crisis. The
proposed mechanism requires that the in-group is relevant to the
problem at hand and that the person feels a lack of personal control.74
71 Duckitt (2015)
72 Jackson (1993)
73 Riek, Mania and Gaertner (2006), González et al. (2008)
74 Fritsche, Jonas and Kessler (2011)

3. Contributions from Other Theories



43

This is in accordance with regality theory in predicting that people
want to strengthen their group when facing threats that they cannot
handle alone. An interesting question is whether the discrimination
against out-groups is directed specifically against a certain out-group
that is blamed for the threat, or whether there is a more unspecific
discrimination against any group of deviants. In fact, there is evidence
for both possibilities.75 For example, the fear of Islamic terrorists has led
to widespread hostility against Arabs and Muslims in general, but also to
more punitive attitudes towards perpetrators of totally unrelated crimes
such as car theft and rape, as well as to more authoritarian parenting.76
In the light of regality theory, we may see this as an indication that the
regal psychological response is only partially goal-directed towards
a specific danger. To some degree, the regal response seems to be an
unspecific reaction of strengthening the in-group against any type of
danger. A clear example of an unspecific response is homophobia.
Many studies have found a strong correlation between authoritarian
attitudes and hostility towards homosexuals, even though homosexuals
in general pose no threat to the authoritarian person.77
People who are uncertain about their social identity are likely to look
for a prototypical leader in order to define their identity, according to
the social identity theory of leadership.78 People with a high degree of selfuncertainty are more likely to join radical extremist groups, according to
uncertainty–identity theory. The essence of this theory is that uncertainty
about oneself and one’s identity motivates people to join groups with
high entitativity: clear boundaries, internal homogeneity, and possibly
a hierarchical structure and strong leadership.79 Most of the literature
is unclear about what kinds of uncertainties have this effect. All the
examples of uncertainty mentioned in the uncertainty–identity theory
literature are threatening uncertainties, such as economic problems,
ethnic conflicts, and natural disasters.80 A recent study focusing mainly
75 Greenaway, Louis, Hornsey and Jones (2014)
76 Fritsche, Jonas and Kessler (2011)
77 Basow and Johnson (2000)
78 Hogg, van Knippenberg, and Rast (2012)
79 Hogg (2014)
80 Hogg, Meehan, and Farquharson (2010), Hogg and Adelman (2013), Rast, Hogg,
and Giessner (2013), Schoel et al. (2011)

44

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

on economic problems finds that both individual and collective economic
problems have this effect, but the measure of individual uncertainty is
very coarse.81
This takes us back to the already well-known connection between
threat and authoritarianism. Uncertainty and threat are known to
be connected with political conservatism, according to the so-called
uncertainty–threat model.82 It appears that uncertainty and threat are
better at explaining conservative and authoritarian extremist groups
than anti-authoritarian extremist groups. Additional factors that have
been suggested to explain extremism in minority groups include
perceived injustice, group threat, perceived illegitimacy of authorities,
and a feeling of being disconnected from the majority of society.83
Terror management theory is based on the assumption that people
become anxious when thinking about their own future death. Anything
that reminds people of their own mortality will provoke a psychological
defense that emphasizes their social group and a world view which gives
meaning to life and death.84 Critics of this theory have found that the
same psychological reaction is seen when threats unrelated to mortality
are made salient. This supports an evolutionary explanation related to
group defense (in accordance with regality theory) rather than the terror
management theory.85 Another study finds that terrorism salience, but
not mortality salience, invokes a group defense response. This finding
supports system justification theory, but not terror management theory.86
A meta-analytical review of the evidence finds that mortality salience
has the same effect as other threats to the world view, but the effect
of mortality salience is delayed whereas the effect of other threats is
immediate.87
A recent theory about the connection between conflict and political
attitudes is the stress-based model of political extremism. This model is
based on studies of protracted conflicts such as the Israeli–Palestinian
conflict and the conflict in Northern Ireland. The studies find that
81 Kakkar and Sivanathan (2017)
82 Jost et al. (2007)
83 Doosje, Loseman and Bos (2013)
84 Greenberg and Arndt (2011)
85 Navarrete, Kurzban, Fessler and Kirkpatrick (2004)
86 Ullrich and Cohrs (2007)
87 Martens, Burke, Schimel and Faucher (2011)

3. Contributions from Other Theories



45

a population exposed to political violence will develop symptoms of
psychological distress. This distress leads to increased perceptions of
threat, which in turn lead to political extremism and lack of support
for political compromise.88 The distress and perception of threat is
particularly strong in cases of terrorism where random civilians are
victims. This explains why peace negotiations often fail in conflicts that
involve frequent episodes of terrorism.89 The research also finds that
the effect can be ameliorated by reassuring messages or aggravated by
alarming messages.90 The stress-based model contradicts the rationalist
view, held by many negotiators, that the conflicting parties will be more
motivated to accept negotiations and compromises when the violence
becomes intolerable. On the contrary, they will be less compromising
the worse the violence they experience.91 This model is not based on
evolutionary theory but on psychological theories of coping. Yet the
findings are in perfect agreement with regality theory: people become
more regal and uncompromising the more threatening they perceive
their situation to be.

3.7. Contributions from social values theories
A network of social scientists have created the World Values Survey,
which is a research project aimed at measuring people’s values and
beliefs around the world. Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel have
analyzed these data and found that most of the variance in cultural
values can be expressed by two factors:92
1. Traditional versus secular–rational values, reflecting the contrast
between the relatively religious and traditional values that
generally prevail in agrarian societies, and the relatively
secular, bureaucratic, and rational values that generally
prevail in urban, industrialized societies.

88 Canetti et al. (2013, 2015)
89 Canetti et al. (2015), Hirsch-Hoefler, Canetti, Rapaport and Hobfoll (2014)
90 Hirsch-Hoefler, Canetti, Rapaport and Hobfoll (2014), Canetti-Nisim, Halperin,
Sharvit and Hobfoll (2009)
91 Canetti et al. (2013)
92 Inglehart and Welzel (2005, p. 48), Inglehart (2007)

46

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

2. Survival versus self-expression values, reflecting an intergenerational shift from emphasis on economic and physical
security in the industrial society towards increasing emphasis
on self-expression and subjective well-being, and the focus on
rights above duties of a democratic, post-industrial society.
Figure 6 shows the average position of citizens in different countries
on these two dimensions in 2011 to 2012. The traditional values reflect
the importance of religion, deference to authority, traditional families,
moral standards, desire for a large number of children, and resistance
to abortion. The survival values reflect traditional gender roles, hard
work, confidence in government, and intolerance of deviants. Inglehart
and Welzel explain the traditional values on the first dimension by the
need for collective action in complex agrarian societies. The shift from
traditional to secular–rational values is connected with the change from
religious authorities to secular authorities that follows industrialization.
The survival values on the second dimension express the need for
physical security in terms of economy and health. The shift from survival
values to self-expression values reflect a relief from the immediate
threats of the industrial society to the higher economic security that
comes with a higher level of education and a modern welfare state. The
self-expression values also reflect an emancipation from authority and a
criticism of the risks of technology.93
Inglehart and Welzel’s study does not focus on war or bellicosity, but
on how people react to changing perceptions of existential security.94 As
existential security is essential in regality theory, we will expect both
factors to correlate with regality. The traditional versus secular–rational
values focus on how to deal with collective survival, while the second
dimension, survival versus self-expression values, has more focus
on individual threats. But the self-expression values also reflect an
emancipation from authority that we can relate to a kungic development.
Some studies described in the next chapter seem to support these
expected correlations with regality,95 but we should not draw wideranging conclusions because the studies are partially based on the
same data.
93 Inglehart and Welzel (2005, p. 48ff), Inglehart (2007)
94 Inglehart and Welzel (2005, p. 52)
95 See table 2

3. Contributions from Other Theories



47

A further study of religious values shows that the transition from
agrarian to industrial to postindustrial societies is followed by a decrease
in religiosity.96 This is explained by increasing security. Religion is more
important to people when they feel insecure. The study shows that basic
religious beliefs are not easily changed, but the importance of religion
in people’s lives is higher in societies with poverty, poor education,
poor health, and high population growth. For example, the importance
of religion is high in countries with high economic inequality such as
the USA, Ireland, and Italy. The data do not support other theories of
religiosity, such as secularization theory and religious market theory.
Interestingly, both individual threats and collective threats seem to
increase people’s need to seek comfort in their religion.97

Figure 6. Inglehart and Welzel’s Cultural Map (wave 6).
World Values Survey Database.98

96 Norris and Inglehart (2011, chapter 4)
97 Norris and Inglehart (2011, chapter 11)
98 Public domain, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp?CMSID=Findings

48

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

Another study found that religiosity increased after an earthquake
in New Zealand.99 Religiosity also increased after a financial crisis in
Indonesia in 1997,100 but not after a financial crisis in Europe in 2008.101
Regality theory may give a clue why the latter financial crisis did not
lead to increased religiosity. Regality is predicted to increase when a
crisis is blamed on external enemies or uncontrollable forces of nature,
but it is predicted to decrease when a crisis is blamed on one’s own
despotic leaders. The 2008 financial crisis was frequently blamed on
greedy bankers and corrupt or incompetent politicians rather than
on some nebulous external power or economic laws of nature. The
prediction from regality theory is that this should cause a revolt, and
indeed there were large protests in the streets in much of Southern
Europe as a reaction to this crisis.
Whether personal values reflect shared norms of the surrounding
society or just personal differences is a matter of debate. One study
finds that some personal values reflect social norms while other values
are less culture-bound.102 Chapter 3.8 will look at values at the cultural
level.

3.8. The theory of tight and loose cultures and
other culture theories
The distinction between tight and loose cultures is an old idea in
anthropology that has received renewed attention in the last decade.103
This theory is very similar to the theory of regal and kungic cultures,
but the two theories have in fact been developed independently
without any cross-fertilization. A tight culture is defined as a culture
with strong norms and low tolerance of deviance from these norms.
A loose culture has weak social norms and a high tolerance of deviant
behavior. The tightness of a culture is increased by ecological or
external threats such as high population density, resource scarcity,

99 Sibley and Bulbulia (2012)
100 Chen (2010)
101 Healy and Breen (2014)
102 Minkov, Blagoev and Hofstede (2012)
103 Gelfand et al. (2011), Uz (2015), Harrington and Gelfand (2014)

3. Contributions from Other Theories



49

disease, natural disasters, and external conflicts. These threats
lead to the development of strong norms for enhancing the social
coordination needed to effectively deal with such threats, according
to the theory. The tightness is also provided by and reflected in social
and political institutions such as the government, media, education
system, legal system, and religion. People adapt to the strength
of norms and intolerance of deviance by the psychology of selfregulation.104 The older definitions of tightness have more focus on
political organization,105 while later definitions focus more on norms
and deviance. Both sets of definitions are relevant to regality theory.
The tightness/looseness theory does not go into detail with
any mechanisms beyond a general functionalist explanation and
the assumption that cultural evolution somehow brings about the
necessary norms and institutions. There is agreement between regality
theory and tightness/looseness theory on the basic claim that collective
threats lead to strict norms and psychological restriction, but the two
theories disagree on the chain of causality. The basic model of regality
theory is:
Collective threats → Psychological adaptation ↔ Cultural norms

whereas tightness/looseness theory says:
Collective threats → Cultural norms ↔ Psychological adaptation

The available data cannot distinguish between these two models
because the direction of causality cannot be deduced from statistical
correlations.
Tightness/looseness theory focuses mainly on ecological threats,
while the threat of war plays only a minor role and bellicosity is not
among the psychological reactions mentioned by this theory. While
tightness and regality are very similar constructs, they are not the
same. It would be more appropriate to say that tightness is one of
several indicators of regality and in fact a very important indicator.
Virtually everything that can be predicted from tightness/looseness
theory can also be predicted from regality theory, while the opposite is
104 Gelfand et al. (2011)
105 Pelto (1968)

50

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

not true. We will now look at a number of statistical studies that have
been made to test tightness/looseness theory and compare them with
the predictions of regality theory.
In a pioneering study, Michele Gelfand et al. asked people in thirtythree countries how much they agreed with statements such as ‘People
in this country almost always comply with social norms’. This was not
a direct measurement of cultural tightness but rather a measurement
of perceived tightness. The results were correlated with a number of
social and cultural variables and the results are shown in table 3.106
Critics have pointed out that the perceived tightness may not be crossculturally comparable, because people may have different kinds of
norms in mind when answering the questions or they may be judging
by different standards or frames of reference.107 Later studies have
used more direct criteria to gauge cultural tightness, and this turns
out to give better correlations.
Psychologist Irem Uz has calculated three different measures
of cultural tightness for sixty-eight countries: (1) a domain-specific
index based on people’s tolerance for various morally debatable
behaviors, such as prostitution, abortion, divorce, euthanasia, and
suicide in the 2006 World Values Survey; (2) a domain-general index
based on people’s endorsement of 124 different sets of values and
behavioral practices in the World Values Survey. The index is based
not on the mean but on the standard deviation of the responses. A
high standard deviation of the responses is taken to indicate a high
diversity of opinions, while a low standard deviation indicates that
opinions comply with social norms; (3) a combination index based on
a factor analysis of values in the domains of work, family, and religion
in the World Values Survey.108 A strong correlation was found between
these three measures of cultural tightness, as shown in table 2. The
correlation with Gelfand’s perceived tightness was not statistically
significant, but all three measures of tightness correlated significantly

106 Gelfand et al. (2011)
107 Minkov, Blagoev and Hofstede (2012), Uz (2015), Heine, Lehman and Greenholtz
(2002)
108 Uz (2015)

3. Contributions from Other Theories



51

with the secular–rational values and the self-expression values
described in chapter 3.7. The measures of tightness showed highly
significant correlations with various measures of collective threat and
with various measures of tolerance.
A study by Jesse Harrington and Gelfand calculated an index of
cultural tightness of the fifty US states based on objective indicators
such as corporal punishment in schools, death penalty execution,
punishments for marijuana law violations, alcohol restrictions, same
sex civil unions, religiosity, and immigrant population. This index
showed high correlations with indicators of collective threat such as
natural disasters, health, and infant mortality, but not with population
density. The index also showed strong correlations with various
measures of law enforcement and attitudes toward regulation and
deviant behavior.109 The results are shown in table 4.
The findings of these three studies are in perfect agreement with
the predictions of regality theory indicated in tables 2, 3 and 4. The
indication > 0 means that a positive correlation is predicted. < 0 means
that a negative correlation is predicted. 0 means that no correlation
is predicted or that the prediction is ambiguous. The directions
of the correlations found in the tightness/looseness studies are in
agreement with the predictions of regality theory in all cases where
the correlations are statistically significant (p ≤ 0.05) as well as in most
cases where the correlations are not significant (p > 0.05). These results
are very interesting because they demonstrate the predictive power
of regality theory. The methodology used in these studies can be
adapted for future studies aimed specifically at testing the predictions
of regality theory.
Another study by Lazar Stankov, Jihyun Lee and Fons van de Vijver
found similar results for two factors that they called ‘conservatism
versus liberalism’ and ‘harshness versus softness’, but their study did
not investigate the influence of threats.110

109 Harrington and Gelfand (2014)
110 Stankov, Lee and van de Vijver (2014)

Variable

Historical threat
Current threat
Traditional/industrialized
Institutional repression
Subjective well-being
Feelings of freedom of choice
and control
Willingness to live near dissimilar others
Tolerance for personal-sexual
deviations
Tolerance for violation of legal
rules
Behavior inhibition
Inglehart and Welzel factors:
Secular-rational values
Self-expression values
Hofstede and Minkov factors:
Power distance
Collectivism
Masculinity
Uncertainty avoidance
Indulgence versus self-restraint
Stankov, Lee, and Vijver factors:
Conservatism versus liberalism
Harshness versus softness

Domain
specific
(1)
.636***
.520***
.549***
.626***
-.279*

Cultural tightness
Domain
Combination
general
(3)
(2)
.476***
.685***
.326***
.514***
.405***
.630***
.402***
.639***
-.196
-.376**

Expect from
regality
theory
>0
>0
>0
>0
<0

-.277

-.230

-.314*

<0

-.426***

-.383***

-.675***

<0

-.814***

-.502***

-.723***

<0

-.236

-.447***

-.219

<0

.406***

.369*

.590***

>0

-.577**
-.533**

-.302*
-.284*

-.448**
-.557**

<0
<0

.242
.411**
-.043
.003
-.263*

.038
.316*
-.141
-.171
-.303*

.332*
.417**
.028
-.061
-.382**

>0
>0
>0
>0
<0

.39
.20

.33
.41

.40
.46*

>0
>0

Table 2. Correlation of the three tightness measures of Uz with various
variables, compared with the predictions of regality theory.111 Levels of
significance: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. The signs of the coefficients
have been adjusted for clarity.

Variable
Percentage of population using left hand
Accuracy of clocks in major cities
Justifiability of morally relevant behavior
Unrestricted sociosexuality orientation
Alcohol consumption
Preferences of political systems that have a strong
leader or are ruled by the army

111 Uz (2015), Stankov, Lee and van de Vijver (2014)

-.61*
.60**
-.48**
-.44*
-.46**

Expect from
regality
theory
<0
>0
<0
<0
<0

.38*

>0

Perceived
tightness

Most important responsibility of government is to
maintain order of society
Agreement on ways of life need to be protected from
foreign influence
Would not want to have immigrants as neighbors
Percentage of population of international migrants (log)
Agreement on one’s culture is superior
Individualism
Power distance
Uncertainty avoidance
Masculinity index
Long-term orientation index
Harmony
Conservatism
Hierarchy
Mastery
Affective autonomy
Intellectual autonomy
Egalitarian commitment
Family collectivism
Institutional collectivism
Performance orientation
Power distance
Gender egalitarianism
Assertiveness
Uncertainty avoidance
Future orientation
Humane orientation
Loyalty versus utilitarian involvement
Traditional versus secular rational values
Self-expression values
Fate control
Spirituality
Reward for application
Cynicism
Flexibility
Vertical sources of guidance
Guidance from widespread beliefs
Guidance from unwritten rules
Guidance from specialists
Guidance from coworkers
Gross national product
Global growth competitiveness

.61**

>0

.57*

>0

.43*
-.32
.60**
-.47**
.42*
-.27
-.08
-.05
-.26
.43*
.47*
.18
-.23
-.28
-.41
.49**
.43*
.35
.32
-.35
-.29
.32
.47*
.30
.45*
-.11
-.13
.44*
.52**
.60**
.14
-.20
.40*
.54**
.18
-.18
-.16
.05
-.08

>0
?
>0
<0
>0
>0
>0
0
<0
>0
>0
0
<0
<0
<0
>0
>0
0
>0
<0
0
>0
0
0
>0
>0
<0
>0
>0
>0
>0
<0
>0
>0
>0
>0
<0
0
0

Table 3. Correlation of the perceived tightness measure of Gelfand112
with various variables, compared with the predictions of regality theory.
Levels of significance: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
112 Gelfand et al. (2011)

54

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

Variable
Natural disaster vulnerability
Food insecurity
Parasite stress index
Infant mortality rate
Environmental health: green index
Percentage of slave-owning families, 1860
Population density (log)
Law enforcement employees
Civil liberties
Attitude towards government control of media
Behavioral constraint index
Relativistic attitude to right and wrong
Attitude against immoral actions
Desire for strict law enforcement
Support for police use of force
Support for buying US products
Support for import restrictions
Interest in foreign cultures
Collectivism
Gender equality index
Discrimination charges per capita
Alcohol binge drinking
Illicit drug use
Murder rate
Burglary rate

Tightness
.84***
.46***
.55***
.76***
-.77***
.78***
.05
.29*
-.63***
.68***
.81***
-.38***
.52***
.49***
.65***
.78***
.51***
-.58***
.37**
-.77***
.61***
-.29*
-.52***
.19
.22

Expect from
regality theory
>0
>0
>0
>0
<0
>0
>0
>0
<0
>0
>0
<0
>0
>0
>0
>0
>0
<0
>0
<0
0
<0
<0
0
0

Table 4. Correlation of tightness of US states with various variables,113
compared with the predictions of regality theory. Levels of significance:
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Most studies of culture types refer to modern industrial cultures, but
a theory of Marc Howard Ross about cultures of conflict explicitly
refers to non-industrial societies.114 His hypothesis is that psychocultural dispositions for conflict and violence are formed through harsh
childhood socialization and male gender identity conflict, and the targets
for the aggressive tendencies can be either group-internal or groupexternal depending on structural factors, which he calls ‘cross-cutting
ties’. The correlation he finds between harsh childrearing practices and
violent conflict is actually in agreement with the findings of regality

113 Harrington and Gelfand (2014)
114 Ross (1993)

3. Contributions from Other Theories



55

theory, but there is disagreement about the direction of causality, which
cannot be determined from the available statistical data. The idea that
cross-cutting ties can mitigate conflicts is quite reasonable, but the
hypothesis that internal and external conflicts form equivalent targets
for an aggressive disposition is not in accordance with regality theory,
and Sigmund Freud’s drive-discharge theory of violence has often been
criticized.115
Theories of culture types have also been developed for organizational
culture. Geert Hofstede, Gert Jan Hofstede and Michael Minkov have
defined a number of dimensions based on studies of organizational
culture. The most important dimensions are:116
• Power distance. This is a measure of hierarchy and the degree
of inequality between leaders and followers or between
teachers and students.
• Collectivism versus individualism. This is a measure of the
degree to which people identify with their organization or
social network rather than rely on themselves and pursue
their individual self-interests.
• Masculinity versus femininity. The masculine values include
strength, competition, care for money and material things,
and prioritization of economic growth. The feminine values
include warm relationships, empathy, care for the weak, and
preservation of the environment.
• Uncertainty avoidance. This is a reflection of fear and stress.
Uncertainty avoidance includes conservatism, fear of change,
fear of ambiguity, repression of deviance, need for precise and
formal rules, nationalism, and xenophobia.
• Indulgence versus self-restraint. Indulgence includes personal
life control, optimism, happiness, leisure, and individual
freedom. Self-restraint includes moral discipline, order, and
pessimism.
• Long-term orientation. This is a focus on perseverance,
thrift, self-discipline, humility, learning, pragmatism, and
adaptiveness. The opposite is short-term orientation, which
115 Sipes (1975)
116 Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010)

56

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

includes a focus on quick results, pride, saving one’s face, and
respect for tradition.
These dimensions include many elements that relate to regality theory,
and we will expect the dimensions of power distance, collectivism,
masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance to be positively correlated
with regality, while indulgence should be negatively correlated with
regality. We can test these predictions by using cultural tightness as an
approximation for regality. The results in table 2 confirm the predicted
correlations for power distance, collectivism, and indulgence, while
there is no significant correlation for masculinity and uncertainty
avoidance. The basic principle of long-term orientation is not related
in any obvious way to regality, although both long-term and shortterm orientation have elements that are typical of regality, namely
self-discipline and respect for tradition, respectively. No significant
correlation is found for this dimension.
We have now seen that psychological preferences or values can be
described with many different measures or dimensions, and these can
be studied both at the individual level as described in chapter 3.7, and
at the collective level as described in this chapter. The regal-kungic
dimension seems to be involved in or to interfere with many of the
other dimensions that have been defined, both at the individual level
and at the collective level, and the effects are in good agreement with
the predictions of regality theory. More research is needed to figure out
which of the many proposed dimensions are most useful, how they
interact or overlap, and which factors they are influenced by. Regality
theory is useful here because it identifies a mechanism by which many
psychological preferences are influenced.

3.9. Contributions from human
empowerment theory
Christian Welzel has developed a new theory of human empowerment
based on the findings of the World Values Survey.117 Welzel’s theory
posits that, as humans get more resources and freedom of action, they
will give higher priority to principles of freedom and this will lead
117 Welzel (2013)

3. Contributions from Other Theories



57

to democracy and other civic institutions that guarantee individual
freedom. Welzel’s model can be summarized as follows:
Action resources → Emancipative values → Civic entitlements

The concept of action resources defines the resources necessary for
existential security, including material resources (equipment, tools,
and income), connection resources (networks of exchange and contact),
and intellectual resources (knowledge and skills). Under a shortage
of action resources, people will give priority to survival values, as
explained in chapter 3.7. When people have plenty of action resources
so that existential security is no longer a concern, they will give higher
priority to emancipative values. Welzel has replaced the factor named
‘self-expression values’ in the previous study with a very similar index
named ‘emancipative values’. The latter index is composed in a way
that puts more emphasis on theoretical relations and less on statistical
coherence (Cronbach’s α is lower). Emancipative values give people
the impetus to organize collective action against tyrannical overlords,
replace an authoritarian government with a more democratic rule, and
implement civic institutions that guarantee individual freedom. This
model explains the growing democratization in the world during the
last several centuries, according to Welzel’s theory.118
Welzel’s theory aligns neatly with regality theory, although it is seen
from the opposite perspective. Regality theory is based on the model:
Collective danger → Psychological preference for a strong leader →
Authoritarian political structure

Welzel’s theory is expressed in the opposite terms:
Existential security → Psychological preference for emancipative values
→ Democratic political structure

The two theories are not perfectly equivalent, though: Welzel does
little to explore the effects of danger, which is central to regality theory;
Welzel’s theory does not distinguish between individual and collective
danger; and war plays hardly any role in Welzel’s theory. Studying a
phenomenon from a different perspective is likely to lead to different

118 Welzel (2013)

58

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

discoveries, and Welzel’s theory throws new light on the processes
during peaceful development.
A very important outcome of Welzel’s study is that he finds evidence
for the direction of causality by means of statistical analysis of time
series over ten years or more. His analysis shows that the direction of
causality is as indicated by the arrows above, whereas there is much
less causal influence in the opposite direction. A similar study has not
yet been carried out for regality theory because it would require the
collection of large amounts of data over a prolonged period of time.
We may notice that democratic institutions come at the end of the
causal chain rather than the beginning. This explains why many political
attempts at forced democratization have failed. Political initiatives that
aim at spreading democracy should focus on existential security before
doing anything else.
The first link in Welzel’s model, existential security, depends
on external geographic factors. The most important factors can be
summarized in what Welzel calls the cool-water condition.119 This includes:
• A relatively cold climate, which makes work less physically
exhausting, reduces the danger of infectious diseases, and
reduces soil depletion.
• Permanently navigable waterways, which facilitate trade and
democratic market access.
• Continuous rainfall all year round. This makes irrigation
unnecessary so that farmers are autonomous and independent
of a centrally controlled irrigation system.
These conditions are found in particular in Western Europe and Japan.
Historically, farmers living under cool-water conditions had high
productivity, autonomy, and existential security. This made it rewarding
to switch from a strategy of maximizing fertility to a strategy of improving
skills (from an r-strategy to a K-strategy). This demographic transition
was a necessary condition for technological progress and economic
growth, according to unified growth theory.120 Artisans and urban markets
came into being. The workforce was small and its quality high. The high
119 Welzel (2013, p. 15)
120 Galor (2011)

3. Contributions from Other Theories



59

cost of labor was an incentive to search for technologies that save labor.
Technological advances and higher productivity contributed further to
existential security. Democratization and individual economic freedom
made it profitable to invest in technological inventions. This explains
why technological innovation was particularly strong in Western
Europe, according to Welzel.121
If we want to compare the predictions of Welzel’s theory of human
empowerment with regality theory, we have to take war into account.
Environmental factors that facilitate high productivity and easy transport
are also factors that facilitate war. According to regality theory, we will
expect to see wars, empires, and tyrannical kings in such an area rather
than human emancipation. An authoritarian rule is not conducive to
individual inventiveness, but the ruler may command the development
of a large and efficient infrastructure, including cities, roads, ships, and
harbors, which is a precondition for technological progress. Empires
wax and wane for reasons explained in chapters 4.1 and 4.2, and there
may be a window of opportunity for inventiveness and technological
progress when a government is too weak to confiscate the profits of
individual enterprise but not too weak to protect the private property
of inventors.122 Inventiveness and technological progress is also possible
in remote areas that are less regal or when war is prevented by factors
such as economic interdependence, alliances, or deterrence. It is no
coincidence that the industrial revolution started in England, which had
fewer enemies to fear than central Europe at the time. Technological
progress brought prosperity and democracy, in accordance with
Welzel’s theory.

3.10. Moral panics: Contributions from the
sociology of deviance
The human mind is notoriously bad at making rational decisions in the
face of uncertainty and low probabilities.123 Some people buy lottery
tickets even though the average losses are higher than the average

121 Welzel (2013)
122 Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, chapter 3)
123 Tversky and Kahneman (1992)

60

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

gains, and some people have an extreme fear of terrorism even though
the risks of dying in a traffic accident or from a lifestyle disease are
many thousand times higher. Sometimes we ignore serious risks, and
sometimes we overreact to even the smallest risks. Often, a certain
group of people are blamed for causing danger and they are labeled as
deviants, such as criminals or terrorists.
As already mentioned, the regal reaction to collective dangers
depends not on the objective risk but on the perceived risk. An
exaggerated perception of a minor or unlikely danger can have a strong
regalizing effect. A highly emotional and exaggerated collective fear
is called a ‘witch hunt’ or a ‘moral panic’. The fear is likely to lead to
strong reactions against a group of deviants who are seen as threatening
the social order.124
The longest witch hunt in history—and the one that gave the
phenomenon its name—took place in Europe around the period of
the Renaissance. The Catholic Church needed scapegoats in order to
consolidate its dwindling power, and the scapegoats were first heretics
and later witches. The witches were accused of worshipping the devil
and causing all kinds of evil. People who were accused of witchcraft were
tortured until they confessed, and they were forced to inform against
other witches so that the process could continue.125 The dangers that
the Church was fighting against may have been completely imaginary,
but the social effects of the witch hunts were real. The regal effect of the
witch hunts strengthened the authority of the Church and enabled it to
defend its power against the threat of secularization.
Invisible dangers are particularly effective in witch hunts and moral
panics because it is easier to exaggerate a danger when it cannot be seen
and its objective magnitude cannot easily be estimated. This is also the
case today. In modern society, the fears of many people have changed
from a concern about how to get food to a concern about technological
risks. Ulrich Beck calls this the ‘risk society’.126 Many risks are more
or less invisible, such as pollution, nuclear radiation, and genetically
modified foods. These risks—or rather the perception of these risks—
can be manipulated up or down to serve the interests of various actors.
124 Cohen (2011), Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009)
125 Ben-Yehuda (1980)
126 Beck (1992)

3. Contributions from Other Theories



61

Environmental protection organizations claim that the risks of pollution
are high, while the polluting industries claim that the risks are small.
This contest over defining the risks is also a power game where the
winner will gain more control of the situation.127
Governments and powerful elites often use witch hunts in order
to consolidate their power. Well-known modern examples include
McCarthyism, the ‘war on drugs’, and the ‘war on terror’.128 Take the
‘war on drugs’ in the United States as an example. Opinions are divided
over whether this campaign has actually reduced the consumption of
illegal drugs, but the intense focus on the dangers of drugs has fueled
a ‘tough on crime’ attitude. The pursuit of drug criminals has led to
many secondary crimes, such as economic crimes to pay for drugs,
gang violence, weapons proliferation, corruption, vigilantism, and
social deterioration. These secondary menaces have led to still more
punitive sentiments and erosion of the standards of justice.129 This selfamplifying process has driven the whole society in a more regal and
punitive direction, which is part of the explanation why the USA has the
highest incarceration rate in the world.
There is no clear distinction between a witch hunt and a moral panic.
The term ‘witch hunt’ is used mainly when the fear and persecution
of deviants is controlled by a powerful elite, while the term ‘moral
panic’ usually describes a more spontaneous collective fear generated
by gossip and mass media without any central control. An example
of a moral panic is the child abuse panic, which began in the USA
in the early 1980’s and spread to large parts of the world. This panic
was started by social workers, physicians, psychologists, and child
protection organizations. The initial focus was on physical abuse and
neglect of children,130 but the focus gradually changed to sexual abuse,
which was even more emotionally touching.131 While child abuse is
certainly a real problem, the reactions were highly emotional and many
innocent people have gone to jail because of overreactions and disregard

127 Altheide (2014, p. 118)
128 Schack (2009)
129 Duke and Gross (1994)
130 Nelson (1984)
131 Best (1990)

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Warlike and Peaceful Societies

for common standards of justice.132 This is typical of a moral panic. The
most characteristic symptoms of a moral panic include:
• There is a highly emotional collective reaction to a problem
that has hitherto been largely ignored. The issue itself has high
emotional appeal.
• Exaggerated claims are made about the incidence and effects
of the problem.
• A group of scapegoats is stigmatized as responsible for the
problem.
• The phenomenon is considered so dangerous that common
standards of evidence and due process are violated.
• The definition of the deviance is unclear and expanding. The
limit between normal and deviant shifts so that more and more
people or behaviors can be defined as deviant and dangerous.
• If any experts contradict the claims, they are accused of being
deviants themselves or allied with the deviants and therefore
persecuted. Soon, there is hardly anybody left who dares to
contradict the claims, and the new consensus allows even
stronger claims to be made.
• A group of often self-appointed experts appear who claim to
understand the problem and get resources to fight it.
The regal effect of a moral panic is obvious, but it is not always
obvious who benefits from it. The experts who are allowed to define
the problem and devise a strategy to fight it benefit in several ways.
They get money and resources; they gain prestige and respect for
their profession; and they gain power by being allowed to redefine
the norms for the society and ultimately change social structure and
laws in their own interest.133 The problem is sometimes fought with
means that have little connection with the problem.134 Often, there
is a competition between different professions over who ‘owns’
the issue, in other words, over which people are recognized as the
132 Eberle and Eberle (1986)
133 Ben-Yehuda (1990, p. 97), Foucault (1980, chapter 6)
134 Keen (2006, p. 98)

3. Contributions from Other Theories



63

experts allowed to define the problem.135 The ‘issue owners’ may
be priests, psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, police, legal
experts, economists, military figures, industry figures, grassroots
movements, politicians, etc. The social structure and power balance
of a society may change profoundly when the ownership of social
problems is transferred from one group of experts to another. Such
societal changes are not necessarily the result of a planned strategy
on the part of the persons involved, but a witch hunt or moral panic
provides a convenient perpetual source of enemies to keep the
hysteria going.136 Those who gain power and prestige from fighting
a social problem are indeed likely to keep promoting and expanding
the fight.
Moral panics are characterized by exaggerated claims and
exaggerated reactions. Many sociologists have discussed whether
it is possible to determine that a claim is exaggerated if we have no
objective standards to judge it by. Typically, we have to involve a
different branch of science that deals with the subject matter of the
problem. Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda have proposed a list
of simple criteria for judging exaggeration,137 and Michael Schetsche
has proposed an analytical framework that tries to separate the subject
matter of the problem from its social construction.138
Conflicts about the definition of a social problem occur all the
time, for example when environment protection organizations and
industry lobbyists disagree over how dangerous a certain technology
is. These conflicts rarely escalate into genuine moral panics with all
the symptoms listed above. The less intense conflicts have little or
no regalizing effect, but they are still important for defining social
boundaries.
The kinds of deviance that cause strong emotional reactions are
often of a religious or sexual nature.139 Attempts to suppress sexual
deviance are typically seen in connection with regal reactions. We
may speculate why. It is hard to find a rational reason why anybody

135 Gusfield (1989)
136 Schack (2009)
137 Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009, p. 101)
138 Schetsche (2000, p. 29)
139 Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009, p. 18)

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Warlike and Peaceful Societies

is concerned about, for example, homosexual activities carried out
in private. The following hypotheses are possible explanations why
concern over sexual deviance is so common:
• Controlling the sexual behavior of others may have important
consequences for biological fitness. It is possible that a
psychological tendency for controlling the sexual behavior
of others has been shaped in our prehistory by selection
mechanisms that are not yet fully understood.
• A social group under threat needs to produce many children. It
is therefore likely that the regal reaction includes an impulse to
suppress non-reproductive sexual behavior (see chapter 3.7).
• Elite members may control people by suppressing their
sexuality.140
• Stories about sexuality have pornographic value regardless
of whether the story is positive (about pleasure) or negative
(about danger). A discourse about sexual deviance may
be titillating because it appeals to the person’s hidden, and
perhaps repressed, desire to do the same.141
• Titillating stories are more likely to be retold. In other words,
they have memetic fitness.142
• The mass media have an economic interest in telling titillating
stories.143 This is further discussed in chapter 5.1.
• Stories about sexual deviance have political consequences and
may be promoted by groups with a certain agenda, such as
feminists or religious groups.144
More research is needed to find out which of these effects are most
important.

140 Foucault (1978)
141 Adams, Wright and Lohr (1996)
142 Brodie (1996, p. 103)
143 Greer (2012, chapter 5)
144 Plummer (1995, chapter 2)

4. Different Kinds of War in
Human History

4.1. The rise of empires: Contributions from
cultural selection theory
Regality is a self-amplifying phenomenon. Regal groups tend to grow
bigger by conquering the territory of neighboring more kungic groups
and become city states, kingdoms, and finally large empires. After a
long period of growth, the empire becomes unable to grow any further
and finally collapses. Reasons for the collapse are discussed in chapter
4.2. For now, we will concentrate on explaining the growth.

Figure 7. Charge of the Light Cavalry Brigade, 25th October 1854, under Major
General the Earl of Cardigan. Painting by William Simpson, 1855.1
1

Public domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:William_Simpson_-_Charge_
of_the_light_cavalry_brigade,_25th_Oct._1854,_under_Major_General_the_Earl_of_
Cardigan.jpg

© 2017 Agner Fog, CC BY 4.0

https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0128.04

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Warlike and Peaceful Societies

The growth of a regal society is a cultural process, and we may seek
explanations for this in the theory of cultural evolution and other
cultural theories (see chapter 3.2).
One widely known version of cultural evolution theory is memetics.
Cultural traits, called memes, are seen as heritable units analogous to
genes.2 Memetics can be explained by the example of a new food recipe.
People will share a recipe with their friends if they find the new dish
tasty. The friends will share it with other friends, and so on. The best
recipes will be the ones that are shared the most. Such recipes may
‘mutate’ or be combined with other recipes to produce new, even better
recipes.
A big problem with the theory of memetics is that it does not
always make sense to divide culture into discrete and inherited units
of information.3 Some theories avoid these problems by allowing
more fuzzy cultural phenomena without a single identifiable cultural
parent.4 Another variant includes the selection of quantitative traits. For
example, big companies often have a competitive advantage that allows
them to grow still bigger. This is an example of a selection process,
but the selected trait is quantitative rather than qualitative.5 The latter
theory has the main focus on the dynamic structure of the whole social
system rather than on individual actors. It is related to systems theory6
and to the mathematics of feedback systems.7
Positive feedback can make a system unstable, while negative
feedback can make a system approach equilibrium under certain
conditions. An example of negative feedback in a social system is the
economic law of supply and demand, which tends to drive a market
towards a stable equilibrium. Positive feedback in social systems is
often seen in the so-called Matthew effect: whoever has the most power
and money can use their influence to manipulate the system in such a
way as to allow themselves to gain still more power and money.8 This

2 Tyler (2011)
3 Richerson and Boyd (2008), Edmonds (2005)
4 Sperber (1996, chapter 5)
5 Fog (1999, p. 64)
6 Laszlo and Laszlo (1997), Luhmann (1995)
7 Richardson, G. (1991)
8 Rigney (2010), Pierson (2015)

4. Different Kinds of War in Human History



67

phenomenon is often seen in weak democracies where the president
makes new laws that give more power to himself.
Both versions of cultural selection theory can explain some important
aspects of the growth of regal societies. If a group of people invents
a more efficient method for food production—for example, a form
of agriculture—then they can produce more food per unit area. This
allows them to feed more children and increase the population density.
A bigger population can make a bigger army, and this enables them to
win wars and incorporate neighbor groups under their rule. The new
food production technology is now adopted by the newly assimilated
population. This allows the population to grow still bigger and make still
bigger armies, and so on. There is plenty of evidence that the growth of
large civilizations and empires through history has been connected with
the spread of agriculture.9 Efficient weapons technology and transport
technology may have been spread by a similar mechanism: the groups
with the strongest weapons and highest mobility have been likely to win
wars over other groups with inferior weapons. DNA studies show that
the most prolific male lineages originate from areas with agriculture or
pastoralism and domesticated horses.10
As the groups grow bigger and stronger, they also become more
warlike in accordance with regality theory. A large-scale war with
firearms is probably much more deadly than anything our ancestors
saw in the evolutionary prehistory that shaped the regal response
pattern. We can regard such a war as a supernormal stimulus leading
to an extremely regal response. This allowed populations to accept
the very hierarchical political structure and tyrannical leaders of the
historical empires.
Certain religious memes may have spread in a similar way.
A systematic study of Austronesian cultures shows that beliefs in
supernatural punishment precede the evolution of larger, more complex,
societies. People who believe that they are somehow punished for
clandestine misdeeds or rewarded for bravery are more likely to obey their
government and social norms, thereby making their society stronger.11

9 Eckhardt (1992, p. 178)
10 Balaresque et al. (2015)
11 Watts et al. (2015)

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Warlike and Peaceful Societies

We can conclude that the growth of warlike societies and empires in
history has involved the selection of qualitative cultural traits, such as
agricultural technology, weapons technology, and religious beliefs, as
well as quantitative parameters, such as food production, population
size, and territory size. These factors have all supported and amplified
each other in a positive feedback process.12 A systematic study of
civilizations through history shows a strong correlation between
agriculture, territorial expansion, weapons technology, political
centralization, social and economic inequality, slavery, strict discipline,
authoritarianism, and warlikeness.13
A recent DNA study shows evidence of an extreme variance in male
reproductive success around 5,000 to 7,000 years ago. In other words,
a few men had many children and many men had none, while no such
variance was seen for women. This is evidence of a wave of extreme
polygamy, occurring first in Asia and the near East and later in Europe
and Africa. This observation is explained by cultural factors connected to
the spread of agriculture.14 It is likely that agriculture and other cultural
innovations allowed kings and emperors to rule over larger numbers
of people and to have more wives. Cultural and religious norms later
limited the amount of polygamy.
It has been proposed that the distinction between r—and K-strategies
in biological evolution (see chapter 3.3) can be applied somewhat
analogously to cultural selection, though the analogy is far from
perfect. A selfish meme—or rather a selfish complex of memes—can
use different strategies for utilizing the resources of its hosts (that is,
the persons holding the memes) to produce either a great quantity or
a high quality of cultural offspring. A cultural r-strategy is a strategy
where the meme complex makes its hosts spend a lot of resources on
propagating their culture and beliefs to others. This is seen, for example,
where a warring group impose their culture on the people they conquer,
and also where a religious sect spends a lot of resources on winning
new converts or competing with other religious groups. The opposite
is a cultural k-strategy (written with a small k), which allocates few
resources to winning new hosts and more resources to making its hosts
12 Gat (2006, chapter 12)
13 Eckhardt (1992)
14 Karmin et al. (2015)

4. Different Kinds of War in Human History



69

satisfied so that they will not choose competing memes. This is typically
seen in times of peace, when ideals of individual freedom become more
popular than ideals of patriotism and unity.15
This theory predicts that the cultural r-strategy will be most efficient
in times of intergroup conflict, while the cultural k-strategy will be
most efficient where there is no culturally different neighbor group to
compete with. Interestingly, the predictions of this cultural r/k theory
are so similar to the predictions of the theory of a psychological desire
for a strong leader in times of intergroup conflict that any of these two
theories would provide a logical explanation for the same cultural
effects. It can be argued that psychological responses to intergroup
conflict are likely to be much faster than cultural r/k selection and
therefore more effective, but the cultural r/k mechanism probably has
at least some effect as well. For now, it is assumed that there is synergy
between the two mechanisms, perhaps as the result of some kind of
gene/culture coevolution16 and we will use the terms regal and kungic,
regardless of which of the two mechanisms is implied.

4.2. The fall of empires: Contributions from
historical dynamics theory
Ethnic groups that are incorporated one by one into an empire as
it grows often preserve some of their culture, ethnicity, religion, and
language. Empires that are created in this way have an inhomogeneous
population. It requires a great deal of power and discipline to prevent
internal conflicts and to keep such an empire together. In terms of
regality theory, an empire must be regal in order to stay together. The
regality is built up and maintained mostly through territorial wars at
the borders. We can predict that an empire will fall apart and split into
smaller ethnic groups when it becomes unable to expand further and
unable to make wars with its neighbors, and therefore unable to maintain
the high regality. This can happen when the empire has become so big
that communication between the center and the warzone at the border

15 Fog (1997)
16 Lumsden and Wilson (1981)

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Warlike and Peaceful Societies

is difficult. Inhabitants at the center lose interest in what happens at the
faraway border and lose the will to defend their country.17
Peter Turchin has given a very similar explanation of the rise and
fall of empires based on the theory he calls historical dynamics.18
Turchin explains the rise of empires by the historical observation that
group solidarity, loyalty, and military strength grow in a conflict zone
between culturally different peoples, such as a frontier between farmers
and nomadic pastoralists. Such a conflict zone can form the nucleus of
a growing empire. Turchin uses the word asabiya, borrowed from the
fourteenth century Arab historian Ibn Khaldun, to denote these forces
of social cohesion. The cohesive force, or asabiya, decreases when the
borders are far removed from the political center and the state or empire
stops growing due to logistic problems, internal competition, and
economic collapse.
The main weakness of Turchin’s theory is that his concept of asabiya
is poorly defined and it is not very clear how it is generated. Obviously,
it is very similar to the concept of regality in the theory of the present
book. Regality theory offers the causal link that is missing in Turchin’s
historical dynamics. Turchin’s explanation of the rise and fall of empires
has so much in common with the explanation based on regality theory
that a synthesis of the two theories seems natural.
Turchin has made a comprehensive study of empires through
history and found several typical factors that are involved in the
disintegration of empires.19 The economy becomes unstable when the
territorial expansion stops while the population keeps growing. The
overpopulation and shortage of land in an agrarian economy leads
to increases in the prices of land and food while the price of labor
decreases. Impoverished farmers are forced to sell their land and go
into unpayable debt. Elite landowners profit from this situation as they
become able to extract more surplus from the peasants. The elite not
only become richer at the expense of everybody else, they also become
more numerous. The luxurious lifestyle of the growing elite is paid for
through heavy taxation or debt.20 There is growing inequality, not only
17 Fog (1999, p. 111)
18 Turchin (2006), Turchin and Gavrilets (2009)
19 Turchin and Nefedov (2009, chapter 10)
20 Gat (2006, p. 371)

4. Different Kinds of War in Human History



71

between the elite and commoners, but also within the elite, where strong
competition for the most attractive positions leads to conflict.
The starving population makes uprisings and food riots against the
extravagant elite. The elite is split between competing factions, some
of which may form alliances with the rebellious commoners and start
a revolution or civil war. Suppressing the rebellion is so expensive
that the government, which is already spending most of its surplus on
external wars, goes into debt and starts to lose control. Banditry spreads,
and farmland far from the cities is abandoned because it can no longer
be protected against raids. The economy collapses and the state goes
bankrupt. The weakened state becomes unable to defend its borders
and is attacked, perhaps by nomadic pastoralists, perhaps by another
growing empire.
This kind of downturn is sometimes ended by dramatic events
such as a major war or pestilence. The increasing poverty, famine, and
urbanization make breeding ground for disease epidemics, and such
epidemics have wiped out large parts of the population several times
through history. The survivors inherit the property of deceased family
members, and a new cycle of prosperity and growth begins. An empire
may go through several such cycles of growth and decline before it
completely disintegrates. Each cycle may take one or more centuries.
Combining regality theory with cultural selection theory and
historical dynamics, we may summarize the main factors leading to the
rise and fall of empires. The growth of an empire can be explained by
a positive feedback process involving war, growing regality, increasing
food production, population growth, improved weapons technology,
military strength, and expanding territory. The decline may involve the
following factors:
• loss of regality when the empire has reached the limits to its
growth
• overpopulation, poverty, and famine
• a growing elite, growing inequality, and conflicts between
elite and commoners as well as between different factions
within the elite
• collapse of the economy and weakening of the state.

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Warlike and Peaceful Societies

4.3. General theories of war and peace
Studies of conflict and peace have produced many different theories of
the causes of war. This chapter will review some of the most influential
theories.
Political realism theory is based on the premise that the international
system is anarchic. The international situation is determined by the
distribution of power, where the stronger states are able to conquer
territory from weaker states.
Every state needs to have a military power or build alliances in order
to protect itself against attacks. A state that sees its neighbor increase
its military power is often unable to know whether the intentions are
offensive or defensive, so it must increase its own military power to at
least the same level in order to assure its security. Such an arms race can
leave both states in a less secure situation than before. This paradox is
known as the security dilemma. Deterrence does not always work, and a
war may result if one of the states launches a preemptive strike in order
to remove the perceived threat from its neighbor.21 The probability
of war is increased when there is a change in the power balance, for
example caused by an economic crisis or a revolution.22 The same states
often wage war against each other repeatedly in enduring rivalries.23
The steps to war model describes the process of conflict escalation
that may lead to war. The first step is a disagreement over some issue
such as a disputed territory. Both parties in the conflict may use various
strategies, such as coercive threats, military build-ups, and forming
alliances. Each step in this conflict spiral increases the probability of
war. Leaders who plan for war are likely to build up military power,
mobilize nationalism, and reduce democratic rights before initiating a
war. The observed nationalism, etc. is thus not the ultimate cause of the
war but part of the steps to war.24
The bargaining theory assumes that it is possible in most cases to
negotiate a peaceful settlement that is less costly to both parties than

21 Gat (2006, p. 97), Levy and Thompson (2010, p. 30), Cashman (2013, chapter 7)
22 Cashman (2013, chapter 11)
23 Levy and Thompson (2010, p. 56)
24 Levy and Thompson (2010, p. 60)

4. Different Kinds of War in Human History



73

a violent war. The conflict will only escalate into war if some factor
prevents the parties from reaching a negotiated settlement. Such factors
can include inaccurate information about the opponent’s strength, lack
of trust that the opponent is truly committed to accepting the negotiated
agreement, or inability to reach a compromise over an indivisible issue.25
The theory of liberal peace argues that democratic structures,
free international trade, and international institutions can promote
cooperation, mitigate the effects of international anarchy, and prevent
war.26 Democracies are widely believed to be inherently more peaceful
than non-democratic states. Democratic states almost never attack other
democratic states, but peace researchers cannot agree why. Every theory
of democratic peace has been met with counterarguments or contradicting
examples, and statistical studies fail to confirm that democracies are
less likely to wage war than autocracies.27 Azar Gat argues that it is not
democracy itself that leads to peace but other aspects of modernization
that are typically seen in democratic states, such as economic prosperity,
welfare, absence of hard work, non-violent domestic culture, sexual
liberation, and lower population growth.28
Historically, peace has almost always come before democracy.
Recent studies have found that states do not develop democracy until
after all border disputes have been settled. In other words, there is
strong evidence that peace causes democracy but little evidence that
democracy causes peace.29 Regality theory can easily explain this
observation. Contested borders or other external threats to a state will
activate regal reactions in the population, who will be likely to support
a strong, autocratic leader. Peace and collective security, on the other
hand, will make the population prefer democracy.
Politicians are well aware that the population shows more support for
their government in cases of war or national insecurity. The diversionary
war hypothesis supposes that state leaders sometimes take advantage
of this effect and wage war in order to divert attention from internal

25 Levy and Thompson (2010, p. 63)
26 Levy and Thompson (2010, p. 70)
27 Cashman (2013, chapter 5)
28 Gat (2017, chapter 6)
29 Owsiak (2013), Gibler and Owsiak (2017)

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Warlike and Peaceful Societies

problems and to make their population rally around the flag and support
their leader. This is not a general cause of war, but it appears that leaders
in some cases have escalated a threatening situation in order to rally
support for themselves.30 This phenomenon, which obviously relates to
regality, is further discussed in chapter 6.3.
The interests of leaders and external actors are often decisive for the
onset of conflicts. The instrumental model of conflict assumes that leaders
manipulate their populations by emphasizing and amplifying public
perceptions of ethnic or religious differences in order to rally support
for a fight that mainly serves the interests of the leaders.31
Many wars are fought mainly for economic reasons. The liberal
economic theories of war assume that state leaders want to maximize
economic utility for their country. They will start a war only if the
expected gains exceed the expected costs. A high level of international
trade will make war unprofitable because the costs of disrupting
the trade will be too high. Thus, this theory predicts that economic
interdependence between countries will deter war.32
A different line of thought, called the economic realist theory, makes the
opposite prediction. A high dependence on international trade makes a
state vulnerable. State leaders are concerned that their access to export
markets and foreign investments might be reduced by adversaries and
that crucial imported goods, such as oil and other raw materials, could
be cut off. They want to reduce their vulnerability and to control what
they depend on. This will increase the probability of militarized conflict
as states that depend on external raw materials will scramble to secure
access to these raw materials and try to control or colonize countries
that can supply these raw materials.33
The international relations researcher Dale Copeland has developed
these theories further. His trade expectations theory confirms that
economic interdependence between states can either increase or
decrease the probability of war, depending on their economic prospects.
Great powers need a strong and growing economy in order to sustain
30 Cashman (2013, chapter 6)
31 DeRouen (2014, chapter 4), McCauley and Posner (2017)
32 Cashman (2013, chapter 5), Copeland (2015, chapter 1)
33 Copeland (2015, chapter 2)

4. Different Kinds of War in Human History



75

their positions in the international system. This requires a high level of
trade. They need to buy many different raw materials and they need to
sell products to many different countries. This makes them vulnerable
to cutoff of markets and investments or supplies of raw materials. Their
rivals may explore this vulnerability in coercive diplomacy.
Great powers are primarily driven by a desire to maximize their
economic security and not by other goals such as welfare maximization,
social cohesion, glory, or the spread of their ideologies, according to
Copeland’s research. Their foreign policy is driven mainly by the desire
to reduce economic vulnerabilities and secure access to critical raw
materials and markets. They may use military means to secure their
access to vital raw materials, such as oil or minerals, if they see a risk
that this access may be cut off in the future.
Copeland found that regime type and other domestic factors
have much less influence than previously thought for the decision of
great powers to make war or maintain peace. By studying the actual
decision-making processes of various governments, he found that trade
expectations often drove the patterns of peace and conflict even in
cases that, on the surface, appeared to be about something else, such as
ideology or religion. The conflicts over capitalism versus communism,
or one religion versus another, may just be psychological rallying foci
that hide more important underlying economic motives.34
Copeland also found that the economic security dilemma was just
as dangerous as the military security dilemma. Attempts to improve
the economic security of one state will decrease the economic security
of its rivals, who are likely to respond with similar countermeasures.
State leaders are aware of this danger of escalation. They need to signal
their commitment to trade agreements in order to avoid escalation of
economic conflicts.
The theories mentioned here are mostly concerned with
‘conventional’ wars between two sovereign states. This kind of
symmetrical war has become rare since World War II. Instead, we are
now seeing insurgencies, asymmetric wars, proxy wars, and other kinds
of conflicts. This is explained in chapter 4.4.

34 Copeland (2015, chapter 8)

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Warlike and Peaceful Societies

4.4. Changing patterns of war
There have always been violent conflicts between humans, but patterns
of war have changed throughout history. Prehistoric hunters, gatherers,
and nomads fought over territory, domestic animals, and other material
possessions—and over women as well. The level of conflict was
determined mainly by geographic and environmental factors. This will
be explained further in chapter 7.
The introduction of agriculture and the settlement into cities led
to larger concentrations of people and a more centralized political
organization. The cities and agricultural fields had to be protected, and it
became possible to assemble larger armies of warriors. Horses, wheeled
vehicles, and large boats made it possible to transport the armies to
distant battlefields where they could conquer more territory. The
growing territories and growing wealth made it possible to assemble
still larger armies and conquer still more territory. Improvements in
weapons technology, transport, communication, and food storage
contributed to this process. Cities grew into states, kingdoms, and finally
large empires by means of this self-amplifying process. An ever more
regal political organization was necessary for keeping large numbers of
troops disciplined and keeping the empire together. An empire could
continue growing until problems of transport, communication, logistics,
and economics prevented further growth. The stagnation of growth
started a kungic development and the empire began to disintegrate,
until a new empire started to grow from a new center. The cyclic process
of rise and fall of empires continued for thousands of years, as explained
in chapters 4.1 and 4.2. The type and intensity of warfare in large parts
of the world was ultimately determined by this dynamic process of the
growth and collapse of empires.
Throughout history we have seen different kinds of political units that
strived to expand their territories, such as dynasties, city states, nation
states, and superpowers. Likewise, we have seen different motives or
justifications for the expansive urge, such as prestige, religion, ideology,
or alliances.35

35 Luard (1986, p. 133)

4. Different Kinds of War in Human History



77

The end of World War II was a turning point in the history of warfare.
Large-scale interstate wars became rare, while intrastate (civil) wars
became more frequent. This development is shown in figure 8.
There are several reasons for this sharp decline in the frequency and
scale of interstate wars. The improvement in weapons technology is a
major factor in this development. The ever more advanced weapons
and defense systems also became extremely expensive. The arms race
was a large economic burden for even the biggest superpowers. The
destructive capacity of the new nuclear weapons and other advanced
weapons grew to alarming heights. The prospect of another large
interstate war had become so frightening that it could deter any potential
aggressor. Not only would such a war be so expensive that it would ruin
the economy of both parties, it would also destroy large parts of the
infrastructure and kill large numbers of people, not only in the attacked
state, but in the aggressor state as well.36

Figure 8. Historical development in different types of conflicts since World
War II. Data from Uppsala Conflict Data Program. By Agner Fog, 2017.37

36 Mumford (2013, p. 2)
37 
Data from Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2017), Pettersson and Wallensteen
(2015)

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Warlike and Peaceful Societies

The decline in interstate wars is also driven by the modern lifestyle,
welfare, urbanization, lower population growth, non-violent attitudes,
democracy, and other aspects of development.38 Increasingly globalized
trade has made most countries so dependent on both import and
export that they cannot bear the disruptive effects of large wars on their
trade and industry. The development of international law is also an
important factor. The norms against war of aggression, promoted by the
United Nations and other international organizations, will damage the
reputation of any violator.39 The Gulf War of 1990–1991 following Iraq’s
invasion of Kuwait was a crucial signal to potential aggressors that the
international community will punish territorial aggression.40
While analysts have no problem describing the decline of international
wars, there is more uncertainty when it comes to describing the kinds
of conflicts that have replaced them. The new kinds of conflicts have
variously been called irregular warfare, unconventional warfare, lowintensity warfare, fourth-generation warfare, asymmetric wars, new
wars, and various other designations.41
The conventional theories of war developed over centuries are based
on the perception of war as a symmetric conflict between two or more
sovereign states, each with central control and a monopoly of force.
Battles traditionally had clear beginnings and endings, clearly located
battlefields where uniformed soldiers fought against each other, and
clear winners and losers.
The new kinds of conflicts are very different. Violent conflicts are now
often fought by decentralized insurgent groups or by guerillas against a
state power. The insurgents may have a diffuse organization with many
autonomous or semi-independent subgroups. The distinction between
combatants and civilians is often blurred. The guerillas mostly use light
or relatively cheap weapons. This kind of conflict has more similarities
with the old forms of warfare that were common before the strong
nation states were formed than with the kind of interstate war that we
now call conventional warfare. In fact, insurgence and guerilla warfare

38 Gat (2017, chapter 6)
39 Münkler (2005)
40 Snow (2015, p. 203)
41 St. Marie and Naghshpour (2011), Rid and Hecker (2009), Münkler (2005), Hughes
(2012)

4. Different Kinds of War in Human History



79

is more common in weak states that lack a strong central government
and a strong centralized military power. Some historians regard this
as a return to old forms of warfare, while the modern kind of warfare
based on heavy weapons has become too costly in terms of both money,
casualties, and destruction of infrastructure.42
But modern conflicts are not only fought with old-fashioned guns. On
the contrary, sophisticated methods, such as cyberattacks, propaganda,
public relations smears, and economic undermining have become
increasingly important in both local and global contests of power. The
distinctions between civilians and combatants, between permissible
and off-limits targets, and between economic and military targets seem
to vanish when conventional warfare is replaced by such new tactics.
These power games have been characterized as low-intensity conflicts
because they never mobilize sufficient amounts of military power to win
territory. Instead, we have seen prolonged conflicts that ebb and flow
without ever reaching a definite resolution. The political and economic
costs of increasing the level of conflict to the point where a clear victory
is possible are simply too high.43
Insurgents and guerillas rely on many different sources of finance
to sustain their operations. Robbery, plundering, and extortion are
frequent sources of finance. Production and trade of psychotropic
drugs is a very profitable source of finance for many insurgent groups.
Other groups rely on the extraction of oil, minerals, and other natural
resources. Even though involvement with organized crime initially
seems unattractive for many insurgent groups, they quickly become
dependent on it. Organized criminals involved in illicit trade depend
on armed guerillas and local warlords for protection, while the guerillas
rely on the illicit trade for finance. Once this symbiosis is established, it
is difficult to break, and many of the actors involved have an interest in
continuing the conflict.44 The reliance on criminal sources of funding has
a demoralizing effect on the guerillas. The high ideological principles
that prompted their resistance in the first place are undermined by the

42 Münkler (2005, p. 24)
43 St. Marie and Naghshpour (2011, p. 3)
44 Münkler (2005, p. 15), Adams (1986)

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Warlike and Peaceful Societies

necessary involvement with crime, and many groups have deteriorated
into marauding gangs of bandits.45
Support from external sources is often crucial. Many insurgent
groups rely on external sources of funding, either from a diaspora of
emigrants and refugees or from foreign states.46 Support from foreign
states is very common but mostly secret. The clandestine support is
typically provided by a secret service and channeled through some
seemingly independent organizations in order to hide the original
source. This principle is commonly known as plausible deniability: the
donor can deny any involvement or responsibility when the support
is channeled through an untraceable chain of intermediaries. Foreign
support for insurgent groups often involves money, weapons, training,
logistics, and intelligence.47
Support from foreign states and secret services never comes for
free—there are always strings attached. Foreign donors use insurgents
as proxies for promoting their own political and military goals in
pursuit of their own geopolitical interests or trade interests. Insurgents
often become so dependent on foreign sponsors that they lose their
ideological purity. Foreign powers have often supported small and
insignificant opposition groups and promoted them into powerful
insurgents or even fabricated opposition groups where none existed.48
Such proxy wars often have two external stakeholders. This may be
two rival superpowers or two coalitions of powerful nations competing
to expand or defend their zones of geopolitical influence in the area.
For example, one party may sponsor insurgents or coup makers
while the other party supports the incumbent government. Instead of
battling against each other directly—which would be too costly—the
superpowers support their proxies in a war on a distant battlefield,
conveniently avoiding any destruction in their own homelands.49
The party that supports the government of the troubled country
may openly supply troops or air forces to support the government in
the battle against what they consider illegitimate rebels.50 This kind
45 Münkler (2005, p. 14)
46 Mumford (2013, p. 65), Hughes (2012, p. 38)
47 Hughes (2012, p. 15)
48 Bale (2012)
49 Mumford (2013, p. 3)
50 Mumford (2013, p. 14)

4. Different Kinds of War in Human History



81

of interventionism has become much more frequent in recent years,
as figure 8 shows. The yellow curve labeled ‘Intrastate with external
troop support’ covers only those conflicts where external intervention
or support includes official foreign troops. Less visible forms of
external support on one or both sides is no doubt more frequent, so
that in fact the majority of violent conflicts today can be characterized
as proxy wars.
External sponsors can have many reasons for supporting a conflict in
a faraway country. First of all, it is very cheap compared to traditional
warfare. Proxy wars are fought mostly in poor countries where the living
costs for the native fighters are low and the fighters mostly use small
light weapons. The sponsor states can avoid large casualties from their
own forces and reduce the risk of escalation by using proxy fighters,
drones, mercenaries, or private military contractors.51 The politicians of
the sponsor countries seek to avoid political resistance from their own
constituencies and also to avoid international opprobrium by hiding
their support behind plausible deniability. In many cases, they have
been able to escape accountability to their own jurisdiction as well as
to international law by leaving the dirty work to irregular groups or
mercenaries in a more or less lawless country and by making their own
influence on these groups difficult to trace.52
A sponsor state can harm a militarily strong enemy, without
engaging in direct conflict, by supporting insurgents in the enemy
state or in a third state that is allied with their enemy. This enables
the sponsor to divert their enemy’s resources toward the intrastate
conflict and away from external conflict.53 It is often a big problem
for the sponsor state, however, that its proxy fighters may be weak,
incompetent, uncontrollable, and disloyal, and may have their own
political or ideological agendas.54
Proxy wars can be very long-lasting because the external sponsors
are never completely defeated, they do not easily run out of resources,

51 Mumford (2013, p. 4), O’Brien (2012)
52 Mumford (2013, p. 42), Carter (2014), Hughes (2012)
53 Hughes (2012, p. 38)
54 Hughes (2012, p. 47)

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Warlike and Peaceful Societies

and the devastating consequences of the war mostly affects a distant
country rather than themselves.55
Today’s conflicts are mostly asymmetric conflicts between unequal
parties—typically insurgents or separatists against a state government
or an external occupying force. Peace negotiations are often tried but
rarely successful. Obviously, the two parties in an asymmetric conflict
have very different positions in the situation of a peace negotiation. A
negotiation between unequal parties with unequal negotiating powers
will naturally lead to a result that is more favorable to the stronger
party than to the weaker party. The insurgents will almost unavoidably
perceive the negotiation result as unfair. A negotiation result that
addresses the grievances of the weaker party in a way that they perceive
as fair can hardly be achieved without strong external pressure from a
third party.56
The leaders or negotiators for the insurgents may be committed to
accepting an unfair negotiation result because they see no alternative,
but the negotiated peace remains fragile as long as the grievances are not
resolved. The insurgents typically have no strong central organization
that can enforce the negotiated peace agreement. Even small frustrated
subgroups with uncompromising attitudes can easily break the peace
and make the conflict flare up again.57
Growing regality is another reason why intrastate conflicts and
asymmetric wars are difficult to end. The insurgents become regalized
and radicalized because of the prolonged conflict. Insurgent leaders also
deliberately promote a radical ideology in order to justify their cause
and to unify their supporters. Leaders on both sides of the conflict will
often manipulate religious feelings and identities in order to mobilize
their population.58
Insurgent groups often use radical religion in their fight against
corrupt and kleptocratic regimes. They see corruption as a result of poor
morality, and the most obvious remedy against amorality is religion.59 A
process of selection occurs in countries where protesting is difficult: the

55 Mumford (2013, p. 107), Cummins (2010)
56 Cummins (2010, p. 6), Rouhana (2011)
57 Münkler (2005, p. 13), Rid and Hecker (2009)
58 DeRouen (2014, chapter 4), McCauley and Posner (2017), Toft (2007)
59 Chayes (2015, p. 64)

4. Different Kinds of War in Human History



83

less radical protest groups are easily crushed by a suppressive regime,
while the most regal groups are more likely to have enough strength
and courage to survive. Some governments have even deliberately
suppressed moderate protest groups while allowing more radical
groups to continue. The existence of radical insurgent groups gives
the incumbent government a convenient justification for their hardline
policy.60
The leaders of insurgent groups face a tactical dilemma here. They
can promote a very radical ideology in order to maximize the zeal of a
small group of supporters, or they can express a less radical ideology
in order to get support from the broader population.61 The most radical
insurgent groups are often out of touch with the sentiments of the
majority of the population they want to represent, because the perceived
level of danger is not high enough to justify their high level of regality.
For this reason, the regality of an insurgent movement is likely to fizzle
out after a victory. For example, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 led to
a strict theocratic rule, but even though the subsequent war with Iraq
also contributed to the regality, more kungic sentiments soon began to
spread in the population, as evidenced by the fact that the Arab Spring
gained considerable support in Iran in 2011.
Insurgents and guerillas have a tactical advantage because of their
flexibility and their ability to hide. The state military often lacks this
flexibility because it has a big, hierarchical organization that cannot
adapt as quickly to changing situations. Traditional militaries have a
problem of balancing hierarchy against innovation, or discipline against
creativity.62 The costs to the counterinsurgent force of maintaining order
and legitimacy are much higher than the costs to the insurgents of
undermining it.63
Guerillas and paramilitary forces are mostly found in weak states
without a strong central military. While a strong military under central
governmental control is taken for granted in modern first world
countries, such an organization of power is less common in third world
countries. A strong, centralized military organization has historically
60 Chayes (2015, p. 69)
61 Rid and Hecker (2009, p. 44)
62 Mumford and Reis (2014, pp. 4–17)
63 Rid and Hecker (2009, p. 3)

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Warlike and Peaceful Societies

been formed in European countries because it was the format most
suited for traditional interstate war. States that failed to build a strong
military have long since been defeated by stronger and more militant
neighbors.64
Third world countries have different organizations of their forces due
to their different histories. Many of these countries have been formed
not by interstate wars but by colonial wars. States that were decolonized
through negotiation have inherited bureaucratic military organization
from the departing colonial powers, but states that were formed through
violent rebellion have tended to approbate the local guerillas that were
active in the process of decolonization and to convert them into prostate militias. These states do not need a strong central military if they
are not threatened by their neighbor countries or if they are protected
by the international community. Relying on paramilitary forces can be
an advantage for a state government if they can use the local militias
as proxies to quell insurgents and rebels while denying responsibility
for any brutality and human rights violation in the counterinsurgency
campaign.65
Weak states without sufficient centralized power are more susceptible
to intrastate conflicts—and intrastate conflicts tend to weaken the state.
This is a vicious circle. It is necessary to strengthen the state if you want
peace, but international initiatives to support state building have often
had little or no success.
The opinion of the population is essential to the outcome of an
asymmetric conflict. Insurgent movements have an advantage over
a foreign occupying force in this regard, because they often have the
support of the local population while it is difficult or impossible for an
external force to win the hearts and minds of the people. The insurgents
have an enduring commitment to the cause and they can rely on steady
recruitment from the local population, whereas an external occupying
force often lacks the patience and political commitment to a long-lasting
and expensive conflict.66
The importance of mass communication has increased dramatically
as the types of conflicts have changed and new electronic media have
64 Ahram (2011, p. 8)
65 Ahram (2011, p. 4)
66 Rid and Hecker (2009, p. 3)

4. Different Kinds of War in Human History



85

made mass communication accessible and affordable to even small
insurgent groups. These groups have gradually learned to use electronic
communication to their advantage. Insurgent groups can publish news,
images, and political statements immediately after a violent event due
to their decentralized structure, while a bureaucratically structured state
force typically responds more slowly because they need verification,
declassification, and political approval before they can issue a press
release. This asymmetry in information handling can give insurgents
a leading edge towards the highly competitive news media, hungry for
breaking news.67
All in all, there are many obstacles that prevent weak states from
obtaining internal peace and from establishing a stable central
government and economic autonomy. The decisive factor for the outcome
of asymmetric conflicts is often psychology rather than violent victories
and losses on a diffuse battlefield. Both parties in the conflict need
support from their constituency or home base. They cannot continue the
battle if they become unpopular with the people they represent or claim
to represent. Both parties will try to disseminate information favorable
to their cause. Obviously, disinformation and selective information
abound in modern conflicts. It has become common for military forces
to invite selected journalists to travel with them and report from the
battlefield. These embedded journalists live with the troops and
depend on them for protection. Obviously, their reports will reflect
a one-sided view of the situation. Insurgents and guerillas may have
less access to journalists and rely more on electronic communication
and social media. This information war is important for consolidating
their support. International opinion is particularly important. If one
party wins the undivided sympathy of the international community,
then they have almost won the conflict. The best chance that insurgents
have of winning an asymmetric conflict is actually to sway international
opinion in their favor and call for sanctions against their opponent.68
Democracy cannot prevent symmetric wars, but it may reduce the
probability of civil war and insurgencies because it gives minorities a
forum where their grievances can be heard.69
67 Rid and Hecker (2009, p. 131)
68 Münkler (2005, p. 25), Kellner (2011)
69 DeRouen (2014, chapter 4)

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Warlike and Peaceful Societies

Terrorism and accusations of terrorism are often significant elements
in psychological warfare. The weaker party in an asymmetric conflict
may turn their violence against civilians if there are no military targets
that they can meaningfully attack, or if they consider that this is the
only tactic that has any effect on their enemy. However, terrorism can
be a very counterproductive strategy, as explained in chapter 6.1. The
definition of terrorism is unclear and contested. It is easy to accuse
someone of terrorism in a situation where the distinction between
combatants and non-combatants is blurred or where there are no
obvious military targets that can be attacked. The concept of terrorism
is so vaguely defined, yet so highly laden with psychological, political,
and legal significance today, that it has become common practice to
accuse one’s enemy of terrorism—with more or less justification.
Asymmetric wars and guerilla wars often generate many refugees
because civilians are more directly affected than in conventional
interstate wars. A massive flow of refugees can have significant
effects—intended or not—on psychological and strategic warfare for
several reasons: (1) the flow of refugees can attract the attention of the
international community; (2) massive migration can destabilize the
region that receives the refugees; (3) refugee camps can be hotbeds for
recruiting new fighters; and (4) humanitarian aid to refugee camps often
finds its way to the fighting insurgents.70
If we want to examine the regal effect of insurgencies and
asymmetric conflicts we should look not only at the casualties but also
at the psychological effects. These low-intensity conflicts typically have
fewer casualties than interstate wars, but they pose more dangers to
civilians and they can be quite long-lasting. Therefore, they have a very
significant regalizing effect and they often lead to political or religious
radicalization. Even the smallest ethnic or religious differences are
amplified in this process. Ethnicity is a result of conflict as much as a
cause of it.71
The regal effect is of course concentrated in the conflict zone, while
the distant sponsors of a proxy war may be unaffected if their population
pays no attention or has no knowledge of the clandestine sponsor
activities of their governments. The sponsor countries may be affected,
70 Münkler (2005, p. 18)
71 Turton (2003), Francis (2009)

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87

however, if they are hit by terrorist attacks or other forms of retribution
or if they receive a massive influx of refugees from the conflict zone.
The violence may spill over the boundaries of the initial conflict, and
we may see blowback effects when radicalized proxy fighters become
enemies of their former sponsors, as in Afghanistan, Syria, and several
other countries (see chapter 5.5).72
A proxy war may be cheap for the external sponsors but devastating
for the country that serves as battleground for the proxy war. The
infrastructure is often severely damaged; powerful crime organizations
do not disappear when the conflict ends, and a proxy may continue to be
dependent on its sponsor.73 The country cannot easily escape the vicious
circle of lawlessness, corruption, instability, poverty, and economic
chaos that follows after a prolonged conflict. Such a failed state can be
very difficult to recover. It can continue for years to be an international
center for drug production, organized crime, and a training ground for
insurgents from other countries.74
The international community has been very slow in coming to terms
with the new forms of conflict. The traditional understanding of civil
war does not fit the new pattern of low-intensity warfare.75 Analysts are
using a variety of names for these conflicts suggesting that it is something
exceptional. Research on asymmetric conflicts has mostly relied on the
paradigms of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism based on the
strategic interests of the stronger party in the conflict. This research is
often sponsored by state actors who are parties to the conflict,76 and
there has been less research by neutral observers analyzing this as
the ‘new normal’ kind of conflict.77 International relations theory and
international law and norms have not yet adapted to the new pattern of
non-state actors and decentralized violence.78
The poor understanding of asymmetric conflicts has also led to
ineffective responses. Many strategies aimed at ending the conflicts have

72 Mumford (2013, p. 78), Hughes (2012, p. 47ff), Williams (2012), Carment and Samy
(2014), Anderson (2016, chapters 2 and 11)
73 Mumford (2013, p. 105), Münkler (2005, p. 75)
74 Williams (2012), Carment and Samy (2014), Münkler (2005, p. 128)
75 Münkler (2005, p. 135)
76 Speckhard (2012, p. 467), Richardson, L. (2006, p. 11), Bale (2012)
77 Arreguin-Toft (2012)
78 Keen (2006, chapter 1), Geiss (2006)

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Warlike and Peaceful Societies

even been counterproductive. A highly militaristic approach is likely
to escalate the conflict and make the population more regal and less
inclined to accept a peaceful compromise. Prompted by the proclivity
of the mass media to personalize conflicts and focus on individual
leaders, politicians, and military strategists have often put the blame on
tyrannical heads of state and individual terrorist leaders as responsible
for the violence. These media phenomena are explained in chapter 5.1.
The strategies have quite often had a narrow focus on removing ‘evil
dictators’ or hunting down terrorist leaders.79 Such a strategy ignores
the regal psychology that brought these militant leaders to power in the
first place. A strategy that removes a militant leader by violent means
is likely to make the affected population still more regal and make
sure that his successor will be even more militant. Attempts to create
democracy by violent means have failed time and again.80
The international community will not be able to deal appropriately
with asymmetric conflicts until it develops a better understanding of the
root causes and grievances behind these conflicts and develops norms
to regulate external sponsorship.
Attempts to establish peace, stability, prosperity, and democracy
in third world countries have often been sabotaged by wealthy elites
and foreign actors, especially in resource-rich countries. This will be
explained in chapter 5.4.

4.5. Theories of revolution
Regality theory predicts that rebellion or revolution is likely to happen
when there is an overly repressive regime and no external conflict or
other dangers that can justify such a strong regime. In other words, a
regal regime with a kungic population will be unstable. We will now
look at existing theories of revolution to see if this is a likely path from
a regal to a kungic society.
Early theories have often interpreted revolutions as manifestations
of a class war where peasants and workers fought against a capitalist
elite. However, this view had to be revised when historical studies

79 Keen (2006, chapters 2 and 5)
80 Keen (2006, chapter 2)

4. Different Kinds of War in Human History



89

found that members of a divided elite play a leading role in revolutions,
and that some revolutions were not based on class issues at all but on
other political or religious issues.81
The sociologist and political scientist Jack Goldstone has studied
revolutions through history and found that they have a number of
factors in common. The most important condition for a revolution to
be possible is that the government is weakened or unstable. There is
a remarkable similarity between the factors that make a revolution
possible and the factors that make an empire collapse, as discussed in
chapter 4.2, even though a revolution is not necessary for an empire to
disintegrate. Economic crises and conflicts between members of the elite
are typical factors that make a state weak and vulnerable to revolution.82
Elite members who lose their privileges, see their wealth being
undermined, or are excluded from influence will not support a weak
regime with economic problems. A regime can also lose the allegiance
of the elite if it squanders its wealth, wastes human lives in wars that it
cannot win, or fails to respect the culture and religion of the people. A
government must provide effectiveness and justice in order to maintain
popular support.83
Revolutions happen more often in periods of high population growth.
Overpopulation may lead to falling wages and rising prices for food
and land. Inequality grows and the economy becomes unstable. There is
growing competition for elite positions and increasing conflict between
different factions of the elite. A critical event such as international
pressure, military defeat, state bankruptcy, or famine—which a healthy
state would be able to withstand—may trigger a revolution.84
Another consequence of high population growth is the youth bulge
effect, discussed in chapter 3.4. A combination of high population
growth and a growing and divided elite can produce a surplus of welleducated and resourceful, but frustrated, young people who have both
the skills and the motivation to lead a revolutionary movement.85 A
large popular mobilization around a common ideology, and an alliance

81 Skocpol (1994, p. 273), Goldstone (2001)
82 Goldstone (2001)
83 Goldstone (2001)
84 Goldstone (2003)
85 Heinsohn (2003)

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Warlike and Peaceful Societies

between commoners and frustrated elite members is necessary for a
revolution to succeed. A dissatisfied and impoverished population is
not enough to start a revolution. A strong and stable government with a
loyal elite can always crush a rebellion.86
Sociologist John Foran has studied revolutions in third world
dependent states where the interplay of internal and external factors is
decisive. Colonial rule or a government that depends heavily on foreign
support and foreign interests will always cause structural problems,
inequalities, political exclusion, and repression. A political culture
and ideology of resistance may develop, but this is not sufficient for a
successful revolution. A revolutionary movement can only succeed if
the state is weakened by economic problems, lack of loyalty from parts
of the elite, and changes in the international situation.87
A revolutionary movement can often be seen as a kungic reaction
against a regal and tyrannical government, but this is not always the
case. Revolutions can happen for other reasons as well. An autonomous
ruler who excludes the country’s elite from influence is vulnerable to
rebellion because he lacks the support and loyalty of the elite. This
was the case in the Iranian Revolution of 1979, for example, which
happened because the Shah failed to respect the religion and culture of
the population.88
Democracy is often the goal of a revolution, but rarely the result. It
is difficult for a new revolutionary regime to establish the political and
economic stability and safe living conditions that the old regime lacked.
The failure of the new regime to create stability and welfare may lead
to continued conflicts where the moderate reformists are replaced by
more radical forces. The youth bulge adds fuel to internal conflicts that
can last for years. In order to deal with these conflicts, the new regime
may end up being more centralized, bureaucratic, and repressive than
the one it replaces.89
The more violent a revolution is, the less likely it is to produce
democracy. Democracy is more likely to emerge by gradual reform
or by non-violent ‘velvet revolutions’ or ‘color revolutions’ than by
86 Goldstone (2003)
87 Foran (2005, chapter 6)
88 Skocpol (1994, chapter 10)
89 Cincotta and Doces (2012), Goldstone (2001, 2003)

4. Different Kinds of War in Human History



91

violent overthrow of a despotic ruler.90 The outcome of a revolution also
depends on whether important resources can be monopolized. Where
industrialization has produced great concentrations of economic power
in the form of large factories, mines, oil fields, and heavy infrastructure,
a revolutionary regime is likely to seize these resources in its drive
for power and create an autocratic regime. But when the sources of
wealth are widely dispersed in the form of farmland, small shops, and
artisan businesses, the revolutionary regime cannot seize control of the
economy. In such cases, the likely result is a less centralized regime.91
These historical findings confirm the theory of contest competition
versus scramble competition discussed in chapter 3.1. Concentrated
resources that can be monopolized and defended by a group are more
likely to lead to a centralized government and a regal society than
widely dispersed resources.

90 Pop-Eleches and Robertson (2014)
91 Skocpol (1994)

5. Economic Determinants of
Conflict and Fear

5.1. Fear is profitable:
The economy of the mass media
We have learned that the regality of a society depends on the perceived
level of collective danger. Now we will look deeper into the factors that
shape people’s perception of their surrounding world as either safe or
full of dangers. If we can identify the most important factors that make
people perceive their world as dangerous or safe then we may be able
to predict whether a society will move in the regal or kungic direction.
A very obvious factor is the mass media. People can directly observe
only what happens in their immediate vicinity. They have to rely mainly
on the mass media for information about the political processes in their
country, social problems, international conflicts, and almost everything
else that happens in society at large.
Before we look at the factors that influence the contents of the mass
media, we will look at the theories of how the mass media influence
people’s opinions. We need to incorporate the scientific disciplines of
media effects theory and social cognition theory in order to understand how
the mass media affect people’s perception of their social world. The
mass media affect their audience in several different ways, including:1
1 Bryant and Oliver (2009), Iyengar and Kinder (2010)

© 2017 Agner Fog, CC BY 4.0

https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0128.05

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Warlike and Peaceful Societies

• Selection: for example, selective reporting of good or bad
news about a particular subject, or preferential treatment of
opinions for or against a controversial issue.
• Agenda setting: telling people what topics are important and
what issues to think or be concerned about.
• Framing: telling people how to look at a particular issue. For
example, nuclear power may be framed either in terms of
(1) technological progress, (2) environmental hazards, or (3)
a strategy for making the energy supply independent of oil
from unstable foreign countries.
• Priming: making particular aspects of a phenomenon salient,
for example, the criteria by which a politician is evaluated.
• Cultivation: the long-term effect of repeated exposure to
similar stories.
The effects of framing and priming can be further explained in terms
of social cognition theory: in modern society, people are bombarded
with such a large amount of complex information that it is impossible
to digest it all. We have to economize the use of our cognitive brain
capacity. We do this by fitting new information that we receive into
existing mental structures or models. Such a mental structure or model
is variously called a cognitive schema,2 interpretive frame,3 social script,4
or paradigm.5 For example, if news media report a home robbery,
readers or viewers will immediately activate their cognitive schema
for a home robbery. This schema includes a catalogue of objects that
are typically involved, such as a house, stolen goods, weapons, vehicle,
etc. and the roles of people involved, such as robber, victim, police,
and witness. The cognitive schema also includes information about the
supposed actions, motives, and emotions associated with each of these
roles. The reader will easily understand what happened, even if some
information is missing in the news report. Information that does not fit
into the schema is likely to be ignored. The priming effect may influence

2 Dimaggio (1997), Graber (1993, chapter 8)
3 Schetsche (2000, p. 109)
4 Abelson (1981)
5 Nersessian (2003)

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which schema is activated for a particular story when more than one
fitting schema is available.
If people read or hear a story about a new phenomenon for which
they have no appropriate cognitive schema, they may either: (1) lose
interest and ignore the story; (2) apply a less appropriate schema and
thereby misunderstand the story; or (3) build a new cognitive schema.
The last reaction requires a lot of mental effort and is therefore less
common. We will expect the framing effect to be particularly strong and
possibly long-lasting in this situation, but this is an under-researched
area.6
A person’s world view is based on cognitive schemas (also called
schemata), shaped by the mass media and by other information sources.
People with different world views and different cognitive schemas
are very likely to disagree on political issues. Cognitive schemas also
influence the decision of political leaders about war and peace.7
With these theories in place, we will now look at the factors that
influence the contents of the mass media. Scholars of media studies
have listed a number of influential factors that determine the contents
of the media:8
• journalists
• editors
• media owners
• information sources
• audience preferences
• advertisers
• technology
• economic constraints
• economic market forces
We need not go into detail about all these factors here, but the economic
factors are particularly important. Commercial mass media in our
6 Tewksbury et al. (2000)
7 Rosen (2005, chapter 2)
8 Shoemaker and Reese (2014), Wahl-Jorgensen and Hanitzsch (2009, p. 59), Ericson,
Baranek and Chan (1989)

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modern society operate in a very competitive market. The media compete
not only for readers or viewers but also for advertisers. In the view of
many economists, the primary business of a commercial TV station is
not selling news to its viewers, but selling the eyeballs of the viewers
to the advertisers.9 The competition in the advertising market forces TV
stations to produce entertaining programmes that appeal to the broadest
possible audience in order to get as many viewers as possible to watch
the commercials. The media appeal to our emotions to such a degree
that the competition between the media has been called an emotional
arms race.10 The result is trivialization and a blurring of the boundaries
between news, entertainment, and advertisement. Controversial and
complicated issues are avoided, while emotionally touching topics such
as sex, violence, and danger get maximum coverage.11
Most economists believe that free competition in the media market is
a guarantee that the most diverse range of topics, interests, and opinions
is covered.12 However, many studies contradict this. The media shape
the cognitive schemas of their audience. Once these cognitive schemas
are formed, the audience will be less receptive to messages that do
not fit into the already formed schemas. People prefer to hear uniform
opinions rather than a diversity of opinions.13
The unrestrained competition has another unintended consequence:
It gives the media fewer resources to produce quality content. In a
monopoly situation where a country has only a single TV station, this
station will have plenty of resources for investigative journalism and
for producing a diversity of programmes of high quality. But if there
are many commercial TV stations competing for the same advertising
money, then there will be less money for each TV station to spend on
the production of programmes, and consequently it will be unable to
produce the same level of quality as in a less competitive market. This is
a consequence of the fact that the fixed costs are high while the variable
costs are virtually zero. The costs of producing a TV programme are
the same whether there is one viewer or a million viewers.14 With few
9 Meyer (2004)
10 Fuller (2010, p. 71)
11 McManus (2009)
12 McManus (2009)
13 McManus (2009), Gunther and Mugham (2000, chapter 12)
14 Berry and Waldfogel (1999, 2001)

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97

resources for investigative journalism, political news broadcasts are
often reduced to an uncritical relaying of statements from leading
politicians.15
The consequences of the fierce competition in the media market
include: trivialization and tabloidization; more entertainment and less
information; more gossip, celebrity scandals, sex, violence, crime, and
disaster; less controversy, and less detailed analysis of complicated
problems; and more focus on persons and less focus on principles and
issues.16
This trivialization leads to a dumbing-down of the audience. People
who have been fed this kind of news all their lives will lack the cognitive
schemas necessary for understanding complicated issues, and they will
be less likely to pay attention to alternative information sources that
provide detailed discussion of complicated issues.17
Humans have an innate tendency to pay attention to danger because
this has always been important for survival. This tendency makes
us pay attention to all kinds of media stories about violence, crime,
deviance, and disaster.18 The news media in a competitive market take
advantage of this human tendency by presenting an extraordinary
amount of bad news. Fear is profitable. Dramatic stories about crime
and disaster make people buy the newspaper or watch the TV news.
If nothing bad is happening then the media may even report people’s
fear of bad things that might happen. The intense media focus on fearprovoking stories has created a ‘culture of fear’, as Barry Glassner calls
it.19 All too often, the media make us afraid of the wrong things. Minor
dangers are hysterically blown out of proportions, while much more
serious dangers in society go largely unnoticed.20 The exaggerated fears
often lead to moral panics, unnecessary precautions, poor legislation,
and ‘gonzo justice’.21

15 McManus (1995), Picard (2004)
16 Fuller (2010, chapter 7), Picard (2004), Esser (1999)
17 Baek and Wojcieszak (2009), Bennett and Iyengar (2008)
18 Fuller (2010, chapter 6), Shoemaker (1996)
19 Glassner (1999)
20 Altheide (2014), Glassner (1999)
21 Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009), Altheide (1995, p. 97; 2002, p. 196)

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The effect of receiving a constantly high dose of crime and violence
from television has been called the mean world syndrome.22 Heavy TV
viewers come to perceive the world as a gloomy and dangerous place.
Fearful people take drastic measures to protect themselves and their
children—measures that are out of touch with the objective risk. As
predicted by regality theory, fearful people become authoritarian and
easy victims of political manipulation.23
The person-centered framing of issues makes people blame social
problems on individuals rather than on political principles or social and
economic structures.24 We see the effects of person-centered framing in
several areas:
• Crime stories focus on perpetrators and victims. They focus
more on violent crime and less on property crime. They
report individual cases rather than statistics. Crime is blamed
on moral defects in the perpetrator rather than on structural
causes. The political consequence of this type of crime
reporting is more prisons and fewer preventive measures,25
even though most experts agree that crime prevention is more
effective than punishment.26
• Political news focuses more on the personalities and strategies
of politicians and less on issues and ideologies. This makes
voters cynical and disinterested.27
• Social problems are blamed on individuals who are seen as
responsible rather than on the underlying social or economic
structures. This lack of focus on root causes undermines
society’s problem-solving capacity.28
• International conflicts are blamed on the ‘evil’ leaders of
enemy states rather than on political and economic structures.
This has led to many attempts to solve international conflicts
by removing foreign leaders and governments by force. Such
22 Signorielli (1990)
23 Signorielli (1990), Hetherington and Suhay (2011), Reith (1999)
24 Altheide (2014, p. 122), Iyengar (1996)
25 Altheide (2002; 2014, p. 144)
26 Welsh and Pfeffer (2013)
27 Capella and Jamieson (1997)
28 McManus (2009), Fuller (2010, chapter 7)

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coups and assassinations have often exacerbated the problems
by leading to chaos and by making the conflict zones even
more regal than they already were.
All in all, the implacable dependence of the commercial mass media on
economic market forces has led to a framing and public perception of
social problems that is superficial and out of touch with the root causes.
At the national level, this has in many cases led to a very punitive and
inefficient strategy against crime. At the international level, it has led
to chaos, escalation of conflicts, and general regalization. Among the
unintended consequences of market forces is that the mass media make
people perceive the world as more dangerous than it is. This ‘mean
world syndrome’ makes the whole culture more regal. Mass media
competition is thus a root cause of one of the most important—and also
most neglected—forces of regalization in our modern age. These media
effects are seen most strongly in countries that have a very competitive
media market and where non-commercial news media have a very low
market share.29
This situation may change as the internet is radically changing the
media landscape these years. It has become so cheap to disseminate
information that even small political groups and grassroots organizations
can afford to have their own website, blog, Facebook page, or Twitter
account. Several states and governments are financing non-commercial
news media with a worldwide target audience. Some of these media
purvey partisan views and propaganda, while others are dedicated to
presenting a diversity of opinions. However, in many countries it is still
not possible to receive non-commercial local news of high quality.
The alternative or non-commercial news media are slow to penetrate
the market. People do not easily switch to watching a new and unfamiliar
kind of information source. They have to get used to different formats
and learn new cognitive schemas before they can appreciate the less
sensation-seeking alternative news media.
But social media also make a contribution here. A message from
even the most obscure source can be spread all over the world in a
matter of days through Facebook and other social media if people find
it sufficiently interesting. This mechanism makes it very difficult for
29 Fog (2013)

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Warlike and Peaceful Societies

governments and powerful elites to cover up serious wrongdoing and
scandals.
Messages are disseminated through social media according to
the laws of memetics. The study of memetics tells us that messages
are particularly likely to be spread through social media if they are
interesting, important, easy to understand, and emotionally touching.30
The social media can be regarded as a new ‘marketplace of ideas’ no
less competitive than the commercial mass media, but controlled by
different mechanisms of competition with different criteria. The theory
of memetics tells us that a message can spread equally fast whether it
is true or false, as long as no proof or disproof is immediately available.
People soon realize that messages on social media are not always reliable
unless it can be verified that they come from a trustworthy source. This
weakens the role of social media as an information source.
The media landscape is changing fast and we have yet to see which
way it is pushing our culture and world views. Different people follow
different media, and the internet has niches for virtually any kind
of special interest. The diversity of media also means a diversity of
cognitive schemas and opinions. People who follow different media will
have different cognitive schemas and therefore different interpretations
of political events. We can predict that this will lead to a wider diversity
of political opinions and ideas.31
The commercial media are shaped by anonymous market forces,
and social media are shaped by the equally uncontrollable forces of
memetic competition. The whole media landscape can be seen as
a headless monster that nobody is able to control. Which way is this
headless monster taking our culture and our world view? The answer
is anybody’s guess.

5.2. Economic booms and busts
A stable economy is important for people’s existential security. This
makes us predict that economic stability and security will stimulate
a kungic climate, while an unstable economy or crisis will have a

30 Tyler (2011), Berger (2013)
31 Bennett and Iyengar (2008)

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regal psychological effect. In fact, conflict studies have found a strong
connection between affluence, peace, and democracy.32
People want to strengthen their nation or their social group when
they experience a collective threat, and several studies show that
economic crises can have such a psychological effect, just like other
collective threats.33 The regal effect is strongest if the crisis is perceived
as a collective threat. There is little or no regal effect if a bad economy is
perceived as an individual problem. This does not mean that individual
insecurity is inconsequential, but the consequences of individual
insecurity are better explained by biological r/K theory (see chapter 3.3)
than by regality theory (see chapter 2.2).
Economic insecurity and poverty mean poor living conditions and
higher mortality. The r/K theory predicts that this will lead to higher
fertility, which in turn may lead to overpopulation, epidemics, and war.
Economic insecurity also means poor education, which may lead to
youth crime, conflicts, and political radicalization. It is well-known that
economic inequality can lead to political instability.34
A good, stable economy, on the other hand, will foster a more K-like
strategy involving good education, which promotes the demographic
transition (see chapter 3.4). These phenomena have obvious effects on
regality. We can therefore expect that individual economic insecurity
leads to a number of social problems which may lead to regality, while
collective economic insecurity also leads to regality directly without
these intermediate steps.
Here, we will first look at some of the mechanisms that cause economic
instability. After this, we will look at historical examples of economic
booms and busts and discuss their psychological consequences.

Some theories of economic instability
Economic activity in society goes up and down due to many factors,
both endogenous and exogenous. High economic activity involves high
employment, consumer optimism, and high consumer spending, while
an economic downturn involves unemployment and less consumption.
32 Gat (2006, p. 587)
33 Fritsche, Jonas and Kessler (2011), Inglehart and Welzel (2005, p. 161), Rickert (1998)
34 Galbraith (2012), Turchin (2012)

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Fluctuations in wages, public spending, interest rates, inflation, credit,
savings, investment, and speculative bubbles are all factors that
complicate the equation. Consumers and investors react to changes in
the market, but the effects of these reactions are delayed, and the delays
can cause fluctuations. Markets are also influenced by many external
factors, such as varying crop yields, changes in international markets,
shortage of natural resources, technological changes, national and
international political changes, and violent conflicts.
These fluctuations in economic activity are traditionally called
business cycles, but in reality they are random fluctuations with no
predictable time periods. It may be argued that, if the fluctuations were
predictable, then people would speculate against them and the effect of
such speculation would cancel out any predictable changes. There are
many different theories of business cycles—too many to review here—
where the different theories have their main focus on different factors.
While these short-term fluctuations appear to be relatively small and
random, there are various mechanisms that may explain major longterm effects and more dramatic changes. In chapter 4.2, we saw how the
dynamics of empires in agrarian societies can lead to state bankruptcy
and political collapse with periods of a hundred years or more.
A further explanation of the rise of despotic empires and kleptocratic
regimes is provided in the theory developed by economist Daron
Acemoglu and political scientist James Robinson.35 Political and
economic institutions can be either inclusive or extractive, according to
their theory. Inclusive institutions are institutions that give rights and
protection to all members of a society, which is typical for a democracy.
Extractive institutions are institutions that extract income and wealth
from common people to serve the interests of a small elite. Extractive
political institutions can facilitate the consolidation of extractive
economic institutions, and vice versa. This positive feedback creates a
Matthew effect that tends to stabilize such institutions and make them
quite durable, as discussed in chapter 4.1. The opposite situation is seen
when inclusive political and economic institutions mutually consolidate
each other to create a democratic society that makes individual
entrepreneurship attractive and generates a thriving economy.36
35 Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 80)
36 Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 81)

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The situation in most Western democracies today is that economic
institutions and market forces are gaining more and more de facto
power and influence, while the options available to politicians are
limited by economic constraints. The nation state has lost much of its
autonomy and territorial sovereignty to globalized economic market
forces. Economic power is also becoming increasingly impersonal and
anonymous.37 There is no longer any identifiable king or government
who controls the economy. Instead, economic influence is concentrated
around a group of major international banks who own shares in each
other.38 The banks are formally controlled by their shareholders, but
when these shareholders are other banks, and so on, it is hard to claim
that any identifiable persons are in control at the top of the economic
pyramid. It looks like the economy is controlled, to a large degree, by
the impersonal market forces. The banks are required to maximize the
returns on investment for their shareholders. This means that they are
extractive economic institutions. We are facing the paradoxical situation
today that Western society is based on inclusive political institutions
(democracy) but extractive economic institutions (banks). The gradual
shift in power from inclusive political institutions to extractive
economic institutions is part of the reason why economic inequality is
now growing fast nationally as well as internationally despite a political
desire for more equality. A few extremely rich people now own as much
as the poorest half of the world’s population.39 This growing inequality
is likely to cause both political and economic instability.
The inequality and instability is driven to a large degree by
globalization. Free trade across borders has led to widespread
competition between countries for attracting industries and cheap labor.
Many countries use low corporate tax rates, poor working conditions,
and poor environmental regulation as methods for attracting profitable
industries in this so-called race to the bottom.40
Another important reason why severe economic crises and collapses
continue to happen is the inherent instability of the money system.
Most countries have a fractional reserve banking system that allows
37 Bauman and Bordoni (2014, chapter 1)
38 Vitali, Glattfelder and Battiston (2011)
39 Credit Suisse (2015), Oxfam (2017)
40 Buzbee (2003), Zodrow (2010), Duanmu (2014), Verschueren (2015), OECD (1998)

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banks to provide loans for more than they hold in reserves. This process
sets electronic money in circulation that is not backed by any material
wealth. Most of the money in circulation in the world today originates
from debt to private banks.41 As this debt accumulates interest, there
is much more debt in the world than there is money in circulation, as
shown in table 5.
Money
Coins and banknotes (M0)
Narrow money (M1 = M0 + checkable deposits)
Broad money (M2 = M1 + savings, time deposits,
and money market accounts)
All debt (government and private)
Derivatives (estimated)

US$ trillion
5
29
81
199
630

Table 5. World money supply and debt in 2014.42

As this debt is repaid with money originating from new debt, the total
debt keeps spiraling and there is no realistic chance that it can ever be
repaid with the available money. The inevitable consequence is that
somebody will be unable to pay their debt, even if nobody is culpable.
It may be individuals who default on their debts and lose everything
they own, or it may be companies, banks, or entire countries that go
bankrupt. This unfortunate flaw in our money system has remained
in obscurity for centuries,43 but today it is widely discussed among
economists and political organizations.44
Economists have proposed many different explanations of
long economic cycles (or Kondratiev cycles). A particularly useful
explanation is Carlota Perez’s theory of technological revolutions.45
Important technological breakthroughs such as the industrial revolution
or electronic information technology can start a boom of investment,
41 Werner (2014), McLeay, Radia and Thomas (2014)
42 Data sources: Desjardins (2015), Dobbs, Lund, Woetzel and Matafchieva (2015),
CIA, “The World Factbook” (2016), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook
43 Zarlenga (2002)
44 Benes and Kumhof (2012), Mellor (2010)
45 Perez (2002, 2010)

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development, and economic growth. As new technology matures and
the market for new products begins to saturate, capital investments
begin to move from material wealth to paper wealth in the form of
complex financial products. Those products generate a virtual growth
that becomes more and more decoupled from the real economy. Such
a decoupling of paper wealth from the real economy is evident in the
amount of derivatives in table 5.
The boom ends when one or more asset bubbles collapse and the
political need for regulating the wayward financial market becomes
obvious. Some of the excess capital that was accumulated during the
period of rapid growth is likely to be invested in new inventions that
may start the next technological revolution. The whole cycle may take
half a century or more.46
Most of the money in circulation originates from bank credit, as
explained above. Today, only a small part of this bank credit is invested
in new production equipment or other things that could benefit the real
economy. Instead, most of the credit is used for changing the ownership
of existing assets, such as real estate, factories, and intellectual rights.
This process inflates asset prices. Housing costs are increased by
inflated real estate prices, while the costs of production are increased by
the inflated prices of the means of production. The consequence is that
an increasing amount of money is extracted from the real economy and
into the financial economy, where it serves to enrich a small financial
elite. The result is rising inequality, instability, and insecurity. We have
seen many examples of severe austerity, poverty, and destitution when
asset bubbles burst and the spiraling debt can no longer be repaid.47
We have now looked at some—perhaps unorthodox—theories that
seek to explain economic instability. It must be emphasized that there
are many other theories of economic booms and busts. Whether one
subscribes to one theory or another, it is a historical fact that economic
crises, crashes, and collapses occur from time to time, and that economists
and politicians have been remarkably bad at predicting them.48

46 Perez (2002, 2010)
47 Bezemer and Hudson (2016)
48 Reinhart and Rogoff (2009)

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Booms and busts in the twentieth century
World War II was a characteristic example of the connection between
economic crisis and regality. The Great Depression of the 1930s was one
of the worst economic crises in modern history, and many historians
believe that this crisis played an important role in the outbreak of the
war. Other factors that contributed to the war are discussed in chapter 6.4.
However, an economic crisis does not necessarily lead to regality and
conflict. It depends on whether it is perceived as a collective threat or
an individual threat. It also depends on whether the threat is perceived
as coming from an external enemy. It is remarkable that the 2008
financial crisis had little or no regal effect, while the Great Depression
had a dramatic effect. The difference between these two crises requires
an explanation. The earlier crisis was worse, but this is not the whole
explanation for their remarkably different effects. How people perceive
a crisis is important for its psychological effect. Many banks were bailed
out by national governments in the 2008 crisis. Even though this was
a controversial move, it gave the population an impression that the
governments were in control of the situation. The bank runs in the
1930s, on the other hand, gave an impression of chaos with nobody in
control. Many people lost their savings. A large surplus of poor and
unemployed young people served as fuel for the war (see chapter 6.4).
An important question in relation to regality theory is who is
blamed for a crisis. If a crisis is blamed on foreign enemies or on general
misfortune, then people will seek protection in collective action and
desire to strengthen the government and the state. In other words, a
regal reaction. But a crisis that is blamed on one’s own leaders may have
the opposite effect, namely a kungic rebellion against leaders perceived
as incompetent and despotic.
In Germany in the 1930s, the massive propaganda of the Nazi regime
blamed the crisis on Jews and other foreigners and there was hardly
space for any counter-propaganda. The 2008 crisis, in contrast, was
mostly blamed on ‘greedy bankers’ and inept political regulation. In
other words, the latter crisis was blamed on an internal elite. A kungic
reaction against the political and economic elite was seen in 2011 in the
form of street protests in southern Europe and in the Occupy Wall Street
movement, which was a protest against plutocracy.49
49 Bauman and Bordoni (2014, chapter 1)

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107

Between the two busts there was a boom. In the 1960s, we experienced
extraordinary prosperity and economic growth. The climate of existential
safety led to fast cultural changes in the kungic direction, epitomized
by the student protests in 1968 and the ‘Flower Power’ movement.
The kungic trends were particularly strong in Northern Europe. The
Nordic countries had made it through the war in a relatively benign
way compared to other European countries. Their strong traditions of
social welfare were further developed into what is known as the Nordic
welfare state with a strong social safety net, free education, and free
universal healthcare. The existential security that the welfare state
provided to all members of society had a strong kungic effect. It is no
coincidence that the Nordic countries have a strong reputation as peace
brokers. Despite their small size, the Scandinavian countries have been
among the avant-gardes with respect to social security, sexual liberation,
women’s liberation, and environment protection. However, the Nordic
welfare state is now being undermined by globalization and the race to
the bottom.

5.3. Greed or grievance:
Economic theories of civil war
In the late 1990’s, a group of economists at the World Bank and the
University of Oxford set out to investigate whether economic factors
could explain civil wars. They found that the risk of civil war was
correlated with various economic variables, while the relationship
between the onset of civil war and ethnic diversity was non-significant
or non-monotonic.50 The economists interpreted these findings as an
indication that insurgent leaders were motivated by economic profit
rather than by grievances such as ethnic discrimination.
A later modification of this theory focused more on opportunities
and less on greed. The revised theory claims that predictions whether
there will be conflict or peace cannot be based on the presence of
grievances because grievances can be found (or invented) everywhere.
The distinguishing factors that determine whether an insurgency breaks
out or not are the economic and other factors that make insurgency
financially and militarily feasible. The study portrays rebel leaders as
50 Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004)

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sadistic predators and their followers as irrational.51 A group of political
scientists at Stanford University made similar findings, supporting
the theory that civil wars depend on economic factors rather than on
grievances.52
These publications sparked a long debate about whether insurgents
were motivated by greed or by grievance. Critics argued that the
economic studies had no relevant measures of grievances other than
some very broad measures of ethnic diversity and income distribution.53
In the initial study, the economists actually found a correlation between
civil war and ethno-linguistic fractionalization, but they used this
variable as an indicator of transaction costs rather than possible ethnic
discrimination.54 Similarly, the economists used the size of an ethnic
diaspora as a measure of external economic support but ignored the
alternative explanation that the size of the diaspora might indicate the
number of people who fled because of ethnic discrimination or other
grievances.55
The distinction between greed and grievance may be an oversimplification, and some studies have found mixed results for the
influence of resource wealth on civil wars.56 It appears that lucrative
economic resources have more influence on the duration of armed
conflicts than on their onset.57 Case studies of a number of individual
conflicts have revealed more complex causal mechanisms that defy the
distinction between political and economic motives for conflict.58
The publications that explain insurgencies in terms of economic
factors rather than grievances are widely cited and quite influential
despite their admitted methodological weaknesses and poor data.
Perhaps the popularity of the ‘greed’ explanation is due to the fact that it
is politically convenient. It legitimizes the continued repression of ethnic

51 Collier, Hoeffler and Sambanis (2005), Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009)
52 Fearon and Laitin (2003)
53 Cramer (2002), Cederman, Gleditch and Buhaug (2013, chapter 2), Keen (2012,
chapter 2)
54 Collier and Hoeffler (1998)
55 Collier and Hoeffler (2004)
56 De Soysa and Neumayer (2007), Weinstein (2005)
57 Ballentine and Sherman (2003, p. 267)
58 Ballentine and Sherman (2003, p. 259), Collier and Sambanis (2005)

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109

minorities by making their grievances irrelevant and by portraying
insurgents as greedy, irresponsible, and irrational.59
A different group of conflict researchers collected more detailed
and reliable data related to the grievances of ethnic groups. They found
strong evidence that the onset of civil war is related to grievances such
as economic inequality and political exclusion of ethnic groups.60 Such
conflicts are particularly frequent in sub-Saharan Africa, where the
boundaries of former colonies are not aligned with cultural and ethnic
boundaries.61 Another group of political scientists found that the regime
type and degree of democracy is the most important determinant of
conflict, while economic conditions, geography, and demography are
less important.62
It is useful to distinguish between factors that influence the onset of
civil wars and factors that influence their duration. Conflict researchers
have found that strong rebel groups who can pose a credible challenge
to the government tend to fight shorter wars and are more likely to see
an outcome favorable to them, while weak and peripheral groups with
strong grievances but little power are likely to see long and intractable
conflicts. Negotiated settlements are unlikely in the highly asymmetric
conflicts between a state power and an excluded minority group.63
There is general agreement among scientists that external support or
intervention tends to lengthen intranational conflicts.64
Part of the disagreement in the greed-versus-grievance debate stems
from different interpretations of the data. For example, conflicts are
more frequent in areas rich in oil, minerals, or other valuable resources.
This may be interpreted as greed when the insurgency is financed by
these resources, or as grievance when the insurgents protest against the
government’s exploitation of resources in a territory that they perceive
as theirs.
Just as it is misguided to ignore grievances as a cause of insurgencies,
it would be equally misguided to ignore the economic and other factors
59 Keen (2012)
60 Cederman, Gleditch and Buhaug (2013, p. 206), Cederman, Wimmer and Min
(2010), Buhaug (2006)
61 Cederman, Gleditch and Buhaug (2013, chapter 4)
62 Goldstone et al. (2010)
63 Cederman, Gleditch and Buhaug (2013, chapter 8)
64 Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Cederman, Gleditch and Buhaug (2013, p. 189)

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that make insurgency possible and feasible. Violent insurgencies cannot
take place if the potential rebels have insufficient funding sources or
insufficient access to weapons, no matter how strong their grievances.65
On the other side of the conflict, the interest of a powerful elite to
suppress democratic rebellion or to support anti-democratic coups is
often based on strong economic motivations.66
Civil wars are more likely to break out when the state is weak, when
the insurgents are strong and well financed, and when they have an
ample supply of young recruits. A mountainous terrain also seems to be
favorable to insurgents.67
There are inconsistent findings on the influence of education
on conflicts. One study finds that ethnic conflicts are more likely
when people have money but no education, while class conflicts and
revolutions are more likely when people are educated but poor.68
Education is a resource that can help rebels organize, build alliances,
analyze political dynamics, and make propaganda, while lack of access
to education can contribute to the grievances that motivate people for
conflict. Education is associated with advancement of the demographic
transition, lower population growth, and higher welfare—all factors
that promote peace.69
Finally, we should not ignore the influence of third parties who profit
from a conflict70 or depend on the export of critical resources from the
conflict area.71 In chapter 4.3, we saw that economic factors and access to
critical resources are often the root causes of symmetric wars. The same
factors may be decisive in asymmetric wars, especially as motivating
factors for the strong part in the conflict. This is further discussed in
chapter 5.4.

65 Regan and Norton (2005)
66 Acemoglu and Robinson (2005)
67 DeRouen (2014, chapter 4), Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner (2009), Fearon and Laitin
(2003), Hegre and Sambanis (2006), Buhaug and Lujala (2005)
68 Besançon (2005)
69 Lechler (2015), Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Cincotta, Engelman and Anastasion
(2003, chapter 2), Hegre et al. (2013), Sambanis (2005)
70 Keen (2012)
71 Copeland (2015, chapter 8)

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5.4. The resource curse
Natural resources are becoming increasingly scarce and expensive
as a consequence of the insatiable demand for growth in the modern
economic system. Many third world countries have rich occurrences
of natural resources in high demand such as oil, minerals, and fertile
land. Paradoxically, these valuable resources have often turned out to
be a curse rather than a blessing because they give rise to conflicts and
corruption rather than enriching the country.
In chapter 3.1, we saw how a concentration of resources in small
defendable patches leads to contest competition and a higher level of
conflict. This still applies in the modern world even though the conflicts
are no longer over food patches but over oil wells and mineral mines.
An important economic study at the Peace Research Institute Oslo
has found that many resource-rich countries are poorly developed
because of the way the rents from the resources are spent. Entrepreneurs
often use the profit from resource extraction in a way that economists
call ‘unproductive rent extraction’ or ‘grabbing’, rather than productive
activities that benefit the country. Countries with weak government
institutions are more ‘grabber friendly’ as these economists express it.
The grabbing entrepreneurs spend a significant part of their profit on
supporting a corrupt and grabber-friendly government that allows them
to export most of the profit out of the country rather than benefiting
local industry. Countries with strong and transparent government
institutions, on the other hand, are able to avert the resource curse
and use their resources in a way that benefits local industry and the
country’s economy.72
Oil is no doubt the number one cause of resource curse problems
today, but other important resources such as food, water, land, timber,
and minerals are also frequent sources of conflict.73 International investors
actively buy land and mining rights, for example, in order to secure their
future access to resources that are expected to become scarce.74

72 Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006)
73 Ross (2012), Carmody (2011)
74 Jacur, Bonfati and Seatzu (2015)

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Extractive industries have little or no interest in establishing
democracy. The voters in a democratic country will want to distribute
the wealth produced by extraction of natural resources to purposes
that benefit the country’s population, while a dictatorial government
can be manipulated or bribed by transnational companies to allow
large amounts of wealth to be exported. There is plenty of evidence
that foreign actors have secretly supported or promoted undemocratic
forces in resource-rich countries although they purportedly support
democracy.75 For example, the coup in Iran in 1953 that brought the
Shah to power was led by US and British secret services in order to
reverse Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh’s nationalization of
oil.76 Even today, the USA is stepping up military operations in almost
all African countries in order to defend its security interests.77 By doing
this, the USA may inadvertently be impeding progress and supporting
kleptocratic and grabber-friendly regimes.
The resource curse can be a serious impediment to economic
development. For example, the Republic of Niger currently has the
lowest development index of all countries in the world despite—or
rather because of—a rich export of uranium and oil. Frequent conflicts
over the valuable resources have destabilized the country, which has
seen four coups and several coup attempts since its independence in
1960.78 A similar fate has befallen the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
which holds more than half of the world’s reserves of the mineral coltan
that is important for the electronics industry.79 The poor development
of resource-rich countries can be explained by a combination of vicious
circles involving both political, social and economic effects. The rent
from oil extraction, mining, or other extractive industries benefits a small
elite but produces few jobs for the local population. The elite have an
interest in shaping policy to secure their own advantageous position by
investing in security rather than in the development of other productive
sectors. A surplus of labor and subsidized unproductive employment
leads to poor development and delayed demographic transition.80
75 Hiatt (2007, chapter 1), Looney (2012, chapters 3, 6, 12, 14 and 24)
76 Ross (2012, chapter 2)
77 Turse (2015)
78 Carmody (2011, chapter 6)
79 Carmody (2011, chapter 6), Keen (2012, chapter 2)
80 Auty (2012)

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113

Rich resources can lead to conflicts between national and foreign
actors, and between different foreign actors such as the USA, Europe,
and China, who compete for access to the resources of third world
countries. There are also frequent conflicts between insurgents and
a government that squanders wealth rather than spending it for the
benefit of the people. Secession conflicts can arise when different groups
compete for resource wealth that is concentrated in a particular part of a
country. For example, a conflict over oil resources in Sudan led to a split
of the country in 2011, and the conflict continues.81
Rich resources can often fuel and escalate conflicts that may have
started for reasons unrelated to the resources. Governments of resourcerich countries are likely to use their riches to finance military operations
in internal as well as external conflicts, but resource wealth may also
end up in the hands of insurgents, so that both parties in a civil war are
financing their operations from the same resource.82 There are several
ways in which insurgents can use resources as a means of financing their
operations. Resources that are easy to loot and smuggle are particularly
useful for insurgents, as we have seen with diamonds in Sierra Leone.83
The lawlessness and chaos in a civil war makes it possible for guerillas
to profit from the production of drugs and other illegal trade. Finally,
insurgents can profit from an existing industry by stealing the product
and by extortion. Oil extraction and mining in remote areas are
particularly vulnerable to extortion because of the large sunk costs that
are invested in the industry and because the industry cannot easily be
moved to another place.84
After World War II, the global oil market was dominated by a cartel
of oil companies, commonly known as the Seven Sisters. The behavior
of the Seven Sisters became so intolerable that, in the 1970s, most oilrich countries nationalized their oil production. However, government
institutions in many of these countries were not strong enough to handle
the windfall of new wealth accountably. The lack of oversight enabled
autocrats to consolidate their power by increasing spending, lowering
taxes, buying the loyalty of the armed forces, and concealing their own
81 Ross (2012, chapter 5), Peck and Chayes (2015, p. 6), le Billon (2004)
82 Ross (2012, chapter 1)
83 Le Billon (2004), Wilson, S. (2013)
84 Ross (2012, chapter 1), Clarke (2015)

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corruption and incompetence.85 Many of the oil-rich countries also used
their new wealth to finance wars and conflicts.86 Oil prices are quite
volatile because the market is inelastic, and extreme price fluctuations
have caused political instability.87
When the economy of a country is dominated by a single sector, other
sectors are likely to suffer. This is known as the Dutch disease. The high
income from oil production leads to an increase in the real exchange rate
of the oil-rich countries. This makes other sectors such as agriculture
and manufacturing less profitable. The export of other products goes
down and the import of food and other products outcompetes much
of the domestic production. The result is lack of investment in other
sectors, lack of development, unemployment, economic inequality, and
further political instability.88
The low demand for labor in these countries has consequences for the
role of women in society. While men may find jobs in the construction
industry, there are fewer jobs in export-oriented industries, such as
textile production, which typically hire more women. Statistically,
women who work at home have more children than women who make
a career outside of the home. This leads to higher population growth
and less economic development, whereby the demographic transition
is thwarted. The patriarchal values of countries in the Middle East have
often been explained with reference to Islam, but statistical studies
show that oil production explains the low status of women better than
does religion.89
Resource conflicts are not always fought by violent means.
International actors often use more subtle economic weapons to gain
access to valuable resources. A quite common strategy used by the
international extractive industry is to control resource-rich countries
by imposing unpayable debt on them. The countries are offered large
infrastructure projects to be financed through loans from international
banks, the World Bank, or the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Most
of the borrowed money goes to international contractors rather than to
local businesses. The profits from the finished projects are invariably

85 Ross (2012, chapter 1)
86 Peck and Chayes (2015)
87 Ross (2012, chapter 2)
88 Ross (2012, chapter 2)
89 Ross (2012, chapter 4)

5. Economic Determinants of Conflict and Fear



115

less than estimated and insufficient to service the debt. Unable to
pay back the debt, the countries are required to implement so-called
structural adjustment reforms as a condition for debt relief. The structural
adjustment reforms include privatization and deregulation of industry
as well as lowering of taxes and trade barriers. These reforms are
supposed to improve the economy of the country by attracting foreign
investment, but often the paradoxical consequence of these reforms has
been to allow international companies to expand the extractive industry
that benefits mostly foreign investors and suppresses or outcompetes
local industry.90
The economic mechanisms that lead developing countries into
growing debt are poorly understood by contemporary politicians. The
common system of fractional reserve banking creates more debt than
money, as explained in chapter 5.2. Private banks earn rents simply
because most of the money in circulation originates from debt. The
privileged status of the US dollar as a reserve currency and the role of
the dollar in international trade increase the demand for dollars and
allow American banks to extract rent from the international circulation
of dollars. Of particular importance is the fact that the international oil
trade is based on US dollars. This so-called petrodollar system gives the
dollar a privileged status and generates rent for US banks at the cost of
oil-producing countries and oil consumers.
Some analysts believe that the American desire to uphold the
petrodollar system has played an important role in conflicts with oilproducing countries. For example, the seemingly groundless war against
Iraq and its leader Saddam Hussein makes more sense when we know
that Hussein decided prior to the war to switch to euros as the currency
for the country’s oil exports.91 In the same vein, analysts suspect that
the US-led wars against Libya and Syria, and the tensions with Iran and
Russia, are connected with attempts to control the oil market and the
desire of these countries to trade oil in currencies other than the dollar.92
It must be emphasized, though, that this is an unproven theory and that
both sides in a conflict are likely to spread deceptive propaganda.

90 Hiatt (2007, chapters 1, 9, 11 and 12), Shiva (2013, p. 31), Babb (2005), Hudes (2009),
Münkler (2005, p. 89)
91 The background for the war in Iraq is further discussed in chapter 6.3
92 Clark (2005), Klare (2012), Scott (2003)

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5.5. Example: Proxy war in Afghanistan
Now we will look at the history of Afghanistan and discuss how a long
series of conflicts and proxy wars has made this one of the most regal
countries in the world.
The landlocked country of Afghanistan is rugged with high
mountains and sparse vegetation. It has a typically continental climate
with extreme variations in temperature. People have lived for several
thousand years as herding nomads and farmers in this area. Many
villages are concentrated at plateaus and along rivers where irrigation
of the fields makes high agricultural production possible.93
The geography of the country makes violent conflicts likely. The
fertile, irrigable spots of land are likely to be coveted, and warriors are
able to travel far with few obstacles. Until the introduction of modern
technology, however, the sizes of traveling armies were limited by the
poor roads and the sparsity of food. The influences of environmental
factors on the level of conflicts in a geographic area are discussed in
chapter 3.1 and chapter 7.
Afghanistan has a strategically important position in Central Asia.
Historically, the Silk Road and other important trade routes have gone
through this area. Afghanistan has often been called ‘the graveyard of
empires’. Throughout more than a thousand years, the area has been a
border zone of one empire after another that tried to conquer the land
from all directions. The shifting empires were unable to fully control the
land, however, with its many autonomous villages separated by large
areas of infertile land.94
In the mid-eighteenth century, the area gave rise to its own empire,
the Durrani Empire, with its capital in Kandahar. The Durrani dynasty
ruled for almost a century until a series of wars with Great Britain that
started in 1839.95 The present-day Afghanistan became independent in
1919 after the Third Anglo-Afghan war.96
Starting in 1956, Afghanistan developed increasingly strong ties with
the Soviet Union. The country received large amounts of economic and

93 Barfield (2010, chapter 1)
94 Barfield (2010, chapters 2 and 4), Rashid (2002, p. 7)
95 Abbas (2014, p. 23)
96 Barber (2008, p. 44)

5. Economic Determinants of Conflict and Fear



117

military aid from the Soviets. A communist government was established
in 1978 after two violent coups. The anti-religious ideology of the
communists was very far from the traditions of the deeply religious
Islamic population, and soon a revolt against the government started in
the town of Herat. Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan in 1979 to crush
the rebellion. This became the start of a series of civil wars. Millions of
Afghans fled the country during the following years. A large part of
them ended up in refugee camps in Pakistan.97
A growing resistance movement of Islamic warriors, known as the
Mujahideen, received billions of dollars in aid as well as training and
weapons from the USA, China, Saudi Arabia, and several other states.
Most of this aid was channeled through Pakistan’s intelligence service,
the ISI, which played a major role in the conflict.98
Thousands of radical Muslims from forty-three Islamic countries
joined the Mujahideen guerillas to support the fight against the ungodly
communists. The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) actively
supported the recruitment of Muslims for the Mujahideen because they
did not want to see the Soviet empire expanding. The war lasted until
1989, when Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev ordered a withdrawal
of Soviet forces. A million Afghans had been killed and six million had
become refugees.99
The Afghan infrastructure was totally demolished by the long war.
Roads, fields, livestock, and irrigation canals had been bombed by the
Russians to destroy the villages where the Mujahideen guerillas were
hiding. The Mujahideen were poorly educated and hardly able to
govern a state. Chaos, lawlessness, and banditry prevailed. Large parts
of the country were controlled by local warlords who had got hold of
the many weapons left from the war.100
A group of leaders in local religious schools—the so-called
madrassas—took action against the lack of security and started to
punish warlords and bandits for stealing, raping, and bullying the
population. This became the start of the Taliban movement. The Taliban
quickly became popular because they established order and security
97 Rashid (2002, p. 13), Abbas (2014, p. 32), Nojumi (2002, p. 197)
98 Abbas (2014, p. 54), Nojumi (2002, p. 83), Murshed (2006, p. 33), Abbas (2005, p. 110)
99 Rashid (2002, p. 19, 129), Nojumi (2002, p. 95), Abbas (2005)
100 Rashid (2002, p. 21), Abbas (2014, p. 55), Murshed (2006, p. 39)

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Warlike and Peaceful Societies

in the lawless country. Local military commandos switched sides and
brought weapons with them to the Taliban. The movement grew as
returning refugees joined them. The Taliban interpreted their success
as a sign that it was God’s will that they should prevail, and within a
few years they controlled large parts of the country. The Taliban finally
captured the capital Kabul in 1996 and established the Islamic Emirate
of Afghanistan, which ruled almost ninety percent of the country. They
received support from Pakistan, and from Saudi Arabia and other Arab
countries.101 The northern part of Afghanistan was still under Russian
influence and against the Taliban. The Northern Alliance was formed in
1997 to fight against the Taliban. It received support from Russia, Iran,
and India.102
The Taliban rule was based on their own extremely strict interpretation
of Sharia law. Women were not allowed to work outside the home and
were required to cover their faces in public. Girls were not allowed to
go to school. Music, dancing, and games were banned. Music tapes,
videos, and televisions were destroyed. The strict religious discipline
that had enabled the Taliban to establish order in the lawless country
came at a high price. The Taliban were vigilante militias with a religious
education, but they were not educated for governing a country and they
made many mistakes. In 1998, they killed ten Iranian diplomats, and
this forced Iran to go into conflict with the Taliban.103
Many of the people who joined the Taliban were young Afghan
refugees who had grown up in refugee camps in Pakistan. The only
education they had been able to get was in the madrassas. Pakistan’s
ruler Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, who had come to power by a military
coup in 1977, supported the expansion of the network of conservative
madrassas in his country. Zia was not a religious extremist himself, but
he supported the conservative religious forces for strategic reasons. He
probably understood that a deeply religious population would be less
likely to demand democracy than a more secular population.104 The
madrassa students were recruited from deeply religious people, poor

101 Rashid (2002, p. 21), Abbas (2014, p. 62), Murshed (2006, p. 42), Richardson, L. (2006,
p. 89)
102 Murshed (2006, p. 49)
103 Rashid (2002, p. 204), Abbas (2014), Nojumi (2002, p. 168), Murshed (2006)
104 Abbas (2005, p. 100)

5. Economic Determinants of Conflict and Fear



119

refugees, and orphans. The education in the madrassas was aimed at
religious work rather than trade or other occupations. Whether the
madrassa leaders realized it or not, they were educating loyal cannon
fodder for the civil wars in Afghanistan, Kashmir, and elsewhere.105
The Taliban attracted Islamic extremists from many countries, and the
areas under Taliban control became a sanctuary for radical international
Islamist groups. One of those Islamists who sought protection under
Taliban was Osama bin Laden. In 1989, bin Laden became the leader of
al-Qaeda—an Islamist network, mainly Salafist, which was fighting for
a caliphate and against Western interference in the Islamic countries.
Al-Qaeda fought along with the Taliban in the Afghan civil war, but they
also had a more international focus. Allegations that the CIA supported
bin Laden cannot be confirmed, but the Pakistan Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI) had recruited bin Laden, and the CIA supported the
ISI as well as the Taliban.106
Al-Qaeda was linked to the first terror bombing of the World Trade
Center in New York in 1993 and was actively involved in the bombing
of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. The USA switched
sides when they discovered that the anti-Russian forces they had so
generously supported and armed were also anti-American. US forces
bombed targets in Afghanistan and Sudan in retaliation and started a
hunt for bin Laden.107
The terror attacks against New York and Washington on 11 September
2001 were a turning point for Afghanistan. The US administration
immediately named al-Qaeda and bin Laden as the culprits behind
these dramatic terror attacks. The USA demanded that the Taliban
expel al-Qaeda and extradite bin Laden. The Taliban refused to comply
with these demands until they had received evidence that al-Qaeda was
responsible for the terror attacks. They were not satisfied with the weak
evidence provided. Less than a month after the terror attacks, the USA
went to war with Afghanistan, with the aim of removing the Taliban
from power, destroying al-Qaeda, and hunting down bin Laden.
Rebuilding the nation had low priority. A coalition led by the USA and
NATO fought for thirteen years in Afghanistan. The coalition forces
105 Butt (2012), Bird and Marshall (2011, p. 167)
106 Rashid (2002, p. 131), Abbas (2014, p. 73)
107 Rashid (2002, p. 134)

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withdrew in 2014, but conflicts continued. The chaos and insecurity that
had led to the formation of the Taliban twenty years earlier plagued the
country once more, and the Taliban has grown again, though they do
not rule the country.108
The introduction of drones has changed the way of fighting. The USA
focuses more on drone-killing leading members of Taliban and al-Qaeda
and less on the reasons why these organizations exist. The death toll
may be smaller in a drone war than in other kinds of war, but there
are still many civilian casualties. Drone strikes are frightening to the
general population because they are seen as an uncontrollable external
force that kills randomly without warning. The US drone strikes have
led to increased recruitment for the Taliban, and we can conclude that
this new military technology has a regalizing effect comparable to other
ways of fighting.109
Both the Northern Alliance and the Taliban have relied heavily on
drug production as a funding source. There is a strong symbiosis between
guerillas and drug producers. The guerillas need the drug money, and
the producers need the guerillas for protection and smuggling. As a
consequence of this self-sustaining cycle, Afghanistan has become the
world’s largest producer of heroin and hashish, with hundreds of drug
laboratories.110 It appears that the USA did nothing to stop this booming
drug industry.111
Another factor in the conflict was the large unused resources of oil
and minerals in Central Asia. There was intense competition between
two oil companies, the US-based Unocal and the Argentinian Bridas,
for permission to build a gas pipeline through Afghanistan. Access to
the oil resources was an important focus for the US involvement in the
conflict prior to 2001.112
Afghanistan has been the battleground for many simultaneous
conflicts within this period: a contest between the two superpowers USA
and the Soviet Union; a conflict over oil and other natural resources;
conflicts between the many ethnic groups in the country; the illegal
108 Rashid (2002), Abbas (2014, p. 117), Murshed (2006, p. 294), Bird and Marshall
(2011, p. 111)
109 Abbas (2014, p. 166, 201)
110 Scott (2003, p. 31), Peters, G. (2011)
111 Risen (2006, p. 154), Scott (2003)
112 Rashid (2002, p. 160)

5. Economic Determinants of Conflict and Fear



121

drugs trade; conflicts between Muslims and anti-religious communists,
Sunni and Shia Muslims, moderate Sufis and the more fundamentalist
Salafists and Wahhabis; conflicts between Iran and Pakistan; and a
central focus in the USA’s global war on terror. At the same time,
Afghanistan has been a training ground for fighters in the conflict
between Pakistan and India over Kashmir as well as for al-Qaeda’s fight
against US dominance in the Middle East.
These conflicts have been fought to a large extent by local militias
with poor education but with large amounts of external support from
each of their sponsor. All warring parties used local militias as proxies
because local knowledge of the rugged terrain was essential for
military success. Arming local militias whose loyalty could change was
a dangerous strategy.113 The USA, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and several
other countries have supported the Taliban with billions of dollars as
well as with weapons, training, and logistics. Russia, Iran, and India
have supported the Northern Alliance on the other side. Everyone
supported their local proxies based on the dubious logic that my
enemy’s enemy is my friend. The external support has enabled these
impoverished tribespeople to fight on a much larger scale then they
would have been able to do otherwise. The casualties, the number of
refugees, and the destruction of infrastructure have been much higher
than any ‘natural’ conflict would bring without external support.
This is why the regal effect of this conflict has been so high and why
Afghanistan under the Taliban was one of the most regal societies we
have seen in modern times.
Regal influences from neighbor countries also played a significant
role. The political climate in Pakistan had been radicalized by the
conflict with India over Kashmir and East Pakistan—now Bangladesh—
while Zia-ul-Haq actively supported radical Islamic groups for strategic
reasons.114 At the same time, the Islamic revolution in Iran and the war
with Iraq had given Iran strict religious rule. Pakistan and Iran both
contributed to the conflict in Afghanistan by supporting their chosen
sides.
The extreme regality of the Taliban showed itself in many ways. The
Taliban gained momentum initially by punishing rape, homosexuality,
113 Giustozzi (2012)
114 Abbas (2005, p. 112)

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Warlike and Peaceful Societies

and other sexual crimes. Culprits were publicly punished and often
killed and hanged in the streets for everybody to see. The regality was
also reflected in cultural life, as predicted by our theory. Music, dance,
paintings, and most games were banned, but all this returned quickly
when the Taliban was removed from power.115 Ancient pieces of art
from before the Islamic period were destroyed in the National Museum
in Kabul. International condemnation was universal when the Taliban
destroyed two giant Buddha statues from the sixth century.116
A very conspicuous sign of regality was the seclusion and complete
veiling of women under the Taliban. Before the Taliban rule, there was
a diversity of opinions about the liberation of women and whether
they should be veiled. Women were free to go with or without the veil,
and some even wore miniskirts when this was in fashion in the 1960s
and 70s (compare figures 9 and 10).
The majority of women lived in villages where veiling was
incompatible with the hard work. Rich women in the cities carried a
veil as a status symbol to show that they did not have to work hard.
Many women put on the veil during the war with the Russians as
a symbol of their cultural difference from the Russians. But under
the Taliban there was no choice. Women had to cover themselves
completely, including the face.117
Many commentators have described the Taliban as a Frankenstein’s
monster. After US support had helped them come to power, the Taliban
and its associated organization al-Qaeda became bitter enemies of the
USA.118 The US administration and the CIA have not learned from
their mistakes in Afghanistan. They are doing the same thing in Syria
right now. The USA and its allies have supported opposition groups
in Syria in an attempt to topple President Bashar al-Assad, while
Russia supports Assad.119 Opposition groups became powerful with US
support, only to grow into one of the most brutal and feared ‘terrorist
organizations’, variously known as Islamic State, ISIS, ISIL, or Daesh.

115 Rashid (2002), Baily (2015)
116 Rashid (2002, p. 76), Abbas (2014, p. 71)
117 Rahimi (1986), Iversen and Stray (1985)
118 Abbas (2005, p. 13), Barfield (2010, chapter 5), Rashid (2002)
119 Mumford (2013, p. 98), Anderson (2016, chapters 2 and 11)

5. Economic Determinants of Conflict and Fear



123

There are presently many rumors about who is supporting whom in
Syria but little reliable evidence. It is too early to write the history books
as events are still unfolding, but we can already see the signs of a new
proxy war between the USA and Russia in Syria.

Figure 9. Students at the Higher Teachers’ College, Kabul, Afghanistan,
1967. Before the war, the religious dress code was not always observed.
Photo by William (Bill) F. Podlich, 1967.120

Figure 10. Afghan women wait outside a USAID-supported health care
clinic, Afghanistan, 2003. The increased regality is clearly reflected in
the women’s dress. Photo by Nitin Madhav, 2003.121

120 All rights reserved, reproduced with permission, http://www.pbase.com/qleap/
image/120404891
121 Public domain, https://no.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fil:Group_of_Women_Wearing_
Burkas.jpg

6. Strategic Uses of Fear

6.1. Terrorism conflicts
Terrorism often leads to a significant regalization of the attacked
society. This leads to further repression of the political interests that
the terrorists are fighting for and therefore more terrorism. The current
chapter explains this vicious circle.
There is no common agreement on how to define terrorism or on
deciding who should be called terrorists. It is often said that one man’s
terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter. Some definitions of terrorism
focus on the terrorization of people through shocking acts of violence.
Other definitions point at political violence against civilians. And some
definitions regard terrorism as a form of political communication where
the intended audience is broader than the immediate victims of the
violent acts. The word ‘terrorism’ was originally used about tyrannical
leaders who terrorized their population, but today the word is mostly
used about rebels fighting against a government—many definitions
explicitly exclude government actors as terrorists.1
All attempts to reach a common definition of terrorism have failed
because the main use of the words ‘terrorist’ and ‘terrorism’ has been to
delegitimize one’s enemies. Politicians and professionals have generally
been careful to tailor their definition of terrorism so that it fits their
enemies but not their friends.2 The power of words and definitions has
1 
Richardson, L. (2006, p. 20), Ganor (2002), Reid (1997), Jackson, Breen-Smyth,
Gunning and Jarvis (2011), Lutz (2008, p. 9)
2 Reid (1997), Jackson, Breen-Smyth, Gunning and Jarvis (2011)
© 2017 Agner Fog, CC BY 4.0

https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0128.06

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long been recognized,3 and there is no neutral ground in this war on
words.4 The one who succeeds in applying the label of ‘terrorists’ to his
enemies has won the moral battle.
The present book will not contribute to the futile attempts to reach a
precise definition of terrorism. Instead, the word will be used in a more
interpretive and historical meaning to describe any kind of political
violence that is considered terrorism by the surrounding society.
Today, terrorism is mostly seen in asymmetric conflicts. It makes no
sense for a small group of rebels with few resources to use conventional
weapons when fighting against an immensely more powerful state or
government.5 Terrorism is used as a last resort when other strategies fail.
For example, Palestinian terrorists say that they have tried everything
else.6 This logic was explained with remarkable clarity by the French
philosopher Jean Baudrillard after the terror attacks against the USA on
September 11, 2001: ‘It is the system itself that has created the objective
conditions for this brutal retort. By taking all the cards to itself, it forces
the other to change the rules of the game’.7 The playing cards that
Baudrillard metaphorically refers to include the superior military and
economic power of the USA, as well as the discursive power. Most of
the international news media are US-owned, and the USA dominates
the academic discussions as well. The much weaker group of Islamists
has strong grievances against the USA, but they would get nowhere if
they chose to fight by more conventional means. However, terrorism is
difficult to justify morally or ideologically, and some terrorists have left
their organizations when they realized how much they had hurt their
innocent victims.8
There is a strange relationship between terrorists and the mass
media. Fear is profitable for the media, as explained in chapter 5.1.
The more shocking and scary the event, the more profitable it is for the
media to report about it. Insurgents complain that the only time the
media want to talk with them is when they have carried out a terror

3 Foucault (1980, chapter 6)
4 Rid and Hecker (2009, 45)
5 Richardson, L. (2006, p. 28)
6 Speckhard (2012), Adams (1986, p. 48)
7 Baudrillard (2001)
8 Moghadam (2012)

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operation.9 Terrorism is a form of political communication, aided by the
mass media, but terrorists pay a high price for this media attention.
The mass media prefer a simple picture of good guys versus bad
guys because moral ambiguity is bad for the media.10 The media tend
to frame terrorism stories with a focus on current episodes of violence
rather than on the underlying political conflicts; and terrorists do not
always regard media coverage as beneficial to their cause.11 The media
often rely heavily on government sources when reporting terrorism
incidents, and they tend to support the government’s position on the
conflict.12 In this way, the mass media amplify the asymmetry of the
conflict and thereby block the road to peace. Peace negotiations have
been more successful in situations where the media have diminished
the asymmetry by representing the negotiators of the two parties as
equals.13
The media coverage of terrorism since 9/11 shows all the signs of
a moral panic described in chapter 3.10: the talk is highly emotional;
the reaction is exaggerated, in the sense that other dangers with much
higher death tolls get much less attention; a group of scapegoats
is stigmatized (such as Muslims after 9/11); common standards of
justice are undermined; the definition of terrorism is unclear and ever
expanding (eco-terrorism, narco-terrorism, cyber-terrorism, etc.); and a
large number of experts claim to know the motives and modus operandi
of the terrorists without ever meeting a terrorist.14
Social scientists have discovered that the threat of terrorism can
have profound effects on public attitudes and sentiments towards a
variety of issues.15 There is a general ‘rally around the flag’ effect, with
increased trust in the government and support for the president, and
increased social identification, nationalism, and patriotism.16 There is a
9 Speckhard (2012)
10 Weimann and Winn (1994)
11 Paletz and Schmid (1992, pp. 41, 67), Cooke (2003)
12 Brinson and Stohl (2009)
13 Shinar and Bratic (2010)
14 
Jackson, Breen-Smyth, Gunning and Jarvis (2011), Rothe and Muzzatti (2004),
Altheide (2009), Keen (2006, p. 98)
15 Woods (2011)
16 
Chowanietz (2010), Nacos, Bloch-Elkon and Shapiro (2011, chapters 1 and 2),
Schmid and Muldoon (2015), Huddy, Feldman and Weber (2007), Olivas-Luján,
Harzing and McCoy (2004)

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tendency towards a more hierarchical orientation and authoritarianism
in political debates.17 Democratic principles, civil liberties, and human
rights are undermined,18 freedom of the press is limited,19 and there are
more hate crimes and scapegoating.20 There is more war, militarism,
and armament, and more state crimes after terrorism campaigns.21 All
these effects are indicators of the strong regalizing effect of terrorism.
We may wonder why the psychological effect of terrorism is so
strong compared to other dangers. A major reason is that terrorism lends
itself to coverage in the mass media. It offers very dramatic and graphic
images with opportunities for person-centered stories of victims, heroes,
and villains. People pay attention to these stories because terrorism can
hit anybody.22 Political entrepreneurs have worked effectively in many
cases to boost the rallying effect by skillfully using the media to whip
up public emotions and by organizing big mourning ceremonies for
the victims.23 Terrorism events are often followed by tough legislation
implemented hastily in the highly emotional atmosphere after the
event, and this legislation is not always rolled back when the peaceful
atmosphere returns.24 Common standards of justice are typically eroded
by this process, which spills over into other areas of justice unrelated to
terrorism.25
There is a long-standing debate about how effective terrorism is as
a weapon.26 The political scientist Robert Pape has found that suicide
terrorism may be successful in achieving at least some proximate goals,27
while his colleague Max Abrahms maintains that terrorism is generally a
counterproductive strategy.28 The disagreement boils down to different
definitions of terrorism and different criteria for measuring success.
17 Olivas-Luján, Harzing and McCoy (2004), Perrin (2005)
18 
Rothe and Muzzatti (2004), Huddy, Feldman and Weber (2007), Welch (2006,
chapter 9), Human Rights Watch (2014), Amnesty International (2004)
19 Simon (2002)
20 Welch (2006, chapter 5)
21 Huddy, Feldman and Weber (2007), Carnagey and Anderson (2007), Welch (2006,
chapter 7), Mayer, J. (2008)
22 Hirsch-Hoefler, Canetti, Rapaport and Hobfoll (2014)
23 Oates, Kaid and Berry (2010)
24 Lynch (2012), Douglas (2014), Carlile and Owen (2015)
25 Donohue (2012)
26 Compare Dershowitz (2002) and Abrahms (2006)
27 Pape (2003)
28 Abrahms (2011)

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129

Terrorist groups have in some cases had success in the short-term goals
of strengthening their organization and their political position, but
rarely in their ultimate strategic goals of gaining national independence
or expelling a foreign regime.29 Historically, terrorism has sometimes
been successful in colonial wars.30
A considerable number of statistical studies have found that rebel
groups who attack civilians practically never win a conflict, and only
rarely are they able to obtain a negotiated settlement,31 while guerilla
groups that attack only military targets have success in some cases.32
In the few cases where terrorists have had some success, this success
may be due to factors other than their tactic of attacking civilians.33
The Madrid bombings have often been mentioned as an example of a
successful terrorism action because they influenced an election result
and political decisions. However, this success was mainly due to the fact
that the Spanish government had lied about the terror incident and that
the lie was exposed on the day of the election (see chapter 6.3).
Asymmetric conflicts tend to be long-lasting,34 and conflicts that
involve terrorism often become intractable. Statistical studies show that
conflicts where civilians are attacked can be very long-lasting.35 There
are several reasons why terrorism is such an unsuccessful strategy.
Government negotiators are mostly unwilling to negotiate with terrorists
for fear that their concessions might inspire more terrorism.36 The rebels
have no chance of winning by means of conventional warfare, yet their
motive for fighting persists as long as their grievances are not resolved.
The political scientist Max Abrahms uses attribution theory to
show that people very often misinterpret the intentions of terrorists by
confusing the consequences of their actions with the motives behind
them. The targeted population believes that the terrorists want to
destroy their society and their values and create chaos, while the real
goal of the terrorists may be, for example, to gain independence, or to
29 Krause (2013)
30 Münkler (2005, p. 103)
31 Abrahms (2006), Abrahms and Lula (2012), Abrahms and Gottfried (2014), Fortna
(2015)
32 Abrahms and Lula (2012)
33 Abrahms and Lula (2012), Cronin (2009)
34 Thies (Thies 2001)
35 Fortna (2015)
36 Richardson, L. (2006)

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end occupation of their land. This misinterpretation leads to hardline
and uncompromising responses. The negotiators of the targeted country
assume that concessions will lead to more terrorism not less.37
The rebels may use violence in order to get media attention, but
the media coverage they get is almost completely negative, with a
focus on the violence and not on the grievances of the terrorists. This
does not lead to more sympathy for the terrorists or understanding
of their grievances.38 Instead, we see a spiral of hate, violence, and
political extremism where the attacked country implements draconian
countermeasures that lead to new violent reactions.39 This spiral of
violence makes both parties more regal and less willing to make
concessions or to negotiate a compromise. Ethnic, religious, or cultural
differences between the two conflicting parties are amplified by this
process and used strategically by the leaders.40 If the conflicting parties
have no important cultural identities to hinge their conflict on, they will
invent them. For example, both the Palestinians and the Israelis have
strengthened their nationalism and sense of identity as a consequence
of the conflict between them. Before the conflict, the inhabitants of
present Palestine were likely to idenfity as Jordanians or Arabs, while
‘Palestinian’ was not a strong or important identity.41
We may ask why terrorism is used at all as a political strategy when
it is so clearly counterproductive. We would expect rebel groups to learn
from history and realize that the strategy of violence against random
civilians only benefits their enemy. Analyzing the situation, we may
suggest several hypotheses for explaining why terrorism exists at all:
• Some terrorists are simply bad strategists. Their minds are
occupied with other things, such as political, ideological, or
theological discussions, internal hierarchy, organizational
matters, security, rallying ceremonies, fundraising, recruiting
new members, and propaganda.42

37 Abrahms (2006)
38 Abrahms and Lula (2012)
39 Canetti et al. (2013), Chowanietz (2010)
40 Richardson, L. (2006, p. 188)
41 Brand (1995), Peretz (1996)
42 Kassimeris (2008)

6. Strategic Uses of Fear



• Terrorists are generally driven by strong grievances. They
become radicalized by seeing great injustice being committed
against a group that they identify with, and they want
revenge. Influenced by a supportive group and a legitimizing
ideology, they may resort to terrorism when other strategies
seem useless. They see themselves as altruists fighting for a
just cause, while their enemies see them as evil psychopaths.43
• Rebel groups are generally unable to cause any significant
damage to their enemy if they fight with conventional
weapons against a superior military power. Attacking civilian
targets is perceived as a last resort.44
• Rebel groups are unable to get media attention unless they
commit shocking acts of violence. They are encouraged by
the intense media coverage they get when they commit acts
of terrorism.45
• Rebel groups are inspired by similar groups in other countries.
They imitate the groups that get the most coverage in the
international news media rather than the groups that are most
successful.
• Terrorists overestimate their chances of victory, because they
draw a false analogy with guerrilla successes.46
• Usually, the ultimate goal of a rebel group is to win a strategic
victory over their enemy, but at the same time they are
pursuing the more proximate goals of strengthening their own
organization, recruiting new members, gaining adherents and
supporters, fundraising, and strengthening their position vis-àvis rival groups within the same movement. While the strategy
of terrorism does not help them reach the ultimate goal, it may
be effective in reaching the other proximate goals. In several
cases, more radical and violent groups have outcompeted
relatively moderate groups fighting for the same cause.47
43 Speckhard (2012), Richardson, L. (2006, p. 63)
44 Speckhard (2012), Richardson, L. (2006)
45 Richardson, L. (2006)
46 Abrahms and Lula (2012), Richardson, L. (2006)
47 Richardson, L. (2006, p. 105), Krause (2013)

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• The conflict may have side effects that are beneficial to certain
stakeholders on one or both sides of the conflict. Leading
members of the rebel groups, government officials of the
attacked country, and, of course, weapons dealers may have
little incentive to end the conflict because of the political,
economic, and psychological payoffs it provides for them.
These payoffs include cover for suppression and abuse of the
population, exploitation of natural resources, protection for
the drugs trade and other criminal economic activity, profit
for the weapons industry, profit for the mass media, uniting a
population around the psychological need for a strong leader,
warding off democracy, and the opportunity for the military
to interfere in politics.48
• In some cases, rebel groups are manipulated by their enemies
into using counterproductive tactics. This is explained in the
next chapter.
• Spiraling violence causes both parties in a conflict to become
more regal. This causes people to act more emotionally, to use
a more radical and uncompromising rhetoric, and to become
more violent or to support the more violent groups.
The strong psychological impact of terrorism makes the attacked
population more regal and more likely to react with draconian
countermeasures. The rebel group feels that the counter-attacks against
them are disproportionate and unfair, and this is ground for further
radicalization. Their civil rights and access to a fair system of justice are
often undermined. This gives the rebel group still more grievances and
reasons to fight. For example, during the conflict in Northern Ireland,
the republican rebels were often more focused on fighting against the
lack of due process and other injustices against them than on fighting
for their original cause.49 In Palestine, many people feel that their life
conditions in the conflict zone are so intolerable that they would rather
die an honorable death as martyrs or suicide bombers than continue
their hopeless lives.50
48 Keen (2006, chapter 3)
49 O’Day (1993), Soule (1989)
50 Speckhard (2012, chapter 8)

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133

This vicious circle is further aggravated by the widespread policy
of never negotiating with terrorists. The rebels may conclude that their
only option is to use more violence when they experience that their
enemies are unwilling to negotiate with them or make any concessions.51
Such a vicious circle is not easily ended. An escalating conflict may
end with complete victory for the strongest party when no third party
intervenes. This was the normal outcome of asymmetric conflicts in
ancient times. Today, however, the international community will not
accept the genocide that such an outcome would entail. The intervention
of third parties or international organizations has often been strong
enough to prevent a genocide but not strong enough to stop the conflict
and enforce a negotiated solution. Conflicts that involve terrorism may
end if the rebels lose their support and funding,52 but the conflicts may
flare up again unless the grievances are resolved.
The international community may facilitate a more lasting solution
to an asymmetric conflict by putting enough pressure on the stronger
party to deal with the grievances of the weaker party. This is what
happened in South Africa when apartheid was abolished. However,
many rebel groups lack sufficient resources to influence international
opinion in their favor. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern
Ireland did indeed have a strong propaganda strategy, but they had
little luck in bypassing British censorship and the self-censorship of the
British media.53 News media in other countries simply relayed reports
from the British news agencies without informing their audience that
they were purveying censored news. The impetus for any kind of
third party intervention that might have facilitated the negotiation
of a compromise solution was therefore missing. The IRA eventually
changed their strategy and ended the violence when they realized that
they lacked public support and that the strategy of terrorism was futile.54
While the tactics of terrorism are mostly counterproductive, so are
attempts to combat terrorism. Politicians often respond with extreme
measures and rhetoric, fueled by media hysteria in the aftermath of a

51 Richardson, L. (2006)
52 Cronin (2009), Clarke (2015)
53 Kingston (1995), Cooke (2003)
54 Alonso (2001), Phayal (2011)

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terrorism event.55 The regal reaction to terrorism events often includes
infringements on civil liberties and lowered standards of justice.56
This is fuel for the ideology of the terrorist organizations and their
claims that they are victims of oppression and injustice. In this way,
counterterrorism measures work against their purpose; they contribute
to radicalization of terrorist organizations and help them to recruit new
members. The Dutch historian Beatrice de Graaf has shown that there is
a positive correlation between the amount of dramatic counterterrorism
measures and the radicalization of rebels.57
Those who fight against terrorism often ignore the more fundamental
but less visible causes of terrorism and focus on something tangible such
as specific persons and organizations.58 Much of the counterterrorism
literature ignores the importance of grievances. Rebels will still be
motivated to fight as long as they have strong grievances. Any attempt
to suppress them by brute force will only add to their grievances. The
strong asymmetry of power makes it unlikely that negotiations can lead
to a compromise that is acceptable to the rebels. The politicians of the
attacked country face a serious dilemma. If they make concessions to
the terrorists they may be encouraging more terrorism. But if, on the
other hand, they employ a hard-line policy, they may exacerbate the
grievances and contribute to further radicalization of the terrorists.
Even the most dovish politician of a country struck by terrorists would
refrain from making concessions to terrorists for fear that he or she
might be accused of being ‘soft on terrorism’ and rewarding terrorists
when the population is panicked by the attacks.
Attempts to combat terrorist organizations are often focused on
eliminating specific leaders, who are portrayed as evil. Arresting the
leader of a terrorist group may be an effective strategy only if the group
depends on a single charismatic leader. In other cases, it will lead to
further radicalization, especially if the leader is killed under dramatic
circumstances.59 Attempts to eliminate specific terrorist organizations
with militaristic means have only contributed to escalation of the conflict
55 Altheide (2006), Mueller, J. (2006)
56 Amnesty International (2004), Simon (2002), Carlile and Owen (2015), Norris, J.
(2016)
57 De Graaf (2011)
58 Keen (2006, chapter 2)
59 Inglehart and Welzel (2005, p. 297), Richardson, L. (2006, p. 12)

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135

and radicalization of the terrorists, while the defeated terror cells are
continually replaced by new ones.60 It may be an efficient strategy to
target the funding sources of the terrorists, but this does not remove
the grievances.61 In most cases, the grievances can be dealt with in a
way that the weaker party perceives as fair only when a third party
mediates in the conflict and puts pressure on the stronger party to make
concessions.
While terrorism is not a winning strategy for the rebels, it may be
quite useful for the government of the country that is being attacked.
Terrorism often produces a strong sense of patriotism, rallying around
the flag, support for the incumbent government, and tolerance of quite
repressive measures of justice. These effects are so strong that the
governments of terror-ridden countries may have an interest in letting
an ongoing terrorism campaign continue. They may even provoke terror
attacks against their own countries. It has happened many times in
modern history that governments have instigated, or deliberately failed
to prevent, terror attacks against their own countries. Whether this is
intended or not, terror attacks give the government the advantage of a
regal climate that strengthens the power of the leaders. The paradoxical
phenomenon that political leaders may somehow be complicit in
terror attacks against their own population is described in the next two
chapters.

6.2. The strategy of tension in Italy and elsewhere
Italy was hit by a large wave of terror attacks in the period from the
late 1960s to the early 1980s—the so-called Years of Lead (named so
after bullets made of lead). The situation in Italy in those years was
very complicated but also very interesting from a theoretical point of
view. The political landscape was chaotic, and political violence was
widespread. There were frequent clashes between neofascists and leftwing activists in the streets, and the violence escalated into political
assassinations, kidnappings, terrorism, and attempted coups.62

60 Keen (2006, chapter 11)
61 Adams (1986), Clarke (2015)
62 Bull, M. (1992), Weinberg (1995)

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A particularly notorious series of terror events occurred on 12
December 1969. A terror bomb exploded in front of a bank on Piazza
Fontana in Milan, killing sixteen people and wounding eighty-eight.
Three bombs exploded in other Italian cities on the same day, and one
more bomb was left unexploded. The bombings were initially blamed
on a small anarchist group, and twenty-seven left-wing activists
were arrested under intense media coverage. After several years of
investigation, it was found that among the approximately ten members
of the anarchist group were two infiltrators: a neofascist activist and a
police agent. They had produced false evidence against the group. New
evidence pointed to the neofascist organization Ordine Nuovo, which
was also responsible for several other terror bombings.63
There were hundreds of terror bombings committed by various
neofascist groups in these years, and quite often they were blamed on
left-wing groups. Sometimes, right-wing terrorists left false leads to
implicate left-wing groups. Corruption at all levels of the state apparatus
was evident. The police would often follow the so-called ‘red track’
(left-wing suspects) and ignore the more likely ‘black track’ (right-wing
suspects). Police investigations were obstructed, evidence disappeared,
false evidence was fabricated, witnesses were murdered, and processes
at one court were interrupted and moved to another court with another
judge. A general pattern was that suspects were convicted only to be
later acquitted at a higher court. This happened to both right-wing and
left-wing suspects. Thirty-three years of trials, re-trials, and appeals
ended with acquittals for most of the suspects.64
Some left-wing groups became radicalized as a response to the
neofascist violence, the political situation, and the illegitimate behavior
of the state apparatus. A particularly militant left-wing group was Brigate
Rosse (the Red Brigades), who committed a series of assassinations
and political kidnappings. The former Prime Minister Aldo Moro was
kidnapped by Brigate Rosse in 1978 and killed after fifty-five days in
captivity. The kidnapping happened at a time when Moro, as president
of the Christian Democrats, was negotiating a historical compromise to
include the Italian Communist Party in a coalition government. Those
plans died with Moro. Preventing the communists from entering the
63 Ferraresi (1996, p. 9)
64 Cento Bull (2007, p. 24), Willan (1991, chapter 7), Bale (1996), Ferraresi (1996)

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137

government was perhaps not the most logical thing for a left-wing
group to do, but it appears that they were against the revisionist, or
compromising policy of the Communist Party.65
The population was confused over whether left-wing or right-wing
groups were behind the many terror attacks, and there was much
suspicion that the secret service, clandestine paramilitary groups,
the CIA, and other foreign agencies were involved.66 Research has
confirmed many of these suspicions as more and more evidence has
been uncovered through the following decades. It is now evident that
the terrorism in Italy in these years was instrumental in the so-called
strategy of tension, with the purpose of preventing a communist
takeover of power in Italy.67
The strategy of tension can be traced back to a symposium on the
topic of revolutionary warfare in 1965, organized by the obscure Alberto
Pollio Institute of Military History. The Pollio Institute was set up by
an agent of the secret service with money from companies interested in
winning defense contracts. Present at the meeting were leading members
of various neofascist organizations and future terrorists, as well as highranking members of the secret service and the armed forces.68
There are many different interpretations of the strategy of tension, and
each of the involved groups and organizations had their own agenda.
Italy had the strongest Communist party in Western Europe at the
time, and many were afraid of a communist takeover of power in Italy.
The supporters of the strategy of tension deliberately fueled political
violence in order to create psychological tension in the population. They
wanted to ‘destabilize in order to stabilize’. By creating insecurity, they
hoped that people would seek security in a strong government and
that this would pave the way for a more authoritarian government or a
neofascist coup.69
The groups that were most active in the strategy of tension were Ordine
Nuovo, Avanguardia Nazionale, and the masonic lodge Propaganda
Due, all with a neofascist ideology and with links to the secret service.
65 Amara (2006)
66 Hajek (2010)
67 Ferraresi (1996, p. 86), Cento Bull (2007, chapter 4)
68 Weinberg (1995), Ferraresi (1996, p. 71), Cento Bull (2007, p. 57), Willan (1991, p. 40)
69 Bull, M. (1992), Cento Bull (2007, chapter 4), Willan (1991), Bale (1996), De Lutiis
(1998, chapter 4)

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Warlike and Peaceful Societies

Propaganda Due included high-ranking and influential members of
the police, military, and secret services, as well as industry leaders and
politicians. The secret services were dominated by neofascists and anticommunists, and the connections between all these groups made coverups and the systematic obstruction of justice possible.70 Secret documents
from the Italian military intelligence service SIFAR reveal that they were
very afraid that the communists would win elections and that the SIFAR
was actively working against the socialists and communists.71
The Brigate Rosse and other radical left-wing groups in Europe
were infiltrated by right-wing activists and secret service agents, who
manipulated them and made them more radical and more violent in order
to use them as tools in the strategy of tension.72 The kidnapping of Moro
was carried out with the highest degree of military professionalism—
far beyond the capabilities of a small group of political activists. It is
unknown whether they were helped by undercover agents from the
secret services or by some paramilitary group.73 However, we can be
certain that the secret services could have stopped the Brigate Rosse at
any time if they wanted to, given the information available to them from
infiltrators.74 During the period of Moro’s captivity, the police messed
up or failed to follow obvious leads that could have taken them to the
hiding places of the Brigate Rosse.75
Historians have been debating for years about who were the masters
pulling the strings in the strategy of tension. Were the various groups
acting autonomously, were they controlled by some powerful elite in
the country, and did they receive support from abroad? Some historians
believe that the CIA and NATO played a major role76 while other
historians disagree.77
There is evidence of strong connections with Aginter Press in
Portugal, a press agency that served as a cover for an anti-communist
mercenary organization that trained its members in covert action
70 Ferraresi (1996, p. 89), Cento Bull (2007, chapters 3 and 4), Willan (1991, chapters 2
and 3), Amara (2006, chapter 3)
71 Ferraresi (1996, pp. 63, 77)
72 Weinberg (1995), Willan (1991, chapter 10), Bale (1996)
73 Amara (2006)
74 Willan (1991, chapter 10)
75 Pellegrino (1997), Amara (2006, chapter 1)
76 Feldbauer (2000), Rowse (1994), Ganser (2005)
77 Davies (2005), Nuti (2007)

6. Strategic Uses of Fear



139

techniques including infiltration and counterinsurgency. Members of
the Aginter Press participated in the Pollio Institute meeting, and there
are close similarities between the strategy promoted by Aginter Press
and the Italian strategy of tension.78
The possible involvement of the CIA is difficult to prove because that
organization routinely hides covert actions behind other organizations
so that its involvement can plausibly be denied.79 Nevertheless, there
are many indications that the CIA and NATO supported the strategy of
tension because they wanted to limit communist influence in Western
Europe and because of the strategic importance of US and NATO
military airbases in Italy.80 It is well documented that the CIA had
secretly been interfering in Italian elections since 1948 in order to keep
the Italian Communist Party from power.81
The CIA, the National Security Council (NSC), and the US Joint Chiefs
of Staff (JCS) were involved in a plan called Operation Demagnetize,
whose purpose was to reduce the strength of the Communist Party,
according to secret documents that have since been declassified.82 The
US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger strongly criticized Moro’s policy,
and a US intelligence official warned Moro of serious consequences if
he continued his policy of dialogue with the communists. Moro was so
shocked by this direct threat that he feared for his life.83 However, there
is no direct proof of active support from the CIA for the violent actions,
and some historians argue that the terrorism was determined mainly
by internal forces within Italy.84 Still other theories suggest that KGB,
Mossad, and other foreign secret services were also involved.85
If we want to analyze the motivations of the terrorists, it is clear that the
right-wing and left-wing terrorists had very different motivations. The
right-wing, or neofascist, terrorists followed a carefully planned strategy,
the strategy of tension. The neofascist groups were anti-intellectual, and
78 De Jesus (2012, chapter 2), Ferraresi (1996, p. 61)
79 Agee (1975)
80 De Lutiis (1998, chapter 4), Cento Bull (2007, chapter 4), Willan (1991), Pellegrino
(1997)
81 Corson (1977)
82 Cento Bull (2007, chapter 4), Willan (1991, p. 27), Ferraresi (1996, p. 76), De Lutiis
(1998, p. 133)
83 Willan (1991, chapter 11)
84 Coco (2015)
85 Fasanella, Pellegrino and Sestieri (2000)

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their members were not very concerned with strategy. They were more
moved by feelings, group spirit, rituals, marches, group loyalty, and
orders from their leaders.86 The organizational culture and hierarchy
of these neofascist groups clearly matched their regal ideology. We
can assume that the actions of the low-ranking members were more
determined by authoritarian or regal sentiments and orders from above
than by individual rationality. The higher-ranking decision makers, on
the other hand, had clearly thought out a strategy.
The strategy of tension definitely makes sense in the light of regality
theory. Evidently, those who devised this strategy had a theory that
people would support a more authoritarian government if random
violence and terror created psychological tension. The plan was that
this should pave the way for a neofascist coup. However, the strategy of
tension was not very successful. The Italians still remembered the cruel
fascist rule under Benito Mussolini and there was no general support
for returning to a fascist dictatorship. The only success of the strategy
of tension was that the murder of Aldo Moro thwarted plans to include
the Communist Party in the government. Such a coalition government
would probably have been quite unstable anyway.87
The failure of the strategy of tension can be explained by the fact
that the chaos and political violence was blamed on internal rather than
external factors. A threat from external powers would have increased
the support for a more authoritarian government, according to our
theory, but the main cause of the chaos and violence was the obvious
corruption, which of course did not increase people’s trust in the
government.
The motivation for the left-wing activists was quite different. They
had long discussions about theory and ideology, and their motivation for
using violence was defense against the violent fascists and the corrupt
state apparatus.88 Their strategy was, of course, even more unsuccessful,
as they were manipulated to serve interests opposite to their own. We
cannot predict what Italy would have looked like without the political
violence, but it appears that the political climate in the country was more

86 Ferraresi (1996, pp. 156, 194)
87 Willan (1991)
88 Ferraresi (1996, p. 193), Amara (2006)

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influenced by economic progress and by the democratic developments
in the neighboring countries than by the strategy of tension.

Figure 11. Aldo Moro in captivity, 1978. The kidnappers published this
photo, which made sure that everybody associated the action with the
left-wing group Brigate Rosse.89

The strategy of tension in Italy was extreme in its range and magnitude,
but far from unique. In a classic study of counterrevolution, Arno Mayer
describes the deliberate fabrication of violence and chaos as a common
counterrevolutionary strategy.90 The Aginter Press was not only active
in Italy and Portugal, but also in Algeria, Congo, Biafra (part of current
Nigeria), and other African countries. It is uncertain whether it used
similar strategies in those countries.91 A mysterious organization,
the Hyperion language school in Paris, delivered weapons to Brigate
Rosse, making it appear that the weapons originated from the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO). There were claims that Hyperion also
delivered weapons to the Red Army Faction (RAF) in Germany, to
the Basque separatist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain,

89 Public domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Aldo_Moro_br.jpg
90 Mayer, A. (1971, chapter 3)
91 De Jesus (2012)

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and to the IRA in Ireland,92 but this has not been verified. The Italian
investigators initially believed that the Hyperion school was a cover
organization for the CIA, but it might have been more than that. Later
investigations have led to the theory that Hyperion was a networking
point for Eastern and Western secret service organizations, with the
purpose of maintaining world stability by preserving the balance of
powers that was established in the Yalta agreement of 1945. Therefore,
the Hyperion people fought against anybody who threatened to sway
this balance of powers, including the new left, Aldo Moro, Olof Palme,
and many others.93
Heads of police from European countries decided at a meeting in
Cologne in the early 1970s to implement a common strategy of infiltrating
terrorist groups at the leadership level. Their undercover agents had
to be the bravest and cruellest members of the groups.94 In Belgium,
undercover intelligence agents were heavily involved in a series of false
flag terrorism attacks that claimed more than thirty lives in the 1980s.95
Turkey had a particularly powerful secret service that infiltrated leftwing groups with agents provocateurs, massacred whole villages and
blamed it on the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and created general
chaos before a coup.96
The situation in West Germany (the Federal Republic of Germany)
and the later united Germany was particularly complex. The undercover
agent Peter Urbach infiltrated several left-wing groups. He delivered
Molotov cocktails to an otherwise peaceful demonstration, he delivered
bombs to a Marxist organization, and he supplied weapons to the
infamous RAF.97 Other undercover agents failed to infiltrate the RAF
but delivered weapons to other radical groups and even attempted to
create a new terrorist organization.98
The RAF had three generations of militant activists. The first
generation received some support from the Stasi, the secret service of
East Germany (the German Democratic Republic), but they did not
92 Willan (1991, chapter 10), Feldbauer (2000, p. 66)
93 Fasanella, Pellegrino and Sestieri (2000, part 3), Igel (2012, p. 136ff)
94 Amara (2006, p. 22)
95 Jenkins (1990)
96 Çelik (1999)
97 Rosenfeld (2014), Winkler (1997), Peters, B. (2004)
98 Gössner (1991, pp. 183–215)

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want to be controlled by the Stasi. The second generation received
paramilitary training from the Stasi, and many RAF members fled to
East Germany, where they became involved in international terrorism
as paid agents of the Stasi.99 However, the relationship between the Stasi
and the RAF appeared to be ambivalent, and western agents and double
agents were also involved.100
The third generation of the RAF showed hardly any signs of being
an autonomous organization. Some researchers claim that the third
generation was nothing more than a phantom organization created
by Western security forces,101 while later research reveals a heavy
involvement of the Stasi.102 But if we assume that the third generation of
the RAF was controlled by the Stasi, then we have a problem explaining
why the RAF continued its activities for almost a decade after the fall
of the Berlin Wall, when the Stasi no longer existed. Regardless of who
was behind the later generations of the RAF, it was able to carry out
bombings and assassinations with military professionalism, and most
of its crimes remained unsolved.103 The similarity with Italy is obvious,
but there is so far no evidence of involvement of western secret services.
There is evidence of cooperation between the RAF in Germany
and Brigate Rosse in Italy. The German industry leader Hanns Martin
Schleyer was attacked by the second generation RAF. Schleyer and his
safety escort were stopped on a road in September 1977. His chauffeur
and three bodyguards were shot while he was abducted alive. He was
killed after forty-three days in captivity. Six months later, exactly the
same happened to Moro in Italy. There is evidence that some of the
RAF militants traveled to Italy and assisted in Moro’s abduction.104 If
the RAF was controlled by the Stasi, then why did they cooperate with
Brigate Rosse, which was almost completely controlled by right-wing
and Western security forces at that time? On the other hand, if the
RAF was controlled by right-wing or Western forces in the same way
as Brigate Rosse, then why did they kill Schleyer? There were obvious
right-wing and Western motives for killing Moro but not for killing
99 Igel (2012, p. 214), Müller and Kanonenberg (1992), Schmeidel (1993)
100 Bale (2012), Igel (2012, p. 288), Müller and Kanonenberg (1992)
101 Wisnewski, Landgraeber and Sieker (2008)
102 Igel (2012, p. 159)
103 Schmeidel (1993), Wisnewski, Landgraeber and Sieker (2008)
104 Igel (2012, p. 173)

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Schleyer. Was he killed in order to delegitimize left-wing movements
in a strategy of tension?
There are many unanswered questions. What we know so far is
that both Eastern and Western security services and paramilitary
forces were heavily involved in terrorism in Western Europe in those
years. It seems that the Western security forces relied on the theory
that terrorism can incite authoritarianism and harm the apparent
supporter, as evidenced by the strategy of tension. The Stasi, on
the other hand, appeared to be more concerned with ideology and
prestige.105 Perhaps the Eastern security forces simply relied on the
belief that terrorism would harm its victim.

6.3. Fabrication of threats and conflicts
The economist and conflict researcher David Keen has studied many
violent conflicts around the world and made the surprising observation
that, in many cases, the fighting parties appear to prolong the conflict
rather than trying to win and end it. For example, they often use tactics
known to be counterproductive, or they provoke an enemy to attack,
and in some cases they even sell weapons to their enemy. Keen suggests
that some participants deliberately engage in endless conflicts because
it gives them certain advantages. Economic advantages include the
weapons trade, but also the extraction of valuable resources such as oil
in Iraq, minerals in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or opium in
Afghanistan. The advantages can also be of a political nature. A violent
conflict can justify the suppression and exploitation of people, sabotage
an emerging democracy, create national unity, and create the need for a
strong leader. Keen suggests that such conflicts can be self-sustaining—
intentionally or not—because certain key players benefit from the
continued conflict.106
Regality theory can contribute to the explanation of the paradoxical
behavior of deliberately protracting a violent conflict. Continuous
fighting is not in the interests of the general population, of course, but
it may be in the interests of the leaders because it helps them sustain

105 Schmeidel (1993)
106 Keen (2012; 2006, chapter 11)

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a regal culture. We saw in chapters 2.4 and 2.5 how a regal culture
increases the biological fitness of the leader. Let us look further at this
phenomenon.
Throughout history, we have seen that many of the leaders of great
empires had large numbers of children and provided luxury and
advantages for themselves and for their relatives. In other words, the
leaders of regal societies had a huge advantage in terms of reproductive
fitness. The more regal the society, the greater the fitness of the leader
at the expense of his followers. DNA evidence shows that a large
fraction of the modern human population is descended from a few
successful emperors. Genghis Khan is the record holder with millions
of descendants.107 It is therefore obvious that any behavior that makes a
leader more powerful could be promoted by natural selection.
The diversionary theory of war, mentioned in chapter 4.3, suggests
that leaders may wage unnecessary wars for the sake of creating a
‘rally around the flag’ effect that will consolidate their own status. The
extreme fitness advantage of powerful leaders leads us to the prediction
that leaders could be inclined to deceive their followers and make their
society more regal than necessary, for example by fighting unnecessary
wars, or by exaggerating or fabricating dangers to their own society. We
can expect this strategy to be employed when leaders, or prospective
leaders, see a chance to expand their power, but also when leaders see
their power threatened by subversive or rebellious movements.
In this chapter, we will search for historical examples of such
deceptions in order to find out how far leaders are willing to go in terms
of spreading fear and fabricating unnecessary threats and conflicts
against their own group.
In chapters 3.10 and 5.1 we saw how leaders and the mass media
can benefit from witch hunts and moral panics. Terrorism threats are
particularly efficacious for boosting regality, because, as we have seen,
they produce strong emotional effects while causing much less damage
than regular intergroup wars. There are many ways in which a leader
and his government can consolidate their position by manipulating
terrorism threats and other dangers, possibly in collusion with the mass
media, including the following:

107 Balaresque et al. (2015)

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• opportunistic exploitation of an unpredicted attack by creating
maximum publicity around the event, showing leadership in
fighting the attackers, showing empathy for the victims, and
implementing stricter legislation
• exaggerating an existing threat by massive media coverage, by
overstating the capabilities of potential enemies, by excessive
security measures, or by setting national alert levels higher
than necessary
• blaming actual terrorism attacks on the wrong culprits
• making false or exaggerated reports about terrorism plots that
have been thwarted
• exaggerating the danger of a relatively weak adversary and
fighting it with dramatic means
• using undercover operations to lure somebody into planning
an attack and arresting them when they are about to carry out
these plans (entrapment)108
• fabricating and staging a victory over an insignificant or
imaginary adversary
• provoking a potential enemy to attack, or deliberately
escalating a low-level conflict
• infiltrating peaceful protest groups with violent agents
• selectively eliminating moderate leaders of rebel groups while
more radical leaders remain at large
• deliberately failing to avert known terrorism plots
• paving the way for known terrorists by removing obstacles to
their plans, disabling surveillance, alarm, and rescue systems,
or actively increasing the damage they are causing
• infiltrating potential terrorist groups with undercover agents
who help them with advice, intelligence, logistics, training,

108 Altheide (2014, pp. 38, 68), Norris, J. (2016)

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weapons, money, and so on, and induce them to attack a
particular target or use particularly dramatic tactics
• fabricating a violent attack and blaming it on a convenient
enemy (false flag attack).
Manipulations at the beginning of this list are very common, while the
more serious deceptions at the end of the list are probably less common
but also more difficult to document. Let us look at some notable
historical examples.

Shelling of Mainila
On 26 November 1939, the Russian village of Mainila, near the Finnish
border, was hit by seven explosions. The Russians claimed that Finland
had attacked Russia with artillery, killing four and wounding nine. A
Finnish border guard who had watched the incident from a distance of
800 meters reported that the shots were fired from the Russian side. He
did not see any bodies being carried away from the scene.109 Russian and
Finnish historians later found documents confirming that there were no
casualties and that the Russians had staged the incident as a pretext for
attacking Finland.110 The Soviet Union renounced the non-aggression
pact with Finland and started the Winter War between the two nations
four days later.

Gulf of Tonkin incident
On 2 August 1964, the US destroyer USS Maddox was on a secret
intelligence gathering mission in the Gulf of Tonkin near the North
Vietnamese coast when it was approached by three North Vietnamese
torpedo boats. Fire was exchanged and there were losses on the North
Vietnamese side but only minor damage on Maddox. The United States
Congress was misinformed about the incident and told that Maddox
was on a routine patrol in international waters when it was attacked by
the torpedo boats. The truth is that Maddox fired first and pursued the
torpedo boats. Two days later, two US destroyers misinterpreted radar
109 Edwards (2006, p. 105)
110 Sokolov (2000), Aptekar (2001), Leino (2009)

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signals and reported that they were being attacked by torpedo boats,
when in fact there were no other boats in the vicinity. Congress was
informed that boats had been attacked again, which was not true. This
led Congress to pass the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which allowed
the US military to engage armed forces in Vietnam and escalate the
Vietnam War. While some of the misinformation was due to human
error rather than deliberate deception, the mistakes were covered up
and the false information was used as a pretext for attacking North
Vietnam.111

Sendero Luminoso
During the 1990s, President Alberto Fujimori of Peru gained popularity
through his uncompromising fight against violent insurgent groups
such as the Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path. Even at a time when
the insurgents were effectively defeated, Fujimori kept fighting them
in dramatic military actions without completely eradicating them.
These highly publicized actions helped Fujimori and his increasingly
autocratic government to stay in power. When the opposition
protested the inauguration of Fujimori for his third term in 2000, the
regime infiltrated a group of peaceful protesters with violent agents
who set fire to the National Bank. The attack, which took the life of
four bank guards, was blamed on the protesters in order to discredit
the opposition.112

Madrid bombing
The Spanish Partido Popular lost the election in 2004 when it was
revealed that it had deliberately deceived the population and blamed a
terror bombing on the separatist group ETA, when in fact the Islamicist
group al-Qaeda was responsible. The Partido Popular would probably
have won a landslide victory had the deception not been revealed on the
early morning of the election day.113

111 Moïse (1996), Hanyok (2001)
112 Burt (2008)
113 Jordan and Horsburgh (2008)

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Operation Mongoose and Operation Northwoods
During the Cold War, the US government tried to destabilize and
overturn Fidel Castro’s government in Cuba in many ways. A campaign
of psychological warfare, known as Operation Mongoose, tried to build
an opposition within Cuba.
In the 1960s, the CIA covertly funded private radio stations inside
and outside of Cuba, including Radio Swan on the Swan Islands, which
sent propaganda messages from anti-Castro Cubans into Cuba. A radio
station in Mexico City promoted a press campaign about epidemics of
hoof and mouth disease and smallpox in Cuba. A CIA radio station in
Zambia was spreading misinformation about the conduct of Cuban
troops in neighboring Angola in the 1970s. Among the false stories
was a fictitious scene in which Cuban soldiers raped fifteen-year-old
girls. The station even disseminated faked photographs of the trial and
executions of the Cuban soldiers.
In 1961, CIA planes bombed targets in Cuba and pretended that the
pilots were Cuban defectors. Many other operations of misinformation
and sabotage were proposed or planned, some of them quite bizarre,
but most of these plans were never carried out.114
One set of plans, known as Operation Northwoods, included false
flag attacks on US and Cuban soil. For example, it was proposed to blow
up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba. Other plans were to
blow up an unmanned vessel in Cuban waters, or a civil airplane, and
to conduct funerals for the non-existing victims. False evidence would
be fabricated to blame those terror attacks on Cuba. There were also
plans of false flag terror attacks in Florida and Washington, or attacks
on Cuban refugees blamed on Cuba. The intention was that such actions
should strengthen the opposition in Cuba and serve as justification for a
US military intervention there.115

114 Elliston (1999)
115 National Security Archive (2001)

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The strategy of tension in Italy and elsewhere
The period from the late 1960s to the early 1980s brought a sharp
increase in terrorism to Italy. Both right-wing and left-wing terrorists
were involved. This story is told in chapter 6.2 above.
The Italian terrorists are classified as elite-sponsored terror groups,
according to a typology developed by Jacob Ravndal.116 However, if we
try to identify the elite that controlled or masterminded the strategy
of tension, we get a very confusing picture of freemasons, various
neofascist and paramilitary groups that were supported or even created
by the secret services, and high-ranking persons within the military,
possibly with international support. These were powerful people
within the state apparatus but not within the official government. A
government commission to investigate the corruption even saw this as
a dual government or dual loyalty.117 Whoever orchestrated the strategy
of tension, it certainly included the most serious kinds of deception on
our list.
The strategy of tension, in our interpretation, might look like this:
powerful actors wanted to create political violence, indiscriminate terror,
and chaos, in the hope that this would create public support for a more
authoritarian government and a neofascist coup. In particular, they
wanted to make their opponents look more violent in order to delegitimize
them. This was done by deliberately failing to stop left-wing violence,
by infiltrating and manipulating left-wing groups to make them more
radical and violent, and by staging false flag terror attacks. However, as
discussed above, this plan did not really achieve its goal.

Russian apartment bombings and other terror
attacks in Russia
A series of explosions hit four apartment buildings in the Russian towns
of Moscow, Buynaksk, and Volgodonsk from 4 to 13 September 1999,
killing 293 people and injuring 651. Quite remarkably, foreknowledge
of these attacks was apparent in a document that was leaked in Moscow
a few months before the incidents. This document talked about terror
116 Ravndal (2015, p. 21)
117 Pellegrino (1997)

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attacks that would be blamed on the mafia and Chechen criminals.118 In
another leak of plans, a speaker at the Duma announced that a building
in Volgodonsk had been blown up, three days before it actually
happened.119
The attacks were in fact blamed on Chechen terrorists, but the
evidence against the suspected terrorists was nebulous. Historians and
independent investigators have presented a strong case supporting
their theory that the Federal Security Service (FSB, formerly KGB) was
behind the attacks.120 A fifth attack against an apartment building in
the town of Ryazan was averted by vigilant residents who reported
suspicious behavior to the police. The police found a bomb consisting
of 150 kg of the advanced explosive RDX (called hexogen in Russia),
a detonator, and a timer. Two suspects were apprehended when they
tried to leave the town. They were not Chechen terrorists but FSB agents.
An intercepted telephone call was also traced to the FSB, and identical
explosives were discovered in a military depot 30 km from the town.
The incident in Ryazan was also initially blamed on Chechen terrorists,
but after the media had published the leads pointing to the FSB, the FSB
claimed that it was an exercise and that the bomb was only a dummy
containing sugar. This explanation has been convincingly refuted.121 The
police, who had analyzed the contents, maintained that it was RDX. The
investigations of all five incidents were characterized by massive coverups, perversion of justice, coerced confessions, intimidation of witnesses
and journalists, and assassination of independent investigators.122 The
FSB was also behind the other four apartment bombings, according to a
confession by FSB major Vladimir Kondratiev as well as large amounts
of circumstantial evidence.123
The terror attacks in September 1999 helped a previously unknown
former KGB officer, Vladimir Putin, attain the presidency. The attacks
also served to justify the invasion of Chechnya on 1 October 1999 in
the Second Chechen War. Historians believe that an independent

118 Litvinenko and Felshtinsky (2007, chapters 5 and 6)
119 Dunlop (2012, p. 248)
120 Dunlop (2012)
121 Litvinenko and Felshtinsky (2007, chapter 5), Dunlop (2012)
122 Litvinenko and Felshtinsky (2007), Dunlop (2012, p. 184ff), Satter (2003, chapter 2)
123 Litvinenko and Felshtinsky (2007, chapter 6), Dunlop (2012)

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investigation of the attacks will not take place as long as Putin is in
power.124
The FSB is suspected of being involved in several other terror attacks
that were blamed on Chechen terrorists, including a railway bombing
in Moscow in 1994 before the First Chechen War, the Moscow theater
hostage crisis in 2002, and the Beslan school siege in 2004.125 One of
the worst terrorist acts in modern Russian history was the siege of a
school in Beslan in 2004, in which more than a thousand people were
held hostage, most of them children. Many of the terrorists were Ingush
criminals who had been released from prison a few months prior to
the incident or who had mysteriously escaped imprisonment. At least
some of these terrorists had to carry out certain operations for the
FSB as a condition of their release. One of the terrorists was a double
agent. Weapons had been brought into the school before the attack, and
it appears that the FSB had prior knowledge of the attack but did not
prevent it. Rather than negotiating with the hostage takers, the police
stormed the school and killed most of the terrorists. Several hundred
hostages died as well.126 Some historians have argued that there was
collusion between the Russian government and the Chechen rebels to
stage the terrorism incidents and to keep the civil war going.127

Terror attacks of September 11, 2001
The topic of 9/11 is difficult to avoid in this context, even though we
do not really know what happened. The official account says that
Islamic terrorists led by Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan flew hijacked
airplanes into the Pentagon and the two towers of the World Trade
Center, and that the towers collapsed because of the ensuing fire.128
Important parts of this explanation are contradicted by large amounts
of technical evidence. Independent investigations have found evidence
that the collapse of the towers was induced by explosives and thermite
which was placed inside the buildings.129 We do not know who placed it
124 Dunlop (2012), Satter (2003, p. 46)
125 Goldfarb (2007), Dunlop (2006)
126 Goldfarb (2007), Dunlop (2006, p. 29ff), Kesayeva (2008)
127 Keen (2006, p. 63), Dunlop (2006, p. 104)
128 National Institute of Standards and Technology (2005, 2008)
129 Harrit et al. (2009), Jones et al. (2008)

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there or why. Theories range from insurance fraud to the involvement of
the CIA or foreign intelligence agencies. A large number of publications
of varying quality, too many to review here, have tried to prove or
disprove various accounts of what happened on 9/11. In the present
situation, neither the official account nor any of the alternative theories
are supported by convincing evidence.
It may seem odd to write about an incident here when we do not
know what happened. The point is, however, that the regalizing effect
does not depend on what happened, only on what people believe
happened.
Initially, most people believed the official account, but later many
people doubted it. In one opinion poll in 2006, 16% of US respondents
found it very likely and a further 20% found it somewhat likely that
‘People in the federal government either assisted in the 9/11 attacks or
took no action to prevent the attacks because they wanted the United
States to go to war in the Middle East’.130 Many other polls show
widespread disbelief of the official account. In some polls, the majority
of respondents believed that the Bush administration was not telling
the whole truth about the event. (These poll publications are no longer
available, but the results are summarized with archive references on
Wikipedia.)131
There can be no doubt that the US government took advantage
of the psychological tension after 9/11 to get support for the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Many people believe that the US government did
more than that and used some of the more severe forms of deception
further down the list on page 146 (chapter 6.3), but this remains a
matter of speculation.

Weapons of mass destruction in Iraq
Prior to the Iraq War in 2003, the US government claimed that it had
evidence that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (that is,
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons) in violation of a UN
resolution, and accused the Iraqi government, led by Saddam Hussein,
130 Stempel, Hargrove and Stempel (2007)
131 Wikipedia. “Opinion Polls about 9/11 Conspiracy Theories”, https://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Opinion_polls_about_9/11_conspiracy_theories

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of involvement with the militant organization al-Qaeda and in the
terror attacks of 9/11. The US administration had put strong pressure
on the CIA to produce intelligence reports that supported these claims.
Much of the purported evidence relied on misinterpretations, some was
knowingly false, and some was even fabricated by an Italian agent.132
The media and populations in the USA and its allied countries mostly
believed the propaganda, and this was the basis for going to war in
Iraq.133 The former UN weapons inspector, Scott Ritter, had already
asserted before the war that the weapons had been destroyed in 1991
and that the production facilities had also been destroyed.134 Ritter
later revealed that the UN-sanctioned weapons inspection programme
was manipulated and compromised by the CIA to create the illusion
that Iraq was resisting disarmament, when in fact Iraq had already
disarmed.135 The award-winning journalist James Risen claims that the
CIA deliberately ignored reports from some thirty spies in Iraq who all
said the same thing: that the nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons
programmes had all been abandoned in 1991.136
Whistleblowers in three other countries later confirmed that there
was no conclusive evidence of any banned weapons.137 Iraq claimed
that the weapons had been destroyed in 1991, and for all that we know
following intensive searches before, during, and after the war, this claim
appears to be basically true.138 The purported alliance with al-Qaeda
did not exist. On the contrary, the Iraqi government was an enemy of
al-Qaeda.139
The US government supported coup attempts against Saddam
Hussein in 1992 and 1996.140 The decision to wage war against Iraq
was made by US President George W. Bush and his staff in 2001.141
This decision was not based on any rational evaluation of available
132 Blix (2004), Eisner and Royce (2007), Pillar (2011, chapter 2)
133 Pillar (2011, chapter 3), Wilkie, A. (2010, p. 95), Calabrese (2005)
134 Ritter and Pitt (2002)
135 Ritter (2005, p. 288)
136 Risen (2006, p. 563)
137 Wilkie, A. (2010), Aagaard (2005, p. 75, 90), “Profile: Dr David Kelly”. BBC News,
January 27, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/3076869.stm
138 Blix (2004)
139 Pillar (2011, p. 43), Ritter and Pitt (2002, p. 45)
140 Ritter (2005, p. 161), Woodward (2004)
141 Woodward (2004, p. 38)

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155

information and options but, according to several analysts, on motives
relating to oil supply, geopolitics, revenge for Hussein’s attempt to
assassinate Bush’s father, and a naive belief that it was possible to
spread democracy in this way.142 The accusations of weapons of mass
destruction and terrorist connections served mainly as pretexts for
justifying the war. While the decision to attack Iraq lacked in rationality,
the deception that was used to justify the war was definitely the result
of deliberate planning, although an element of self-deception was also
present.143

Conclusion
Fabrication of dangers and unnecessary conflicts has occurred repeatedly
throughout modern history, and many leaders and contenders for
leadership have deceived their own populations into believing that their
society was more endangered than it actually was. The above accounts
are just examples. These examples show that the fabrication of dangers
towards one’s own population has occurred primarily in the following
situations:
• Before a war, in order to justify the war and create psychological
support for the war. There are many examples of this, including
World War II (see below), the Russian-Finnish Winter War, the
Vietnam War, the Chechen Wars, the Iraq War, and possibly
the Afghanistan War.
• Before an undemocratic coup or in general to facilitate a
transition to a less democratic form of government. This
strategy achieved its goal in Germany (under Hitler, see
next chapter) and Russia (under Yeltsin and Putin), and was
attempted without success in Italy.
• To strengthen a government when its power is dwindling.
This strategy was used in Peru and attempted in Spain.
• To defame an enemy, as in the case of Cuba.

142 Pillar (2011, chapters 2 and 3), Wilkie, A. (2010, p. 62), Woodward (2004)
143 Pillar (2011, chapters 2 and 3), Wilkie, A. (2010)

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Terrorism provokes strong psychological reactions because it makes
civilians feel threatened, even though the casualties are much lower
than in conventional war.144 In other words, terrorism is a cheap way
of creating regality. Even warnings about possible terror attacks have
a regal effect. For example, it has been found that terror warnings have
increased the approval ratings for the incumbent US president.145
Beliefs in ‘conspiracy theories’ are quite common.146 After almost
every major terror attack in recent years, especially since 9/11, there have
been rumors and suspicions in the social media that it was a false flag
attack. It is quite logical to entertain such suspicions when it is observed
that terror attacks are almost always counterproductive. The suspicions
and rumors of false flag attacks are quite often false, of course, but they
can in fact be true, as we have seen in this chapter. The often-used term
‘false flag attack’ is actually somewhat misleading. The leaders do not
want to use their own forces to make the deceptive attacks, but prefer to
manipulate others to do it. In many cases, such as the Red Brigades in
Italy, some of the terrorists involved were actually ‘true flag’ militants,
who honestly believed that they were fighting against the political
system, unaware that they were being manipulated by infiltrators to
work against their own interests.
Deceptions like these are obviously difficult to study and document,
and many cases may have gone undetected. Objective and reliable
information is hard to get, and many information sources are tainted by
deception, propaganda, and political bias. We must keep this caveat in
mind and consider that there is often more than one interpretation of a
situation, and that the above accounts may be inaccurate.
The deceptive fabrication of threats to one’s own population is
predicted by regality theory, as discussed at the beginning of this
chapter. The leader simply gets a personal fitness advantage by boosting
the regality of his society. Some of the great emperors in history have
fathered hundreds of children, but such extreme levels of fecundity
belong to the past. Powerful leaders today do not in general have many
children, due to the widespread norm of monogamy. Many leaders
have mistresses, but they rarely get their mistresses pregnant because
144 Hirsch-Hoefler, Canetti, Rapaport and Hobfoll (2014)
145 Willer (2004)
146 Stempel, Hargrove and Stempel (2007)

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of the use of birth control. It is hard to demonstrate that the powerful
leaders who live in modern society today have any fitness advantage. If
there is any raise in the fertility of powerful leaders at all, it is probably
offset by the risk of being killed in a violent overthrow. One of the most
powerful evolutionary forces that has driven political leaders to strive
for grandeur, majesty, and power has disappeared, but the psychological
predisposition for this behavior remains. The behavior of strong leaders
and warlords today is a strange mixture of rationality and irrationality.
Military strategies, as well as strategies of psychological warfare, are
often carefully planned with the use of the best available experts, while
the ultimate motive behind the wars and imperialism is hidden in
psychological predispositions that evolved in a distant past, driven by
fitness advantages that no longer exist today.

6.4. Example: Why World War II started
A war generally depends on a spiral of increasing regality, and we have
to look at the factors that contribute to this spiral of regality in order to
explain a war. This chapter will not review or explain the whole history
of World War II but will focus on only a few key factors that started the
spiral of regality that drove the war.
Many psychologists have tried to explain World War II by analyzing
the peculiar psychology of Adolf Hitler, and a long list of diagnoses
have been postulated.147 Such an approach gives only a very limited
understanding of the causes of the war. I will venture the theory
that all countries have a potential Hitler, and that—under different
circumstances—Hitler could have remained a painter, as he once was,
rather than a warmaker.
Regality theory allows us to go beyond the explanation of the war as
a consequence of Hitler’s postulated psychopathology and try to answer
some more basic questions such as: why was Hitler bellicose? Why did
the Germans vote for him? Why did they not replace him with someone
more peaceful and agreeable? Why did they allow him to abandon
democracy and make himself a dictator? How did he manipulate his
people to make them support his war?

147 Redlich (1998, pp. 255, 333)

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If we want to know why Hitler was bellicose, we may try to start
with the same focus as psychologists habitually employ. Psychologists
like to analyze people’s childhoods, and it cannot be denied that
childhood experiences have a strong influence on people’s personalities.
Hitler lost his father and a brother while he was a child, and later lost
his mother. Three older siblings had died before Adolf was born.148
These and other traumatic events may have had an influence, but other
people with similarly traumatic childhoods have grown up to become
peaceful adults. Hitler played war games when he was a child, but this
is something that most normal boys do.
At the age of twenty-five, Hitler volunteered for a Bavarian regiment
to fight in World War I. He was a brave soldier and was promoted to the
rank of corporal. He was wounded twice, but survived many dangerous
episodes. Thousands of men in his regiment were, however, killed.149
These experiences during World War I are sufficient to explain
Hitler’s regal disposition, although childhood experiences may have
laid the foundation. This regal disposition can explain his passion for
war and his disdain for democracy. It also explains why he was so
receptive to anti-Semitic ideas, which were common in Germany at the
time.
A study of Hitler’s personality may explain the behavior of one
person, but it does not answer the more important question of why the
German people supported him and his ideas. We have to look at the
general political, social, and psychological climate of the time.
The first half of the twentieth century was a period with many wars
in Europe. The Ottoman Empire was in decline, and other countries
with imperial ambitions were eager to fill the power vacuum. Shifting
alliances, contests of power, and arms races led to World War I, which
ended with total humiliation of Germany.
Europe was not a peaceful place after World War I. There were many
wars and violent uprisings all over Europe that contributed to a general
insecure and warlike climate.
The Great Depression of the 1930s hit Germany particularly hard,
with unemployment rates over 30%. The population was relatively
young due to a high rate of population growth. The combination of a
148 Redlich (1998, p. 5)
149 Redlich (1998, p. 36)

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youth bulge and a high unemployment rate is a dangerous cocktail. It
was easy to mobilize the large surplus of unemployed and frustrated
young people by means of a violent ideology.150 The psychological
consequences of economic crises were discussed in chapter 5.2.
The aftermath of World War I and the economic crisis provided
fertile breeding ground for the nationalist and racist ideology called
National Socialism, or Nazism. This ideology was promoted by the
National Socialist German Workers’ Party, led by Hitler. There is general
agreement among historians that the economic crisis contributed to the
rise of Nazism. A study of Germany in the interwar years has found
significant correlations between economic indicators and various
measures of authoritarianism. The strongest correlation was between
the unemployment rate and the votes for Hitler.151
The Nazi ideology was promoted by massive propaganda, organized
by the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, headed by
Joseph Goebbels. The most powerful mass media at the time were radio
and cinema films. The Nazis promoted the distribution of radios and
the sale of cheap radios so that, by 1938, 60% of all households owned
a radio receiver. Radio broadcasting in Germany was initially intended
to be an apolitical cultural institution with the purpose of educating the
population. Nationalist sentiments were common on radio programmes
in Weimar Germany, but this was not perceived as controversial.
When the Nazis came to power, they used the radio for propaganda
purposes and broadcast political speeches. The radio propaganda
must have had a strong influence on the German population, since
they were unaccustomed to organized propaganda at this scale, while
counterpropaganda was only available from foreign media. The Nazi
propaganda promoted an ideology of racial superiority and territorial
expansion (Lebensraum) and blamed the economic crisis on Jews and
other foreigners.152
Fabrication of threats, as discussed in chapter 6.3, was used both for
suspending democracy and as a pretext for starting the war. In February
1933, the Parliament building (Reichstag) in Berlin was set on fire. A
young, homeless, visually impaired Dutchman, Marinus van der Lubbe,
150 Heinsohn (2003, p. 23), Weber (2013), Moller (1968)
151 Padgett and Jorgenson (1982)
152 Von Saldern (2004), Zimmermann (2007)

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was arrested inside the burning building. Van der Lubbe, a communist,
readily confessed that he had set the fire for political reasons, and he
was sentenced to death.153

Figure 12. Burning German Parliament, 1933. Bundesarchiv.154

The German government, led by Hitler, blamed the attack on the
Communist Party and arrested a large number of communists including
all of the communist members of the parliament. The Nazi party now
had an absolute majority in the parliament, which allowed them to
suspend democracy and civil liberties under the pretext of preventing a
communist uprising. This key event made Germany a dictatorship until
the end of the war and allowed Hitler to rule without opposition.

153 Hett (2014)
154 CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Reichstagsbrand.jpg

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However, technical evidence indicates that van der Lubbe could not
have started the fire alone, and Nazi leader Hermann Göring admitted
that he was responsible for the fire, according to one witness testimony.155
In 1939, the Germans made a propaganda campaign to justify an
invasion of Poland. This campaign, known as Operation Himmler,
involved various false flag operations that simulated Polish attacks on
Germany. On 31 August that year, German soldiers dressed in Polish
uniforms attacked a number of buildings in Germany, including a radio
station, and left behind dead bodies, most of them in Polish uniforms
to make it appear that Polish attackers had been shot down. The dead
bodies were in fact not Polish soldiers but prisoners from concentration
camps that had been killed for this purpose. Hitler made a public speech
the next day, claiming twenty-one alleged attacks as justification for
military invasion of Poland. This was the start of World War II.156

155 Hett (2014), Shirer (1960, p. 191)
156 Whitehead (2008)

7. Regality Theory Applied to
Ancient Cultures

In this chapter we will look at a number of ancient, non-industrial
civilizations and see whether the predictions of regality theory fit these
cultures. A statistical study of the results follows in chapter 8, but the
discussions of each of these cultures can also be read as interesting and
illustrative examples in themselves.
In chapter 3.1, we saw how the ecology and the environment can
determine the level of violent conflict between groups or determine
whether war is possible at all. Conflicts are likely if multiple groups are
competing for the same ecological niche, according to the competitive
exclusion principle, while conflicts are less likely for groups that have
adapted to their own unique niche. Using the distinction between
contest competition and scramble competition, we found that conflicts
are more likely where food or other valuable resources are concentrated
in patches that can be monopolized and defended, while conflicts will be
rare where food is sparsely distributed. Logistic factors such as weapon
technology, ease of travel, efficient food production, and storage and
transportation of food must also be taken into account.
To summarize, we can predict that the level of violent intergroup
conflict in a non-modern culture will be high when the following factors
are present:
• An ecology and technology that enables a high food production
per unit area and thus a high population density.

© 2017 Agner Fog, CC BY 4.0

https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0128.07

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• Food and other important resources are concentrated in
patches that can be monopolized and defended by the group
rather than sparsely distributed.
• Neighbor groups with similar ecology are competing for the
same resources.
• Efficient means for transportation of warriors to enemy
territory are available.
• Efficient means of communication over distance are available.
• Efficient means of food storage and transportation are
available.
• Efficient weapons are available.
• The climate is favorable.
In contrast, intergroup conflict is likely to be impeded or prevented
when these factors are reversed, specifically when
• Food is sparsely distributed and the population density is low.
• Geographical barriers or logistic problems make travel
difficult.
• A group has specialized in a unique niche that neighbor
groups are unable to exploit.
• Extreme climate conditions make work and fighting more
difficult.
It must be noted that these assumptions do not hold in modern industrial
societies, where international economic interdependence or third party
intervention can prevent war.
The next step in our prediction is that a culture will be regal when
intergroup conflicts are frequent and severe, while we will expect to
find a kungic culture where the level of intergroup conflict is low. We
will predict an intermediate level on the regality scale when some
factors point in one direction and other factors point in the opposite
direction. Other environmental factors that threaten a sociocultural
group, such as natural disasters and unpredictable food shortages,
may also have an influence in the regal direction. The level of regality

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165

will be reflected in a number of social, political, and cultural indicators,
as discussed in chapter 2.6.
The relevant predictions of regality theory can be summarized as
follows:
• People will show a preference for a strong leader and a social
structure with strict discipline in cases of a high level of
intergroup conflict or other collective danger. They will show
a preference for an egalitarian social structure in the absence
of collective danger.
• These individual preferences will influence the social and
cultural structure in the directions called regal and kungic,
respectively, as reflected in the indicators listed in table 1
(chapter 2.6).
• A society with a high level of intergroup conflict will use both
reward and punishment of its members to enhance its military
strength (see chapter 2.2).
• Individual danger and intragroup conflict will not have
the same effect on social structure as collective danger and
intergroup conflict have. However, both kinds of danger will
have the same effect on fertility.
• The level of intergroup conflict will depend on the geographic
environment, the ecology, and the available technology, as
described above.
We will now study a number of non-modern and non-industrial cultures
to see how well they fit these predictions. Each of these cultures can be
seen as an interesting case study illustrating the application of ecological
theory and regality theory.
The methods used for theory testing in the social sciences can roughly
be divided into two categories: (1) statistical testing on a large number
of cases, and (2) comparative historical analysis where a small number
of cases are compared and analyzed in more detail.
In the statistical method, you look at the input variables and the
output variables, but rarely at what happens inside the ‘black box’
causing the input to affect the output. In the comparative historical

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method, you open the black box and look at the chain of events that
is responsible for the causal relationship. The comparative historical
analysis allows methods such as studying whether events are happening
in the temporal order predicted by the theory, and looks for events that
should or should not happen according to the a priori theory but not
according to alternative theories.1
A combination of statistical testing and comparative historical
analysis is the best method we have to test a causal theory of social
phenomena. The political scientist Evan Lieberman recommends a
method that starts with a correlational analysis on a large number of cases
and then studies a few cases in more detail.2 However, a correlational
analysis can only confirm a relationship between variables that are
already known to be relevant—it is unlikely to lead to the discovery
of new interesting variables or relationships. Therefore, the present
study uses case studies before statistical analysis. A number of ancient
and non-industrial societies are analyzed below. A statistical summary
and discussion of the results is provided in chapter 8.3. These cultures
are selected according to a number of predefined criteria, explained in
chapter 8.3, in order to avoid selection bias.

7.1. Andamanese
The Andamans is a group of islands in the Bay of Bengal, totaling
6,400 km2. The islands are volcanic mountains with dense vegetation.
The temperature is between 17°C and 36°C all year round. At the time
of the first anthropological studies, the islands were populated by
twelve tribes of Negritos speaking different languages. They lived from
hunting, fishing, and gathering and had sufficient food at all times. Their
only vehicles of transportation were canoes, which were used for fishing
and traveling along the coasts of the islands. The canoes were unable to
sail in open sea. The Andaman Islands had very little contact with the
surrounding world until the mid-nineteenth century.3 The Andamanese

1 Mahoney and Thelen (2015)
2 Lieberman (2015)
3 Man (1883), Radcliffe-Brown (1922)

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167

are one of the oldest and most isolated human populations outside of
Africa.4
Based on the geographic variables, we would expect the Andamanese
culture to be moderately kungic. The mountains and dense jungle
make traveling on land very difficult, and the available means of
transportation by sea were insufficient for large-scale war. The natives
had no knowledge of any people living more than 32 km away. The
favorable climate and abundance of food can be expected to allow a
moderately high population density, which would weigh in the regal
direction. The possibility of natural disasters, such as cyclones, volcanic
eruptions, and earthquakes, might also have a limited regal influence,
but the mountains would offer some protection, at least against the
cyclones.
The frequency of warfare is listed in the standard cross-cultural
sample as continual or once every one to two years. However, this
listing is very misleading due to a vague definition of war. There is no
evidence that large scale fighting has ever taken place on the Andaman
Islands. The literature agrees that the only evidence of fights is of ‘brief
and far from bloody skirmishes’ where ‘only a handful of warriors were
engaged on each side and rarely more than one or two were killed’. These
skirmishes were usually feuds between neighbor groups, belonging to
the same or different tribes. The feuds may be ended after some time
with a peace-making ceremony. No weapons of war have been found
other than the bows and arrows used for hunting.5
While no evidence of large-scale war has been found, some inferences
can be made. The many different tribes living in close proximity would
quite possibly lead to conflicts over territory. One of the tribes, the
Jarawa, who live on the South Andaman Island, are believed to be
invaders from Little Andaman Island, because their language is similar
to that spoken on Little Andaman. It is possible that the Jarawa took
territory from the original inhabitants in a more serious conflict in a long
forgotten past. The Jarawa are in constant conflict with their neighbors.
It is remarkable that so many tribes were able to coexist in a small
area for as long as it took to develop different languages. This is indirect
evidence that traveling was limited and that the Andaman tribes were
4 Thangaraj et al. (2003)
5 Man (1883, pp. 44, 135), Radcliffe-Brown (1922, p. 50ff)

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willing to maintain peace and respect territorial boundaries, with the
exception of the Jarawa.
The Andamanese were hostile to foreigners and have systematically
killed all shipwrecked sailors who entered their land. In particular, the
Jarawa were so hostile to foreigners that it has been impossible to study
them. The Jarawa have survived for the very same reason, while most of
the other tribes have perished after contact with modern settlers.6

Figure 13. Andamanese hunting turtles, ca. 1900. Photo by Bourne
& Shepherd photographic studio. Smithsonian Institution, National
Anthropological Archives.7

The Andamanese had no political organization above the local group.
There were influential older men and women but no leaders with
authority. There was no penal system, and neither children nor adults
were punished for wrongdoing.8
Religious beliefs were fluid, flexible, and incongruent. The
Andamanese believed in spirits and other supernatural beings who
control diseases, weather, and other natural phenomena. E. H. Man
found several similarities with Christian beliefs,9 but these were
6 Pandya (2000)
7 Public domain, https://siris-archives.si.edu/ipac20/ipac.jsp?uri=full=3100001~!57153~!1
8 Man (1883, p. 25ff), Radcliffe-Brown (1922, pp. 22–77)
9 Man (1883, p. 89)

7. Regality Theory Applied to Ancient Cultures



169

convincingly refuted by Alfred Radcliffe-Brown as projections of Man’s
own faith.10 All other observers agree that no supernatural beings ruled
the Andamanese or punished their misdeeds in life or in the afterlife.11
The relationships between neighbor tribes were friendly, except in
times of feuds and except with respect to the Jarawa. Intermarriages
occurred, as well as adoption of children across tribes.
Fertility was low, possibly because children were breastfed for three
to four years. There was no birth control or infanticide. Mortality was
high, and nobody lived longer than fifty years. Suicide was unknown.
Children started to help their parents with various work from about the
age of ten. Children as well as adults played many games.12
The marrying age was approximately 16 to 20 for women and 18 to
22 for men. Betrothals in childhood occurred, but in most cases young
people were free to choose their spouses. There was no polygamy.
Divorce was very rare. Sexual morals were lax. Premarital sex was
almost universal, and adultery was frequent. Syphilis has spread fast.13
Men and women had almost equal status and influence. Children
were named before birth, and the same names were used for boys and
girls. The most important of their gods was described as female more
often than as male.
Their art was simple. They adorned themselves with necklaces,
body paint, and scars. The body painting consisted of simple patterns
such as parallel lines or zigzag lines, with variations due to individual
taste or changing fashions. The same adornments were used for men
and women. Tools and canoes were decorated with similar painting
or cuttings. Singing and dancing occurred on many occasions, often
for ceremonial reasons. The songs were about everyday activities, not
religion. Each singer had his own songs, while dancing was communal.14
The conclusion for the Andamanese is that most observations fit the
expectations for a kungic culture. The observations regarding political
organization, discipline, religion, fertility, sexual morals, marrying age,
length of childhood, art, and music are in agreement with a kungic
10 Radcliffe-Brown (1922, pp. 141–197, 370)
11 Radcliffe-Brown (1922, p. 48), Cipriani (1966, p. 43), Ganguly (1961)
12 Man (1883, pp. 31, 43, 109), Radcliffe-Brown (1922, p. 78)
13 Man (1883, pp. 13, 67), Radcliffe-Brown (1922, pp. 50, 70), Cipriani (1966, p. 22),
Nippold (1936), Pandya (1993, p. 15)
14 Man (1883), Radcliffe-Brown (1922), Cipriani (1966, p. 54), Portman (1888a)

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culture. The absence of suicide, the absence of divorce, and especially
the hostility towards strangers point more in the regal direction.
One explanation for the xenophobia of the Andamanese is their
belief that dangerous spirits have a lighter skin color than themselves.
They regard all light-skinned strangers as dangerous spirits.15 However,
this is just a proximate explanation with little theoretical value. The
belief in dangerous light-skinned spirits is likely to have a historical
origin in encounters with foreigners with firearms. Indeed, history
gives the Andamanese ample reason to fear foreigners. Malay and Arab
slave traders, shipwrecked sailors, and European and Indian settlers
have all treated the Andamanese with deadly violence;16 and the latest
reports indicate that violent confrontations with the Andamanese have
continued until the present time.17 They were friendly to foreigners in
previous times, according to some reports.18
The frequent feuds between neighbor groups, whether they
belonged to the same or to different tribes, are easily explained by the
absence of any political system for resolving conflicts. The fact that the
Jarawa appear to be more hostile than the other Andaman tribes has
no immediate explanation, since almost nothing is known about their
history.

7.2. Arrernte
The Arrernte (Aranda, Arunta) tribe of Australian aborigines were a
semi-nomadic people living in the desert-like areas near Alice Springs
in Central Australia. They had no means of transportation other than
walking naked and barefoot. The few navigable rivers sometimes dried
out, and there was no timber suitable for making boats. The relatively
flat land with sparse vegetation did not constitute any serious barrier
to traveling, but the lack of efficient means for carrying water made it
impossible to travel too far away from water sources except in occasional
wet periods. The climate is dry with large variations in temperature.
Day temperature can exceed 40 °C, and night temperature can go below
15 Man (1883)
16 Cipriani (1966, p. 3), Portman (1888b)
17 Pandya (2000)
18 Cipriani (1966, p. 4)

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171

freezing point. They lived as hunters and gatherers and had no metals,
no pottery, and no efficient means for food storage.19
Based on this information, we can expect the culture to be fairly
kungic, because the population density must be low and because mass
traveling was limited by lack of drinking water for the Arrernte as well
as for the neighboring tribes. However, the droughts that appeared at
unpredictable intervals constituted a significant collective danger that
occasionally killed significant parts of the population. This may have
pushed the culture somewhat in the regal direction.

Figure 14. Arrernte rain ceremony, ca. 1900.
Photo by W. B. Spencer and F. J. Gillen.20

Large-scale war was absent at the time of the first studies, but war was
reportedly more common in earlier days before the spread of European
diseases decimated the population. Deadly clashes could occur when
droughts forced people to migrate into enemy territory. The political
structure was very simple. Decisions were taken by deliberation among

19 Spencer and Gillen (1927, p. 1), Tindale (1974, p. 50)
20 Public domain, http://spencerandgillen.net/objects/50ce72e9023fd7358c8a8534

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the old men. Some men had leadership status, but none had absolute
power. There was no leader at the level of the whole tribe.21
Men often beat their wives. Physical punishment was common, and
the death penalty was prescribed for several offences, including some
rather trivial ones. The literature is not clear on how often the death
penalty was actually executed in practice. Vendettas were very common.
Beliefs in life after death were weak or absent. Women became
pregnant and gave birth as a result of totemic ancestors entering their
body. The father played little or no role in this process, according to
Arrernte beliefs. There was no supreme being ruling over the humans.
Sickness, death, and misfortune were blamed on taboo violations, evil
spirits, and, most commonly, on magic performed by enemies. Witch
doctors had some political influence but no strong power. There were
many painful rituals. Many religious traditions and objects were
monopolized by men and kept hidden from women and children.22
People’s identity was defined in terms of totem group and a
complicated system of marriage classes. Tribal unity was not a strong
factor. Foreigners were not allowed into their territory unless they
had a peaceful purpose such as negotiation or barter. However, there
were often friendly relations between neighbor tribes, and intertribal
marriages were common.23
Fertility was sufficiently low to keep the population size stable.
Abortion was known and infanticide was common. Twins were always
killed at birth. Suicide was unknown. Children were breastfed for
several years.24
The Arrernte had little or no idea of biological fatherhood and
consequently no notion of illegitimate children. A man might therefore
lend his wife to other men for a number of reasons, with or without
her consent. There were plenty of rituals and traditions that allowed,
or even prescribed, extramarital sexual contacts in certain situations.
Premarital sex, however, was generally not tolerated. Homosexuality
has been reported for both men and women. Girls married around

21 Spencer and Gillen (1927, p. 9), Tindale (1974, p. 33), Basedow (1925, p. 183)
22 Spencer and Gillen (1927, pp. 36, 443), Tindale (1974), Strehlow, T. (1947, pp. 5, 52,
93)
23 Spencer and Gillen (1927), Tindale (1974, pp. 35, 75), Strehlow, T. (1947, p. 41)
24 Spencer and Gillen (1927, p. 221), Strehlow, C. (1907–20, IV:I–II)

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173

puberty, boys much later. Promises of marriage were often made for the
expected future daughters of a woman, even before she got pregnant.
Polygamy was common. Divorce occurred.25
Children were treated kindly, and much time was devoted to them.
Punishment of children is not mentioned in the literature.26
Artistic expression was simple. Religious objects were embellished
with lines, dots, and circles. Body adornments included necklaces, nose
piercing, scarification, etc. Objects adorned with feathers and paintings
were used in ceremonies. There were songs and dances for many
occasions, but only few and very simple music instruments. Marriage
ceremonies were rather simple, while initiation ceremonies were more
elaborate, especially for young men.27
The conclusion for the Arrernte is that most observations fit the
expectations for a kungic culture. The political organization, religion,
group identity, fertility, sexual behavior, treatment of children, and
art are all as expected for a kungic culture. The possible occurrence of
severe punishment, intolerance of strangers, absence of suicide, and the
strong male dominance point more in the regal direction. The marrying
age is low for girls but high for boys. The amount of war before the
spread of European diseases is difficult to estimate.

7.3. Babylonians
The alluvial plains along the rivers Tigris and Euphrates in what is
now Iraq were the seat of many city-states and empires that waxed
and waned over many thousands of years. We are considering only the
period before the advent of monotheism, with the main focus on the
era of King Hammurabi. The climate was dry and hot in the summer
months, and the temperature went below freezing point in the winter.
The fertile river plains were surrounded by desert. Boats of various
sizes were available for transportation of goods and people along the
rivers and the many canals that were dug. For transportation on land,
the Babylonians had donkeys, camels, horses, and wheeled vehicles.
Cuneiform writing was used for communication over long distances.
25 Spencer and Gillen (1927, p. 473), Strehlow, C. (1907–20, IV:I)
26 Basedow (1925, p. 69)
27 Spencer and Gillen (1927), Strehlow, C. (1907–20)

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Warlike and Peaceful Societies

The Babylonians practiced intensive agriculture with a well-organized
irrigation system. They had metals for tools and weapons.28
There are strong regal factors here. Nothing hindered the mobility
of the people. They had means for storing and transporting food and
water, and they could travel far by land as well as on the rivers. The
intensive agriculture could sustain a high population density, and the
area that could be traveled was large enough for including multiple
states that could wage war against each other with efficient weapons.
The only kungic factors we can find are the hot climate in the summer
and the low population density in the surrounding desert. Since the
regal factors are much stronger than the kungic factors, we can expect
to find a rather regal culture here.
The political system was a monarchy where the king was the
supreme ruler, though the priests also had a considerable influence.
The religion was polytheistic, with a high number of gods and demons.
Humans were created by gods for the sole purpose of doing service to
these gods. Humans were thus servants of the gods, represented by the
king. Humans were punished by the gods for their sins.29

Figure 15. Babylonian cylinder seal showing the king making an animal
offering to the Sun God Shamash. Hjaltland Collection.30
28 Contenau (1954, p. 62), Nemet-Nejat (1998, p. 12), Saggs (1962, pp. 4, 158)
29 Saggs (1962, pp. 162, 300; 1965, p. 181)
30 CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=31696169

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War was frequent and the army was one of the most important
institutions in Babylon. Armies numbered thousands of men, probably
more than a hundred thousand, and war casualties were high.31
Slavery and slave trade were widespread. A man could be reduced
to slavery if unable to pay a debt. Political and economic matters, as
well as marriage and divorce, were regulated by a detailed set of laws
written by the king. Discipline was harsh. The law prescribed the death
penalty or mutilation for many common crimes. It is unknown whether
legal practice followed the laws or whether law-breakers could get
away with paying a fine. It is certain, however, that slaves and prisoners
of war could be treated harshly, and there is ample evidence of torture.32
The cuneiform scripts and other archaeological sources tell us little
about the life of children. Children were set to work and subjected to
strict discipline, but the presence of toys indicates that there was also
time for play. Children could be lent out as slaves for three years,
perhaps longer, in order to pay their father’s debt.33
Little is known about the fertility of the Babylonians. On average,
between two and four children per family survived into adulthood.
The marrying age has been estimated at 14 to 20 for women and 26
to 32 for men, though these estimates are uncertain. The sexual morals
gave men more freedom than women. Girls were supposed to marry as
virgins. Adultery between a married woman and a man was punished
by drowning both, according to the law, while a man was free to have
concubines and to visit prostitutes. Prostitution was widespread and
regulated by law and by religion. Homosexuality was tolerated.34
Babylon had a large production of art, mainly under the patronage
of the state and the priesthood. The numerous temples and palaces were
highly embellished with bas-relief and monuments glorifying gods and
kings. Favorite motifs were royal hunting scenes and battle scenes,
supplemented with stylized religious symbols. Geometric patterns

31 Saggs (1965, p. 112), Delaporte (1970, p. 69)
32 Nemet-Nejat (1998), Saggs (1962), Pallis (1956, p. 556)
33 Contenau (1954, p. 18), Nemet-Nejat (1998, p. 130), Saggs (1962), Delaporte (1970, p.
80), Stol (1995, p. 490)
34 Nemet-Nejat (1998, p. 127ff), Saggs (1962, p. 185), Stol (1995, p. 488), Roth (1987)

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reflecting a horror vacui tendency were common embellishments.
Likewise, song, poetry, and literature often glorified gods and kings.35
The conclusion for the Babylonian culture is that the political
organization, the discipline, the religion, the treatment of children,
and the art all show typical regal characteristics. The sexual morals are
ambiguous. We have insufficient information about the fertility.

7.4. Chiricahua Apache
The Chiricahua Apache Indians originally lived in Southern Arizona
and New Mexico. They belong to the Na-Dene language group,
having migrated from the Beringia later than the Amerind speakers.36
The Apache had been displaced to reservations at the time of the
anthropological studies. What is known about their original lifestyle is
therefore based mainly on the recollections of elderly informants.37
The environment included semiarid plains and mountains. The
Indians lived a seminomadic lifestyle and they were able to travel far,
especially since the acquisition of horses in the seventeenth century.
We would expect a plains culture to be more regal than a mountain
culture. The Apache culture is a mixture of these two.38 The access to
easy traveling on the plains and the possibility of simple communication
by smoke signals makes war possible and likely. However, the relative
scarcity of food sets a limit to the population density and to the scale
of war. The maximal possible size of a war party was limited by the
availability of food rather than by political factors.39 We can therefore
expect the culture to be moderately regal, though the scale of war is
limited by the sparseness of food.
The tribe was divided into four autonomous bands at peace with
each other. The bands were divided into camps, and each camp might
include several families. There were leaders at the camp level and the
band level, but there was no leader of the whole tribe. Leadership
was based on common recognition. While the position of leader was
35 Contenau (1954), Nemet-Nejat (1998, pp. 66, 167), Delaporte (1970, p. 182), Pallis
(1956), Galpin (1955)
36 Schurr and Sherry (2004)
37 Gifford (1940), Opler (1937, 1941)
38 Gifford (1940, p. 187)
39 Opler (1937, p. 177)

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177

often inherited from father to son, it was not necessarily so. The leader
was generally obeyed, especially in times of war, but his power was
not absolute. An unpopular leader could always be replaced without
violence.40
Discipline was strict, especially for children. Young children were
strapped to a cradleboard where they could hardly move. Older
children were taught obedience, and they might be subjected to
physical punishment, including whipping, if their wrongdoing was
severe. Adults were occasionally punished harshly, especially for such
crimes as marital infidelity or murder. Deviants were often accused of
witchcraft. Suspected witches might be tortured until they confessed,
and then killed.41
Religious practices and shamanism were based on individual
revelations with no orthodox teaching. Everybody could have
supernatural powers and perform magic rituals. People could specialize
in different rituals for different purposes. There were many supernatural
beings, but none of these had a supreme position. The supernatural
beings were much involved in human affairs. They gave power and were
prayed to, and they could punish people with sickness and misfortune,
but there was no punishment in the afterlife.
The most important ceremony was the girls’ puberty rite. This was
a very elaborate and expensive ceremony lasting for four days, where
neighbors were invited for dancing and feasting. The initiation rite for
boys was very different. The boy had to go as a novice on four raids or
war expeditions before he was considered a man. He was trained to
endure all kinds of hardship.42
Raiding and war was an integrated part of Apache life. They went
on raiding expeditions to enemy tribes several times a year for the
purpose of stealing horses and cattle or for avenging the deaths of lost
warriors. They might take prisoners of war, who were tortured and
killed. Captured boys might be adopted and raised to become warriors.
Women were not captured.43

40 Opler (1941, pp. 73, 174), Schroeder (1974, IV)
41 Gifford (1940), Opler (1937, p. 191; 1941, p. 14)
42 Gifford (1940, p. 76), Opler (1937, p. 226; 1941)
43 Gifford (1940), Opler (1937, p. 230; 1941, p. 334), Schroeder (1974:VD)

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Girls married at age 18 or 19, boys a little older. Marriages were
arranged, but in most cases in agreement with the wishes of the young
people. Sororal polygyny was practiced. Children were breastfed for
three years. No information is available on the fertility or birth rate.
Birth control was practiced by supernatural means and occasionally by
abortion or infanticide. Suicide occurred.
Sexual morals were strict. Social contact between the sexes was
limited. Nudity was not allowed, even when no members of the opposite
sex were present. Masturbation was unknown. Girls were guarded for
chastity. There was more sexual freedom for divorced women and
widows than for married women and unmarried girls.
Art was elaborate. Clothing and utensils were decorated with
colorful patterns or figures. Music and dance was used for ceremony as
well as for social gatherings. It was the girls who chose their partners at
social dances.44
The conclusion for the Chiricahua Apache is that this culture shows
a mixture of regal and kungic signs. The cultural importance of war, the
strict discipline, and the strict sexual morals are definitely regal signs.
However, the political system was less hierarchic and dictatorial than
one would expect for a regal culture. The low population density made
it impossible to incorporate a large number of people under a single
leader. Political leaders did not have absolute power, and there were no
religious authorities either. The realm of supernatural beings also lacked
a supreme ruler. It seems, nevertheless, that religion had a disciplining
function in the sense that people feared supernatural punishment and
witchcraft accusations.
There is no reliable information about fertility or family size, but the
fact that birth control was practiced or attempted seems to indicate that
the population size was controlled by the availability of food as much
as by war. On the other hand, the practice of capturing young boys
from enemy tribes indicates a clear desire to raise as many warriors as
possible.
Art, body adornment, and ceremonial paraphernalia were elaborate,
embellished, and so expensive that this may be interpreted as a
moderately regal sign.45
44 Gifford (1940, p. 63), Opler (1937, p. 200; 1941, p. 131)
45 Opler (1941, p. 379)

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179

Conflicts with white settlers and the availability of horses since the
seventeenth century has no doubt increased the possibilities for war and
raids, but the earliest available historical sources seem to indicate that
the Apache had frequent conflicts with other tribes before the arrival of
Europeans.46

7.5. Copper Inuit (Eskimo)
The Inuit, previously called Eskimo, are a nomadic people living in the
Arctic regions. The focus in the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample is on
the group that anthropologists have called Central Eskimo or Copper
Eskimo, who live north of the tree line in Canada in the area around
Coronation Gulf and Victoria Island. The environment is arctic tundra
covered with snow most of the year and with very little vegetation.
There are polar nights in the winter. The natives eat mainly fish, seals,
and caribou, but hardly any vegetable food. Fuel is scarce and meat is
often eaten raw. The native copper is hammered with stones to make
tools such as spearheads, fishing hooks, and knives. Iron is sometimes
found on shipwrecks or obtained by trade. People live in tents made of
caribou skins in the summer. In the winter, they live on the ice in snow
houses. People can travel far, but quite slowly, using dog sleighs.47
We can expect the culture to be kungic because food is sparse with
no defendable resources (scramble competition) and because of the
extreme climate. It is possible to travel very far, but people have to
stop often and hunt for food during the travel, and this would make
war difficult.
The concept of organized warfare is completely unknown to the
Copper Inuit. There is no organized system of justice. Most crimes go
unpunished. Murder may be revenged by the relatives of the victim,
and this often leads to feuds unless the offender flees to another
district. Theft is rare. There is no chief and no political system beyond
the family unit.48

46 Schroeder (1974:IV)
47 Stefánsson (1914, p. 7), Boas (1964, p. 11), Jenness (1923, p. 13)
48 Stefánsson (1914, p. 131), Boas (1964, p. 173), Jenness (1917; 1923, pp. 93, 235; 1928,
p. 85), Condon and Ogina (1996, p. 79), Rasmussen (1932, p. 68)

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Figure 16. An Inuit family, 1917. Photo by George R. King.49

The fertility is low. Children are breastfed for at least two years and
sometimes even up to six or seven years.50 Infanticide is common. The
total population in the area has probably remained at a stable level of
below a thousand individuals for centuries. There is high mortality due
to occasional famines and harsh living conditions. Infectious diseases
were rare prior to European contact. Suicide is allowed and accepted,
including assisted suicide.51
The population had no name for their own tribe until foreigners gave
them the name Eskimo (of uncertain origin), or Inuit, which simply
means ‘human’ in their language. Subgroups are named according to
their home area, but an individual can belong to more than one home
area. People have little interest in their own ancestry.52
The religion is animist, with many taboos that vary from place to
place. Shamanistic séances are used for divination and for influencing
the weather and hunting luck. Animals have souls just like human
beings, and a shaman may just as well be possessed by the spirit of an
animal as by the ‘shadow’ of a dead person. People are uncertain about
what happens in the afterlife.53
49 Public domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Eskimo_Family_NGMv31-p564.jpg
50 Stefánsson (1914, p. 255), Boas (1964, p. 158), Jenness (1923, p. 163), Dodwell (1936)
51 Boas (1964, pp. 172, 207), Jenness (1917; 1923, pp. 91, 166), Condon and Ogina
(1996), Rasmussen (1932, pp. 17, 46), McGhee (1972, p. 116)
52 Stefánsson (1914), Jenness (1923), Condon and Ogina (1996)
53 Stefánsson (1914, p. 126), Jenness (1923, p. 177), Condon and Ogina (1996, p. 86),
Rasmussen (1932, p. 72)

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181

The sexual morals are lax. Polygyny and polyandry occur. Temporary
wife swapping is a common way of building alliances, and it is not
uncommon for a visiting man to be offered a woman for the night.
Marriage appears to be based more on practical considerations than on
love, with no elaborate ceremony to consolidate it. There are no love
songs or other expressions of romanticism. Divorce is easy. Girls marry
at the age of 14 to 16, boys somewhat later.54
The sex roles are not rigid. While hunting is the job of men and
sewing is the job of women, it is not shameful to do a task that belongs
to the opposite sex. There is no distinction between boys’ names and
girls’ names.55
Children are treated with affection: they have toys, they are never
punished severely, and they do not have to work hard.56
The most important form of art is singing and dancing. The only
music instrument is a drum. People take turns singing and dancing,
while the remaining people sit or stand in a circle around the dancer.
Often, each person has his or her own songs and dancing style. The song
texts are mostly about everyday occurrences and hunting events.57
People have tattoos identifying their home area. Tools and clothes are
sometimes embellished with simple patterns.58
We can now conclude that all the cultural markers of the Copper Inuit
fit the predictions for a kungic culture, except for the low marrying age.

7.6. E De (Rhadé)
The E De are one of several tribes that live in the highlands of southern
Vietnam. The present study will focus mainly on the time before
colonization. The mountain environment consisted of forests, dense
bush and grasslands. They grew rice and other crops using slash and
burn and shifting cultivation. Irrigation of rice fields was used only
where the environment was favorable. They were herding buffaloes

54 Boas (1964, p. 171), Jenness (1923, 1925, 1928), Condon and Ogina (1996, p. 85),
Rasmussen (1932, p. 50), Dodwell (1936)
55 Stefánsson (1914, p. 102), Boas (1964, p. 204), Jenness (1923, p. 167), Condon and
Ogina (1996, p. 85), Rasmussen (1932, p. 42)
56 Stefánsson (1914, p. 154), Boas (1964, p. 163), Jenness (1923, p. 169)
57 Stefánsson (1914), Jenness (1923, 1925, 1928), Rasmussen (1932, pp. 16, 130), Dodwell
(1936)
58 Boas (1964, p. 153), Jenness (1923, p. 117; 1946)

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and several other animals, including a limited number of horses and
elephants. They had tools of iron and other metals.59
The environment presented many obstacles to travel but, given the
availability of horses and elephants, we would expect the E De people
to travel far. An efficient means of travel combined with efficient food
production makes us predict a regal culture.
The E De people lived in villages consisting of several longhouses.
Each longhouse was the home of a matrilineal group of up to 300 people.
The level of political integration varied considerably. The villages were
often partially or fully autonomous under the leadership of a village
chief. In some cases, a group of several villages formed a mini-state.
In one period, the E De paid tribute to the closely related Jarai tribe.
The E De were part of the Champa kingdom and paid tribute to the
Champa king for a period of possibly several hundred years, although
the Champa influence appears to have been very limited. Intervillage
raids and wars were common.60
The E De society was highly stratified. The village chief and other rich
people were very powerful, while up to two-thirds of the population
lived in slavery or debt dependence.61
The justice system was based on a large set of orally transmitted laws.
Prescribed punishments ranged from payment of fines and religious
offerings to enslavement and (rarely) death. The animist religion
supported the social stratification and the socially unequal justice
system by the beliefs that wealth was sanctioned by the spirits and that
misdeeds must be expiated by expensive offerings to the spirits. Unable
to pay for these offerings, many people ended up in the possibly lifelong
slavery-like conditions of debt dependence.62
Families typically had five to six children, and the population
appears to have been growing. Infanticide was not allowed. Boys were
married at age 16 or older, girls perhaps younger. Child marriage had
been practiced in the past. Premarital sex was tolerated if the couple
entered a secret marriage. The wedding ceremony was very simple.
59 Donoghue, Whitney and Ishino (1962, p. 3), LeBar, Hickey and Musgrave (1964, p.
251), Schaeffer (1979, p. 9), Special Operations Research Office (1965, p. 2)
60 Donoghue, Whitney and Ishino (1962, p. 38), LeBar, Hickey and Musgrave (1964, p.
254), Schaeffer (1979, p. 15)
61 Schaeffer (1979, p. 3)
62 Schaeffer (1979, p. 94), Sabatier (1940)

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183

Extramarital sex might have been punished but was often tolerated
as long as it did not have economic consequences. Polygyny was rare.
Divorce was disapproved of. Children started helping their parents
from age 7 to 8 and working in the fields from age 10 to 13.63
Little has been published about old E De art and music. Buildings
and woven clothes sometimes had rich ornamentation. Rich people
collected jewelry, decorated gongs, and other prestige items.64
Though the available data for precolonial E De are sparse, we can
conclude that the cultural indicators are in accordance with a moderately
regal culture, though not quite as regal as expected.

7.7. Ganda
The Ganda or Baganda are a Bantu people still living in the kingdom of
Buganda, which comprises 50,000 km2 of land to the north and west of
lake Victoria in East Africa. Buganda is now part of the state of Uganda.
The environment consists of flat hills, savanna, swamps, rivers, lakes,
and forests at an elevation of 1,000 to 1,400 meters above sea level. The
position on the equator provides a climate with only small seasonal
variations. The average day temperature is between 25 °C and 28 °C all
year round. There are two rainy seasons a year and no completely dry
season.
The area of Buganda is very fertile and more suited for agriculture
than the neighboring areas. The staple food is bananas or plantains,
which are harvested all year round. Other crops are harvested twice
a year. The diet is supplemented with protein from domestic animals,
hunted game, fish, and insects.65
The traditional Baganda had good roads that were traveled by foot.
They had no wheeled vehicles, and they did not use animals for work or
transport. They had canoes for sailing the lakes and those of the rivers
that were navigable. They used iron for making spearheads, hoes, and
other tools.66

63 Donoghue, Whitney and Ishino (1962, p. 26), LeBar, Hickey and Musgrave (1964, p.
253), Schaeffer (1979, p. 136), Sabatier (1940)
64 Schaeffer (1979), Special Operations Research Office (1965, p. 9)
65 Kottak (1972), Roscoe, J. (1911, p. 4)
66 Roscoe, J. (1911, p. 239), Rusch (1975, p. 37)

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Based on these facts, we can expect the culture to be regal. The
population density was high, due to the fact that they had plenty of
food all year round. They were able to travel far through the savannah
and grassy hills as well as on rivers and lakes. Their range of movement,
however, was limited by their inability to build bridges across large
swamps and rivers.67
Buganda was the strongest military power in the region. Their power
is generally attributed to the efficient production of plantains and to
the availability of iron. They attacked and plundered the neighboring
peoples on regular raids where they captured cattle, women, and slaves
and killed as many men as they could.68
The political system was a highly hierarchical system of chiefs headed
by the all-powerful king. The king ordered large numbers of men to be
killed. Some were killed for minor offenses, some were sacrificed to the
gods, and some were killed to honor the ancestor kings; but most of all,
the king killed men just to confirm his power to kill.
All crimes and signs of disloyalty were severely punished. Theft,
disobedience, adultery, and other crimes were punished by death, by
cutting off a limb, or by heavy fines. The fines were to be paid in bark
cloth, goats, cows, and women. The culprit might enslave himself or his
relatives to pay the penalty. The question of guilt could be tried by a
system of courts that might hear testimony and use divination, ordeals,
or torture to reach a verdict.69
The Baganda worshipped various gods, most of whom were spirits
of men who had served previous kings well while they were alive. Dead
kings were worshipped in almost the same way as gods, but the living
king did not have god status, and he could be killed and overthrown by
rival princes. Anthropologists have discussed who was most powerful,
the king or the gods. The king, and nobody else, could punish the gods
by killing their priests and plundering their temples. The gods, in turn,
could punish the king with disease and misfortune. There appears to be
no clear winner in this contest of power. Most of the time, however, the
king made rich sacrifices to the gods, and the gods in turn supported the
king and gave him advice through mediums.
67 Roscoe, J. (1911, p. 319)
68 Kottak (1972), Roscoe, J. (1911, p. 4)
69 Roscoe, J. (1911), Kagwa (1934, p. 80)

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The gods did not punish undetected sins, but some sins led to
automatic punishment. For example, a child would die if its father
committed adultery during the breastfeeding period. There was no
punishment in the afterlife, except for the belief that a person who had
had a limb cut off as punishment would continue to be maimed in his
afterlife or next incarnation.70
The members of the kingdom were generally loyal and willingly
sacrificed their lives in the frequent wars against neighboring peoples.
In some cases, hostility towards strangers was an obstacle to trade, but
for the most part they welcomed Arab traders.71
Polygamy was widespread. The later kings had hundreds, perhaps
thousands, of wives and concubines. High-ranking chiefs had many
wives as well. Such a degree of polygamy was possible because of a sex
ratio of three women to one man. The surplus of women was due to the
loss of men in war, the king’s mass killings of men, and the capture of
women in war. No fertility data are available for the period prior to the
introduction of Christianity and the abandonment of polygamy in the
late nineteenth century. By the mid-twentieth century, the birth rate was
three to four children per mother. The common opinion of the natives is
that fertility was higher in the old times, and this is in accordance with
the few individual genealogies that have been reconstructed.72 Suicide
was probably rare. The only reports of suicide refer to the motive of
shame.73
Girls married at age 13 or later, boys at 15 to 16. The marrying age
increased after the introduction of Christianity. A man had the right
to beat his wife and could even kill her with impunity. Divorce was
relatively common, especially in connection with polygamy. Women
were guarded carefully to preserve their chastity. It brought great
shame on a girl to become pregnant before marriage. The punishment
for adultery was severe, but even the risk of the death penalty was
apparently not sufficient to completely deter this crime.74
70 Roscoe, J. (1911, p. 273), Kagwa (1934, p. 124), Ray, B. (1991, p. 42), Rusch (1975, p.
361), Southwold (1969, p. 90)
71 Roscoe, J. (1911, p. 346), Mair (1934, p. 191)
72 Roscoe, J. (1911, p. 83), Kagwa (1934, p. 69), Klein (1969, p. 135), Richards and
Reining (1954)
73 Roscoe, J. (1911, p. 20)
74 Roscoe, J. (1911), Southwold (1969, p. 108), Mair (1934, p. 78)

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Warlike and Peaceful Societies

Babies were sometimes nursed by maids so that their mothers
were free to work. Children were often placed with relatives or chiefs
so that they could receive a stricter upbringing. Children were taught
politeness, etiquette, and cleanliness. Boys had time to play while they
were herding animals, whereas girls spent their time making mats and
baskets.75
The Ganda had very little material culture. All that people needed
was a grass hut to live in, bark cloth for clothing, and a few tools for
harvesting and cooking. The early kings did not even have chairs to sit
on. Palaces, temples, and shrines were built of reed.

Figure 17. Kasubi Tomb, Uganda, nineteenth century. Royal buildings were
large, but not as embellished as might be expected. Photo by Agner Fog, 2007.

Ganda art was more decorative than representational. High-ranking
persons had some decoration and pomp to signify their status, and
religious artifacts were embellished. These decorations were typically
made of plant material, cowry shells, ivory, and bird feathers. Such
embellishments may have impressed the natives, but they were quite
simple compared to other cultures. The Ganda had many different

75 Roscoe, J. (1911), Southwold (1969, p. 107), Mair (1934, p. 31)

7. Regality Theory Applied to Ancient Cultures



187

musical instruments, but we do not have sufficient information to
evaluate the degree of embellishment in Ganda music and dance.76
The conclusion for the Ganda is that the observations regarding their
political system, discipline, religion, fertility, marriage, sexual morals,
and length of childhood are in agreement with a highly regal culture.
The prediction fails, however, on the question of art. Regal cultures
typically make impressive pieces of art and architecture of durable
materials. The Ganda culture has none of this. No royal or religious
buildings, monuments, or sculptures were made of stone, brick, or
metal. The fact that the art was non-naturalistic and the architecture
perfectionist is in accordance with the theory, but it did not have
the degree of embellishment that other regal cultures have. The low
sophistication of their material art may be connected with the low
sophistication of their material culture in general. There appears to have
been very little impetus to technological innovation, because food was
available everywhere for a minimum of work.
The lack of highly embellished art makes one suspect that the
extremely regal political system was not fully internalized in the
psychology of the people. While most of the cultural indicators are
relatively regal, they are not fully on the same level as the political system.
There were songs about military events, but no systematic glorification
of kings, heroes, or gods in Ganda music and art. The religion supported
the king by sanctioning the mass killings that his power depended on,
but the disciplining function of the religion was less effective than we
have seen in other regal cultures.77 It is worth noting that sub-Saharan
Africa is dominated by kungic cultures because of the dense vegetation
that impedes traveling and a climate that is too hot for hard work. As
a regal enclave, the Ganda culture may not have been able to evolve
a cultural ethos that was too different from the surrounding cultures.
We can thus observe a mixture of typically African traits with typically
regal traits. We may speculate that the king had to compensate for this
slight discrepancy in his culture by consolidating his power with mass
killings of his own men.

76 Roscoe, J. (1911, p. 285), Kagwa (1934, pp. 90, 170), Rusch (1975), Mair (1934, p. 193),
Lugira (1970)
77 Roscoe, J. (1911), Ray, B. (1991, p. 167), Mair (1934, p. 25), Kagwa (1934, p. 141)

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7.8. Gilyak
The Gilyak lived in east Siberia along the river Amur and on the island
of Sakhalin. Their main means of subsistence was fishing. The climate
was very cold in winter. The vegetation was primarily taiga (primeval
forest), which was difficult to penetrate. The means of transportation
were limited to dog sleighs and snowshoes in the winter and rowing
boats in the summer. The boats were unable to sail on the open sea.78
We can expect to find a kungic culture based on the facts that the
means of transportation were too inefficient to make war likely and that
the environment could not sustain a high population density.
The Gilyak culture had a moderately high level of internal conflict
but no external wars. The Gilyak did not keep records of their own
history and had no memories of any war. According to one source, there
had probably been a conflict between the Gilyak that lived along Amur
and those that lived on Sakhalin, as well as a conflict with the Russians.
However, no solid information about these conflicts is available. Internal
conflicts were relatively common. The main reason for such conflicts
was rivalry over women.79
The Gilyak had no political system beyond the family or clan. There
was no chief or ruler. Common decisions and resolution of disputes, if
necessary, were made through deliberations where the most respected
men had the most influence. Sources of respect were age and experience,
as well as wealth and bravery. Crime was rare, and there was no formal
system of policing. Punishments for wrongdoing were generally mild.
Corporal punishment and capital punishment occurred only rarely.80
The religion was mainly based on beliefs in spirits and animals.
There was no orthodox teaching, and not even the shamans were able
to explain their beliefs to the level of detail that the explorers expected.
The prophecies and teachings of the shamans were readily disputed or
doubted. The Gilyak had a weak concept of a good god that they may
have learned from Buddhists or Christians, but they did not pray, and
this belief was completely void of influence on their daily life. There was
no opposition to other religions. Some Gilyak even worshiped a few
78 Schrenck (1881, p. 655), Seeland (1882, p. 245)
79 Schrenck (1881), Seeland (1882)
80 Schrenck (1881, p. 663), Seeland (1882, p. 227), Shternberg (1933, p. 15)

7. Regality Theory Applied to Ancient Cultures



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church bells that they had found as well as the ruin of an old Buddhist
temple.81
The Gilyak had no word for their own tribe other than the word for
humans. The name Gilyak is used only when talking with foreigners.
They had regular barter trade with the Chinese, Japanese, and Russians.
The Gilyak were highly tolerant of foreigners and readily mixed with
the neighbor tribes.
The fertility rate was consistently described as low, but there are
no accurate accounts beyond the observation that there were no childrich families. Children were breastfed for two to five years. Suicide is
often mentioned in the literature on the Gilyak. No specific rates can be
inferred, but at least it seems safe to conclude that the suicide rate was
not low.82
The literature contains discrepant accounts of the sexual morals
of the Gilyak. Leopold von Schrenck characterizes the sexual morals
as strict, while Nicolas Seeland describes them as fairly lax, and L.
Sternberg reports that the Gilyak were quite promiscuous.83 We must
recognize that sexual behavior is particularly difficult to study. There
may be considerable differences between what people say and what
they do. Sternberg’s accounts are quite detailed and appear to be the
most reliable. Schrenck mentions sexual morals only briefly and is more
concerned with describing physical objects. Apparently, Schrenck was
unable to penetrate through the initial facade of modesty that Sternberg
described. It seems safe, therefore, to conclude that the sexual morals
of the Gilyak were quite lax. The marrying age was variable. Bachelors
aged 23 to 25 were commonly seen, but child marriages were also
reported. Divorce was easy.
The Gilyak produced very little art. The most common products of
art were small religious figures carved in wood. These wooden figures
were quite simple and could be made by any member of the tribe.
Women’s clothes were often embellished with small brass plates and
other adornments. Knives and other tools were sometimes embellished
with inlaid pieces of brass, copper, or silver. These adornments were
81 Schrenck (1881, pp. 678, 739), Seeland (1882, p. 239)
82 Schrenck (1881, pp. 99, 641), Seeland (1882, p. 129), Shternberg (1933, p. 126)
83 Schrenck (1881, p. 638), Seeland (1882, p. 226), Chard (1961), Shternberg (1933, p.
124)

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used as signs of wealth. Musical instruments were very primitive.
Songs were simple and often improvised. It was quite common for
each singer to have his own song. Dance was not observed, except for
shamanic acts.84
The conclusion for the Gilyak is that the culture was quite kungic, in
accordance with the geography, climate, and means of transportation.
The predictions for a kungic culture are in excellent agreement with the
observations of level of external conflict, political system, discipline,
religion, tribal identification, tolerance of foreigners, fertility rate,
suicide rate, sexual morals, art, and music. The occurrence of child
marriages is in disagreement with the expectation of a high marrying
age. The amount of adornment on clothes and tools is somewhat higher
than expected. This adornment served the need to display wealth, which
was an important source of political influence.

Figure 18. Gilyak wooden figures. From Schrenck (1881).85

84 Schrenck (1881, pp. 387, 681), Seeland (1882, pp. 109, 126, 234)
85 Public domain

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191

Figure 19. Gilyak decorated tools. From Schrenck (1881).86

7.9. Hausa
The Hausa are a sedentary people living south of the Sahara in northern
Nigeria and south-eastern Niger. The climate is hot and dry half of the
year with a rainy season from May to September. The environment
is mostly savannah, with patches of scrub and wooded watercourses
infested by tsetse flies. Occasional droughts, famines, and epidemics
have limited the population.87
The Hausa grow sorghum, millet, and several other grains and
vegetables in the rainy season and store them for the dry season. They
have various domestic animals, including horses and donkeys. The dry
season is used for practicing many different crafts, including ironwork
and long distance trade.88
86 Public domain
87 Smith, M. G. (1960, p. 1; 1965, p. 121)
88 Smith, M. G. (1965)

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Based on this information, we can expect the Hausa to be quite regal.
Intensive agriculture in defendable fields, food storage, no geographical
obstacles to travel, horses and donkeys for transportation, and iron for
making weapons are all factors that point in the regal direction. The
only kungic influence is that shortage of water and intense heat may
impede traveling armies.
For more than 1,500 years, the Hausa have lived in seven states,
united by a common language. In early times, these states were ruled
by kings or queens. Islam reached Hausaland in the mid-fourteenth
century, and the kingdoms gradually became emirates. The Fulani, a
pastoral people, waged jihad (holy war) on the Hausa from 1804 to 1810
for the purpose of purifying Islam in the population. Since then, most of
the ruling class have been Fulani, though the majority of the population
were Hausa. The population includes several other ethnic minorities.
Slavery was common until Nigeria was colonized by England in the
early twentieth century.89
There has been war more often than peace in the region from the
earliest times and until the English colonization. Each kingdom or
emirate was independent in some periods, at other times paying tribute
to another state or empire. The majority of the population lived in cities
surrounded by walls for protection.90
The political system was hierarchical and bureaucratic. A wellorganized legal system suppressed internal conflicts. After Islamization,
punishments were determined by Islamic law. Serious crimes were
punished by death, theft and robbery by cutting off a hand. Suspected
criminals might be whipped until they confessed. It is difficult to
determine to what degree these severe punishments were actually
carried out, because the old literature rarely mentions specific cases
of punishment.91 Many folktales tell of tricksters who got away with
immoral behavior or who received lenient treatment.92
The literature is full of references to prostitution and other
extramarital sexual affairs. Punishment for sexual crimes is rarely
mentioned in the literature. Girls were supposed to be virgins at their
89 Smith, M. G. (1955, p. 91; 1978, p. 33), Palmer (1928)
90 Smith, M. G. (1955, p. 102; 1960, p. 2; 1978), Hogben and Kirk-Greene (1966)
91 Smith, M. G. (1960, p. 42; 1978, p. 39), Smith, M. F. (1954, p. 183), Palmer (1928)
92 Edgar and Skinner (1969), Tremearne (1913, p. 48)

7. Regality Theory Applied to Ancient Cultures



193

first marriage, but premarital petting was often tolerated as long as
pregnancy was avoided. Girls were married at the age of 13 to 14 (some
say 18), boys at around 20 to 21. The first marriage was preferably
between cousins, but these marriages rarely lasted. There were certain
customs of avoidance and formalized speech between husband and
wife. These customs also contributed to making marriages unstable and
encouraging husbands to seek intimacy with prostitutes. It was normal
for women to be divorced and remarried several times through their
lives. Polygamy was widespread and desired. Rich men preferred to
hold their wives in seclusion in their homes (purdah). Eunuchs served
the ruler. No statistics for fertility before colonization are available, but
many families mentioned in the literature were child-rich. The firstborn
child was normally given away for adoption after weaning at the age
of two, and there was formalized avoidance between parents and the
firstborn child. This sometimes applied to subsequent children as well.
Boys were circumcised and girls clitoridectomized.93
Children were expected to work, but they also had plenty of time for
play. Some children earned money for themselves by selling things at
the market.94
Suicide is not mentioned in the literature, except for a few cases
where the reason was shame rather than anomie.95
The urban population was mostly Muslim, while some of the rural
population preserved their indigenous religion and engaged in rituals
of spirit possession. However, both groups were characterized by
syncretism. The spirits in the ‘pagan’ beliefs were regarded as identical
to the jinn (genies) mentioned in the Quran, and Allah was their king.
The supernatural world of the urban Muslims was hierarchical, while
the pagan spirits were organized around clans, where each clan
worshipped their own local spirits. The spirits were responsible for
disease and misfortune, but they were not perceived as agents of moral
punishment. The Muslims believed in supernatural punishment—at
least in theory—but apparently they did not fear hellfire much.96

93 Smith, M. G. (1955, p. 21; 1965, p. 139; 1978, p. 43), Smith, M. F. (1954, pp. 15, 60),
Tremearne (1913, p. 77; 1914), Greenberg (1946, p. 16), Nicolas (1975, p. 182)
94 Smith, M. F. (1954, p. 55), Dry (1949)
95 Hogben and Kirk-Greene (1966, p. 286), Tremearne (1914, p. 143)
96 Tremearne (1913, p. 109; 1914), Greenberg (1946, p. 27; 1947), Nicolas (1975)

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Warlike and Peaceful Societies

Individual feelings of identity were a mixture of clan membership,
ethnicity, membership of a kingdom or emirate, and the general Hausa
identity. Each of the ethnic groups was mostly endogamous.97
The most important form of art was praise singing. Formalized
speeches and songs of praise were required at all major religious and
political events. There were several different kinds of praise singers
extolling artisans as well as the nobility. The oral tradition with preIslamic heritage is bombastic, boastful, and highly formalized, and
it usually follows regular schemes for meter and rhyme. Written
poetry follows Islamic tradition with mandatory doxologies.98 The
art of embroidery was also developed to perfection. Various objects
were decorated with fine geometric patterns. Architecture was less
developed. Royal palaces and mosques were beautiful and impressive,
but their decoration lacked precision.99

Figure 20. Old Hausa building in traditional Tubali style.
Photo by Dan Lundberg, 1997.100

97 Smith, M. G. (1960, p. 2; 1978, p. 31)
98 Hiskett (1975)
99 Smith, M. G. (1978, p. 99), Tremearne (1913)
100 CC BY-SA 2.0, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:1997_277-10A_Agadez.jpg

7. Regality Theory Applied to Ancient Cultures



195

We can conclude that the Hausa were regal, but perhaps not quite as regal
as expected. In particular, the sexual morals were more permissive than
expected. This may be due to the custom of avoidance between husband
and wife that made the man seek warmth and intimacy elsewhere. The
seclusion of women, clitoridectomy, and the use of eunuchs, however,
point in the direction of strict sexual morality.

7.10. Inca
The Inca Empire had its center in the town of Cuzco in the Andes.
During the hundred years prior to the Spanish conquest in 1533, the
empire grew fast to reach the size of several million km2, stretching from
present Ecuador to Chile and part of Argentina. This vast area covered
a wide variety of environments, including coastal areas, mountain
plateaus, deserts, and rain forest. The day temperature in the Cuzco
area was 21–22 °C all year round, while night temperature occasionally
fell below freezing point. There are plenty of rivers running down
the mountains, but these are not navigable.101 Transportation by boat
was possible only along the coast and in the lakes. The territory was
connected by an elaborate system of roads totaling at least 23,000 km
and probably more. Relay runners were placed along major roads for
fast communication. The Incas had llamas for transportation of goods,
but no animals capable of carrying humans were available. Wheeled
vehicles were not available.102 Agriculture and animal husbandry have
been practiced in the mountain plains and basins for 3,000 to 4,000 years.
Terraces and large irrigation systems were built to intensify agricultural
production.103
Based on the geography alone, we would not expect to find a very
regal culture in the Andes because of the many barriers to travel.
However, knowing that water for irrigation, efficient food production
technology, and communication technology were available, the
prediction is a different one. The main crops—quinoa, potatoes, maize,
and beans—provided highly nutritious and storable food in high yields.
The environment and available technology therefore provided all the
101 Baudin (1961, p. 1), Mason (1957, p. 1), Means (1931, p. 3)
102 Mason (1957, pp. 140, 167), Means (1931, p. 329), Hyslop (1984)
103 Mason (1957, p. 137), Bauer (2004, p. 25)

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factors necessary for developing a highly regal culture: efficient food
production for sustaining a high population density, a concentration of
food production in defendable irrigated areas, efficient transportation
and communication, a climate that was suitable for hard work, and
highly different environments leading to trade and wars between
different cultures and different lifestyles.
The political system of the Inca Empire was highly centralized.
Everything was planned and controlled by a large bureaucratic system.
People had hardly any choice about where to live and what kind of
work to do. At the same time, the administration took great care to
make sure everybody had what they needed. Discipline was strict
and punishment was severe. The worst crimes were punished by the
death not only of the culprit but also of his entire village.104 The religion
justified the dictatorial rule by making the emperor a direct descendant
of the sun. Rich sacrifices were made to the gods, occasionally including
the sacrifice of humans.105 Sinners were punished in the afterlife in a
hell. Suspected witches might be tortured to confession and killed.
Religious ceremonies were plentiful and more pompous than puberty
rites, marriages, or burials.106
The Inca rule did not enforce total cultural uniformity, but they
moved conquered people around to prevent rebellion. The different
groups were allowed to maintain some of their cultural characteristics.107
Large families were desired, but infant mortality was high. Abortion
was known but illegal; other means of birth control were unknown.
Infants were strapped to a cradle day and night and were breastfed
only three times a day for one or two years. They were never held in
the arms or on the laps of their mothers but were breastfed by their
mothers bending over them. Larger children were confined to a hole
dug in the ground. Children were required to contribute to household
and agricultural work as soon as they were able to do so.108

104 Baudin (1961, p. 34), Mason (1957, p. 170), Means (1931, p. 347), Brundage (1963, pp.
121, 151)
105 Mason (1957, p. 202), Malpass (1996, p. 101), Wilson et al. (2007)
106 Means (1931, p. 367), Brundage (1963, p. 57), Malpass (1996, p. 106)
107 Mason (1957, pp. 119, 197), Malpass (1996, p. xxvi)
108 Baudin (1961, p. 100), Mason (1957, p. 147), Means (1931, pp. 313, 363), Malpass
(1996, p. 75)

7. Regality Theory Applied to Ancient Cultures



197

Girls married at age 16 to 20 and boys in their mid-twenties. Some
girls were selected for a religious life in celibacy or were given as
rewards to high-ranking men. Most boys were probably able to choose
their wife, but staying unmarried was not an option.109 Polygamy was
common among the nobility. Divorce from the first or principal wife
was impossible, while divorce from secondary wives or concubines was
easy. Trial marriages were possible in some areas, and the marriage
ceremony made a distinction based on whether the bride was a virgin.
Except for the institution of trial marriages, fornication and all other
sexual sins were severely punished.110
Elaborate art was common. The Inca made large and impressive stone
buildings, such as the famous Machu Picchu. Festive and ceremonial
clothes were finely woven and richly decorated. The decorations on
cloth and pottery were typically highly repetitive, with geometric
patterns or stylized figures. Immense riches of gold and silver added to
the glory of the empire.111

Figure 21. Inca carved gold leaf wall coating.
Photo by Manuel González Olaechea, 2007.112
109 Baudin (1961, p. 24), Means (1931, p. 358), Brundage (1963, p. 149), Malpass (1996,
p. 37)
110 Mason (1957, p. 150), Brundage (1963, p. 225), D’Altroy (2002, p. 191)
111 Baudin (1961, p. 187), Mason (1957, pp. 144, 231), Means (1931, p. 105), Malpass
(1996, p. 87)
112 CC BY 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Muro_de_oro.JPG

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Warlike and Peaceful Societies

The conclusion for the Inca Empire is that the observations regarding
political system, discipline, religion, fertility, sexual morals, length of
childhood, and art are in agreement with a highly regal culture. There
is no mention of suicide in the literature except in connection with war.
The marrying age did not differ markedly from that in kungic cultures.
The observation that the Inca Empire could grow only because of the
elaborate road system and the intensive agriculture raises a question:
was the empire built because they had good roads and efficient food
production, or did they build roads and irrigation systems because
the power of the empire enabled them to do so? The answer is, of
course, that the causality went both ways in a self-amplifying process.
The area is more suited for a sedentary life than for nomadism, and
the population had sufficient time to develop an advanced agriculture
and a relatively high population density. The availability of water for
irrigation and efficient crops such as potatoes and maize were also
important factors. The first regal developments may have taken place
in the coastal areas where the ocean provided ample food and means
of transportation, or it may have taken place in fertile areas near rivers.
There was trade as well as frequent wars between the coastal people and
the mountain people for centuries. Numerous chiefdoms and kingdoms
had waxed and waned at the coast as well as in the mountains for
more than a thousand years before the Inca Empire flourished.113 Our
theory predicts that empires will collapse when they have reached the
maximum manageable size, which is indeed what appears to have
happened several times in this area. Each new empire may have grown
bigger than the previous ones due to improved technology or political
skills. The Inca Empire, too, was probably on the verge of collapsing at
the time of the Spanish conquest.114

7.11. !Kung
The !Kung bushmen, also called San, have lived in the Kalahari Desert
of southern Africa for many thousands of years, representing one of the
oldest living human races.115 They speak an old language containing
click sounds; the ‘!’ in their name is a click sound.
113 Means (1931, p. 47), Brundage (1963, p. 121), Malpass (1996, p. xxiii)
114 Means (1931, p. 47)
115 Chen et al. (2000)

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199

The Kalahari Desert is dry for long periods of the year. The !Kung
depended during the dry season on a few permanent water holes and
on water-containing roots and melons. They traveled long distances
on foot and had no more possessions than they could carry. No other
means of transportation were part of !Kung tradition.
Our theory predicts that the !Kung culture must be kungic because
the low population density, lack of water, and lack of efficient means
of transportation make war impossible. The neighboring tribes had
no desire to conquer their land because it was unsuitable for herding
and agriculture. The !Kung adapted to the dry climate and were able
survive the frequent droughts without starving. At the time of the first
studies in the 1950s and 60s, they were happily unaware that their entire
culture was threatened and that bushmen in more fertile areas had
been exterminated. The !Kung were not refugees expelled from other
territories.116 Had they been refugees, they might have been more regal.

Figure 22. A !Kung bushman sucks up underground water through a
straw and stores it in an ostrich eggshell. Photo by Jens Bjerre, 1958.117

The !Kung never engaged in war. They would usually run away and hide
if foreigners entered their territory. The traditional means of subsistence

116 Lee (1979, p. 33)
117 All rights reserved, reproduced with permission

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Warlike and Peaceful Societies

was hunting and gathering. At the time of the studies, some !Kung had
started to work for neighboring black farmers who treated them well.
Others worked for white farmers under slave-like conditions.118
The political organization of the !Kung is consistently described as
fiercely egalitarian. There was no political unit beyond the individual
settlements with fluid membership. Various observers disagree on
whether settlements had chiefs. There was obviously some degree of
leadership based on kinship, age, experience, and personal qualities.119
Sharing was very important in !Kung life. Anybody who had food
was required to share with others. Hunting tools, clothes, and other
possessions circulated widely through systematic gift exchange. Any
attempt at boasting, self-promotion, or accumulation of wealth was
despised and effectively prevented through social pressure.
There was no formal system of justice and punishment. Even the
worst cases of wrongdoing could go unpunished, for children as well as
for adults. Theft did not occur. Murder was occasionally revenged—in
most cases as an outburst of rage, but in a few cases in a planned way.
Severe conflicts were more likely to result in the social group splitting up
than in any kind of disciplining. The most severe punishment described
by the observers was that somebody sang a song about the misdeeds of
the culprit. The need for social acceptance was sufficient to keep people
in line. When the first schools were set up in the area, the !Kung did not
accept the fact that corporal punishment was practiced in the schools.120
The !Kung beliefs were fluid, ambiguous, and incoherent. They
had no clear distinction between natural and supernatural, between
human and divine, or between human and animal. Their legends
included traces of Bantu religion, Christianity, and even European
fairy tales. Several observers have equated the most powerful of their
mythological characters, the creator of everything, with the Christian
God. But this god had few similarities with this monotheistic God.
He was, in a mythological past, a vulgar trickster displaying all the
immoral behaviors that humans abhor. The gods and spirits interacted
with humans in good and bad ways but were not concerned with
upholding human morality. Rather, they manipulated humans for their
118 Lee (1979, p. 77), Thomas (1959)
119 Lee (1979, p. 244), Thomas (1959), Marshall (1976, p. 181)
120 Lee (1979, p. 24), Thomas (1959), Marshall (1976, p. 289), Draper (1975)

7. Regality Theory Applied to Ancient Cultures



201

own obscure purposes. The religious beliefs were used in storytelling,
in the use of oracle discs, and in trance dances and healing. The exercise
of these rituals was not monopolized by any religious authorities,
although some people were obviously better healers than others.121
Anthropologists disagree on what to call the !Kung because they
themselves had no clear name for their tribe or race. They did not
recognize as tribe fellows other people that spoke the same language.
They readily mingled with and worked for neighboring people of
different races. Mixed marriages were common.122
The fertility of the hunting and gathering !Kung was so low that
overpopulation was avoided and the natural resources were not
overexploited.123 Children were breastfed for three to four years, and
birth spacing was three to five years. Infanticide occurred at a reported
rate of 1–2%. No other means of birth control were used. Children did
not work but were free to play all day. The average marrying age was
14 to 17 for women and 22 to 30 for men, according to some observers,
but child marriages are also reported to have been common. Polygamy
occurred, and a single case of polyandry was reported in a neighbor
tribe. Divorce was easy. Suicide was rare.124
The frequency of premarital and extramarital sex is difficult to
estimate. Lorna Marshall reports that illegitimate sex was rare because
it was impossible to hide, but she also notes that spouse swapping was
allowed. M. G. Guenther notes that their marriages were ‘loose’. I. EiblEibesfeldt writes that they were fairly liberal in sexual matters, but open
promiscuity was not tolerated. G. Silberbauer reports for a neighbor
tribe that people often could get away with adultery. R. Lee reports that
gonorrhea was spreading fast. Rape was rare.125
The !Kung rarely produced pictorial art, because it didn’t fit into
their nomadic lifestyle. The main art forms were song, dance, and
storytelling. Women and girls decorated themselves lavishly with strings
of beads. Men were tattooed as an element of hunting magic. They used
121 Thomas (1959), Guenther (1999), Biesele (1976), Marshall (1962, 1999)
122 Thomas (1959)
123 Lee (1979, p. 44), Silberbauer (1981, p. 286), Marshall (1976, p. 146)
124 Lee (1979, pp. 265, 310), Thomas (1959), Marshall (1976, p. 166; 1999, p. 320),
Silberbauer (1981, p. 149)
125 Marshall (1976, p. 279), Guenther (1999, p. 237), Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1978, p. 136),
Silberbauer (1981, p. 156), Lee (1979, p. 417)

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bows as musical instruments. Other simple musical instruments were
introduced during the twentieth century. They appreciated individual
inventiveness in art and readily borrowed elements of art from neighbor
cultures. There were no big ceremonies, not even at marriage or burial.
The most important socially unifying ceremony was the frequent trance
dance.126

Figure 23. !Kung bushmen telling stories around the fire.
Photo by Jens Bjerre, 1958.127

The conclusions for the !Kung are that the culture was very kungic,
in accordance with the geography, lack of efficient transportation
means, and niche specialization that prevented territorial conflicts with
neighbor tribes during the times of early observations. The predictions
for a kungic culture are in excellent agreement with the observations of
a low level of conflict, an egalitarian political system, lax discipline, nonauthoritarian religion, low degree of group identification, tolerance of
foreigners, low fertility rate, long childhood, and flexible art and music.
126 Marshall (1976, p. 34, 363; 1999, p. 63), Guenther (1999, p. 165)
127 All rights reserved, reproduced with permission

7. Regality Theory Applied to Ancient Cultures



203

The expected high suicide rate has not been found. The sexual morals
appear to be fairly liberal for a people without birth control.
Fertility has recently been increasing and egalitarian ideals decreasing
for those !Kung who have changed to a settled lifestyle based on herding
or farming, as can be expected from our theory.128
Previous literature uses the word ‘kalyptic’ for the opposite of regal.129
As this word sounds somewhat awkward and may be misinterpreted as
an abbreviation of ‘apocalyptic’, it was decided to replace it with the
new term kungic in commemoration of the !Kung culture. There is no
circular reasoning in the observation that !Kung culture is kungic, as the
decision to use this term was made ex post facto.

7.12. Maasai
The Maasai are a seminomadic pastoral people living on the semiarid
plains and plateaus of the Great Rift Valley in Kenya and Tanzania. They
have migrated from the north since the fifteenth century and displaced
other tribes as they expanded. Their territory reached its maximum size
in the mid-nineteenth century. The population was decimated in the
late nineteenth century due to rinderpest and other epidemics among
their livestock, as well as smallpox and drought.130
They have large herds of cattle and goats and a smaller number of
donkeys used as pack animals. Their diet consists almost entirely of
milk, meat, blood, and honey. They avoid meat from wild animals. They
have metal-headed spears which they use in warfare.131
To make a prediction for the Maasai, we first note that the ease of
travel on the plains makes war possible. Their donkeys are useful for
transport of material but not for war. The population density must be
relatively low, due to the limited and periodic rainfall and frequent
droughts. However, the use of cattle as a food source allows groups
of several hundred people to live together. Scramble competition for
grazing land points in the kungic direction, while contest competition
for important water sources points in the regal direction. We will predict
128 Lee (1979, pp. 48, 324), Draper (1975), Katz and Biesele (1986)
129 Fog (1997)
130 Coast (2001, p. 24), Fosbrooke (1948), Huntingford (1953, p. 105)
131 Huntingford (1953, p. 107), Merker (1904, p. 157)

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a moderately regal culture, since there are more regal than kungic
factors in their environment and ecology.
The social and political organization of the Maasai is based on a
peculiar age set system. When an age group of boys reach maturity,
they are collectively circumcised and soon afterwards included in the
class of warriors (moran). This event also initiates them into the age set
system. A new age set is formed every fifteen years, while the members
of the preceding age set mature and get married and a new group of
warriors is formed. The cohort of men belonging to the same age set
forms a lifelong political unit with its own leaders and spokesmen. The
fifteen-year age span allows the warrior group to be big enough to form
a strong military force.132

Figure 24. Maasai warriors. The patterns on their shields indicate their
group and age set. Photo by Walther Dobbertin, 1906–1918.
Bundesarchiv, Bild 105-DOA0556.133

The Maasai have no paramount chief. The political power above the
division into age sets resides with leaders selected among the elders. A
particularly powerful man is the medicine man and diviner, the laibon,
who has many wives. Nobody can go to war or make other important
decisions without first asking the laibon for ritual directions.134
The non-migratory ironsmiths form a separate caste, despised by the
pastoralists.135
132 Fosbrooke (1948), Merker (1904, p. 70)
133 CC-BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_105DOA0556,_Deutsch-Ostafrika,_Massaikrieger.jpg
134 Fosbrooke (1948), Merker (1904, p. 18), Krapf (1860, p. 362), Whitehouse (1933)
135 Huntingford (1953, p. 109), Merker (1904, p. 110), Fokken (1917)

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The entire life of the pastoral Maasai revolves around the accumulation
of wealth in the form of livestock. The warriors make regular raids
against neighboring tribes in order to steal livestock. Indeed, this is the
main occupation and the raison d’être of the warrior group. Raids and
wars against other Maasai sometimes occur. The Maasai have a strong
sense of tribal identity and they despise all other tribes.136
There is a well-defined system for punishment of crimes against
other Maasai. Most crimes, including murder, are punished by the
payment of fines in the form of livestock. Revenge killing occurs, but
is mostly prevented. Children work from an early age, and they can be
punished with beating if they fail to do their work properly.137
The religion of the Maasai is monotheistic. Their god, Engai, is
identified with the sun, rain, and other natural phenomena. Nobody
knows or speculates about what Engai looks like. The Maasai believe
that they are Engai’s chosen people. Engai has given livestock to them
and nobody else, and this gives them the right to attack other tribes and
steal their livestock.138
The Maasai have little or no beliefs in spirits or an afterlife. Dead
people are rarely buried—they are just left in the wild to be eaten by
scavengers.139 Ritual curses are used as a means of disciplining people.
A person who breaks a curse by misbehaving or by failing to fulfill a
duty will be punished by misfortune.140
The sexual morals of the Maasai are lax. Premarital and extramarital
sex is allowed and considered normal as long as certain rules are
obeyed.141 This is unexpected for a moderately regal culture and
requires an explanation. The social organization of the Maasai into age
sets serves the function of generating a large group of young unmarried
warriors with high prestige who can devote their time to warfare and
raids without having to care about family life and children. It is unlikely
that these powerful young men can be disciplined into spending the

136 Huntingford (1953, p. 107), Merker (1904), Krapf (1860, p. 354), Baumann (1894, p.
163)
137 Coast (2001, p. 32), Merker (1904, p. 203), Spencer, P. (1988, p. 51), Sankan (1971, p.
11), Saitoti (1986, p. 7), Hollis (1905, p. 203)
138 Merker (1904, p. 195), Krapf (1860, p. 360), Fokken (1917), Baumann (1894, p. 163),
Spencer, P. (1988)
139 Fokken (1917), Baumann (1894, p. 164), Hollis (1905)
140 Spencer, P. (1988, p. 219), Saitoti (1986, p. 3)
141 Coast (2001, p. 115), Merker (1904, p. 44)

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most virile years of their lives without access to women. This would
have undermined any strict sexual morals that may have existed in a
distant past.142
Men do not marry until they advance into the group of elders, while
girls marry at a much younger age. Girls cannot marry before they
have been clitoridectomized, which is a rite of passage analogous to the
circumcision of boys.143
Most men will acquire additional wives as they grow older, if they
can afford it. One may suspect that the economic aspects of marriage are
more important than the romantic aspect. The society is patriarchal, and
inheritance is patrilineal. The children that a woman bears belong to
her husband, regardless of who the biological father is. Divorce is rare
and difficult for a woman who has children. Due to the age difference
between husband and wife, there are many widows, and widows rarely
remarry although they may continue to have children. It is even possible
to marry a dead childless man in order to give him a son that can inherit
his property.144

Figure 25. Young married Maasai woman wearing iron spirals and other
ornaments. Photographer unknown, ca. 1900. From Hollis (1905).145
142 Fosbrooke (1948)
143 Coast (2001, p. 80), Merker (1904, p. 44), Krapf (1860, p. 363)
144 Coast (2001, p. 86), Fosbrooke (1948), Huntingford (1953, p. 115), Sankan (1971, p. 47)
145 Public domain

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207

The Maasai desire to have many children, and the fertility is high. They
have a strong taboo against mentioning the name of a dead person.
For this reason, it is very difficult to gather information about the
occurrence of infanticide and suicide, though these are known to occur.
The casualties of war are high.146
The conclusion for the Maasai is that most of the cultural markers fit
the predictions for a moderately regal culture, with the exceptions of the
political structure, which is less hierarchical than expected, the sexual
morals, which are unusually permissive, and the late marrying age for
men. The Maasai have developed a unique sociopolitical structure that
has brought them military success, despite being different from the
highly hierarchical and centralized political structures of other militarily
strong societies.

7.13. Mbuti
Mbuti is a name for several groups of pygmies who lived in the Ituri
forest, a tropical rain forest in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
near the equator. The average day temperature was around 27 °C all
year round. It was possible to pass through most parts of the forest
on foot because of limited undergrowth. Rivers and swamps formed
barriers to the movement of the Mbuti, who did not make boats. The
Mbuti were nomads with a peculiar lifestyle alternating between two
different cultures. For periods of several months, they lived in the forest,
where hunting and gathering formed their subsistence. At certain times
of the year, they lived near villages at the edge of the forest, where they
traded meat for vegetables and tools with slash and burn agriculturalists
of Bantu and Sudanese origins. The villagers had bound the Mbuti into
a kind of serfdom, which was inherited on both sides—at least in the
imagination of the villagers. However, the Mbuti could easily escape
and change their allegiance, because the villagers were afraid to enter
the forest. The relationship between Mbuti and agriculturalists has
lasted for so long that the Mbuti have lost their original language but

146 Coast (2001, p. 135), Merker (1904, p. 333)

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not their genetic uniqueness.147 The only evidence that the pygmies ever
lived independently in the forest is archaeological.148

Figure 26. Mbuti men hunting with net. Photo by Paul Schebesta, n. d.
Bildarchiv Austria, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Nr. 10819171.149

To make a regality prediction for the Mbuti, we first note that the
population density in the forest was low. Walking through the forest
was slow, and there were rivers that the Mbuti could not cross. The
environment was healthy and dangers were few. The forest provided
good protection from the villagers, who would never pursue the Mbuti
into the forest. These are factors that point in the kungic direction. Other
factors point in the regal direction. The nomadic lifestyle could lead to
territorial conflicts. The territory of the Mbuti was shrinking as forest
was converted to agricultural land. Furthermore, the Mbuti were heavily
influenced by the village culture, which we would expect to be more
147 Cavalli-Sforza (1986, p. 18), Harako (1976, p. 39), Schebesta (1938, p. 54), Turnbull
(1961, p. 17; 1965, p. 23)
148 Bailey (1989), Mercader et al. (2000), Wilkie and Curran (1993)
149 All rights reserved, reproduced with permission

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209

regal than the forest culture. Nevertheless, we will expect the kungic
factors to dominate, because the Mbuti could escape any conflict with
the villagers, who were unable to penetrate their niche. Consequently,
the prediction is that the Mbuti culture would be moderately kungic.
The Mbuti had very little political organization. Some people, mostly
older men, took leading roles in the camps, but egalitarian principles were
held in high regard and everybody had a say in discussions. Conflicts
were handled collectively. Everybody in a camp was responsible for
avoiding or stopping conflicts between camp members. Young bachelors
sometimes played a key role in handling conflicts between the older
married people by means of mockery and ridicule. Conflicts were often
diverted or dissolved into ridicule rather than settled with a formal
decision. Retaliation for wrongdoing was common, but organized
punishment was very rare. Serious wrongdoing could lead to the flight
or ostracism of the perpetrator, but the banished person might return
after a few days of hiding in the forest, where somebody had secretly
brought him food. No case of permanent banishment is known.150
The Mbuti abhorred physical violence. They have been engaged by
the villagers as scouts in wars with other tribes, but there is no evidence
that the Mbuti have ever themselves taken any part in war beyond
killing a few trespassers.151
The religious beliefs of the Mbuti varied considerably and lacked
precision and dogmas. Different observers disagree on even the most
fundamental aspects of Mbuti beliefs, such as the names and nature
of their supernatural beings, whether they prayed and sacrificed,
whether they performed witchcraft, and whether they believed in an
afterlife. The villagers involved the Mbuti in their rites of passage in an
attempt to exercise supernatural control over them. The Mbuti willingly
participated in these rituals and pretended to share the beliefs of the
villagers, which they could use to their own advantage. The villagers
believed that the forest was full of malevolent spirits, and the Mbuti
actively worked to reinforce such beliefs among the villagers in order to
keep them out of the forest. When no villager was watching them, the
Mbuti would ridicule the beliefs of the villagers and deliberately violate
150 Harako (1976, p. 89), Schebesta (1948, p. 332), Turnbull (1961, p. 102; 1965, pp. 26,
178; 1983, p. 44), Putnam (1950)
151 Schebesta (1948, p. 534), Turnbull (1965, p. 220), Putnam (1950)

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the religious taboos of their villager hosts. When in the forest, the Mbuti
had few religious rituals. It is uncertain whether the Mbuti honestly
believed in any form of supernatural punishment, but we can say with
reasonable confidence that religion was not a strong disciplining force
in Mbuti life.152
Different Pygmy groups considered themselves as belonging to
the same tribe, even if they spoke different languages (the languages
of their respective village hosts). They did not allow trespassers. They
were fearful of foreigners but also friendly toward them, and they
were open to foreign cultural influences. They regarded the villages as
hunting grounds and saw the villagers as ‘animals’ to exploit for their
own advantage.153
Sexual morals were liberal among the Mbuti. Premarital intercourse
was sanctioned in certain puberty rituals. Marital infidelity was not
a rare occurrence, and divorce was easy. Polygamy occurred. They
married after puberty with little or no ceremony. The average age of first
marriage was 18 for boys, 16 for girls. A marriage was not considered
fully established until the first child was born.154
Children were breastfed for at least one to three years. Birth spacing
was three to four years. Birth control was obtained by a postpartum sex
taboo and probably by other, unknown means. Abortion was known
but rare. Infanticide was practiced after twin births. The fertility was
low according to some accounts, higher according to others, but the
total population size was stable. Suicide occurred.155
Children were treated with affection. They had considerable
freedom, were rarely punished, and did not have to do hard work.156
The most important art forms were singing and dancing. The singing
of the Mbuti and related Pygmy tribes is characterized as polyphonic.
Everybody could join in or contribute in turns with possibly improvised
harmonies in no predefined order and with no apparent hierarchy of
voices. The result was a rich complexity of different voices to a common
rhythm. The dances often formed mimicry of daily events. Erotic dances
152 Schebesta (1950, p. 14), Turnbull (1961, p. 75; 1965, p. 29)
153 Schebesta (1948, p. 512), Turnbull (1965, pp. 37, 82)
154 Cavalli-Sforza (1986, p. 37), Schebesta (1948, pp. 297, 359), Turnbull (1961; 1965, pp.
63, 122; 1983, p. 34)
155 Cavalli-Sforza (1986), Schebesta (1938, p. 112), Turnbull (1965, p. 128), Bailey (1989,
p. 100)
156 Schebesta (1941, p. 118; 1948, p. 419), Turnbull (1961, p. 118)

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211

were also common. There was no graphic art other than simple body
painting, body adornment, and decoration of clothes.157
We can conclude that Mbuti culture was even more kungic than
expected. All the cultural indicators point in the kungic direction. The
further away they were from village influence, the more peaceful and
egalitarian was their behavior.

7.14. Somali
The Somali live in the north-east of Africa at the Gulf of Aden. The
climate is dry with temperatures ranging from below freezing point to
above 40 °C. Droughts occur at irregular intervals. The environment is
mostly semiarid plains and plateaus with little vegetation. Most of the
population lived as nomads and herders, and milk was the staple food.
There are only two permanent rivers in Somaliland. Agriculture with
irrigation was practiced near the rivers. The coastal population lived
off fishing, trade, and crafts. There was extensive trade with Arabia and
with other parts of Africa.
The Somalis traveled around with camels and donkeys as pack
animals. Lack of water was no big obstacle to traveling, because the
camels could go long distances without water, and because the herders
could drink camel milk on their travels. The sparse grazing resources
for the animals set a limit to the size of troops that could travel together.
The most important weapons were iron-headed spears. Horses were
used in battle if available, but there were only few horses.158
Based on this information, we can expect the culture of the Somalis
to be moderately regal. The relative ease of travel and the availability
of metal weapons are factors that point in the regal direction. The
occurrence of droughts at unpredictable intervals may also be a regal
factor. However, the population density must necessarily be low, except
near the coast and the rivers. This points in the kungic direction. The
low-density nomadic population could not easily be incorporated into
a larger political or military organization. The hot and dry climate also
limited the fighting ability of the population.

157 Schebesta (1941, p. 243), Turnbull (1961, p. 76; 1983, p. 46), Arom (1983), Ichikawa
(2004)
158 Lewis (1955, pp. 11, 75), Cassanelli (1982, p. 9)

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Prior to European colonization, the political organization of the
Somalis was fluid and ever changing. The political leader of a family,
clan, or tribe was chosen partly by majority decisions of the adult
men, partly by inheritance, and partly by power, influence, and age.
Higher-level political structures were either absent or unstable. Citystates and small sultanates were formed from time to time, but they
often disintegrated again after some time. The political leader and the
religious leader were seldom the same person. Arab immigrants had
high prestige and considerable political and religious influence. Slavery
was very common. However, slaves were reportedly treated well and
many slaves were freed.159
War, feuds, raids, and plundering were frequent occurrences. The
wars were of a relatively low scale with at most a few hundred deaths,
but it is assumed that the territorial boundaries were ultimately defined
by military strength.160
The religious belief of the Somalis was dominated by Islam due to
a strong Arabic influence. The religion was a strong power, especially
in moral and judicial matters. Legal matters were governed mainly by
Islamic sharia law. Crimes were punished by the payment of a fine, for
example 100 camels for homicide, which was paid partly by the offender
and partly by his group. Other forms of punishment were rare.161
The literature gives no reliable information on fertility and population
growth. Children were breastfed for two years, but were also given
other food. Child mortality was high. Children were set to work from an
early age. Children were well disciplined, but there are no reports about
punishment of children. The marrying age varied from 12 to 20 for girls
and 17 to 25 for boys. Child betrothal and forced marriages occurred but
were not common. Men who could afford it practiced polygamy. The
sexual morals were strict, except for the divorce rate, which was very
high. Girls were infibulated to ensure chastity. Social contact between
boys and girls was limited.162
Pictorial art was not very important because of the nomadic lifestyle
of the majority of the population. Clothing and body adornment was

159 Cassanelli (1982), Lewis (1955, pp. 11, 99; 1961, p. 198), Luling (2002)
160 Lewis (1955), Haggenmacher (1876, pp. 11, 31)
161 Cassanelli (1982, p. 17), Lewis (1955, pp. 107, 140; 1961)
162 Cassanelli (1982, p. 13), Lewis (1955, p. 135; 1962), Luling (2002, p. 71), Haggenmacher
(1876, p. 27)

7. Regality Theory Applied to Ancient Cultures



213

simple, without excessive embellishments. Tools and objects were
sometimes embellished with woodcarvings, showing simple figures
and often repetitive geometric patterns. Dances were relatively simple,
sometimes with a war theme. The most important art form was poetry,
which was highly stylized and rule bound.163
The conclusion for the Somali is that the political organization
is intermediate, whereas the justice system and the relatively mild
punishments can be characterized as kungic. The religion, the sexual
morals, and the widespread slavery are more on the regal side. The
artistic expressions show mixed characteristics: the poetry in particular
shows regal tendencies, while the clothing and body adornment look
more kungic.

7.15. Warao
The Warao Indians lived mainly in the large delta of the Orinoco River
in Venezuela, an area of approximately 18,000 km2. The environment
was swamps, mangroves, tropical rain forest, and a labyrinthine system
of rivers. The staple food was the sago-like pith of the Moriche palm,
supplemented by fish and small animals. Food was plentiful but
seasonal. Food storing was practiced where necessary. In later times,
the Warao built their huts on stilts for protection against floods. They
went everywhere by canoe. Their canoes were capable of sailing along
the coast of Venezuela and to the nearby island of Trinidad, where they
went for trading. Traveling over land was virtually impossible due to
the dense forests, lack of dry ground, and many rivers. They had no
pottery and no metal tools, except in later times where modern tools
were obtained by trade.164
Warao culture was adapted to a very specialized niche. No foreign
tribe had the necessary skills to navigate the swampy delta, and much
less to gather food and survive there. This gave the Warao good
protection. Whenever the Warao were attacked by neighbor tribes, they
found protection in the swamps and dense forests.
We would expect the Warao to be able to attack neighbor tribes
because of the ability to travel far in their canoes, although they lacked
163 Cassanelli (1982, p. 267), Lewis (1955, p. 132), Luling (2002, p. 164), Puccioni (1936,
p. 88)
164 Wilbert (1958, p. 272; 1993, p. 235), Wilbert and Layrisse (1980, p. 3)

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efficient weapons and the population density was low. However, they
would have little incentive to leave the area that fitted their specialized
niche, and outsiders would have little reason to attack them. Hence, we
can predict that the niche specialization gave the Warao a moderately
kungic culture.
The Warao were peaceful people who detested physical aggression.
They were rarely involved in war, but there is evidence that they were at
war with neighbor Carib, who allegedly cannibalized the Warao or sold
them as slaves. There was no war between Warao subtribes. Internal
conflicts were dealt with by public hearings or ritualized competitions,
and territorial transgressions were prevented by threats of black
magic.165
The Warao were divided into subtribes. Each subtribe consisted of
a number of bands, which were led by an elite of elders, patriarchs, or
chiefs, possibly including women. Shamans belonged to the elite, and
chiefs were often shamans. There was only a loose organization of the
subtribe and no political organization above the level of the subtribe.166
The political leaders had little power to discipline or coerce people.
Shamans did, however, have considerable power because of their contact
with spirits who could cause fortune or misfortune. The Warao believed
in a supernatural world populated by spirits or deified ancestors. People
were rewarded in the afterlife if they had been skillful at their work.
There was no dogmatic system of beliefs.167
The Warao traditionally avoided contact with other tribes, except
for trade of necessary products. In modern times, however, they
intermarried with foreigners, adopted Spanish names, migrated, and
accepted foreign culture elements quite quickly.168
The fertility was very high. A woman who survived into old age
would have almost nine children on average. It must be mentioned,
however, that this fertility rate was measured at a time when modern
medicine had reduced the—previously very high—mortality, and

165 Wilbert (1993, pp. 16, 244), Grohs-Paul (1979, p. 33), Heinen (1985, p. 14; 1994, p.
359), Kirchoff (1948, p. 878)
166 Wilbert (1993, p. 31), Wilbert and Layrisse (1980, p. 7)
167 Wilbert (1993, p. 74; 1996, p. 257), Wilbert and Layrisse (1980, p. 8), Heinen (1994, p.
358), Olsen (1996, p. 227)
168 Wilbert (1993, p. 93), Wilbert and Layrisse (1980, p. 180)

7. Regality Theory Applied to Ancient Cultures



215

where a large fraction of the population had settled into an agricultural
lifestyle. It is possible that infectious diseases stabilized the population
size in earlier times. Children were breastfed for three to four years.
Infanticide was practiced.169
Girls were usually married in their teens or early twenties; boys
were a few years older when they married. A few girls were married
as children. Polygyny occurred. Most marriages were within the same
subtribe. Promiscuity was common in connection with certain rituals
and dances. A man could have sex with the unmarried sister of his wife.
Premarital trial unions were common. Divorce was rare for couples
with several children.170
Children were treated well, and parents made toys for their children.
Children spent most of their time playing, but they also helped with
light work. Children were rarely scolded, and teenagers were not well
disciplined.171
Some religious artifacts were decorated, while tools, canoes, and
huts were rarely so. People wore necklaces and other adornment. The
main forms of art were songs, dances, and narratives. Singers had
much freedom for variation and improvisation. Typical narratives were
fables, stories about magical transformations, and stories about the
supernatural world. There were no narratives or songs exalting powerful
leaders, gods, or battles, but there were tales about past invasions and
a few fables told about jaguars that symbolized the enemy Carib. The
main occasions for large social gatherings were religious ceremonies.
Ceremonies for marriages and other rites of passage were not very
elaborate.172
The conclusion for the Warao is that the level of war, political
system, discipline, treatment of children, sexual behavior, and art are
all in agreement with the predictions for a kungic culture. The religion
was relatively kungic, though it did have a disciplining function. The
fertility was atypically high.

169 Wilbert and Layrisse (1980, pp. 25, 61), Kirchoff (1948)
170 Wilbert (1958, p. 274; 1993, p. 33), Wilbert and Layrisse (1980), Heinen (1994, p. 358),
Kirchoff (1948), Suarez (1968, p. 128)
171 Wilbert (1993, p. 40), Grohs-Paul (1979, p. 51), Kirchoff (1948)
172 Wilbert (1970, p. 28; 1993, p. 136; 1996, p. 25), Olsen (1996), Suarez (1968)

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7.16. Yahgan
This section concerns the canoe Indians who lived in the southernmost
part of South America, Tierra del Fuego, with the main focus on the
Yahgan tribe. The climate was harsh and cold, with frequent storms. The
territory of the canoe Indians was an archipelago of islands with high
mountains and dense forests. The land was difficult to penetrate and
provided only very little vegetable food. Therefore, the Indians lived
as nomads traveling in bark canoes, eating mainly seafood. Their tools
were made mainly of wood, bone, and shells. They had no metals and
no pottery. As they had very few clothes, they always kept a fire for
warmth.173

Figure 27. Yahgans 1896. Photo by Otto Nordenskjöld.
From Nordenskjöld (1898).174

Fishing in this environment could sustain only a low population density.
The Indians could travel in their bark canoes from island to island but
not in open sea. Large-scale war was probably impossible because of
the low population density and because the bark canoes were too small
and fragile. Small-scale clashes were more likely to have taken place. If
we have to make a prediction based on the geography and technology
alone, we will expect the Yahgan culture to be moderately kungic. The

173 Cooper (1917, p. 3; 1946, p. 81), Gusinde (1937, p. 403; 1974, p. 243), Lothrop (1928)
174 Public domain

7. Regality Theory Applied to Ancient Cultures



217

niche culture, harsh climate, low population density, and absence of
technology suitable for war are factors that point in the kungic direction.
The ability to travel far and the risk of territorial conflict that come with
a nomadic lifestyle are factors that point in the regal direction.
The Yahgan had no social organization beyond the family. Several
families might live together, or meet for social and ceremonial occasions
or to feast on a stranded whale, but there was no common leadership
and no group organization. War was unknown, but small-scale conflicts
and feuds were common. Revenge was not always deadly. There were
no weapons other than the usual hunting tools. There was no organized
policing. Punishment occurred in the form of revenge from the wronged
party assisted by his or her family, for example beating for marital
infidelity. In most cases, however, public condemnation was sufficient
to deter undesired behavior.175
They had few religious activities other than rites of passage and a
few ceremonies. Some sources say that they believed in a high god,176
but other sources deny this.177 Medicine men worked to cure diseases by
means of self-induced trance or dreams, but they had little or no religious
paraphernalia; they did not sacrifice, and they did not believe that
supernatural beings could be influenced by prayer. They believed that
diseases and death were punishments for wrongdoing. For this reason,
we can say that the religion had at least some disciplining function.178
There were several tribes of canoe Indians with distinct tribal
identities. They feared the neighboring Selk’nam, who lived on land
rather than in canoes. They were surprisingly tolerant of Whites,
considering that they had been treated very brutally by white seafarers,
gold diggers, and settlers in the past.179
There are no reliable data on the fertility of the Yahgan, and the
sources do not fully agree. Some sources tell that they had many
children, but the mortality was also high. The population size may have
been stable for hundreds or thousands of years. The population became
175 Cooper (1917, p. 174), Gusinde (1937, p. 887; 1974), Lothrop (1928, p. 160), Bridges
(1949, p. 79), Hyades and Deniker (1891, p. 16)
176 Gusinde (1937, p. 1040), Lothrop (1928, p. 35)
177 Bridges and Lothrop (1950, p. 98)
178 Cooper (1946, p. 102), Gusinde (1937, p. 1393), Lothrop (1928, p. 160), Bridges and
Lothrop (1950)
179 Gusinde (1937, p. 28; 1974, p. 578), Cooper (1917), Nordenskjöld (1898)

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extinct after contact with Whites, mainly due to infectious diseases.
Abortion and infanticide were known. Suicide was unknown.180
There are conflicting accounts of the sexual morals of the Yahgan.
They tried to keep boys and girls apart from each other, but premarital
sex was nevertheless common. Extramarital sex occurred. The marrying
age was reportedly around 17 to 19 for boys and 15 to 16 for girls, but
these figures may be inaccurate since they did not count their ages.
Polygamy was rare in some areas, perhaps common in other areas.
Authors disagree on whether divorce was frequent or rare.181
Children were treated with devotion. Weaning age was 3 years or
older. Children were given miniature tools to play and practice with.
Small children were never punished. Children were obedient and helped
their parents with daily chores, but they were never forced to do hard
work.182
Yahgan art was extremely simple. Body painting consisted of simple
lines and dots without precision. There was little or no tattooing and
body mutilation. Music consisted of just a few notes, sometimes only
a single repeated note. There were no musical instruments other than
percussion. Dances were imitations of animals. Legends were mostly
fables, myths about culture heroes, and a few stories about revenge.183
The conclusion for the Yahgan is that the level of war, political system,
discipline, treatment of children, and art are all in agreement with the
predictions for a kungic culture. The religion was kungic, though it did
have a disciplining function. The fertility was high.

7.17. Yanomamo
The Yanomamo lived in the Amazon rainforest in Brazil and Venezuela.
They resided mainly in semi-permanent villages with 20 to 400
inhabitants. Slash and burn agriculture was their main source of food.
They were capable of living a nomadic life as hunters and gatherers, and
it is speculated that they might have done so in pre-Columbian times,
180 Gusinde (1937, p. 699; 1974, p. 437), Lothrop (1928, pp. 25, 163), Hyades and Deniker
(1891, p. 189)
181 Cooper (1917, p. 164), Gusinde (1937, p. 633; 1974, p. 338), Lothrop (1928, p. 163),
Bridges and Lothrop (1950, p. 106), Hyades and Deniker (1891, p. 377)
182 Gusinde (1937, p. 745), Bridges and Lothrop (1950, p. 107)
183 Gusinde (1937; 1966, p. 71; 1974), Lothrop (1928, p. 125)

7. Regality Theory Applied to Ancient Cultures



219

since their main crop—plantains—was brought to the Americas by
Europeans. They traveled almost exclusively on foot on narrow paths
that were almost invisible to foreigners. Many trails were impassable in
the wet season. They went barefoot and almost naked. They had little or
no means for sailing on the rivers, and they could cross big rivers only
with difficulty. They had no domestic animals besides dogs. Their main
weapons were clubs and bows and arrows. Arrow tips were mostly made
of wood or bone, poisoned with curare. Metal tools were obtained by
barter.184
The cultivation of high-yield crops made room for large village
populations, but the dependence on hunting for acquiring protein made
it necessary that each village had sufficient hunting territory. This makes
us predict that wars were likely, and the wars would be aggravated by
the availability of strong arrow poison. On the other hand, the difficulty
of traveling through the rain forest and the low overall population
density are factors that reduced the opportunities for war. Considering
these opposing factors, we will predict an intermediate level of regality.

Figure 28. Yanomami. Unknown photographer, 2007.185
184 Ferguson (1995, p. 61), Chagnon (1977, p. 18; 1992, p. 56), Peters, J. (1998), Smole
(1976, p. 32), Valero and Biocca (1970)
185 CC-BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Yanomami_en_el_Estado_
Amazonas_(21).jpg

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The Yanomamo have a reputation for fierceness in war, but there has
been considerable controversy among anthropologists over how fierce
the Yanomamo actually were, why they fought, and whether their raids
can be classified as war. It is undisputed, however, that violence was a
frequent cause of death in some areas. The level of fighting was much
higher in the lowlands, where villages had more inhabitants, than in the
highlands.186
In their own understanding, the Yanomamo conducted raids against
other villages for purposes of retaliation and to capture women. They
were well aware that the enemy might move away as a consequence
of a conflict, but they rarely mentioned the desire to make the enemy
move away as a motivation for attack.187 An ethologist has suggested
that we make a distinction between the proximate cause of Yanomamo
warfare, which is the personal motivation, and the ultimate cause of the
warfare, which is connected to the evolutionary function of securing
a sufficiently large hunting territory.188 Since Yanomamo conflicts had
territorial consequences, we will classify them with regard to regality
theory as wars.
The Yanomamo had no political organization above the level of the
village, and the village headman had very little authority. There was
no organized system of justice and punishment other than retaliation.
Even rape and murder could go unpunished if there were no relatives
to retaliate on behalf of the victim. Personal conflicts were handled
by fighting duels. These duels were formalized and rule-governed.
Afterwards, the issue was regarded as settled, regardless of the outcome
of the duel. However, a duel might sometimes escalate into collective
fighting or even war, especially if somebody died.189
The religious beliefs of the Yanomamo involved a close connection
with animals and spirits. Many men were shamans. They took strong
hallucinogenic drugs in order to get in contact with, or even become,
spirits. They manipulated the spirits for purposes of curing diseases and

186 Ferguson (1995), Chagnon (1992, p. 105), Good (1987)
187 Ferguson (1995, p. 7), Chagnon (1979, 1992, p. 113), Peters, J. (1998, pp. 24, 214),
Valero and Biocca (1970, p. 31)
188 Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1989, p. 108)
189 Chagnon (1977, p. 118), Cocco (1972, p. 366), Lizot (1976, p. 83)

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221

harming their enemies. They had no supernatural rulers and only weak
concepts of supernatural punishment after death.190
The fertility was controlled by breastfeeding, abortion, infanticide,
and magical anticonception means. Birth spacing was two to five years.
The overall fertility was four to eight children per woman. Extramarital
sex occurred when detection could be avoided. It was common for a
man to share his wife with his brothers. Rape was common.191
Most girls married soon after puberty. Girls might be married
before puberty, but they did not live with their husbands until after
first menstruation. Men married at age 18 to 30. They often married for
economic and strategic reasons rather than romantic reasons. Girls had
little self-determination about whom to marry. Polygyny and polyandry
occurred. There was no marriage ceremony. Wife beating was normal.
Divorce was common.192
Children were rarely disciplined, but boys were taught to be fierce
and to retaliate. Children were given miniature tools and other toys.
Girls were obliged to do work from a much younger age than boys.193
The Yanomamo produced little art. Body painting was made as much
for magical reasons as for decoration. Different colors and patterns were
used for war paint, hunting, and shamanism. Some patterns symbolized
or imitated various animals. Piercings in ears, lips, and the nasal
septum were decorated with long sticks or feathers. Arrow tips were
often decorated, while clay pots were not. Dancing and singing were
common. There were few or no music instruments. Myths and stories
did not glorify war.194
The conclusion for the Yanomamo is that the level of war is
intermediate, while the political organization, justice, discipline,
religion, sexuality, and art all tend in the kungic direction. The strong
male dominance may be interpreted as a regal indicator.

190 Chagnon (1977, p. 44), Smole (1976, p. 23), Zerries (1964, p. 237)
191 Chagnon (1977, p. 40), Peters, J. (1998, p. 119), Smole (1976), Cocco (1972), Lizot
(1976, p. 22)
192 Chagnon (1977, p. 14; 1992, p. 145), Peters, J. (1998, p. 111), Smole (1976, p. 75), Lizot
(1976, p. 27)
193 Chagnon (1992, p. 145), Peters, J. (1998, p. 131), Smole (1976, p. 74), Cocco (1972, p.
292), Lizot (1976, p. 102)
194 Chagnon (1977, p. 110), Valero and Biocca (1970, p. 179), Cocco (1972, p. 124),
Zerries (1964, p. 103), Wilbert and Simoneau (1990, p. 110)

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7.18. Yi (Lolo, Nuosu)
The Yi people live in the large mountainous region of southwestern
China. The present study is focused mainly on the subgroup living in
the Liangshan area and the period prior to the rise of communism in
China.
The climate is temperate, but winters are hard. The subsistence was
based mainly on slash and burn agriculture and animal husbandry.
Transportation was difficult because of the steep mountains. There
were no roads except narrow footpaths. Roads built by Han Chinese
invaders were systematically destroyed to prevent invasion. The Yi used
horses for transportation and in war, but many paths were difficult or
impossible to travel on horseback. Most traveling was done by walking
barefoot. There were many rivers, but few were navigable. The weapons
included bows and arrows, iron-headed spears and tridents, and, in
later times, primitive firearms.195
Attempting to predict a regality level based on this information, we
get a somewhat mixed result. The rivers produce fertile valleys between
the mountains and, although the agriculture was not intensive, it could
sustain a considerable population. The efficient food production, the
possibility of storing and transporting food, the large territory, and the
availability of horses and metal weapons are all factors that make war
likely. On the other hand, the harsh environment and the difficulty of
traveling are factors that point in the kungic direction. The fertile valleys
are separated by large mountains, steep cliffs, and torrential rivers, so
that the average population density was low. The overall expectation is
that the regality level will be intermediate.
The Yi in the Liangshan area had a persistent caste system. The ruling
caste, known as the Black Yi, constituted about 10% of the population.
The rest of the population belonged to the slave caste, known as the
White Yi. The White Yi were of mainly Han Chinese descent, while the
Black Yi were related to the Tibetans. These two castes were further
subdivided into social classes. Newly captured slaves were lowest in
rank. Over the generations, slaves could work their way up the hierarchy
and become partly independent and even own slaves themselves. But

195 LeBar, Hickey and Musgrave (1964, p. 1ff), Dessaint (1980), D’Ollone (1912), Ko
(1949), Pollard (1921), Yueh-Hua (1961)

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the line between Black and White could never be crossed. Interbreeding
between the two castes was prevented by all means. The caste system
was dissolved centuries ago among other Yi groups living in areas with
a stronger Han Chinese influence.196
The political organization of the Yi was not as regal as one might
expect for a society based on slavery. Most decisions were taken by
public deliberation in which even members of the slave caste had a
say, and the leaders of villages and clans were chosen based partly
on heritage and partly on merit. In some periods and in some areas,
there were political leaders above the clan level, but these had limited
influence in times of peace. For centuries or even millennia, the Chinese
dynasties tried to control the Yi territory and used Yi chiefs as suzerains.
But the Yi successfully rebelled time and again, so that, in effect, the
Yi were mainly autonomous until the establishment of the People’s
Republic of China.197
Political organization above the clan level—if any—was not strong
enough to prevent the almost incessant feuds, raids, and attacks between
enemy clans or ethnic groups. The inter-clan conflicts were, however,
of a relatively low scale: certain rules were obeyed, and the opposing
parties generally agreed to end a battle episode after a few hours when
a winner had been found. Battles with more distant enemies, and in
particular with the Han Chinese, were much more violent and merciless.
Strangers who entered Yi territory without protection were habitually
killed or enslaved.198
The available literature contains very little evidence of policing or
punishment. Most crimes were punished by requiring that the offender
pay compensation to the victim. Newly captured slaves were brutally
tortured, but there is no other evidence of corporal punishment. Serious
crimes were dealt with by persuading the offender to commit suicide. If
he refused to do so, he would be banished but rarely killed.199
Religious rituals, linked to animism and ancestor worship, were
controlled by priests and shamans. The priests (bimo) always belonged
196 LeBar, Hickey and Musgrave (1964), Dessaint (1980), Ko (1949), Harrell (2001), Hui
(2001)
197 LeBar, Hickey and Musgrave (1964), Dessaint (1980), D’Ollone (1912), Ko (1949),
Harrell (2001), Ayi (2001), Hill (2001), Jingzhong (2001), Shimei and Erzi (2001)
198 LeBar, Hickey and Musgrave (1964), Dessaint (1980), Pollard (1921), Yueh-Hua
(1961), Jingzhong (2001), Liétard (1913)
199 Hill and Diehl (2001), Shimei and Erzi (2001)

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to the White slave caste. Their skills were transmitted mainly from father
to son. Major political and judicial decisions required consultation of a
priest and performance of certain rituals. The disciplining function of
religion was probably limited. A few sources talk about supernatural
punishments, but there is no agreement between the different sources
regarding the kind of punishments or even whether they took place
before or after death. Beliefs in supernatural punishments, if any, may
be due to Chinese influence or Christian missionaries.200
The Yi had a written language, which was mastered by the priests
and only rarely by anybody else. Writing was used only for preserving
religious rituals and formulas, not for trade or political administration.201
We can assume that the priests had considerable influence. Whether they
used this influence mostly in the interest of their own caste or mostly in
the interest of the Black leaders, we do not know.
There is no reliable information about the fertility or birth rate of the
Yi. Children were breastfed for four to five years, but they were also
given other food.202 Suicide was customarily committed for different
reasons relating to war, conflict, peacemaking, crime, infectious
diseases, and love.203
The marrying age ranged usually from 9 to 21 for both girls and
boys, though children as young as 4 or 5 could be married. Married
girls stayed home with their parents until their first pregnancy. During
this period, they were free to have sexual relations with anybody they
liked. For this reason, the firstborn child often had a father who was not
the woman’s husband, but the latter had to accept the child as his own.
Divorce was more common in the period before first pregnancy than
after. Polygamy was rare.204
The sources tell us very little about the life of children and nothing
about the disciplining of children. Children were treated well, and boys
were taught to be brave. Parents did not make toys for their children,
but various games are known. Girls helped spinning hemp from age 4
and boys helped tending animals from age 7 to 8.205
200 Ayi (2001), Shimei and Erzi (2001), Liétard (1913)
201 Ayi (2001)
202 Yueh-Hua (1961)
203 Dessaint (1980), Ko (1949), Pollard (1921)
204 LeBar, Hickey and Musgrave (1964), Dessaint (1980), Ko (1949), Yueh-Hua (1961),
Hui (2001), Liétard (1913)
205 Liétard (1913), Yu (2001)

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225

Clothing, tools, and houses were often embellished. The Yi were
fond of colorful clothes as well as gold and silver. Before firearms
made face-to-face battle superfluous, the inter-clan feuds were not
only contests of strength, but also opportunities to compete on fancy
clothing or flute playing. The sources show no evidence of the highly
repetitive geometric patterns typical of regal art. Singing and dancing
was common. Song texts were mostly about everyday topics, but there
were also war songs.206
Evaluating the Yi culture, it is surprising how a slave system
could persist for centuries when the political and religious means
of disciplining the population were so weak. The caste system that
allowed slavery may have been supported by ideology or religion, but
the religion was managed by priests belonging to the slave caste. No
slave rebellion has been reported. The agricultural production was also
fully in the hands of the slave caste.207
The caste system and the pervasive slavery are the strongest
indicators of regality in the Yi culture. The full-scale wars with the Han
Chinese are also regal indicators, while the frequent inter-clan feuds and
raids with limited casualties can hardly be considered regal indicators.
The political administration, the discipline, the religion, and the
sexual morals appear to be mostly kungic. The use of body adornment
in conflicts is a regal sign, but the adornment is hardly more elaborate
than in other cultures. The almost complete absence of praise for gods
or rulers in art and songs is an indication of a fairly kungic art.

Conclusion
We have now looked at eighteen very different societies of the past and
compared their levels of internal and external conflict, their political
systems, systems of justice and punishment, religions, group identities,
fertility, occurrence of suicide, sexual morals, marrying ages, frequency
of divorce, attitudes toward child labor, and art styles with predictions
based on regality theory. The principles behind the predictions were
explained in the beginning of this chapter. A statistical analysis of the
results follows in chapter 8.3.

206 LeBar, Hickey and Musgrave (1964), Dessaint (1980), Pollard (1921), Liétard (1913)
207 Yueh-Hua (1961)

8. Statistical Testing of
Regality Theory

8.1. Problems of cross-cultural statistics
We need to compare different cultures when we want to test the
predictions of regality theory. However, the statistical comparison of
different cultures is full of problems that we have to deal with. The first
problem is the availability of data. Many data sources are available for
modern cultures, but few for ancient cultures. The quality of the data is
a matter of serious concern. Data collected from different cultures may
not be fully comparable because of language problems, differences in
definitions, or different frames of reference. There is a general problem
with quantifying culture, because it is not always meaningful to put
numbers on things like ideas, beliefs, emotions, or understandings.
How can we know if concepts such as prestige or patriotism have the
same meaning in different cultures?
The available data for contemporary modern western countries are
generally of a satisfactory quality because the methods of data collection
have been refined and standardized to a certain degree. But here we
encounter another problem. Modern cultures are too similar. We need
variation in the measured variables in order to get useful statistical
results. Any similarity that we find between two countries may simply
be due to cultural diffusion rather than to some causal factor that
influences both countries in the same way.
The best way to overcome the problem of cultural similarity, known
as Galton’s problem, is to look at the more isolated cultures of the past.
© 2017 Agner Fog, CC BY 4.0

https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0128.08

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No culture is completely isolated, but many of the non-modern and
non-industrial cultures of the past were sufficiently autonomous to
make cross-cultural comparisons useful. The Standard Cross-Cultural
Sample, mentioned in chapter 8.2, is a database of cultures selected
specifically with the purpose of minimizing Galton’s problem. The data
in this database have been obtained from the ethnographic literature.
Unfortunately, the quality of the data in the Standard Cross-Cultural
Sample is often problematic. Some of the variables are poorly defined
or interpreted differently for different cultures. Some variables refer
to concepts that make sense only in particular cultural contexts. Data
are coded in the database as missing when a variable is irrelevant for
a particular culture or the information is not available. In the course of
the present study, it was discovered that data were often missing for
non-random reasons. Special care was needed to reduce the systematic
bias caused by such missing data.
Many of the problems with data quality and unclear interpretation
of data are best dealt with by qualitative methods. A qualitative study
can look into the life situation of the informants to put the information
into a meaningful context. It allows us to discover new phenomena or
mechanisms that were not anticipated when the study was planned. A
qualitative study can give us a better understanding not only of what
people do but also of the motives behind. For example, it is important
for regality theory to study not only whether people fight but also why
they fight.
It has been suggested that a combination of qualitative and
quantitative methods is a particularly fruitful way of doing crosscultural research.1 We shall do this here with a subsample of the
Standard Cross-Cultural Sample. Relevant information is gathered for
each culture in the subsample by studying the original ethnographic
literature (chapter 7). The qualitative study assures that we can gather
meaningful information that actually reflects what we want to measure.
The advantage of this mixed method is that we get more reliable data and
that we are able to better understand the context and mechanisms that
lie behind these data. The disadvantage is that we have fewer cultures

1 Harding and Seefeldt (2013)

8. Statistical Testing of Regality Theory



229

to compare, because it requires more work to gather the information
about each culture.
A study with a large data set (large N) makes it possible to construct
bigger statistical models with more independent variables and still
have enough statistical power to get significant results; a smaller data
set (small N) can support only a smaller model with fewer independent
variables. Each method has its advantages and disadvantages. The
present study uses several different statistical methods and data
sources, and we must keep in mind the strengths and weaknesses of
each method when interpreting the results. The following statistical
studies are included here:
• A statistical study based on George Murdock and Douglas
White’s Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (SCCS), which
contains data from 186 non-industrial societies around the
world. This study includes an exploratory factor analysis to
identify the most relevant variables, a structural equation
model to analyze the causal network in the proposed model,
and a multiple correlation analysis of various variables against
the central variables in the structural equation model.
• A statistical test based on the societies that were analyzed in
chapter 7. This is a subsample of the SCSS. The results of the
detailed analyses of these societies are compared with the
predictions of regality theory.
• A study of individuals in contemporary cultures using data
from the Survey of World Views Project, based on a survey of
data from 8,883 persons in 33 countries. This study includes
a factor analysis and various correlation analyses based on
relevant factors that emerge from the factor analysis.
• A comparison with previously published statistical studies of
social, psychological, and cultural effects of collective danger.
• Various tests based on previous studies of tight versus loose
cultures and other cultural variables presented in chapter 3.8.
We are using these methods to test the predictions of regality theory,
explained in chapter 7. No other known theory generates the same set
of predictions.

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8.2. Ancient cultures, large sample
Regality theory predicts effects both at the individual level and at the
level of whole societies. The predictions of social-level effects should
preferably be tested on distinct sociocultural groups. We prefer to
compare different societies that have as little connection with each
other as possible in order to avoid spurious correlations due to cultural
diffusion or common descent (Galton’s problem). Since almost all
contemporary cultures are heavily influenced by modern western
culture, we have used ethnographic data from non-industrial cultures
of the past that were less influenced by global trends. The available
archaeological data are insufficient for statistical testing, so we have
used data mainly from ethnographic studies of non-industrial cultures.

Description of the data
Murdock and White’s Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (SCCS) is a
database covering more than a thousand variables recorded for 186 nonindustrial societies around the world.2 These societies are intended to
form a representative sample of world cultures studied at a time when
cultural independence was higher than today. The data are based on
ethnographic records, many of which were collected by early explorers
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
The variables include information about subsistence ecology,
intergroup relations, political organization, culture, beliefs, and
child—rearing practices.3 Relevant variables from the SCCS were used
in this study. Statistical calculations were done in the R programming
language.4
The quality of the data in the SCCS is far from perfect, but it is the best
available. The data have been collected from the original ethnographic
literature and coded into a database. This process involves many
potential sources of error, despite elaborate precautions. The native
informants that were interviewed, the anthropologists or explorers
2 “Standard Cross-Cultural Sample”. World Cultures, 2008, http://www.
worldcultures.org/
3 Murdock and White (1969), Murdock and White (2006), http://repositories.cdlib.
org/imbs/socdyn/wp/Standard_Cross-Cultural_Sample
4 Dow (2003)

8. Statistical Testing of Regality Theory



231

conducting the field studies, the coders who interpreted the original
literature and coded it into predefined categories for the database,
and the database designers who defined the variables and categories
to include in the database—all of these people may have influenced
the data by their own agendas, predilections, selectivity, taboos, and
language problems. Most of the field studies were conducted many
years ago, often by people without adequate scientific training, such as
explorers and missionaries.
Re-reading some of the original ethnographic literature revealed
several flaws in the database, mainly due to imprecise definitions of
the categories in soft areas such as religion, morals, and psychology.
The data in the SCCS appear to be severely influenced by the observers
in the area of religion; some of the psychological variables depend
on psychoanalytical interpretations; and the reliability of the data is
questionable in taboo-ridden areas such as sexual behavior.5
Many data values in the SCCS are coded as missing, and it was
suspected that data might be missing for non-random reasons. For
some variables, more than half of the data values were missing. There
is reason to suspect that the coders tended to err on the side of caution
and entered the code for ‘data not available’ rather than ‘trait absent’
when a particular trait was not mentioned in the ethnographic literature
for a particular society. This leads to a systematic bias, so that data are
more likely to be coded as missing when a trait is absent than when
it is present. This suspicion was tested statistically by correlating
missingness for each of the variables against the factors that emerge
from the factor analysis described below. This correlation was highly
significant (p < 0.001) for several variables. It is quite understandable,
for example, that the value for ‘leadership during battle’ is coded as
‘data not available’ if there is no battle, but the statistical models do not
work correctly if data are missing for non-random reasons. Hence, it is
better to replace ‘data not available’ with no ‘leadership during battle’
here. Similar replacements were made for the variables ‘despotic bias in
conflict resolution’ and ‘interpersonal violence’.

5 Broude and Greene (1976)

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Exploratory factor analysis
Regality theory predicts that many different variables are related to
regality. If these variables are sufficiently strongly correlated, then they
might form a single factor in a factor analysis. In other words, we will
expect cultural indicators of regality, such as hierarchy and discipline,
to load on the same factor as war and other indicators of collective
danger. Collective danger and individual danger have different effects
on regality but similar effects on r/K life history strategy, as explained
in chapter 3.3. It will be interesting to see whether these turn out as two
different factors or as a single factor.
The database includes more than a thousand variables for each
society, but not all variables were relevant for the present study. Factor
analysis requires that the number of variables must be less than the
number of societies in order to avoid the covariance matrix becoming
singular. It was therefore necessary to exclude a large number of
variables and retain only those considered most relevant to the theory.
Variables that had little or no relevance to the purpose of the current
analysis, such as language and geographic region, were excluded. Also
excluded were: categorical variables that could not be made ordinal,
variables where more than half of the values were missing, and variables
with low variance or high uniqueness. Unfortunately, many of the
variables that are relevant to regality theory had to be excluded from the
factor analysis because they had too many missing values, especially
psychological variables and variables relating to childrearing.
Where a group of variables all relate to the same subject area, either
the redundant variables were excluded or closely related variables were
combined into one. After this reduction, ninety-one variables remained
for the factor analysis (see table 8). These variables were normalized to
unit variance.
Missing data was a big problem because the factor analysis model
has no standard way of dealing with missing data. Missing values
were replaced with appropriate values for three of the variables in the
manner explained above. The factor analysis was performed twice
on the same data set, using two different methods for dealing with
the remaining missing data: (1) replacement with the mean, and (2)
multiple imputation by the hot-deck method with population density

8. Statistical Testing of Regality Theory



233

as auxiliary variable.6 The second method gave higher variance and
poorer correlation than the first method on those variables that had
many missing values. The results of the factor analyses are shown in
tables 6 and 7 respectively for these two methods.
Factor interpretation
Political complexity and population density
War
Other conflict and violence
Agriculture
Urbanization
Animal husbandry
Fishing
Gathering

% variance explained
7.9
5.2
4.9
4.1
2.7
2.6
2.1
1.9

Table 6. Factor analysis of sociocultural variables in 186 societies.
Missing data values were replaced by the mean.

The number of factors was chosen to be eight based on a scree plot.
Oblique rotation (Promax) was used in order to allow factors to be
correlated. Detailed factor loadings are shown in table 8.
Factor interpretation

Occurrences
in 25 runs

% variance
explained

Political complexity and
population density
Climate
War, conflict, and violence
Animal husbandry
Gathering
Fishing
Urbanization
Hunting
Agriculture
Uninterpreted

25

9.8

Standard
deviation
between runs
0.9

25
25
25
24
23
21
19
11
2

5.1
4.9
3.3
2.0
2.8
2.8
2.9
3.6
3.3

0.3
0.3
0.7
0.3
0.9
0.1
1.2
0.8
0.0

Table 7. Factor analysis of sociocultural variables in 186 societies.
Same data as in table 6, but missing data values were replaced by
multiple imputation in 25 runs.
6 Reilly (1993)

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Results
The first factor analysis (Table 6) shows that political complexity is highly
correlated with population density, and these variables combine to form
the strongest factor. The second factor represents intergroup conflict as
well as its correlates. This factor has high loadings on variables related
to war, army, and bellicosity (Table 8). The third factor has high loadings
on both internal and external conflicts as well as individual violence.
In other words, we have two factors that relate to conflict. These two
conflict factors are both positively related to polygamy. Other indicators
of life history strategy show only weak and inconsistent correlations
with the two conflict factors.
It is interesting that the second factor (the war factor) has its highest
loadings on prestige and rewards for warriors and cultural valuation
of war (Table 8). This confirms the prediction of regality theory that
warriors are rewarded by their group. Other theories of war rely on
punishment of defectors, while rewards are too costly to be explained
by traditional evolutionary theories (see chapter 2.2).
The two conflict factors merge into one in the second factor analysis
(Table 7). The difference between the results of the two factor analysis
methods is a mathematical artifact. The method used in the second
factor analysis has a higher tendency to form factors around variables
with few missing values. This is seen in the formation of a factor of
climate variables, which have no missing values. While the first method
probably gives more accurate results, the second method is useful for
estimating the inaccuracy due to missing data.
It is noteworthy that the war factor is always distinct from population
density and political complexity. This means that the level of war is not
simply determined by population factors. The prediction that internal
and external conflicts have different psychological and cultural effects
gets weak support from the first factor analysis and no support from the
second. We must conclude that the factor analyses do not give a clear
answer to the difference between internal and external conflicts, due to
mathematical problems and poor data quality.

8. Statistical Testing of Regality Theory



235

Comparison with other studies
A similar factor analysis made earlier by Elbert Russell found a war
factor that correlates clearly with social hierarchy, slavery, polygyny,
achievement, and crime.7 Interestingly, the war factor in Russell’s study is
also significantly correlated with a number of variables relating to sexual
restrictiveness, tough treatment of children, and early socialization. The
correlation with religious variables is weak. An interesting finding in
Russell’s study is that people in warlike and hierarchical societies show
a high level of boasting and display of wealth. The status competition
and striving for wealth may lead to increased levels of theft and other
crimes and conflicts.8 This finding may contribute to our understanding
of the connection between external and internal conflicts. Another
possible explanation is that, in warlike societies, boys are socialized
for aggression.9 Other studies have found that the level of intergroup
conflict is positively correlated with harsh and punitive treatment of
children and socialization for aggression10 and a moralizing religion.11
A comprehensive meta-analysis of wars throughout history has
found a number of correlations of war with large civilizations and
empires, weapon technology, grasslands, social stratification, slavery,
authoritarianism, boastfulness, crime, punishment, discipline, sexual
repression, games of chance and strategy, and artistic creativity.12
Some of the predicted correlations have also been observed in
modern cultures. Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart find that existential
insecurity is linked with religiosity and high fertility,13 Nicholas
Carnagey and Craig Anderson find increased pro-war attitudes,14 and
Richard Sipes finds a link with warlike sports.15
A caveat is in place here when interpreting factor analysis results.
The factors and factor loadings are quite sensitive to the design of the
factor analysis and, in particular, to the choice of variables included
in the analysis. Other cross-cultural studies have found only weak
correlations with a war factor, or no war factor at all.16
7 Russell (1972)
8 Russell (1972), Stewart (1971)
9 Ember and Ember (1994)
10 Ember and Ember (1994)
11 Roes and Raymond (2003)
12 Eckhardt (1992)
13 Norris and Inglehart (2011)
14 Carnagey and Anderson (2007)
15 Sipes (1975)
16 Rummel (1972), Sawyer and LeVine (1966)

236

Variable
number
V64, V156
V61
V62
V63
V66
V149
V152
V203
V204
V205
V206
V207
V677
V732
V1265
V1267
V1684
V1685
V1260
V854
V855
V921
V1122
V157
V1132
V158
V72
V861, V79
V82
V83
V237
V270
V272
V274
V920
V79, V1133

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

Variable name
Population density
Fixity of settlement
Compactness of
settlement
Community size
Large or impressive
structures
Writing and records
Urbanization
Dependence on
gathering
Dependence on
hunting
Dependence on fishing
Dependence on animal
husbandry
Dependence on
agriculture
Migration
Importance of trade in
subsistence
Occurrence of famine
Severity of famine
Threat of weather or
pest disasters
Chronic resource
problems
Total pathogen stress
Niche temperature
Niche rainfall
Agricultural potential
Total population
Political integration
Political integration,
state
Social stratification
Intercommunity
marriage
Polygamy
Trend in autonomy
Levels of sovereignty
Jurisdictional hierarchy
Class stratification
Caste stratification
Type of slavery
Proportion of slaves
Polygamy, maximum
harem size

F1

F2

F3

0.30
0.23
0.30

-0.15

F4

F5

0.50
0.67

0.20

F6

F7

F8

-0.25

0.13

0.15
0.20

-0.18

-0.11
0.91

0.39

0.25

-0.18

0.19

0.11

-0.11

-0.44

-0.14

-0.21

-0.16

-0.74

-0.38

-0.27

-0.11

-0.16

-0.21

0.94

-0.17

0.98

0.92

-0.29

0.66

-0.20
-0.13
-0.11

0.19
-0.31

0.11
0.93

0.26
0.13

0.22
0.1

-0.27

0.27

0.13

0.16

-0.10

0.22

0.11

0.23

-0.12
0.14

-0.12

-0.11
0.21
0.21

-0.17
0.19
0.58
0.91
0.41

-0.92

0.42
0.42
0.41
0.30
0.22

0.15

0.13

-0.12

0.15

0.12

0.10

-0.17

0.15

-0.39

-0.26
0.51
0.87
0.92
0.77
0.21
0.11

0.37
-0.20

0.38

0.17
0.15

-0.3
-0.20
0.14

-0.25
-0.24
0.19
-0.13
-0.13

-0.24
0.11
-0.20

0.79

0.13

-0.20
0.14

0.22

-0.11

0.22
0.22

0.22
0.14

0.12

-0.15
0.12

0.12
0.28

-0.31

-0.26

-0.12

8. Statistical Testing of Regality Theory

V1134

Despotic bias in
conflict resolution
Sanctions

V1743
V1650, V774,
Frequency of external
V892, V893,
warfare
V670
Frequency of external
V892
war—Attacking
Frequency of external
V893
war—Being attacked
Wives taken from
V668
hostile groups
Form of military
V894
mobilization
Leadership during
V902
battle
Prestige, soldiers or
V903
warriors
Rewards for killing
V905
enemy
V907
Value of war
V908
Military success
Subjugation of terriV909
tory or people
V1654
Pacification
V1649,
Frequency of internal
V1748, V773,
warfare
V891
V666
Interpersonal violence
Expect violence to
V906
solve problems
V1776
Intraethnic violence
V1665
Homicide
V1666
Assault
V1667
Theft
Socially organized
V1676
assault
Socially organized
V1677
theft
Socially organized
V1678
trespass
V1721
Rich people
V1726
Communality of land
Bodily restrictiveness
V24, V25
in infancy
V31
Infant crying response
Childhood pain
V33
infliction
Autonomy—encourV41
agement in childhood
V43
Covering genitals—age

0.41



0.32

-0.20

0.18

-0.17

0.28

0.14

0.24

0.39

-0.12

0.16

0.56

0.13

-0.19

0.12

0.13

0.46

-0.13
0.34

0.27

0.53

0.40

0.45

-0.13

0.82

-0.22

0.73

237

-0.12

0.10

0.14

0.15

0.17

0.72
0.37

0.10

0.61
-0.23

-0.23

0.12

0.17

-0.15

0.51

0.34

-0.11

0.13

0.54
-0.16
0.17
0.13
0.16

0.42
0.56
0.63
0.47

0.16
-0.15
-0.18

0.36
0.40

-0.14

0.23
-0.28

-0.13
-0.16

0.12

-0.16

0.31
0.40

0.20
0.13

0.20

-0.13
-0.16

0.24

0.18

-0.10

0.26

-0.12

0.10

0.17

0.14

0.15

-0.10

-0.11

0.30

238

Variable
number
V44, V45

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

Variable name

Weaning age
Role of father, infancy/
V53, V54
early childhood
Segregation of adolesV242
cent boys
Duration of early
V293
childhood
Differentiation of
V831, V832 adolescence from
childhood
V453, V454, Corporal punishment
V455, V456 of boys/girls
V667
Rape
V34
Postpartum sex taboo
V671
Menstrual taboos
Male avoidance of
V672
female sexuality
Sexual expression in
V827, V828
adolescent boys/girls
Lack of sexual restraint
V829, V830 in adolescent boys/
girls
Marriage arrangeV740
ments (female)
Rooming arrangement
V864
for wives
Multiple wives for
V868
leaders, headman,
chiefs
Ideology of male
V664
toughness
Flexible marriage
V657
mores
Female political
V661
participation
V665
Male segregation
V238
High gods
V713
Classical religion
Adolescent initiation
V529, V530
ceremonies
V1188
Evil eye
V1694,
Scarification
V1695
Total factor loading,
square sum*

F1

F2

F3

-0.11

-0.10

0.19

F4

F5

F6

F7

F8

-0.11

0.13

-0.25
-0.18

0.40
-0.14

0.24
0.12

0.13

0.35

0.18
0.30
0.21
0.28

-0.18

0.26

0.15

0.28
0.28

0.27

0.14

0.37

0.11
-0.17

0.27

-0.13

-0.14

0.20

-0.11

0.11

0.11

-0.20

0.32
-0.11

0.16

-0.26

0.21

0.19

0.41
0.13
-0.22

-0.13

-0.13

0.12

0.33

0.14

0.12

-0.11

0.19

7.20

-0.14
0.20

0.29

0.20

-0.11

0.12
0.13

4.72

4.49

-0.17

0.12

-0.17

0.16

-0.12

0.33

-0.13

0.10

0.22

-0.25

0.15

-0.11
0.44

3.71

2.42

2.40

Table 8. Factor loadings for factor analysis of table 6.
*Values below 0.1 are not shown in the table because they are
insignificant, but included in the square sum.

0.11

1.91

1.74

8. Statistical Testing of Regality Theory



239

Structural equation model
The purpose of a structural equation model is to study latent variables
that cannot be observed directly, but only through their causes and
effects. The theoretical constructs ‘regality’ and ‘life history strategy’ are
latent variables that we cannot observe or measure directly.
Figure 29 shows a structural equation model based on the same
data as used above in the factor analysis. Several indicators related to
intergroup war are combined into a war variable. The regality dimension
is inserted as a latent variable based on the war variable and a number
of cultural indicators according to the theory. The r versus K life history
strategy dimension is also inserted as a latent variable based on internal
and external war as well as other dangers and cultural indicators
of life history strategy. ‘Sexual morals’ is included as another latent
variable, because sexual behavior could rarely be observed directly. The
influences of cultural regality and life history strategy on sexual morals
are included in the model.
Missing values are replaced with appropriate values for those
variables where missingness correlates significantly with the factors in
the exploratory factor analysis and where the reason for data missing
is clear, in the same way as for the factor analysis. Missing values are
replaced by the mean for the remaining variables.
Relevant variables according to the theory are included, but variables
that fail to reach significance at the 0.05 level are removed. Unfortunately,
most of the variables used by Robert Quinlan as indicators of parental
investment fail to reach significance in the present model.17 A few
variables that relate to parental investment remain significant, while
only one variable related to art and three variables related to religion
remain significant.
The removal of non-significant variables may have caused selection
bias resulting in false significance. Ideally, the confirmatory test on
the structural equation model should not use the same data set as the
exploratory factor analysis. Unfortunately, no extra data set is available,
since the number of relatively independent cultures is limited. This is a
general problem in cross-cultural research.
The model is analyzed with the R package named ‘lavaan’.18
17 Quinlan (2007)
18 
“Lavaan: Latent Variable Analysis”. The Comprehensive R Archive Network.
http://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/lavaan/index.html

240

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

Figure 29. Structural equation model showing the influence of collective
dangers and individual dangers on cultural regality and life history
strategy, as well as the influence of both of these variables on sexual
morals. Rectangles indicate measured variables while ovals indicate latent
variables. The directions of the arrows indicate the assumed dominating
direction of causality, but the statistical results are insensitive to the
directions of these arrows. It is impossible to distinguish between cause
and effect with this method. Numbers on the arrows are path coefficients.
Levels of significance are indicated as: * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001.
(Measures of fit: RMSEA = 0.076, 90% CI: 0.067–0.084, SRMR = 0.091,
CFI = 0.61, AIC = 13782). By Agner Fog, 2017.

8. Statistical Testing of Regality Theory



241

The structural equation model shown in figure 29 is based on the theory
that war and other collective dangers influence the level of regality
while both collective dangers and individual dangers influence the life
history strategy. Both factors influence sexual behavior. Various cultural
indicators of regality and life history strategy are included in the model.
The war factor emerges from the level of war and various indicators
that we expect to be correlated with war. The results suggest that
famine is a significant cause of war. The availability of efficient means
of transportation (horses) appears to be a significant contributing factor
as well.
The war factor is significantly correlated with rewards for successful
warriors. There are few variables relating to cowardice and desertion,
and these variables show no significant correlation. The database has
no variable indicating punishment for defection in war. Therefore,
we have more support for the theory that attaches importance to the
rewarding of brave warriors than to the alternative theory that relies on
the punishment of defectors only.
The cultural regality is modeled here as a latent variable that is
influenced by war and other collective dangers. However, the regality
is also influenced by unmeasured factors such as cultural traditions
and subjective beliefs about dangers, including religious beliefs. A
number of cultural indicators of regality are included in the model, and
it is confirmed that they fit into the model with highly significant path
coefficients.
The life history strategy is influenced by internal and external
conflict as well as by other dangers. Only a few cultural indicators of
life history strategy and parental investment are included in the model.
Several other indicators of life history strategy were excluded because
they failed to give significant coefficients.
Sexual morals are influenced by both the regality dimension and by
the life history dimension, and reflected in various attitudes towards
sexuality and marriage. No reliable measure of fertility was available,
but we may assume that strict sexual morals lead to high fertility.
The hypothesis is that strict sexual morals allow only reproductive
sex within marriage, while sex for pleasure is suppressed. This puts
pressure on young people to marry early and have many children
because alternative outlets for their sex drive are blocked.19
19 Garcia and Kruger (2010)

242

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

The results from the structural equation model confirm that cultural
regality is connected with political stratification, caste stratification,
despotism, and slavery. These results are highly significant. The
connection with disciplining of children is weaker, but still statistically
significant (p = 0.013). Few relevant variables relating to art are available,
but the presence of large or impressive structures (such as large
buildings) has a highly significant connection to cultural regality. Three
variables relating to religion are also significant. Finally, it is confirmed
that sexual morals are influenced in the strict direction by both cultural
regality and life history r-strategy. No direct path between regality and
life history strategy was found.
Various correlation coefficients are given in table 9. The correlation
between regality and life history strategy is moderate but highly
significant (p = 7∙10-4). Regality is also significantly correlated with
population density and with various modes of subsistence.
Variable
Regality
Population density
Political integration
Urbanization
Agriculture
Animal husbandry
Hunting
Gathering
Fishing
Warrior reward
Warrior prestige

Regality
0.52***
0.73***
0.48***
0.41***
0.43***
-0.49***
-0.50***
-0.25***
0.10
0.18*

Life history
War
strategy
0.25***
0.49***
0.11
0.20**
0.21**
0.43***
0.04
0.31***
0.13
0.15*
0.09
0.17*
-0.10
-0.09
-0.13
-0.22**
-0.11
-0.15*
0.12
0.58***
0.15*
0.61***

Table 9. Correlation coefficients of selected variables against cultural
regality, life history strategy, and war. Level of significance: * p  ≤  0.05,
** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001.

While the structural equation model supports our theory, it is not a
definite proof. It may be possible to construct other models that fit the
data equally well.20

20 Breckler (1990)

8. Statistical Testing of Regality Theory



243

Multiple correlation analysis
A simultaneous multiple correlation analysis was made for several
variables according to the linear model
v = k0 + k1 f1 + k2 f2 + k3 f3 + ε

where v is any of the variables in the standard cross-cultural sample.
f1 represents cultural regality and f2 represents life history r-strategy,
both obtained from the structural equation model. f3 is the population
density, which was included in the model because it is a very likely
confounding factor according to the results of the factor analysis. k0, k1,
k2, and k3 are coefficients, and ε is the residue of unexplained variance.
The levels of significance for k1, k2, k3 ≠ 0 were calculated.
The results of the multiple correlation analysis for various variables,
v, are shown in table 10. There is a correlation of regality with agriculture,
which disappears when population density is controlled for, as we can
see when comparing tables 9 and 10, while the correlations of regality
with other means of subsistence remain significant. The correlation
of sexual morals with both regality and life history strategy remains
significant when population density is controlled for. Polygamy is
significantly related to life history strategy but, contrary to expectation,
not to cultural regality in this test. The expected correlation between
regality and suicide was not found. The variable named ‘classical
religion’ is a mixture of very different religions and therefore not as
specific as we would wish, but it is included in table 10 because it has a
significant correlation with regality.
Variable
Political integration
Urbanization
Agriculture
Animal husbandry
Hunting
Fishing
Gathering
Sexual morals
Trend in autonomy
Urbanization

Regality
0.59***
0.26***
0.07
0.47***
-0.21**
-0.20*
-0.30***
0.42***
0.24**
0.26***

Life history
strategy
0.04
-0.07
0.05
-0.01
0.01
-0.06
-0.01
0.42***
0.02
-0.07

Population
density
0.27***
0.46***
0.63***
-0.08
-0.55***
-0.06
-0.37***
-0.11
0.19*
0.46***

244

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

Class stratification
Caste stratification
Severity of famine
Heritable slavery
Polygamy
Suicide
Formal sanctions
Horses
Classical religion
High gods
Evil eye beliefs

0.85***
0.52***
0.27**
0.63***
-0.04
-0.01
0.23**
0.22*
-0.24**
0.41***
0.55***

-0.11**
-0.08
-0.03
0.00
0.24**
0.38***
0.10
-0.12
0.10
-0.05
0.03

0.04
-0.08
-0.04
-0.17*
-0.13
-0.09
0.14
-0.18*
-0.09
-0.15
-0.05

Table 10. Multiple regression of various variables against regality, life
history strategy, and population density. Level of significance: * p ≤ 0.05,
** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001.

8.3. Subsample, 18 cultures
A subsample of eighteen of the cultures represented in the Standard
Cross-Cultural Sample (SCCS) was selected for further study, and the
desired data were extracted from the original ethnographic literature
rather than from the SCCS database. This method was intended to
reduce the problems with data quality and to obtain information that
was not available in the SCCS.
The literature listed as sources for the SCCS21 was supplemented by
any additional literature published later. All coding of data was done by
the author. Every conscious effort was made to avoid expectation bias.
No funding was available for hiring extra raters or testing inter-rater
reliability. A brief description of each society including an explanation
of how it is evaluated and the literature used is provided in chapter 7.
The purpose of the subsample study is to test the prediction that
certain environmental factors influence the level of intergroup conflict,
which in turn influences the social and cultural indicators that we
associate with regal and kungic cultures.
Many of the cultural traits that we would like to test—especially
those that belong to soft areas such as religion, sexuality, discipline,
treatment of children, and art—are poorly represented in the standard
21 White (1989)

8. Statistical Testing of Regality Theory



245

cross-cultural sample. The relevant variables are either not included
in the SCCS database, or they are unreliable, or they have too many
missing values. The data in the database are coded into simple categories
and values that may be poor representations of the complex behaviors,
beliefs, and social structures in the cultures that we study. It is difficult
to guess what the human realities are that lie behind a number in a
database.
Firsthand observation and collection of the missing data is no
longer a possibility, because the cultures in question have been heavily
transformed by modernization if not completely annihilated or absorbed
into modern cultures. We must resort to the original ethnographic
literature and hope that we can find the missing data there. Using this
literature has the advantage that the data are presented in a coherent
and meaningful way. Therefore, it was decided to extract the relevant
data from the original ethnographic literature for a subset of the cultures
represented in the SCCS.
The subsample was selected on the basis of the following criteria:
1. The selected cultures must be geographically, culturally, and
genetically distant from each other in order to minimize
similarity due to cultural diffusion or common descent
(Galton’s problem).
2. The cultures should be different in terms of subsistence
ecology. Where multiple cultures resemble each other too
much, only one is included.
3. The population of each society must have lived in relative
isolation long enough to develop a distinct culture and
language.
4. The influence from modern cultures must be minimal.
5. The culture is not pacified by any colonial authority or other
external power.
6. The culture must be well described by more than one
ethnographer.
Many cultures had to be excluded for not meeting these criteria. In
particular, criteria 4 and 5 were difficult to meet.

246

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

The subsample consists of eighteen cultures that were selected for
further study. The ethnographic literature for the selected cultures was
studied in order to extract sociocultural information relevant to the
theory. A number of cultural variables were evaluated in order to test if
the correlations predicted by our theory could be confirmed.
The different types of conflict, such as war, raiding, and feuding
are often difficult to distinguish, and this is a serious problem for the
testing of regality theory. Feuding is usually motivated by the desire to
obtain justice by retaliating against the perpetrator of some wrongdoing
or against his or her family. This takes place mostly where there is
no organized system of justice, which is typical for a kungic culture.
Territorial war, on the other hand, is expected mainly in regal cultures,
according to our theory. Any confusion between feuding and territorial
war will thus tend to blur the statistics. Unfortunately, it is difficult
to determine whether the main motive behind a raid is retaliation,
plundering, capturing women, or territorial expansion. For example,
anthropologists cannot agree whether Yanomamo Indians fight over
women, hunting territory, or steel tools.22
It was decided to use environmental, ecological, and technological
parameters, rather than the level of war, as the independent variable
in order to avoid the difficulties in determining the level of war and
distinguishing between different motives for conflict. A statistical
correlation cannot distinguish between cause and effect, but it seems
reasonable to assume that the environment influences the culture more
than the culture influences the environment, even when the available
technology is included as an environmental factor. The semi-fixed status
of ecological environment and available technology makes statistics
based on these factors less ambiguous in terms of distinguishing
between cause and effect.
The assumptions about environmental causation of conflict do
not hold when the society is pacified by colonial rule or other foreign
powers. This is the reason why pacified and modernized societies are
excluded from our subsample.
To summarize, the prediction we want to test is that environmental
and technological factors that enable intergroup conflict are positively
22 Ferguson (1995, p. 7), Chagnon (1979), Gat (2017, chapter 4)

8. Statistical Testing of Regality Theory



247

correlated with those sociocultural variables that indicate a regal
culture, as the theory claims. Other environmental factors that threaten
a sociocultural group, such as unpredictable natural disasters, may also
have an influence in the regal direction.
The statistical tests use rank correlation. This is a non-parametric
test that makes no assumption about linear relationships or normal
distribution, unlike the previous tests. Kendall’s tau, τ, was calculated
and the level of significance, p, was calculated for the one-tailed tests.
There was no control for confounding factors. Most variables were
evaluated on an arbitrary five-point scale as follows.
Expected conflict level. The expected conflict level is evaluated on a fivepoint scale, where 1 indicates that intergroup conflict is unlikely because
of environmental factors or niche specialization, and 5 indicates that
environmental factors make large scale war possible and likely.
War or intergroup conflict. The observed level of intergroup conflict is
interpreted as the frequency, intensity, degree of violence, and casualty
rate of conflicts against other social groups that do not have the same
self-defined ethnic or tribal identity. Territorial conflicts are given higher
weight than plundering and retaliation of injustice. (In the coding used,
1 = no intergroup conflict; 2 = only small raids, feuds, or vendettas;
3 = rare or low scale intergroup conflict; 4 = intermediate intergroup
conflict; 5 = frequent large wars).
Internal conflicts and feuds. Internal or intragroup conflicts are
conflicts between people with the same ethnic or tribal belonging.
Examples are conflicts between families over properties or marriage, or
conflicts between leaders and followers. Feuds are series of retaliations
over real or alleged wrongdoing. The theory predicts that intergroup
conflicts, but not necessarily internal conflicts, are positively correlated
with regal indicators. (Coded as 1 = rare internal conflicts; 5 = frequent
internal conflicts).
Political system. A hierarchical political system with strong centralized
power is expected in a regal society. In a kungic society, we will expect
an egalitarian political system with little or no hierarchy, or in extreme
cases no formal system of leadership at all. (Coded as 1 = no leadership,

248

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

or simple political system; 2 = formal leadership; 4 = complex or varying
political system; 5 = strong and highly hierarchical political system).
Justice and punishment. We expect a strict justice system and
harsh punishments in a regal society, but a mild or lenient degree
of punishment in a kungic culture. (Coded as 1 = mild or lenient
punishment; 2 = somewhat mild punishment; 4 = somewhat strict
punishment; 5 = very strict punishment).
Religion. We expect the religion in a regal society to support the
power structure by mirroring or being part of the hierarchical political
structure and by legitimizing or exalting the ruler. The religion in a
regal culture often has a disciplining function by enforcing strict rules,
possibly with supernatural punishments. The religion in a kungic
culture is typically non-discriminatory and not connected with political
power, discipline, elitism, dogmatism, or strict rules, according to the
theory. (Coded as 1 = mild, unorganized, or non-authoritarian religion;
2 = religion supports politics; 4 = some disciplining connected with
religion; 5 = strict religion, legitimizes ruler).
Group identity. We expect people to be hostile to strangers and have
a strong sense of ethnic or tribal identity in a regal society. We expect
less distinction between ‘them’ and ‘us’ in a kungic culture. (Coded as
1 = low sense of group identity; 3 = hostility to strangers; 5 = high sense
of group identity).
Fertility. We expect people to have more children in a regal than in a
kungic society. Kungic cultures may keep the birth rate down by means
of postpartum sexual taboos, long breastfeeding periods, contraceptive
means, abortion, or infanticide. (Coded as 1 = low fertility; 3 = medium
fertility; 5 = high fertility).
Suicide. We expect the incidence of suicide to be higher in kungic
than in regal cultures.23 This applies only to the types of suicide that
Durkheim has labeled anomic and egoistic suicide,24 not to culturally

23 Fog (1999)
24 Durkheim (1897)

8. Statistical Testing of Regality Theory



249

prescribed suicide or self-sacrifice in battle. (Coded as 1 = rare or no
mention of suicide; 3 = suicide occurs; 5 = suicide is common).
Sexual morals. We expect regal societies to have strict taboos and
rules regulating sexual behavior, including bans on premarital and
extramarital sex. Kungic societies are likely to be more tolerant of a
variety of sexual behaviors. (Coded as 1 = lax, permissive sexual morals;
3 = mixed or intermediate sexual morals; 5 = strict sexual morals).
Marrying age. We expect the marrying age to be lower in regal than in
kungic societies. The marrying age is recorded separately for men and
women. Where the literature specifies a range for the marrying age, the
median of this range is used in the statistics.
Divorce. We expect divorce to be easier and more tolerated in kungic
than in regal societies. (Coded as 1 = divorce is rare, difficult; 3 =divorce
occurs; 5 = divorce is easy, frequent).
Children work. We expect children to work harder, and from an earlier
age, in regal than in kungic societies. (Coded as 1 = children do not
work; 3 = children do some work; 5 = children work a lot, or from an
early age).
Art. Different cultures produce different kinds of art. We are considering
many different forms of art, including carving, painting, sculptures,
decorated clothing, body adornment, architecture, and other material
art, as well as poetry, tales, drama, music, singing, and dance. We expect
the artistic production of regal cultures to be highly embellished and
perfectionist, possibly glorifying representatives or symbols of power.
We expect kungic cultures to produce a more individualistic art with
less conformity. (Coded as 1 = simple, individualistic art; 3 = somewhat
embellished art; 5 = embellished, repetitive, stylized art).
The evaluation of these variables for the eighteen societies is
summarized in table 11. A rank correlation of these variables against the
predicted conflict level is shown in the table. A review of the analysis of
each culture is given in chapter 7.

Religion
1
1
1
1
5
5
1
1
na
3
na
5
na
3
5
5
na
na
.60
.01

Fertility

Group identity

Justice, punishment

Political system

Internal conflict,
feuds

War or intergroup
conflict

Expected conflict
level based on
environment
1
1
1
3
3
3
3
1
3
1
na
5
na
3
3
5
na
na
.61
.007

1
5
5
3
1
1
1
1
5
1
3
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
-.34
.06

Suicide
1
1
1
1
3
1
1
1
1
3
5
1
5
3
3
5
5
3
.62
.002

26
18
22.5
18
18
21
20
na
13
na
20
28
21
na
20.5
15.5
25
29
.10
.34

15.5
15
na
16
15
19
18
na
13
na
18.5
17
16
na
15
14
18
17
.04
.45

5
5
5
5
3
3
1
3
3
5
na
5
5
1
5
5
1
na
-.15
.27

1
1
na
1
3
3
3
1
3
3
na
5
5
3
3
5
5
5
.70
.0009

1
1
3
1
1
1
1
1
3
1
3
3
3
3
3
1
5
5
.57
.004

Table 11. Rank correlation of various sociocultural parameters against the expected conflict level for eighteen non-industrial
cultures. Variables are indicated on a scale of 1 to 5 as described above, except for marrying age, which is indicated by the
median. τ = Kendall’s tau; p = level of significance, one-tailed; na = data not available.

1
1
1
1
2
4
1
1
1
1
4
2
5
4
4
2
5
5
.63
.001

Sexual morals

1
1
1
1
2
1
1
4
2
1
5
2
2
4
4
5
5
5
.72
.0002

Marrying age, men

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
2
4
4
5
5
5
5
.80
.00006

Marrying age, women

1
3
5
1
5
1
5
5
5
5
5
3
5
5
1
1
1
1
-.18
.20

Divorce

1
1
1
1
1
3
3
3
5
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
.85
.00002

Children work

1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5

Art

!Kung
Inuit
Gilyak
Mbuti
Yahgan
Warao
Andaman
Arrernte
Yi
Yanomamo
Apache
Maasai
Somali
E De
Hausa
Ganda
Inca
Babylon
τ
p

Culture

250
Warlike and Peaceful Societies

8. Statistical Testing of Regality Theory



251

Table 11 is sorted by expected conflict level. At the peaceful beginning of
the table, we find isolated cultures, such as the Inuit and the Gilyak, and
niche cultures, such as the Mbuti pygmies and !Kung bushmen. At the
high-conflict end of the table, we find empires such as the Babylonians
and the Incas. This corresponds to the regality scale with kungic cultures
at the beginning of the table and regal cultures at the end. Values of p
below 0.05 are considered statistically significant. We can see that most
of the correlations are in the predicted direction and highly significant.
First, we notice that there is a strong correlation between the
expected conflict level and the observed level of war and conflict. This
is a strong confirmation of the hypothesis that the level of war in nonmodern societies is determined mainly by environmental factors. The
cultures with a typical niche ecology, such as !Kung, Mbuti, and Warao,
are all found to be peaceful and kungic. The same is the case for isolated
cultures and cultures with scramble competition for food, such as Inuit
and Yahgan. This indicates that competition over food sources is a major
cause of conflict and that other reasons for violent intergroup conflict
are less important in non-modern cultures.
The correlation for ‘internal conflicts and feuds’ shows a slightly
negative, and non-significant, correlation with the expected conflict
level. This confirms that the distinction between intergroup and
intragroup conflicts is important, as predicted by our theory.
The correlations for ‘political system’, ‘justice and punishment’,
‘religion’, ‘sexual morals’, ‘children work’, and ‘art’ are all highly
significant with p levels below 0.01. These results give strong support
to regality theory. ‘Group identity’ and ‘fertility’ are significant at the
0.01 level.
Suicide seems to be more common in kungic than in regal societies,
as predicted, but the correlation is only marginally significant (p = 0.06).
It should be noted here that it was difficult to find reliable data for
suicide and that it was difficult to distinguish between the different
motives for suicide.
Divorce shows a weak correlation in the expected direction, but not
a significant one. This correlation is weakened by the higher incidence
of polygamy in regal societies.
There was no noticeable correlation between marrying age and
expected conflict level. The data for marrying age were quite inaccurate,
but this is probably not the only explanation for the absence of correlation.

252

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

It appears that marrying age is determined more by economic factors
and level of education than by ecology.
The significant correlation of sexual morals with regality is interesting
because cultural differences in sexual morals are difficult to explain
by other theories. We observe that the sexual morals are permissive
in kungic societies and strict in most regal societies. But not all regal
societies have strict sexual morals. For example, premarital sex is
common among the unmarried Maasai warriors, and extramarital sex is
common among the Hausa. High-ranking and prestigious men in regal
cultures have the power to give themselves more sexual opportunities
than the morals would otherwise dictate.

8.4. Contemporary cultures, large sample
Data and methods
The Survey of World Views project is a psychometric study based on
a survey of data from 8,883 persons in 33 countries carried out in 2012.
The participants were mainly college students who were rewarded for
filling out an online questionnaire with 293 questions. The methods are
described in detail by Gerard Saucier and coworkers.25 A copy of the
raw data files was kindly provided by Saucier.
An exploratory factor analysis on the complete data set was
performed first in order to identify relevant items with significant factor
loadings. A scree plot, given in figure 30, shows that there are at least
four important factors. These factors could be interpreted as follows:
1. Universalism ethics, benevolence, and self-direction
2. Cynicism, traditional family values, spirit beliefs, materialism,
violence
3. Religiousness
4. Egalitarian society

25 Saucier et al. (2015)

8. Statistical Testing of Regality Theory



253

The factor interpretations were less clear when more factors were
included.

Figure 30. Scree plot for factor analysis of World Views Survey,
2012. By Agner Fog, 2017.

Construction of variables
Twelve composite variables were constructed for the purpose of
the current analysis. Each variable was formed by a combination of
questionnaire items. These items were selected based on their theoretical
relevance and on their loadings in the exploratory factor analysis. Items
with low factor loadings and items with ambiguous interpretations
were not included. The composite variables are listed in table 12. The
items were scored on various Likert scales with different numbers of
points, some of them with a forced choice. All items and variables were
scaled in order to obtain equal weighting.

254

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

Variable name
Items
Perceived
IV2: The present-day world is vile and miserable.
danger
IV5: Our people are in danger: everyone is trying to divide us and hurt
(α = 0.52)
us.
ISM45: Foreigners have stolen land from our people and they are now
trying to steal more.
Want tough
ISM35: We need tough leaders who can silence the trouble-makers and
leader (no α)
restore our traditional values.
Bellicosity
IV4: We should never use violence as a way to try to save the world.
(α = 0.42)
(reverse scored)
IV10: If violence does not solve problems, it is because there was not
enough of it.
M1: I honor the glorious heroes among my people who sacrificed
themselves for our destiny and our heritage.
Discipline
P11: I would never take things that aren’t mine.
(α = 0.71)
P17: I cannot imagine that I would engage in lying or cheating.
P19: I shirk my duties. (reverse scored)
P23: I steal things. (reverse scored)
P25: I like order.
IC7: It is my duty to take care of my family, even when I have to sacrifice
what I want.
FV08: Children should respect their grandparents.
MF04: Respect for authority is something all children need to learn.
MF05: People should not do things that are disgusting, even if no one is
harmed.
MF08: Justice is the most important requirement for a society.
Hierarchy
NO9: In this society, rank and position in the hierarchy (in the social
(α = 0.71)
order) have special privileges.
NO25: In this society, people in positions of power try to increase their
social distance from less powerful people.
NO28: In this society, power is concentrated at the top, rather than being
shared throughout society.
NO39: In this society, individuals generally attempt to be dominant over
other individuals.
NO42: Power is shared throughout this society, rather than being
concentrated at the top. (reverse scored)
Egalitarianism ISM19: I support the rights and power of the people in their struggle
(α = 0.63)
against the privileged elite.
ISM33: There should be increased social equality.
ISM34: Wealthy people should have a higher tax rate than poor people.
MF02: When the government makes laws, the number one principle
should be ensuring that everyone is treated fairly.
Conformity
P38: I stick to the rules.
(α = 0.65)
AM3: Breaking the rules and regulations is an unpleasant activity.
ISM30: It is good to defy ‘traditional family values’ as feminists and
homosexuals have done. (reverse scored)
EN4: My first loyalty is to the heritage of my ancestors, their language
and their religion.
MF11: I would call some acts wrong on the grounds that they are
unnatural.
MF21: When you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what
extent are the following considerations relevant to your thinking?:
Whether or not someone conformed to the traditions of society.

8. Statistical Testing of Regality Theory

Xenophobia
(α = 0.58)

Religiosity
(α = 0.92)

Cynicism
(α = 0.72)

Violence
(α = 0.60)

Patriarchy
(α = 0.81)



255

VAL1: Rate the following values as a guiding principle in your life: tradition, that is, respect for tradition, humbleness, accepting one’s portion in
life, devotion, modesty.
VAL4: Conformity, that is, obedience, honoring parents and elders, selfdiscipline, politeness.
ISM11: I believe in the superiority of my own ethnic group.
ISM21: My own race is not superior to any other race. (reverse scored)
ISM29: People of different races and nationalities should live in different
places apart from one another.
MF14: When you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what
extent are the following considerations relevant to your thinking?:
Whether or not someone’s action showed love for his or her country.
DRI01: How often do you attend church, mosque, temple, or other
religious meetings?
DRI02: How often do you spend time in private religious activities, such
as prayer, meditation, or study of religious scriptures?
DRI03: In my life, I experience the presence of the Divine.
DRI04: My religious beliefs are what really lie behind my whole
approach to life.
DRI05: I try hard to carry my religion over into all other dealings in life.
Ax17: Belief in a religion helps one understand the meaning of life.
Ax29: Religious faith contributes to good mental health.
ISM8: There is no God or gods. (reverse scored)
ISM12: I adhere to an organized religion.
ISM17: I believe in predestination—that all things have been divinely
determined beforehand.
ISM22: Religion should play the most important role in civil affairs.
AM10: I don’t need to care about the problems of other people because
nobody cares about me.
AM2: The true purpose of stories about honesty and goodness is to make
people confused and stupid.
AM7: A person who helps others ahead of himself quickly comes to ruin.
IV12: Modern governments have overstepped moral bounds and no
longer have a right to rule.
IV13: It is better to assume that people will deceive you than to always
assume that they are telling the truth.
IV15: It would be pointless to reduce one’s possessions and live more
simply.
AM8: When someone insults me, I can go for days thinking of nothing
else but revenge.
IV1: Killing is justified when it is an act of revenge.
IV6: A good person has a duty to avoid killing any living human being.
(reverse scored)
PA03: If a person insults me, it may happen that this person gets beat up
(by me or someone else).
FV01: The father should be the head of the family.
FV03: The mother’s place is in the home.
FV05: The father should handle the money in the house.
FV07: The mother should accept the decisions of the father.
MF10: Men and women each have different roles to play in society.

Table 12. Variables constructed from Survey of World Views items.
α values are Cronbach’s alpha, which is a measure of internal consistency
in the variable.

256

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

The items included in each variable express the theoretical concepts
less clearly than we could wish. This is a consequence of the current
state of cross-cultural psychology, where it is not yet known which
variables are most important.26 Theories about causal relationships are
not very developed. Many of the questionnaire items were formulated
without any clear underlying theory and definitely without any
knowledge of regality theory. A discussion of the quality of each
variable is in place here:
• The items included in ‘perceived danger’ are somewhat abstract
and probably do not capture the full diversity of collective
dangers and the distinction between individual and collective
dangers that regality theory presupposes.
• The variable ‘want tough leader’ depends on just a single item
that expresses a rather extreme opinion.
• The variable ‘bellicosity’ does not include any items relating
explicitly to war, as there were no such items in the questionnaire.
The Cronbach’s alpha is low, indicating some inconsistency.
• The variable ‘discipline’ includes items relating both to behavior
and opinion. It covers the concept well.
• The variable ‘hierarchy’ reflects only a subjective evaluation of
the hierarchy of the culture in question, with no standard or
reference specified. People tend to evaluate things with their
own culture as a frame of reference. Evaluating a culture with
the same culture as reference makes little sense.27 It is possible
that participants have used some other culture as reference
when answering the questions, but it is also possible that they
have used their own idea of an ideal society as reference. Thus,
a participant indicating that the level of hierarchy is high may
actually mean ‘higher than I would like’.
• It was expected that ‘egalitarianism’ would be the opposite of
‘hierarchy’ and that these two concepts would load on the same
factor with opposite signs. However, the exploratory factor

26 Saucier et al. (2015)
27 Heine, Lehman, Peng and Greenholtz (2002)

8. Statistical Testing of Regality Theory



257

analysis showed, quite surprisingly, that egalitarianism and
hierarchy loaded on different factors and that they had in fact
a significant positive correlation with each other, rather than a
negative one. This paradox may be due to acquiescence bias:
some people tend to answer ‘yes’ to anything. The items under
‘egalitarianism’ are general statements that are easy to agree
with, and none of these items are reverse scored. The problems
with ‘egalitarianism’ are further discussed on page 263.
• The variables ‘conformity’ and ‘xenophobia’ contain enough
relevant items to express the concepts adequately.
• The variable ‘religiosity’ reflects the strength of religious beliefs
and the involvement in religious activities, but perhaps not the
strictness of religious observance or the disciplining function of
the religion, which would be more relevant to regality theory.
• The variable ‘cynicism’ was included because it turned up
strongly in the factor analysis with significant correlations
to relevant variables. Cynicism is related to a pessimistic
worldview, but the relationship of this variable with regality
has not been fully investigated yet.
• The variable ‘violence’ does not adequately distinguish between
organized or socially sanctioned violence and simple crime
and rage, or between group-internal and external conflicts.
However, it may be related to collective danger in its broadest
sense.
• ‘Patriarchy’ includes values and opinions that have been
thoroughly described in the literature. The questions are
appropriate and consequently the alpha is high.

Correlations of the variables
There are significant differences between countries for all of the variables
defined here. For example, many of the variables correlate strongly
with the gross domestic product (GDP) and the human development
index (HDI) of the countries, as shown in table 13. Therefore, we need
to control for country-specific effects in the statistical investigations of
relationships between these variables.

258

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

Variable
perceived danger
want tough leader
bellicosity
discipline
hierarchy
egalitarianism
conformity
xenophobia
religiosity
cynicism
violence
patriarchy

Human development
index
-0.71***
-0.71***
-0.35*
-0.60***
-0.28
-0.46**
-0.73***
-0.60***
-0.72***
-0.71***
-0.33
-0.63***

log gross domestic
product
-0.71***
-0.75***
-0.37*
-0.59***
-0.32
-0.45**
-0.75***
-0.66***
-0.72***
-0.74***
-0.39*
-0.66***

Table 13. Correlation coefficients (r) of the country average of each
variable with HDI and GDP. Levels of significance: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,
*** p < 0.001.28

The country-specific effects are not limited to economic factors.
Environmental factors and cultural differences are also very likely to
influence these variables. We can get an indication of the influence
of all country-specific factors on each variable by testing how much
of the variance in each variable is accounted for by between-country
differences. Table 14 lists the correlation of each variable with country
differences. The correlation coefficients in table 13 are mostly higher
than in table 14 because the former is looking at country averages while
the latter is looking at differences between individuals.
Variable
perceived danger
want tough leader
bellicosity
discipline
hierarchy
egalitarianism
conformity
xenophobia

Correlation with country
differences
0.19***
0.53***
0.34***
0.39***
0.40***
0.29***
0.48***
0.53***

28 
Data sources: United Nations Development Programme (2013), New World
Encyclopedia (2016), International Monetary Fund (2012)

8. Statistical Testing of Regality Theory

religiosity
cynicism
violence
patriarchy



259

0.65***
0.37***
0.28***
0.55***

Table 14. Correlation coefficients (r) of each variable with country
differences. Level of significance: *** p < 0.001.

The next step in our analysis is to study the correlations between the
variables while controlling for country differences. Table 15 lists all
pairwise correlations between two variables with country differences as
control. We can see that most of the variables are correlated significantly
with each other, even after controlling for confounding country differences.
The averages of each variable within each nation are listed in table 16.
patriarchy

patriarchy

0.07
***
0.37
***
0.24
***
0.27
***
0.20
***
0.07
***
0.30
***

-0.35
***
-0.07
***
-0.27
***
-0.10
***
0.32
***
-0.09
***
0.51
***
0.51
***
0.19
***

violence

violence

0.02

1

cynicism

cynicism

0.22
***
0.22
***
0.12
***
0.13
***
0.09
***
0.37
***
0.19
***
0.16
***

0.08
***
0.18
***

religiosity

religiosity

0.01

1

xenophobia

xenophobia

0.17
***
0.11
***

conformity

conformity

0.11
***
0.08
***

egalitarianism

egalitarianism

0.17
***

hierarchy

hierarchy

1

discipline

discipline

bellicosity

bellicosity

want tough
leader

perceived
danger
want tough
leader

perceived
danger

Variable

0.01

0.22
***

0.22
***
0.07
***
-0.27
***
0.36
***
0.28
***

0.12
***
0.37
***
-0.10
***
0.47
***

0.13
***
0.24
***
0.32
***
-0.10
***
-0.11
***
-0.22
***
0.23
***

0.09
***
0.27
***
-0.09
***
0.29
***
-0.05
***
0.05
***
0.45
***
0.16
***

0.37
***
0.20
***
0.51
***
-0.29
***

0.19
***
0.07
***
0.51
***
-0.41
***
-0.08
***
-0.28
***
-0.08
***
0.37
***
-0.07
***
0.59
***

0.16
***
0.30
***
0.19
***
0.08
***
-0.05
***
-0.05
***
0.39
***
0.36
***
0.35
***
0.31
***
0.25
***

0.18
***
-0.35
***
1
0.11
***
0.36
***
0.47
***
-0.10
***
0.29
***
-0.29
***
-0.41
***
0.08
***

0.02
-0.07
***
0.11
***
1
0.28
***
0.02
-0.11
***
-0.05
***
-0.01
-0.08
***
-0.05
***

1
0.14
***
-0.22
***
0.05
***
-0.20
***
-0.28
***
-0.05
***

0.02
0.14
***
1
0.23
***
0.45
***
0.05
***
-0.08
***
0.39
***

1
0.16
***
0.45
***
0.37
***
0.36
***

-0.01
-0.20
***
0.05
***
0.45
***

1

0.00

0.00

1

-0.07
***
0.35
***

0.59
***
0.31
***

1
0.25
***

Table 15. Partial correlation coefficients between all pairs of two variables,
controlling for country differences. Levels of significance: *** p < 0.001.

1

260

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

0.60

0.78

0.76

0.29

0.16

0.74

0.81

0.85

0.43

0.38

0.29

0.71

0.61

0.41

0.58

0.37

0.72

0.70

Egypt

0.62

0.63

0.31

0.70

England

0.44

0.47

0.35

0.71

Canada
China

0.74

0.54

0.28

0.83

0.68

0.67

0.52

0.72
0.77

0.70

0.78

0.67

0.72

patriarchy

0.54

0.33

violence

Brazil

0.60

cynicism

0.80

0.76

religiosity

0.37

0.70

Bangladesh

xenophobia

hierarchy

0.72

0.41

0.40

Australia

conformity

discipline

0.31

0.56

Argentina

egalitarianism

bellicosity

0.77

want tough
leader

0.81

perceived danger

0.19

0.52

Nation

0.40

0.25

0.17

0.37

0.33

0.19

0.20

0.33

0.64

0.50

0.36

0.59

0.22

0.49

0.21

0.15

0.23

0.54

0.29

0.37

0.21

0.21

0.35

0.60

0.56

0.31

0.39

0.31

0.46

0.65

0.44

0.70

0.38

0.30

0.62

0.54

0.29

0.30

0.29

0.24

0.33

Ethiopia

0.52

0.63

0.42

0.77

0.61

0.76

0.67

0.43

0.68

0.37

0.29

0.48

Germany

0.38

0.14

0.24

0.70

0.54

0.69

0.45

0.21

0.27

0.18

0.12

0.20

Greece

0.63

0.35

0.20

0.73

0.76

0.82

0.58

0.34

0.38

0.30

0.19

0.31

India

0.59

0.71

0.34

0.76

0.72

0.82

0.66

0.49

0.50

0.37

0.29

0.53

Ireland

0.36

0.34

0.20

0.76

0.67

0.78

0.53

0.22

0.31

0.17

0.14

0.23

Japan

0.38

0.64

0.39

0.59

0.62

0.65

0.57

0.36

0.22

0.32

0.32

0.42

Kenya

0.58

0.70

0.24

0.83

0.75

0.84

0.74

0.43

0.67

0.30

0.21

0.60

Korea

0.46

0.58

0.43

0.69

0.70

0.72

0.63

0.53

0.46

0.36

0.42

0.50

Malaysia

0.63

0.77

0.29

0.81

0.58

0.76

0.76

0.52

0.82

0.39

0.23

0.72

Mexico

0.52

0.51

0.23

0.80

0.71

0.78

0.66

0.42

0.51

0.32

0.20

0.43

Morocco

0.56

0.63

0.32

0.71

0.62

0.76

0.67

0.48

0.73

0.39

0.30

0.63

Nepal

0.63

0.80

0.44

0.81

0.77

0.80

0.68

0.43

0.55

0.42

0.25

0.48

Netherlands

0.40

0.34

0.23

0.73

0.56

0.77

0.53

0.19

0.28

0.21

0.16

0.21

Peru

0.50

0.53

0.22

0.76

0.78

0.72

0.58

0.37

0.41

0.30

0.23

0.36

Philippines

0.51

0.67

0.39

0.82

0.65

0.74

0.72

0.54

0.68

0.36

0.27

0.58

Poland

0.41

0.31

0.22

0.68

0.68

0.71

0.57

0.21

0.41

0.23

0.16

0.37

Russia

0.46

0.56

0.34

0.73

0.82

0.67

0.58

0.38

0.35

0.30

0.23

0.50

Singapore

0.46

0.49

0.35

0.73

0.66

0.73

0.59

0.37

0.45

0.30

0.24

0.46

Spain

0.54

0.29

0.27

0.72

0.74

0.78

0.52

0.29

0.22

0.30

0.23

0.23

Taiwan

0.43

0.47

0.36

0.68

0.65

0.80

0.58

0.43

0.40

0.33

0.31

0.36

Tanzania

0.72

0.87

0.36

0.80

0.67

0.75

0.71

0.54

0.69

0.47

0.28

0.61

Thailand

0.53

0.69

0.31

0.79

0.72

0.80

0.68

0.44

0.57

0.36

0.25

0.61

Turkey

0.62

0.46

0.36

0.73

0.80

0.81

0.61

0.28

0.42

0.34

0.23

0.42

Ukraine

0.46

0.76

0.33

0.74

0.78

0.73

0.61

0.43

0.40

0.30

0.23

0.56

USA

0.43

0.45

0.34

0.70

0.66

0.68

0.57

0.36

0.44

0.26

0.25

0.41

Table 16. Nation averages for twelve variables.

8. Statistical Testing of Regality Theory



261

Factor analysis on the variables
A factor analysis was carried out in order to search for a structure in
the relationships between these variables. Mixed factor analysis was
used in order to allow both quantitative variables and a qualitative
variable (‘nation’) to be included.29 Missing values were imputed.30 The
two strongest factors account for 9.5% and 6.5% respectively of the total
variance. The contributions of the twelve variables to these two factors
are shown in figure 31. Figure 32 shows how the nations are distributed
along the dimensions of these two factors.
This analysis was repeated using multiple factor analysis. This is a
two-step procedure which carries out first a principal component analysis
on each group of items that make up the twelve variables in table 12, and
then a factor analysis of the dimensions that result from the principal
component analyses.31 The results of the latter analysis were almost
identical to figures 31 and 32 and are therefore not shown here.

Figure 31. Mixed factor analysis. The figure shows the distribution of the
variables along the two strongest factors. By Agner Fog, 2017.
29 Pagès (2004), Lê et al. (2008)
30 Audigier, Husson and Josse (2013)
31 Lê et al. (2008), Bécue-Bertaut and Pagès (2008)

262

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

Figure 32. Mixed factor analysis. The figure shows the distribution of
nations along the two factors. By Agner Fog, 2017.

Most of the variables have a significant loading on factor 1, as predicted.
We can regard factor 1 as reflecting the basic aspects of regality, with a
central focus on perceived danger and the desire for a tough leader.
Factor 2 is more difficult to interpret. It is dominated by discipline
at the positive end and violence at the negative end, both of which
are indicators of regality as evidenced by their positive loading on
factor 1. The two factors are almost orthogonal, and it appears that
factor 2 distinguishes between different variants of regal cultures. The
interpretation of this factor is further discussed below.
Discipline is unrelated to perceived danger, according to table 15,
but positively correlated with the desire for a tough leader. Discipline
is strongly correlated with conformity, and conformity is strongly
correlated with the desire for a tough leader and moderately correlated
with perceived danger.
The variable ‘hierarchy’ has only an insignificant effect in the factor
analysis (Figure 31), but it has a significant correlation with perceived
danger (Table 15). The weak effect of this variable is very likely due to
the reference group effect discussed on page 256. The respondents are
probably evaluating the degree of hierarchy in their own culture with
that same culture as reference.

8. Statistical Testing of Regality Theory



263

It is puzzling that the variable ‘egalitarianism’ is positively
correlated with hierarchy, while we would expect egalitarianism and
hierarchy to be each other’s opposites (see table 15). Egalitarianism is
negatively correlated with bellicosity and xenophobia, as expected, but
positively correlated with perceived danger, contrary to expectation.
However, perceived danger is positively correlated with bellicosity and
xenophobia. An explanation for this paradox can perhaps be found in
the strong correlation of egalitarianism with discipline. People who
score high on discipline may be more likely to express agreement than
disagreement with any statement. People with such an acquiescent
response style will score high on egalitarianism because this variable
has no reverse scored items. An acquiescent response style may be
linked to hierarchy, collectivism, and uncertainty avoidance, according
to one study.32
Perhaps some people express egalitarian opinions as a reaction
against a level of hierarchy that they perceive as too high. This may
also contribute to the positive correlation between egalitarianism and
hierarchy. It is also possible that people who agree with egalitarian
values are conforming to an egalitarian ideology expressed by their
political leaders. An egalitarian society requires some discipline to
suppress the pursuit of egoistic goals. Note that conformity is positively
correlated with egalitarianism and discipline but not correlated with
hierarchy (Table 15).
The two variables that are called bellicosity and violence here do
not actually make a proper distinction between internal and external
conflicts, because the survey questions failed to make this distinction.
Given the mainly peaceful environment, it is likely that these variables
mostly express internal conflicts.

Correspondence with other theoretical constructs
It can be useful to compare the factors in figures 31 and 32 with similar
measures found by other scientists. Table 17 lists the correlations of these
two factors with the various cultural and psychological measures that
have been listed for different countries by other authors, as discussed
in chapters 3.7 and 3.8. It is clear that all these measures, under
different names, have something in common. They are all correlated
32 Harzing (2006)

264

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

in the predicted direction with factor 1, and all these correlations are
statistically significant, except for Lazar Stankov’s harshness versus
softness variable (p = 0.053, n = 18).
Other studies

Author and theory

Uz: Cultural
tightnessi
Gelfand et al.:
Tight versus loose
culturesii

Cultural measure

Tightness, domain specific
Tightness, domain general

0.54**

0.33

Tightness, combined

0.78***

0.15

Tightness

0.60**

0.22

-0.44*

0.63***

Secular/rational versus
Inglehart and Welzel: traditional values
Human development
Self-expression versus
and valuesiii
survival values
Welzel: Human
empowermentiv
Stankov, Lee and
Vijver: Personality,
attitudes, values,
normsv
Stankov and Lee:
Social attitudesvi
United Nations

Regality factors
Factor 1:
Perceived
Factor 2:
danger and
Discipline
desire for tough versus violence
leader
0.60**
0.06

Secular values
Emancipative values
Conservatism versus
liberalism
Harshness versus softness

-0.56***

-0.24

-0.49**
-0.74***

0.32
0.18

0.74***

-0.38

0.46

0.46

Nastiness

0.66***

0.14

Religiosity

0.79***

-0.46**

Morality

0.77***

-0.57***

-0.65***
-0.76***

-0.40*
0.35*

Life expectancy
Human development index

i Uz (2015)
ii Gelfand et al. (2011)
iii Inglehart and Welzel (2005), Inglehart (2007)
iv Welzel (2013)
v Stankov, Lee and van de Vijver (2014)
vi Stankov and Lee (2015)

Table 17. Correlation of factors from the present study with various other
cultural measures at the country level. Levels of significance, two-tailed:
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.33

33 Data sources: Inglehart and Welzel (2005), Gelfand et al. (2011), Uz (2015), Stankov,
Lee and van de Vijver (2014), Welzel (2013), United Nations Development

8. Statistical Testing of Regality Theory



265

If we accept the suggestion of Irem Uz and coworkers that life expectancy
is a useful measure of threat,34 then we can confirm that factors 1 and 2
are both significantly correlated with threat. The human development
index (HDI) is a less accurate measure of threat and danger. While factor
1 is negatively correlated with HDI, factor 2 is positively correlated with
HDI. This will be discussed later.

Discussion
The results of our analysis are useful for investigating relationships
between important political and cultural phenomena, but it must be
emphasized that it is not possible to infer causal relationships from
correlations without time series data. The results are quite interesting
despite the fact that many of the items in the Survey of World Views
questionnaire are somewhat off the mark from the concepts that are
relevant to regality theory. Future research will need to include
questions, methods, and samples that are designed specifically to test
the predictions of regality theory.
Most of the twelve variables that we defined in table 12 are
significantly correlated with each other, as we can see in table 15.
The first and strongest factor in the factor analysis is centered
around perceived danger and the desire for a tough leader, as shown
in figure 31. This fits nicely with the central claim of regality theory that
perceived danger leads to the desire for a strong leader, and that this
affects many aspects of a culture. All the variables except hierarchy and
egalitarianism have substantial loadings on this factor. Patriarchy has
particularly strong loading because of the high internal consistency (α)
of this variable. Factor 1 also has significant negative correlations with
life expectancy and human development index, which can both be seen
as rough measures of safety and absence of dangers.
Several scientists have tried to map cultural differences and have
each developed their own methods and measures. It is interesting that
all these different measures seem to be related. There must be some core
phenomenon that is reflected in these different measures, and this is
exactly what regality theory asserts.
Programme (2013), New World Encyclopedia 2016), Inglehart and Welzel (2013),
Welzel (2016), United Nations Data Retrieval System (2012)
34 Uz (2015)

266

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

The phenomenon that we call regality is expected to have a strong
influence on many different aspects of culture, such as politics, religion,
morals, and art, as shown in table 1 (chapter 2.6). This makes it very
likely that attempts to map cultural differences will reveal some of
these connections, regardless of which methods are used. Factor 1 in
the factor analysis is a reasonably good indicator of the core aspects
of regality, and this factor is correlated significantly with almost all
the other cultural measures, as we can see in table 17. Some of these
correlations are due to confounding economic factors, of course, but we
can see from table 15 that significant correlations persist when economic
and other country-specific effects are controlled for.
Factor 2 is dominated by discipline versus violence, as we can see
in figure 31. A possible interpretation of this factor relates to the way
conflicts are solved. Internal conflicts are solved by official legal or
political means in countries with strong and efficient moral or legal
systems. However, people tend to use violence in the absence of other
means of conflict solving. Efficient ways of disciplining people are
seen not only in regal societies, but also in highly developed societies
regardless of regality. Countries with low loadings on factor 2 have
less efficient legal or moral means for disciplining people. We saw the
same phenomenon in the study of non-industrial cultures (page 246
in chapter 8.3). There is a lot of internal violence in the form of feuds
and vendettas in some moderately kungic cultures without strong
legal systems. Regal societies, however, were able to suppress internal
violence, but engaged in a lot of external violence against other societies.
We can conclude that factor 2 is related to the disciplining aspect of
regality, but also to other effects that have less to do with regality.
The distribution of nations across the two factors, shown in figure
32, has notable similarities with cultural maps published by other
scientists using other constructs and methods. Figure 32 is very similar
to a map of the distribution of countries along two dimensions named
conservatism versus liberalism and harshness versus softness, published
by Stankov and coworkers,35 despite the non-significant correlation of
their harshness/softness dimension with factor 2 of the present study
(p = 0.056, see table 17).
The factor map of figure 32 also has striking similarities with Ronald
Inglehart and Christian Welzel’s cultural map in figure 6 (chapter 3.7).
35 Stankov, Lee and van de Vijver (2014)

8. Statistical Testing of Regality Theory



267

It is interesting that factor 2 is strongly correlated with Inglehart and
Welzel’s secular/rational values, which do not measure conflict solving
but industrialization and secularization of authority. Inglehart and
Welzel’s map can be seen roughly as a mirrored and somewhat rotated
version of our factor map. Regal countries are found at the lower left
corner of figure 6 and kungic countries at the upper right. Countries
with a strong disciplining system are found at the top of figure 6 and
countries with weak discipline at the bottom.
The most conflict-ridden countries were not included in the Survey
of World Views study because of technical and political difficulties.36
Therefore, we cannot see the full effect of war in these statistics.
Fortunately, Inglehart and Welzel’s study is more inclusive, and we can
see that the most conflict-ridden countries tend towards the lower left
corner of figure 6, which we have identified as the most regal.
The position of Germany at the kungic end of figure 32 and the upper
right corner of figure 6 is evidence that the regality of a culture can
change quite dramatically in just a few generations. In addition to the
obvious explanation that Germans felt safe at the time the studies were
made, we should also note that Germans are determined to distance
themselves ideologically from the Nazism of their past.
Our evaluation of the present results must take into account that
the survey has been made in modern cultures with student samples.
Furthermore, the countries included here were dominated by relative
peace and security at the time of the study. This is far from the
environment under which the mechanism behind regality evolved.
Nevertheless, we can see highly significant correlations between nearly
all the variables we have studied. This confirms that the psychological
mechanism of regality that evolved in a very different environment still
operates in modern cultures today.

8.5. Evidence from existing studies
Many previous studies have found effects of collective danger that are
relevant to our theory. Some of these studies are listed in table 18. All of
these studies find correlates of collective danger that are in accordance
with regality theory, though a few of them fail to find all the effects that
we would predict.
36 Saucier et al. (2015)

modern
modern
modern
modern
modern

modern
modern

individual
individual

individual
individual
individual
individual
individual

Feldman and Stennervii
Wohl et al.viii

Riek, Mania, and Gaertnerix
Laddx
Carnagey and Andersonxi
Huddy and Feldmanxii
Bonanno and Jostxiii

Echebarria-Echabe et al.xiv
i ndividual
Curşeu, Stoop, and Schalkxv i ndividual

terrorism
immigration

war
war
intergroup
competition
existential
insecurity
political
violence
economy,
violence
economy, war
group
extinction
various
terrorism
terrorism
terrorism
terrorism

Type of danger

hostility to minorities, etc.
strengthen group

hostility to out-group
support for president
war attitudes, punitiveness
strict foreign policy
authoritarianism, militarism,
patriotism, religiosity
natural
authoritarianism, prejudice
correlation study prejudice

imagined
scenario
correlation study
salience
manipulation
various
natural
natural
natural
natural

natural

nationalism, politics, religion, discipline, fertility
attitude to peace,
xenophobia
prejudice

punitiveness
combative sports
religion

Observed effect

Theory

social psychology
integrated threat
theory

various
political psychology
psychology
psychology
social psychology

authoritarianism
social psychology

authoritarianism

political psychology

political psychology

psychology
cultural evolution
various

viii Wohl, Branscombe and Reysen (2010)
ix Riek, Mania and Gaertner (2006)
x Ladd (2007)
xi Carnagey and Anderson (2007)
xii Huddy, Feldman and Weber (2007), Huddy and Feldman (2011)
xiii Bonanno and Jost (2006)
xiv Echebarria-Echabe and Fernández-Guede (2006)
xv Curşeu, Stoop and Schalk (2007)

meta-analysis
representative
students
representative
terrorism
witnesses
self-selected
semi-random

representative
self-selected

students

representative

world cultures natural

Source of
variation
world cultures natural
world cultures natural
world cultures natural

Sample

Table 18. Previous studies that found correlates of collective danger.

i Russell (1972)
ii Sipes (1975)
iii Roes and Raymond (2003)
iv Inglehart and Welzel (2005)
v Canetti et al. (2015), Hirsch-Hoefler, Canetti,
Rapaport and Hobfoll (2014)
vi Jugert and Duckitt (2009)
vii Feldman and Stenner (1997)

modern
modern

modern

individual

Canetti et al.v

Jugert and Duckitt vi

Type of
culture
non-industrial
non-industrial
non-industrial

individual modern
and culture
individual modern

Level of
effect
culture
culture
culture

Inglehart and Welzeliv

Russelli
Sipesii
Roes and Raymondiii

Study

8. Statistical Testing of Regality Theory



269

Several of the studies listed in table 18 use non-representative samples
and unrealistic manipulations of danger, and measure only short-term
effects. The cited studies are based on other theories than the one
discussed here, or on no theory at all. We need similar studies based on
regality theory in order to make more detailed predictions that can be
tested, including predictions that differ from alternative theories.

8.6. Conclusion of the statistical tests
In this chapter, we have tested the predictions of regality theory
systematically in several different ways. The effects at the individual
level have been tested on contemporary societies only, while the effects
at the social level have been tested on both contemporary and ancient
non-industrial societies, using a combination of comparative historical
analysis and various statistical methods. Few social science theories
have been tested as thoroughly as this. Most of the predictions of the
theory were confirmed. We now have empirical support for all the links
in the causal chain hypothesized by our theory:
• The geography, ecology, and available technology have a
strong influence on the level of intergroup conflict in a nonmodern setting.
• A high level of intergroup conflict influences the psychological
disposition of the individual members of the society in the
direction of a desire for a strong leader, bellicosity, xenophobia,
conformity, discipline, patriarchy, and strict religiosity.
• The emergent effects of individual psychological preferences
makes the political system more hierarchical, makes the justice
system more strict and punitive, and shapes the culture in the
direction of a strong group identity, strict sexual morals, strict
treatment of children, and a preference for perfectionist and
highly embellished art.
• The opposite situation, where the environment makes violent
conflict difficult or unlikely, has the opposite effects, leading
to peace and tolerance at both the individual and the social
level.

270

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

Thus, the central claims of regality theory are strongly confirmed by the
data. A few less important predictions were only weakly supported or
not supported at all. The prediction that anomic suicide is more common
in kungic societies than in regal societies was only weakly supported for
the non-industrial cultures. It was not supported for modern cultures in
a country-level statistic (not shown here). The predictions for divorce
rate and marrying age were not supported.
While the regality level is strongly connected with the political
complexity and population density, it cannot be reduced to these
factors alone. The first factor analysis (Tables 6 and 7) and the multiple
correlation analysis (Table 10) indicate that significant effects remain
when population density is controlled for.
None of the tests in the present study includes a time sequence
which could be used to verify the direction of causality, but several of
the studies cited in table 18 demonstrate the direction of causality based
on single events, such as terror attacks or laboratory experiments.
In the study of non-industrial cultures (chapter 8.3), we can infer the
direction of causality from the influence of the environment. This relies
on the assumption that these cultures had little influence on their own
environment.
Radical changes in the environment are so rare and case-specific that
it would be difficult to make a statistical time series analysis to study
the influence of the environment on whole societies, but individual
case studies can be quite indicative. One example is the Moriori people
mentioned in chapter 3.1. These people became isolated on the Chatham
Islands because the islands lacked materials for building boats. The
Moriori culture changed from violent to peaceful in a few hundred
years. When the population was finally attacked by invading Maoris,
the Moriori were easily wiped out because they lacked an efficient
culture of defense.37
The problems and weaknesses of the different statistical studies are
discussed in chapter 8.1.

37 Endicott (2013)

9. Discussion and Conclusion

Figure 33. Kungic versus regal. Demonstration against the Vietnam
War. Arlington, Virginia, USA, 1967. Albert R. Simpson, US Army
Audiovisual Center, 1967.1

9.1. Summary of findings
Evolutionary theories of war and conflict are not new, but previous
theories have several weaknesses. It is difficult to explain why
warriors are willing to risk their lives fighting for their group. Previous
1

Public domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Vietnamdem.jpg

© 2017 Agner Fog, CC BY 4.0

https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0128.09

272

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

explanations have relied on evolutionary mechanisms such as kin
selection, group selection, altruistic punishment, or benefitting from the
spoils of war,2 often attributing much more power to these mechanisms
than the quantitative models bear out. Regality theory proposes a
mechanism that better explains the parochial altruism of warriors
without resort to such weak or controversial mechanisms as altruistic
punishment or group selection.
Another problem with many of the previous theories is that they try
to explain variation with a constant.3 Some theorists claim that humans
are peaceful by nature, while others claim that humans are inherently
ethnocentric and xenophobic, but few have explained the extreme
variability in human societies from the extremely peaceful and tolerant
to the unfathomable cruelty of warlike societies. Regality theory explains
this variability by showing that humans have a flexible psychology that
allows us to adapt to our life conditions.
Humans will express an authoritarian reaction in the event of
war or any other perceived collective danger that requires collective
action. This includes the desire for a strong leader, strict discipline, a
strong group identity emphasizing ‘us’ versus ‘them’, xenophobia, and
intolerance. The social and political structure of the society will take
shape according to these preferences. We will see a hierarchical political
organization and harsh punishment of traitors and deviants. Such a
society is called regal.
This mechanism provides an evolutionary solution to the collective
action problem. The powerful leader can reward brave warriors and
punish cowards and defectors. In the absence of such a leader, there
would be more free riders than fighters. It is not worthwhile for anybody
to fight for his group if everybody else is free riding on his actions. It
is a better strategy to support a strong leader who can make sure that
nobody is free riding (see chapter 2.2).
There is no reason to support a strong leader when there is no war or
other collective danger. On the contrary, a strong leader is likely to be
a tyrant who exploits everybody else. Therefore, people will show the

2 Thayer (2004, chapter 3), van der Dennen (1995, chapter 1.2)
3 Thayer (2004, p. 234)

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opposite psychological tendencies in a situation of peace and security,
preferring an egalitarian and tolerant society. This kind of society is
called kungic.
Most societies will be somewhere in between these two extremes.
We can imagine a continuous scale from the extremely kungic to the
extremely regal, and each society or culture can be placed somewhere
on this scale depending on the level of perceived collective danger. The
regal-kungic scale does not only affect the political climate. We have
observed that a lot of different aspects of a culture reflect its level of
regality. The characteristics of regal and kungic societies are summarized
in table 1 (chapter 2.6).
This model can explain a lot of different social phenomena. Most
importantly, it can explain why some societies are warlike and
authoritarian while others are peaceful and tolerant. The hierarchical
and highly disciplined structure in a regal society is good not only for
defense, but also for offensive purposes. A regal country will attack
any neighbor country if it has a good chance of gaining more territory
through war.

9.2. Three epochs in human history
Different factors in the environment and subsistence pattern can make
war or violent conflict feasible or impossible, as we have seen. We can
roughly divide human history into three epochs where different means
of subsistence have led to different dynamics for war and regality.
In the first epoch, humans depended on hunting, gathering, and
fishing. The amount of violent conflict was determined mainly by the
ecology and geography. Where food was concentrated in rich patches,
we would have contest competition and frequent intergroup conflicts
over access to the most attractive food patches. The population density
would be higher around these rich patches so that larger groups were
able to fight together. Geographic barriers and niche specialization were
factors that could prevent war. Thus, we would find the relatively regal
cultures in areas with rich food patches and the more kungic cultures
in remote areas where food was sparse, where travelling was difficult,
or where a small group had adapted to a special niche that neighboring

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groups could not penetrate. When nomadic pastoralism was introduced,
the dynamics were basically the same, but the groups that traveled
together were larger, which increased their fighting ability.
In the second epoch, humans depended increasingly on agriculture
to produce their own food. Where the lifestyle had previously been
nomadic, it now became more and more sedentary. This development
probably started with slash and burn agriculture, in which groups of
humans traveled to a new place whenever the soil had been exhausted.
The lifestyle became more and more sedentary with the Neolithic
revolution, when fields were cultivated in fertile areas such as river
valleys. The population grew in these areas. As villages grew into cities,
it became possible to organize and build irrigation canals to increase the
agricultural yield.
The more the production of food became concentrated in fertile areas
near water sources, the more these areas became the subject of violent
conflicts. A self-amplifying cycle of increasing regality, territorial
expansion, increasing food production, and population growth was
started. Villages and small cities grew and became city states, nations,
kingdoms, and finally large empires. The political structure became
more and more hierarchical and centralized while the culture focused
increasingly on the importance of military virtues and new conquests.
When such an empire had finally reached the practical limits to
expansion, the opposite development set in. The wars and conquests
that had driven the regal spiral were no longer feasible, the state was
economically bankrupt, and a kungic development set in. The empire
started to disintegrate into smaller states, some of which were later
absorbed by neighboring empires.
The level of regality in this second epoch was now determined
not only by ecological and geographic factors but increasingly by
the dynamical rise and fall of empires. This cyclical process, which is
explained in chapters 4.1 and 4.2, led to an alternation between regal
and kungic developments over periods of several hundred years.
The third epoch is one of industrialization and a globalized economy.
Large scale territorial wars have become less common since World
War II due to the influence of international organizations, alliances,
deterrence, economic costs, and economic interdependence. Political

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275

leaders may still have imperial ambitions, but their strategies are now
based less on brute-force military dominance and more on proxy wars,
economic structures, resource extraction, debt dependence, and the
domination of culture, ideology, science, and mass media.4
We still have violent conflicts, but on a lower scale. In most cases,
one or both parties in a conflict depend on foreign support (often
clandestine). These conflicts can be characterized as proxy wars or
foreign-supported attempts at inducing regime change. Most violent
conflicts today are asymmetric wars where the traditional theories of
war do not apply. The weaker party in an asymmetric conflict may
turn to terrorism tactics when the traditional means of warfare are not
available to them. The actual damage done by acts of terrorism is much
smaller than in traditional warfare, but the regalizing effect can be very
high because of the intense media attention (see chapter 4.4 and 6.1).
In fact, the mass media play a major role in the regal-kungic
dynamics of modern societies. Most people depend on the mass media
for information about political violence and other dangers, because
they do not witness these events themselves. The image presented by
the mass media is often exaggerated, though, because the media are
forced by fierce economic competition to focus on dramatic and highly
emotional stories about crime, violence, and mayhem. The ‘mean world
syndrome’ caused by media competition is in fact a major regalizing force
in modern society (see chapter 5.1). Politicians sometimes contribute to
this effect by fabricating threats and conflicts (see chapter 6.3).
The mass migration of refugees out of conflict zones can cause regal
reactions in the countries that receive these refugees. In the future,
climate change, natural disasters, overpopulation, and ecological
collapse may have similar effects.
Economic factors also contribute to regal developments when an
unstable economic system causes crises and growing global inequality.
The regal effect of an economic crisis depends on who is blamed for the
crisis and whether the politicians are perceived to be in control of the
situation (see chapter 5.2).

4 Altheide (2014)

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Despite these regal influences, we are now seeing strong kungic
developments in many parts of the world due to the improved living
conditions, peace, and stability that are connected with the demographic
transition (see chapter 3.4).
The state of the world today can be characterized by the observation
that the pattern of war has changed (see chapter 4.4), but some wars are
still being fought based on obsolete principles. Today, we are seeing
mostly asymmetric conflicts which tend to be intractable and longlasting. Asymmetric wars are often fought with unconventional means,
including terrorism. Most violent conflicts today can be characterized as
proxy wars. The level of conflict is increased here by foreign support in
the form of weapons, training, and other resources.
On the surface, these asymmetric wars and proxy wars appear
to be conflicts over ideology or religion, but the political or religious
extremism of the fighters is mainly a consequence of the conflict itself.
The fighters in proxy wars become radicalized as a regal reaction to the
violence and also as a result of manipulation by their leaders. Behind
the scenes, the sponsors who are pulling the strings are more motivated
by a need to secure their access to critical resources and by geopolitical
strategy (see chapter 4.3, page 75). They use religion, ideology, and
a rhetoric of good and evil mainly to rally support for their cause. The
weaker party in asymmetric conflicts is in most cases fighting against
the suppression and exclusion of a minority. The religious and ethnic
identity of this minority is amplified by the conflict.
The third epoch that we are now in has lasted for less than a century,
and the driving forces behind the social and political developments
are changing faster than the theories about their workings. The
globalized economy is still changing shape with new dynamic forms of
international cooperation and competition, concentration of wealth and
power, economic booms and busts, security and insecurity, economic
regulation and deregulation, and new conflicts and alliances. Likewise,
the political climate is changing, with new forms of dynamics formed
by new forms of mass communication, competition for attention,
economic influences on the mass media, and new forms of propaganda
and deception. As scientists, we have a lot of work to do to catch up with
these developments in order to understand in which direction these
processes are taking our society.

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9.3. The regal/kungic dynamics and human
social development
While it is certainly more pleasurable for ordinary people to live in
a kungic society than a regal one, we should not forget the role that
regal periods have played in the history of human development. Regal
regimes have certainly caused unfathomable amounts of cruelty and
human suffering, but without the historical periods of regality we might
still be living in the Stone Age.
The first condition for technological innovation and development is
a political and economic structure that allows division of labor, where
some people produce food while others can devote their time to being
artisans, intellectuals, and other specialists. Scientific progress requires
a wealthy government that can support education and pay people for
doing research.
A rich and powerful government is necessary for the construction
of the large infrastructure that industrial development and large scale
international trade depends on. However, this is not the friendliest
environment for individual innovation and free enterprise. Throughout
most of our history, rich and powerful governments have also been
regal. Regal governments are likely to tax or confiscate new enterprises
that appear to be profitable. Such governments are extractive in the
sense of Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson’s theory, as explained
in chapter 5.2. Furthermore, regal societies are typically intolerant of
the deviance and experimentation that may be necessary for social and
cultural innovation.
On the other hand, a kungic society with a lax system of justice may
fail to protect private entrepreneurs against theft and blackmail, or fail
to provide the accumulation of wealth necessary for investment in new
businesses. The societies that have been most conducive to technological
progress have been those that had a strong legal system to protect
private property, but that also encouraged diversity and individual
inventiveness.5
The present state of human technology and social organization is
the result of a development that has depended on different levels of
5 Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 43)

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regality at different times and in different places. Most states were
created through violence.6 Regal periods have created larger political
units, division of labor, and the accumulation of wealth that has been
required for the investment in infrastructure, education, and science.
Subsequent kungic periods have fostered individual creativity and
inventiveness, and allowed the political, cultural, and religious deviance
that was connected with inventiveness, while perhaps the previously
accumulated capital made the investment in technological inventions
possible. The most fruitful environment for technological and industrial
innovation is one that combines democracy and individual freedom
with a strong law enforcement system to protect private property.
Different periods with different levels of regality have created windows
of opportunity for different innovations and developments. The changes
in regality level and the conflicts between regal and kungic forces have
been the root of much artistic and cultural creativity and innovation.
Today, the possibility of establishing a well-functioning and
reliable government and legal system no longer requires a strong
regal government; but the decoupling between regality and efficient
law enforcement is historically new, as it came with the third epoch
described in the previous chapter.
The regal periods in human history have not only produced war,
tyranny, imperialism, slavery, cruelty, and mayhem, but also formed
the preconditions for the highly developed society that we live in today.
Most of the basic principles of law that are necessary for a civilized society
to function today were developed in regal periods. Classical music, as
well as many of the magnificent pieces of art and architecture that we are
impressed by today, was created under the regal regimes of the past. We
admire old fairy tales without realizing that they were written to glorify
sovereign kings and emperors and to make unambiguous distinctions
between friend and foe, between good and evil. And we enjoy the fruits
of past scientific, technological, and political progress without thinking
of the incredible hardship that made it possible.

6 Tilly (1992)

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279

9.4. New explanations of well-known phenomena
Regality theory can contribute to a better understanding of many
well-known phenomena, for example the rise and fall of empires, as
discussed in previous chapters.
Altruism is a behavior that has always been difficult to explain in
evolutionary theory. Many different theories have been put forth,
but none of the previously proposed mechanisms seems to be strong
enough to explain why people are willing to sacrifice themselves in war.
Regality theory offers a model that predicts a stronger effect than the
previous theories can account for (see chapter 2.2).
Another common phenomenon that receives a new theoretical
explanation is authoritarianism. The psychological concept of
authoritarianism has often been criticized for being politically biased
and poorly defined. For many years, there has been confusion and
disagreement over whether authoritarianism was a fixed personality
trait, a psychopathology, a reaction to fear and danger, a consequence
of pessimistic world views, or just a divergent political opinion.
Regality theory explains the phenomenon that psychologists have
called authoritarianism as an evolved pattern of response to perceived
collective danger. This new explanation removes the weaknesses of
authoritarianism theory and gives a good explanation of the relationship
between individual reactions and sociopolitical phenomena (see chapter
3.5).
The question of whether humans are violent or peaceful by nature
has often been discussed. Regality theory has the answer: it depends on
the environment. The endless debates over whether human differences
are due to genes or culture have often totally missed a third possibility,
that the genes define a flexibility or plasticity that allows the individual
to show different behaviors depending on the environment.
In folk psychology, people often believe that war and violent conflicts
are caused by hate, fanaticism, nationalism, or religious extremism.
Regality theory turns this argument upside down. Conflict leads to
regality, which is typically expressed as xenophobia, fanaticism, an
increased sense of national identity, and religious strictness and zeal.
While the causal mechanism often goes both ways in a self-amplifying

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spiral of violence, it is fair to say that xenophobia, fanatical patriotism,
religious extremism, and so on are the consequences of conflict more than
the causes of it. This insight has important implications for peacemaking
efforts. Attempts to root out, for example, a particular expression of
religious extremism by force will most likely be counterproductive and
create more regality, while third-party interventions that guarantee
peace and security will have a kungic effect and make the extremism
slowly fade away.
The fundamental dogmas of a religion are quite resistant to change.
However, people have a peculiar ability to interpret their religion in a
way that matches their psychological propensities or political agenda
so that they can justify almost any action—violent or peaceful—by
reference to carefully selected parts of their religious principles.
The statistical results show a quite significant correlation between
religion and various measures of war and regality in both modern and
non-industrial societies. The religion of regal societies typically supports
the hierarchical political power structure and serves a disciplining
function by emphasizing supernatural rewards and punishments. This
insight can improve our understanding of religious differences.
Regality theory improves our understanding of several other cultural
phenomena as well, including some phenomena that are difficult to
explain with other theories. One phenomenon that has hitherto been
difficult to explain is sexual morals. The statistics presented above show
that the level of regality explains remarkably well why different cultures
have such strikingly different sexual morals. Cultural prohibitions
against birth control can be seen as a means by which a regal society tries
to increase the population growth. A ban against premarital sex is likely
to force young people to marry early and have many children when all
other outlets for their sexual drive are closed. Many regal cultures even
have bans against such harmless, but non-procreative, sexual behaviors
as masturbation and homosexuality. More research is needed to study
the possible psychological mechanisms that connect regality with the
desire to make rules for the sexual behavior of others.
The theory also improves our understanding of patriarchy. Regal
cultures tend to be patriarchal and male-dominated, while kungic
cultures have more equality between the sexes.

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281

Regality theory also offers a completely new way of explaining
differences in artistic style and taste. Regal cultures have a marked
preference for a highly embellished, refined, and perfectionist style, while
the members of kungic cultures appreciate the more individualistic,
imaginative, and less rule-bound artistic expressions. Art is a form of
communication that reflects the social structure as the artist sees it or
the social structure that the artist would like to see. This tendency to
reflect the level of regality appears to be the same in many different
kinds of art, including music, dance, literary fiction, drama, painting,
body adornment, and architecture.
Finally, regality theory contributes to a better understanding of
democracy. In international relations, it is often believed that democracy
is the road to peace, but the statistics show that the democratization of
a country almost always comes after the borders have been settled and
peace established.7 This observation fits perfectly with regality theory.
Unstable or contested borders are a collective threat that drives the
political climate of a country in the regal and autocratic direction, while
peace and secure borders will promote a kungic political culture, which
leads to democracy. In other words: peace comes before democracy.
This also explains the paradoxical phenomenon that the voters in
a democracy sometimes elect undemocratic candidates. A return from
democracy to autocracy is possible in the face of national threats—real or
fabricated. We can expect democracy to be adversely affected by border
conflicts, proxy wars, fabricated dangers, highly emotional threats such
as terrorism, and by a concentration of valuable resources in areas that
can be monopolized and fought over.

9.5. Integration with other theories
A common way of promoting a new theory is to prove previous theories
wrong. This naive form of falsificationism has not been very fruitful in the
social sciences.8 While regality theory explains our observations better
than alternative theories do, this does not mean that previous theories
7 Owsiak (2013), Gibler and Owsiak (2017)
8 Lakatos (1974)

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should be completely rejected. Previous theories may still contain some
important insights that might be remodeled and combined with the new
discoveries in a synthetic process that makes our knowledge evolve and
expand its explanatory power. Regality theory may improve previous
theories by contributing to a deeper theoretical understanding of both
individual behavior and social structures.
There is a long-standing debate in sociology about the relative
importance of individual agency and social structure. The present
book argues for a theory where individual preferences shape the
social structure, and where the social structure determines the power
relations between people and determines who is able to get into
powerful positions and what interests they serve. The social structure
and the environment also have a strong influence on the psychological
preferences of individual people. A conflict-filled and dangerous
environment fosters authoritarian preferences in people, while a
peaceful and safe environment makes people prioritize egalitarian
values. These individual preferences then feed back into the social
structure in such a way that people tend to build hierarchical political
systems in dangerous environments and egalitarian political structures
in safe and peaceful environments.
The actor-centered explanation of historical events can be criticized
for seeing only proximate causes. For example, Ronald Inglehart and
Christian Welzel criticize explanations of democracy that can be reduced
to the observation that democracy has been implemented because prodemocratic actors were stronger than anti-democratic actors. It is always
clear in retrospect that the winners were stronger than the losers, but
this gives no insight into the social forces that explain why the winners
were stronger. The actor-centered approach often tries to explain social
processes by actions that are endogenous to the processes themselves
without seeing the deeper structural mechanisms.9
The present theory improves the opportunities for a scientific
understanding of history based on environmental and technological
factors and intergroup relations. Rather than explaining a war as caused
by the whims of a particular bellicose leader, we can start to study why
this leader was bellicose and, more importantly, why he had enough

9 Inglehart and Welzel (2005, p. 224)

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283

supporters to stay in power, and why the population did not overturn
this despot and replace him with somebody more peaceful (see chapter
6.4).
Many social developments are unpredicted or unintended. We cannot
explain unintended developments adequately by idiographic accounts
of the personal decisions of specific influential people. Unplanned
developments are often the emergent effects of the actions of a large
number of people, perhaps without anybody understanding how their
own decisions contribute to the big picture of macroscopic change.
Regality theory is only one among many theories that can explain
emergent social developments. Other theories that may contribute
to the understanding of unplanned developments include systems
theory with feedback models, cultural selection theory, economic
market mechanisms, social cognition theory, and media effects theories
combined with media economy (see chapters 4.1, 5.1, and 5.2).

9.6. Policy lessons
Regality theory can be useful for guiding political decisions and for
predicting the consequences of political actions.
There may be many reasons why one wants to push a society and
culture in the kungic direction. A kungic development is the road to
peace, tolerance, and democracy. It can also be an important tool for
saving the environment. A kungic culture is usually coupled with a
K-like life history strategy, which implies better education and reduced
population growth (chapter 3.3). The current level of consumption of
natural resources exceeds the carrying capacity of the planet, and so
does the level of pollution.10 We have often observed that the protection
of the environment has very low priority in the event of war but higher
priority in times of peace. A kungic development combined with
demographic transition is probably the most efficient way to avoid
ecological collapse.
The following policies may be useful for pushing a society and
culture in the kungic direction:

10 Steffen et al. (2015)

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Warlike and Peaceful Societies

• Protect the borders of countries. Prevent violent territorial
conflicts. Borders should be created, removed, or moved only
by peaceful negotiations, or decided by public referendum in
the affected areas. Strong, fair, and accountable international
organizations should oversee this.
• Remove violence, particularly against civilians, and reduce
threat perceptions.11
• Resolve asymmetric conflicts, which tend to be intractable
and produce terror. International mediation is often necessary
for solving such conflicts in a way that is acceptable to both
parties.
• Prevent proxy wars and expose clandestine foreign support
for conflicting factions. Do not buy oil, diamonds, drugs, or
other valuable products from conflict areas. Prevent foreign
support for violent regime changes. Prevent and expose the
deliberate fabrication of conflicts by third parties.
• Create economic stability and safety. The money system
should not generate unpayable debt or inescapable debt
dependence. Restrain the Matthew effect. Regulate the kinds
of international trade that would lead to a race to the bottom.
• Reduce the dependence on critical resources, such as oil,
rare minerals, and water. Make sure that all people and all
countries have fair access to vital resources.
• Establish social security systems and safety nets that guarantee
the basic necessities of life and health for everybody and make
people feel safe.
• Promote good education for all citizens. Support education
for the poor. Make education attractive by providing jobs for
the educated.
• Support free mass media that do not have to rely on
fearmongering and exaggeration of dangers for reasons of
economic competition. This requires alternative sources of
funding for ‘public service’ news media.
11 Hirsch-Hoefler, Canetti, Rapaport and Hobfoll (2014)

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285

• Prevent overpopulation. The above policies will in fact
advance the demographic transition and help to prevent
overpopulation.
This theoretical discussion would not be complete without also
describing policies that can be used to push a society in the regal direction.
A society that is too kungic will be vulnerable to attacks from more
regal forces. Karl Popper, citing Plato, expressed this as the paradox of
freedom. Freedom in the sense of absence of restraining control ‘makes
the bully free to enslave the meek’. Popper also explained the paradox
of tolerance: ‘If we extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are
intolerant, if we are not prepared to defend a tolerant society against
the onslaught of the intolerant, then the tolerant will be destroyed, and
tolerance with them’.12 The optimal position of a society on the regalkungic dimension depends on the dangers it faces from its neighbors as
well as on the need for solidarity and collective action.
Regalizing policies have often been used to strengthen a government
against the interests of the majority of the population, as we have seen in
chapters 6.2 and 6.3. Such policies can also be used to strengthen a country
against a likely attack from a militant neighbor, to increase solidarity
in times of crisis, to nurture the will to cultural self-preservation, or to
strengthen a military organization. Actions and inactions that can make
societies more regal include the following:
• War, including proxy war and fabricated conflicts; political
influence of the weapons industry; weak and corrupt
international organizations.
• An unregulated economy depending on debt, exploitation of
other countries, increasing inequality, perpetual growth, and
overconsumption of natural resources.
• Climate change, overexploitation, and destruction of the
environment.
• Exaggerated stories about all kinds of dangers in the mass
media; a highly competitive media market.

12 Popper (1945)

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• Political control of artistic production, especially the
suppression and destruction of kungic art.
Evidently, tyrants and despots have used regalizing techniques such as
these over the millennia to increase their own power, even if they did not
know why these techniques worked. The list of regalizing techniques
provided here will hardly add anything to the repertoire of powerhungry autocrats. It can, however, be useful to a political opposition
and to the general population because it makes it easier to see through
the hidden motives of rulers who want to strengthen their own power
or abuse their power to enrich themselves.
The insights provided by regality theory can also be useful for
identifying ineffective and counterproductive policies. For example,
both parts in an asymmetric conflict should avoid escalating the
violence because this will lead to further regalization and make the
conflict intractable.
This theory also explains why so many attempts to establish
democracy by force have failed. International interventions in troublefilled countries have too often had a focus on regime change. While
the professed aim has been to establish democracy, the result has
invariably been less liberating. No matter how tyrannical the leader
of an undemocratic country is, he will have supporters who see any
foreign-backed attempts to remove him by force as an attack on their
country. This has a regalizing effect that is likely to make the country
less democratic, not more. The analyses of conflicts need to focus on
systemic causes rather than hunting down individual ‘bad guys’.
Removing an ‘evil dictator’ by force will only regalize the population of
his country and make sure his successor will be even more militant and
despotic. Peace and stability must come before democracy.13
Counterinsurgency and counterterrorism have too often been
counterproductive. They ignore the grievances that provide the driving
force behind all insurgency. They also ignore the fact that, in most
cases, there are no military targets that the insurgents can meaningfully
attack with any chance of success, so they can see no other option than
to attack less legitimate targets. This makes it easy for a suppressive
regime to call them terrorists. We can be pretty sure that they have
already tried less radical forms of protest with disappointing results.
13 Owsiak (2013)

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287

It should be no surprise that insurgent movements become more
radical and militant the stronger their grievances and the more they are
suppressed. Their radical religious and political ideologies are likely
to lose adherents if their grievances are dealt with in a sensible way.
A suppressive and kleptocratic regime may be the main cause of their
grievances. International intervention is unlikely to bring lasting peace
if it only helps a despotic regime suppress the insurgents while ignoring
their grievances. Intelligence organizations with their traditional focus
on secret operations and paying secret informants are only likely to
exacerbate the corruption that lies at the core of the conflict. Intelligence
gathering should instead focus on identifying the root causes of a
conflict.14
International policies that are likely to fail include the following:
• Blaming insecurity and political problems on specific political
leaders; hunting down ‘evil dictators’ while ignoring the basic
reasons why certain countries have despotic leaders.
• Blaming conflict on religion. Fanatic religiosity is a
consequence of conflict as much as, or rather more than, a
cause of it. People will automatically become less fanatical and
less bellicose when their environment is made more secure.
Putting the blame on ‘Islamists’, ‘Zionists’, or ‘Crusaders’ will
only make them feel that their religion is threatened and make
them more regal.
• Trying to solve international security problems by forcing a
regime change in other countries by violent means.
• Proxy war; covert support for coup attempts in other countries;
opportunistic support for one faction or another in foreign
countries based on one’s own economic and geostrategic
interests.
• Focus on violent conflict rather than state building; trying to
impose democracy on other countries by force without focusing
on the root causes of why the country has an autocratic rule;
trying to establish democracy before stability.15

14 Chayes (2015, p. 154)
15 Inglehart and Welzel (2005, p. 297), Owsiak (2013), Ahram (2011, p. 139)

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9.7. Supporting evidence
Let us review the most important support we now have for regality
theory:
1. First, we have a solid theoretical basis. Evolutionary theory
has always had a problem explaining why people are willing
to fight for their group. Many models have been proposed,
but the effects always seemed to be too weak to account for
the high costs and dangers of fighting. Regality theory offers
a model with a stronger potential effect because it involves
a strong leader who has the power to coordinate, reward,
and punish. Common support for a strong leader makes sure
that everybody will be fighting rather than free riding. A
hypothetical genetic code that says ‘support a strong leader
in times of collective danger, but not otherwise’ would be
evolutionarily stable (see chapters 2.2 and 2.3). The actual
observations are in good agreement with this model.
2. The extensive research that has been carried out in connection
with authoritarianism theory confirms that people become
authoritarian when they perceive collective danger. This
involves support for a strong leader and strict discipline (see
chapter 3.5).
3. Many previous studies have found various effects of collective
danger that are in accordance with regality theory (see table
18, chapter 8.5).
4. Regality theory provides an explanation for the rise and fall
of empires that is in very good agreement with the theory and
observations behind Peter Turchin’s historical dynamics (see
chapter 4.2).
5. Many scientists have tried to map cultural differences. Different
scientists have assigned different names to the cultural factors
that they discovered, such as cultural tightness, harshness,
traditional values, survival values, emancipative values,
conservatism, and nastiness. All these constructs—whatever
they are called—seem to be closely related to each other (see
table 17, chapter 8.4). The fact that different scientists, relying
on different theories and methods, make similar discoveries

9. Discussion and Conclusion



289

suggests that there is a common underlying reality behind
all these findings. Most of these different constructs are
significantly correlated with regality at the country level. The
various studies of cultural factors have found correlations
with many different aspects of culture. These correlations are
in very good agreement with the predictions of regality theory
(see chapter 3.7 and 3.8).
6. A large statistical analysis of 8,883 persons in 33 contemporary
countries found highly significant correlations between
perceived danger, desire for a tough leader, bellicosity, and
several other variables in accordance with the predictions of
regality theory (see table 15 and figure 31, chapter 8.4).
7. A statistical analysis on ancient, non-industrial societies has
been made based on data from the 186 cultures in Murdoch
and White’s Standard Cross-Cultural Sample. A structural
equation model supports the predicted relationships between
war, leadership, rewards for warriors, various cultural
indicators of regality, life history strategy, and sexual morals
(see figure 29, chapter 8.2).
8. A subsample consisting of eighteen of these ancient, nonindustrial societies was investigated in more detail in a
comparative historical analysis. The level of intergroup
conflict in each of these societies was in very good agreement
with the conflict level that could be predicted based on
geographic, ecological, and technological factors. The level
of hierarchy, discipline, and several other cultural indicators
agreed very well with the predictions of regality theory for
these societies and confirmed the direction of causality. A
statistical summary of these results showed that most of the
predicted relationships were highly significant (see table 11,
chapter 8.3).
Such a broad and solid range of support is quite unusual for a social
science theory. This is an excellent basis for further research and
exploration of the many aspects of regality theory and the many social
and cultural variables that are influenced by the level of regality,
according to this theory.

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9.8. What regality theory can be used for
This book has explained how regality theory was developed with
contributions from many different scientific disciplines. In this
conclusion, it is time to suggest how regality theory can give something
back to these disciplines. The following list shows examples of how
regality theory can make useful contributions to other scientific
disciplines:
• In history, to explain war and peace, despotism, the rise and
fall of empires, and the development of democracy.
• In archaeology, to get an image of the social and political
structure of a society based on physical remains. A regal
culture is likely to leave large, impressive, perfectionist, and
embellished artifacts made from durable materials, while the
artifacts of kungic cultures are likely to be less rule-bound,
to reflect individual fantasy, and to be made of perishable
materials. This causes a sampling bias in the archaeological
record (see chapter 2.6).
• In social psychology, to explain authoritarianism, racism,
xenophobia, punitiveness, and tolerance; to suggest a revision
of the politically biased authoritarianism theory (see chapter
3.5).
• In conflict and peace research, to identify the conditions that
lead to conflict or peace and to understand the social and
psychological consequences of different kinds of conflict,
including international war, civil war, proxy war, insurgency,
revolution, terrorism, and spirals of violence.
• In the history and sociology of religion, to relate changes in
religious sentiments, beliefs, and rituals to social and political
changes and ecological factors.
• In art history, to relate artistic innovations and genres of art to
social and political developments.
• In cultural studies, to understand the connections between
social conditions, political ideas, artistic style, music genres,
religious movements, and so on.

9. Discussion and Conclusion



291

• In sexology, to relate sexual behaviors, lifestyles, morals, and
tolerance or intolerance to the social and political climate.
• In media studies, to understand how the economic mechanisms
in a competitive media market shape the quality of the media
and the number of titillating or scary stories, and how this in
turn may create a ‘mean world syndrome’ that influences the
general level of regality in the society (chapter 5.1).
• In political demography, to understand the connection
between ecological environment, r/K life history strategies,
demographic transition, and political changes along the regalkungic dimension.
• In political science, to understand the social and psychological
factors that make authoritarian or egalitarian ideas popular,
and to predict the likely consequences of political decisions.
• In futurology, to predict future developments in the political
climate.

9.9. Further discussion
A forum for the discussion of regality theory is provided online at
http://www.regality.info

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11. Illustrations

This book is published under a Creative Commons Attribution license 4.0,
except for some of the photos, as listed below.
1.

Cologne Cathedral (Kölner Dom). Photo by Tobi 87, 2009. CC BY 3.0,
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:K%C3%B6lner_Dom.jpg

23

2.

Residential buildings, Bispebjerg Bakke, Copenhagen. Photo by
Agner Fog, 2017.

24

3.

Prehistoric cave painting, Bhimbetka India. Photo by Nikhil2789,
2008. CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:
Cave_Painting-_War_Bhimbetika_caves.jpg

29

4.

Demographic transition. By Max Roser, 2016. CC BY-SA 4.0, https://
commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Demographic-Transition
OWID.png

36

5.

World population. By Agner Fog, 2017. Data from United Nations
Data Retrieval System. “World Population Prospects: The 2015
Revision”, http://data.un.org

37

6.

Inglehart and Welzel’s Cultural Map. World Values Survey
Database. Public domain, http://www.world​valuessurvey.org/
WVSContents.jsp?CMSID=Findings

47

7

Charge of the Light Cavalry Brigade, 25th October 1854, under
Major General the Earl of Cardigan. Painting by William Simpson,
1855. Public domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:
William_Simpson_-_Charge_of_the_light_cavalry_brigade,_25th_
Oct._1854,_under_Major_General_the_Earl_of_Cardigan.jpg

65

8.

Historical development in different types of conflicts since World
War II. By Agner Fog, 2017. Based on data from Uppsala Conflict
Data Program (2017).

77

346

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

9.

Students at the Higher Teachers’ College, Kabul, Afghanistan,
1967. Photo by William (Bill) F. Podlich, 1967. All rights reserved,
reproduced with permission, http://www.pbase.com/qleap/
image/120404891

123

10.

Afghanistan women wait outside a USAID-supported health care
clinic, Afghanistan, 2003. Photo by Nitin Madhav, 2003. Public
domain,
https://no.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fil:Group_of_Women_
Wearing_Burkas.jpg

123

11.

Photo of Aldo Moro in the captivity of Brigate Rosse. Photo by
Brigate Rosse, 1978. Public domain, https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Caso_Moro#/media/File:Aldo_Moro_br.jpg

141

12.

Firemen work on the burning Reichstag. Unknown photographer,
1933. Bundesarchiv. CC BY-SA 3.0, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Reichstag_fire#/media/File:Reichstagsbrand.jpg

160

13.

Andamanese hunting turtles. Photo by Bourne & Shepherd
photographic studio, ca. 1900. Smithsonian Institution, National
Anthropological Archives. Public domain, https://siris-archives.
si.edu/ipac20/ipac.jsp?uri=full=3100001~!57153~!1

168

14.

Arrernte rain ceremony. Photo by W. B. Spencer and F. J. Gillen,
1912. Public domain, http://spencerandgillen.net/objects/50ce72e9
023fd7358c8a8534

171

15.

Babylonian cylinder seal showing the king making an animal
offering to the Sun God Shamash. Hjaltland Collection. CC BY-SA
3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=31696169

174

16.

An Inuit family, 1917. Photo by George R. King, 1917. Public domain,
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Eskimo_Family_
NGM-v31-p564.jpg

180

17.

Kasubi Tomb, Uganda, nineteenth century. Photo by Agner Fog,
2007.

186

18.

Gilyak wooden figures. From Schrenck (1881). Public domain.

190

19.

Gilyak decorated tools. From Schrenck (1881). Public domain.

191

20.

A building in Agadez, Niger. Photo by Dan Lundberg, 1997. CC BYSA 2.0, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:1997_277-10A_Agadez.jpg

194

21.

Inca carved gold leaf wall coating. Museo Oro del Perú y Armas
del Mundo. Photo by Manuel González Olaechea, 2007. CC BY 3.0,
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Muro_de_oro.JPG

197

11. Illustrations



347

22.

A !Kung bushman sucks up underground water through a straw
and stores it in an ostrich eggshell. Photo by Jens Bjerre, 1958. All
rights reserved, reproduced with permission.

199

23.

Kung bushmen telling stories around the fire. Photo by Jens Bjerre,
1958. All rights reserved, reproduced with permission.

202

24.

Maasai warriors. Photo by Walther Dobbertin, 1906–18.
Bundesarchiv, Bild 105-DOA0556. CC-BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.
wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_105-DOA0556,_
Deutsch-Ostafrika,_Massaikrieger.jpg

204

25.

Young married Maasai woman wearing iron spirals and other
ornaments. Photographer unknown, ca. 1900. From Hollis (1905).
Public domain.

206

26.

Mbuti men hunting with net. Photo by Paul Schebesta, n. d.
Bildarchiv Austria, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Nr.
10819171. All rights reserved, reproduced with permission.

208

27.

Yahgans. Photo by Otto Nordenskjöld, 1896. From Nordenskjöld
(1898). Public domain.

216

28.

Yanomami. Unknown photographer, 2007. CC-BY-SA 3.0, https://
commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Yanomami_en_el_Estado_
Amazonas_(21).jpg

219

29.

Structural equation model showing the influence of collective
dangers and individual dangers on cultural regality and life history
strategy. By Agner Fog, 2017.

240

30.

Scree plot for factor analysis of World Views Survey 2012. By
Agner Fog, 2017.

253

31.

Mixed factor analysis. Distribution of the variables along the two
strongest factors. By Agner Fog, 2017.

261

32.

Mixed factor analysis. Distribution of nations along the two factors.
By Agner Fog, 2017.

262

33.

Demonstration against the Vietnam War. Arlington, Virginia,
USA, 1967. Albert R. Simpson, US Army Audiovisual Center,
1967. Public domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:
Vietnamdem.jpg

271

Index

9/11. See September 11 attacks
!Kung 9, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203,
250, 251, 298, 305, 318, 320, 322,
347
abortion 46, 50, 172, 178, 196, 210,
218, 221, 248
Afghanistan 24, 87, 116, 144, 152
Afghanistan war 153, 155
Africa 68, 109, 112
Aginter Press 138, 139, 141
agriculture 29, 30, 46, 67, 68, 76, 114,
116, 274
slash and burn 181, 207, 218, 222,
274
al-Qaeda 119, 120, 121, 122, 148, 154
altruism 9, 14, 131, 279
Angola 149
animal husbandry. See  pastoralism
Arab Spring 39, 83
archaeology 24, 28, 29, 31, 175, 290
architecture 22, 23, 24, 183, 187, 194,
249, 278, 281
arms race 72
art 2, 8, 22, 25, 122, 249, 251, 278, 290
asabiya 70
Asia 36, 68, 116, 120
asset bubbles 105
asymmetric conflicts 78, 82, 84, 85,
87, 109, 126, 133, 275, 284, 286
attribution theory 129
austerity 105
Australia 29, 170, 260

authoritarianism 4, 39, 40, 41, 42,
44, 68, 128, 144, 159, 235, 268,
279, 288, 290, 317. See also rightwing authoritatianism; social
dominance orientation
banditry 71, 80, 117
bargaining theory of war 72
Belgium 142
birth control 157, 178, 201, 210, 248,
280
blowback effect 87
brain size 32
Brazil 218
breastfeeding 19, 185, 221, 248
Brigate Rosse (the Red Brigades)
136, 138, 141, 143
Bush, George W. 153, 154, 155
camels 173, 211
Canada 179, 260
carrying capacity 35
caste system 204, 222, 223, 225, 236,
242, 244
Catholic Church 17, 23, 60
Chechen war 151, 152, 155
chimpanzees 16, 27
China 113, 117, 222, 223, 260
CIA 104, 117, 119, 122, 137, 138, 139,
142, 149, 153, 154, 294, 301, 307,
331
coevolution 69
cognitive schema 94
Cold War 149

350

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

collective action 4, 7, 9, 25, 35, 40, 46,
57, 62, 106, 272, 285
collectivism vs. individualism 55
colonies 38, 84, 90, 109, 129, 245, 246
comparative historical analysis 3,
165, 269
competitive exclusion principle 27,
163
conformity 13, 32, 40, 41, 249, 257
Congo, D. R. 112, 141, 144, 207
conservatism vs. liberalism 51
conspiracy theories 156
contest competition 28, 31, 91, 111,
163, 203, 273
contraception. See  birth control
cool-water condition 58
Copper Inuit (Eskimo) 179, 180, 181
corruption 48, 61, 82, 87, 111, 136,
140, 150, 151, 285, 287
costly signaling theory 18
coup d’état 80, 99, 110, 112, 117, 118,
135, 137, 142, 154, 155, 287
cowardice 11, 14, 241, 272
Cross-Cultural Sample (SCCS) 229,
230, 231, 244, 245
cross-cutting ties 54
Cuba 149, 155
cultural selection 10, 21, 32, 49, 71,
82, 283
mass media 94
culture 1
capacity for 32
danger 25, 39, 40, 43, 60, 93
collective 7, 12, 15, 35, 57, 165, 267,
272
exaggeration of 17, 60, 97, 127, 145,
275
fabrication of 17, 141, 144, 159,
275, 284
individual 25, 35, 39, 46, 47, 106,
165
debt 70, 104, 114, 115, 175, 182, 275,
284, 285
default 104
defection 8, 10, 14, 234, 272

democracy 57, 58, 73, 90, 102, 109,
281, 283, 290
imposing 88, 286, 287
inhibiting 112, 132, 144, 157, 159
unstable 38
weak 67
democratic peace theory 73
demographic
dividend 38
transition 35, 58, 101, 110, 112, 114,
276, 283
demography 35, 291
deregulation 115, 276
despotism 12, 15, 16, 48, 67, 70, 90,
91, 102, 106, 231, 242, 278, 283,
286, 290
deviance 8, 21, 43, 46, 48, 59, 97, 272,
277
diversionary war 73
divorce 50, 169, 170, 173, 175, 178,
181, 183, 185, 189, 193, 197, 201,
206, 210, 212, 215, 218, 225, 249,
251, 270
donkeys 173, 191, 203, 211
drones 81, 120
Dutch disease 114
ecology 27, 48, 246, 283, 291
economic
competition 66, 93, 96, 111, 275,
283
conflict 39, 107, 114
constraints 103
crisis 25, 70, 71, 89, 101, 106, 159,
275
cycles 38, 70, 100, 101, 104, 274
growth 55, 58, 107, 111, 285
inequality 47, 68, 70, 89, 101, 105,
109, 114, 275, 285
power 91, 126
realist theory of war 74
rent 111, 115
economic rent 112
E De (Rhadé) 181, 182, 183, 250
education 25, 34, 37, 46, 47, 69, 101,
107, 110, 119, 252, 277, 283, 284

Index

egalitarianism 4, 8, 12, 25, 165, 200,
209, 247, 256, 263, 273
elite 61, 64, 70, 71, 88, 89, 100, 102,
105, 106, 110, 112, 138, 150
emancipative values 57, 288
embedded journalism 85
empires 17, 39, 59, 65, 67, 69, 76, 102,
116, 235, 251, 274, 279, 288, 290
England. See Great Britain
environment 63
environmental influence 7, 12, 15,
27, 34, 37, 76, 163, 244, 270
environment protection 34, 55, 60,
61, 94, 103, 107, 283
epidemics 71, 101, 191, 203
Europe 35, 36, 38, 48, 58, 59, 60, 68,
106, 107, 113, 137, 138, 139, 144,
158, 309, 318, 323, 330
Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) 141,
148
evil dictators 88, 98, 286
evolution 9, 13, 18, 28, 33, 34, 42, 68,
69, 157, 234, 272, 279, 288
evolutionary
ecology 34
psychology 4, 7, 9, 19, 64, 157
extractive institutions 102, 103, 112,
114, 277
extramarital sex 17, 172, 183, 192,
201, 205, 218, 221
extremism 43, 118, 119, 130, 279
failed states 87
false flag 136, 142, 147, 149, 156, 161
falsification 281
famine 25, 31, 71, 89, 180, 191, 241,
244
feuding 28, 167, 212, 217, 223, 246
financial market 48, 105
fishing 166, 179, 183, 188, 211, 213,
216, 273
fitness 9, 10, 13, 15, 18, 19, 64, 145,
157
flexibility 1, 12, 53, 83, 272, 279
fractional reserve banking 115
free riding 10, 11, 288
French Revolution 39



351

gathering 18, 28, 76, 166, 171, 200,
207, 213, 218, 273
genes versus culture 1, 279
geographic barriers 27, 164, 273
Germany 106, 141, 142, 143, 155, 157,
158, 159, 160, 161, 260, 267
Great Britain 59, 112, 116, 133, 192,
260
group-based control restoration
theory 42
group selection 9, 14
guerilla warfare 78, 83, 84, 86, 113,
117, 120, 129
Gulf War 78
harshness vs. softness 51
Hausa 191, 192, 194, 195, 250, 252
hierarchy 8, 10, 12, 15, 21, 25, 40, 43,
55, 67, 235, 247, 256, 272, 274
history 290
Hitler 155, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161,
330
homosexuality 43, 51, 64, 121, 172,
175, 280
horses 67, 173, 176, 182, 191, 211, 222
hunting 18, 28, 76, 166, 171, 179, 183,
200, 207, 218, 273
identity 8, 21, 25, 43, 130, 247, 248,
251, 272, 279
identity theory
avoidance 55
uncertainty–identity theory 43
uncertainty–threat model 44
ideology 4, 21, 38, 82, 89, 131, 134,
137, 140, 159, 263, 275, 276
Inca 195, 196, 197, 198, 250
inclusive institutions 102
India 29, 118, 121, 260
indulgence vs. self restraint 52, 55
industry 45, 46, 47, 59, 78, 91, 103,
104, 111, 112, 114, 164, 274, 277
infanticide 248
instrumental model of conflict 74
insurgence 78, 107, 109, 113, 126,
148, 286
integrated threat theory 42

352

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

interdisciplinary research 2
International Monetary Fund 114,
258
intervention 27, 81, 109, 133, 149,
164, 280, 286
Iran 112, 115, 118, 121
Iranian Revolution 39, 83, 90, 121
Iraq 78, 83, 115, 121, 144, 173
Iraq war 153, 155
Ireland 132, 133
Irish Republican Army (IRA) 133,
142
Islamic State 122
Israel 44, 130
Italy 47, 135, 137, 139, 140, 141, 143,
150, 155, 156, 299, 302, 307, 312, 342
kalyptic 203
Kashmir 119, 121
Kenya 119, 203, 260
kin selection 9
kleptocracy 82, 102, 112, 287
Kuwait 78
leadership 10, 13, 15, 17, 21, 25, 43,
48, 165, 256, 262
legal system 49, 118, 132, 251, 266,
277, 278
international 78, 81, 87
liberal
economic theories of war 74
peace 73
Libya 115
life history theory 34
long-term orientation 55
loose cultures 48, 229
Maasai 203, 204, 205, 206, 207
male warrior hypothesis 19, 33
masculinity vs. femininity 55
mass media 61, 84, 93, 126, 136, 145,
154, 159, 275, 283, 284, 291
Matthew effect 66, 102, 284
Mbuti 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 250,
251
mean world syndrome 98, 275
media effects theory 93
memetics 64, 66, 67, 68, 100

men 17, 18, 20, 38, 68, 114
mercenaries 81, 138
metals 174, 179, 182, 183, 189, 191,
197, 203, 211, 219, 222, 225
milk 203, 211
money creation 103, 115, 284
moral panic 59, 97, 127, 145
Moro, Aldo 136, 138, 139, 140, 141,
142, 143
mountains 31, 110, 116, 166, 176, 181,
195, 216, 222
mourning ceremonies 128
music 8, 22, 23, 25, 118, 278, 290
narcotic drugs 61, 79, 87, 113, 120,
132, 220, 284
NATO 119, 138
natural sciences 3, 5
New Zealand 32
niche theory 27, 163, 164, 202, 209,
213, 247, 251, 273
Niger 112, 191
Nigeria 141, 191, 192, 314, 335
nomadism 28, 30, 70, 76, 116, 170,
176, 201, 203, 207, 211, 216, 218,
274
oil 74, 75, 79, 91, 94, 109, 111, 112,
113, 114, 115, 120, 144, 155, 284
organized crime 79, 87
overpopulation 70, 89, 101, 275, 285
oxytocin 33
Pakistan 117, 118, 119, 121, 293, 299
Palestine 126, 130, 132, 141, 298, 314
Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) 141
Palme, Olof 142
paradigms 2, 41, 94
paradox of freedom 285
parental investment 25, 34
parochial altruism 9
pastoralism 67, 70, 71, 116, 181, 183,
192, 203, 211, 222, 274
patriarchy 114, 206, 257
peace 7, 9, 15, 20, 30, 34, 107, 251,
279, 290
negotiations 45, 82, 109, 127, 129,
133, 284

Index
Peru 148, 155, 260
petrodollar system 115
phenotypic plasticity 1
plasticity 1
plausible deniability 80, 81, 139
police 13, 54, 63, 94, 136, 138, 142,
151, 152
political realism theory 72
pollution. See  environment
protection
polyandry 19, 181, 201, 221
polygamy. See  polygyny and
polyandry
polygyny 16, 19, 68, 234, 235, 243, 251
prestige 9, 11, 18, 31, 62, 234
propaganda 79, 99, 106, 110, 115,
133, 149, 154, 156, 159, 276
punishment 8, 9, 13, 21, 41, 43, 51,
165, 234, 235, 248, 272, 280, 288,
290
supernatural 22, 67, 248
Putin, Vladimir 151, 155
Quran 193
race to the bottom 103, 107, 284
radicalization 82, 86, 101, 121, 131,
132, 134, 135, 136, 138, 146, 150,
276, 287
raiding 28, 71, 177, 182, 184, 205, 212,
220, 223, 246
rally around the flag-effect 74, 128,
135, 145
realistic group conflict theory 42
reciprocal selection 9
Red Army Faction (RAF) 141, 142,
143
refugees 80, 86, 87, 117, 121, 149, 275
religion 8, 21, 22, 25, 46, 49, 50, 67,
82, 90, 114, 169, 173, 174, 175, 176,
178, 180, 182, 187, 188, 190, 193,
196, 198, 200, 202, 205, 210, 212,
213, 215, 217, 218, 221, 224, 225,
231, 235, 243, 248, 257, 276, 279,
280, 287, 290
resource
curse 111
grabbing 111
use 283



353

revolution 38, 71, 83, 88, 110
rewards 8, 10, 13, 19, 22, 67, 165, 234,
241, 272, 280, 288
right-wing authoritarianism 40
r/K reproductive strategy 34, 35, 68,
69, 101, 232, 291
Russia 115, 147, 150, 151, 152, 155,
188, 260
Scandinavia 107
science 2, 5, 275
scramble competition 28, 30, 91, 163,
179, 203, 251
security
dilemma 72
economic 46, 100, 101, 105, 276,
284
existential 46, 47, 57, 58, 100, 101,
107, 235
political 112, 117, 137, 267, 280, 287
social 107, 284
Sendero Luminoso 148
September 11 attacks 126, 127, 152,
153, 154, 156
sexual
deviance 61, 63, 122
division of labor 17, 18, 114, 118,
181
equality 20, 169, 181
morals 22, 25, 235, 239, 241, 249,
251, 252, 280, 291
selection 9, 18
Sierra Leone 113
slavery 54, 68, 170, 175, 182, 184, 192,
200, 212, 222, 223, 224, 225, 235,
236, 242, 244, 278
social
cognition theory 93, 283
dominance orientation 40
identity theory of leadership 43
inequality 55, 68, 70, 71, 235
psychology 290
structure 12, 22, 63, 66, 165, 272,
281, 282
sociology 2, 5, 21, 45, 48, 59, 89, 165,
272, 277, 282, 290
Somalia 211, 212, 213, 250
Somaliland 211

354

Warlike and Peaceful Societies

South Africa 133
Soviet Union 116, 120, 147. See
also Russia
Spain 141, 148, 155, 260
standard cross-cultural sample 229,
230, 244
state
bankruptcy 104
building 84, 119, 287
steps to war 72
Stone Age 11, 18, 277, 335
stress-based model of political
extremism 44
structural adjustment reforms 115
Sudan 113
suicide 22, 25, 50, 128, 132, 243, 248,
251, 270
survey of world views 229, 252, 265,
267
survival vs. self-expression values
46, 51, 57
Syria 87, 115, 122, 123
system justification theory 44
systems theory 3, 66, 283
Taliban 24, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121,
122, 293, 325, 329
Tanzania 119, 203
technological revolutions 104
terrorism 2, 6, 43, 44, 45, 60, 86, 119,
125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131,
132, 133, 134, 135, 137, 139, 142,
143, 144, 145, 146, 148, 150, 152,
156, 268, 275, 276, 281, 284, 290,
315
terror management theory 44
tight culture 48, 52, 56
tightness/looseness 48, 49, 50, 51
tolerance 8, 25, 48, 50, 283, 285
trade 58, 116
expectations theory of war 74
illicit 79, 121, 132
international 78, 103, 115, 277, 284
traditional vs. secular–rational values
45, 51
traitors 272
Turkey 142, 260
tyranny. See  despotism

Uganda 183, 186
uncertainty–identity theory 43
unified growth theory 58
United Nations 78
USA 47, 61, 112, 113, 117, 119, 120,
121, 122, 123, 126, 147, 149, 152,
154, 260, 271, 308
Venezuela 213, 218
Vietnam 147, 181
Vietnam war 147, 148, 155, 271
war 7, 10, 38, 67, 72, 76, 157, 272, 273,
279
civil 71, 77, 87, 107, 113, 117, 152
on drugs 61
prehistoric 28
proxy 80, 86, 116, 275, 284, 287
unnecessary 17, 145
Warao 213, 214, 215, 250, 251
war on terror 61, 121
warriors 17
wealth 16, 70, 88, 89, 91, 102, 103,
108, 111, 112, 113, 235, 276, 277
weapons 11, 67, 76, 81, 117, 132, 141,
142, 144, 147, 153, 163, 276, 285
welfare state 107
whistleblowers 154
wife capture 10, 18, 184, 220, 246
Winter War 147
witches 17, 25, 60, 172, 177, 196, 209
witch hunt 60, 61, 63, 145
women 9, 10, 12, 14, 18, 19, 20, 21, 33,
68, 76, 107, 114, 118, 122, 123, 168,
169, 172, 173, 175, 178, 181, 184,
185, 188, 193, 195, 201, 206, 214,
220, 221, 224, 246, 249, 250, 255
World Bank 107, 114
world values survey 45, 50, 56
World War I 158, 159
World War II 106, 155, 157, 274
xenophobia 21, 25, 41, 55, 170, 257,
272, 279, 290
Yahgan 216, 217, 218
Yi 222, 223, 224, 225
youth bulge 38, 89, 159

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Warlike and Peaceful Societies
The Interaction of Genes and Culture

AGNER FOG
Are humans violent or peaceful by nature? We are both.
In this ambi�ous and wide-ranging book, Agner Fog presents a ground-breaking new
argument that explains the existence of differently organised socie�es using evolu�onary
theory. It combines natural sciences and social sciences in a way that is rarely seen.
According to a concept called regality theory, people show a preference for
authoritarianism and strong leadership in �mes of war or collec�ve danger, but desire
egalitarian poli�cal systems in �mes of peace and safety. These individual impulses shape
the way socie�es develop and organise themselves, and in this book Agner argues that
there is an evolu�onary mechanism behind this flexible psychology. Incorpora�ng a wide
range of ideas including evolu�onary theory, game theory, and ecological theory, Agner
analyses the condi�ons that make us either strident or docile. He tests this theory on
data from contemporary and ancient socie�es, and provides a detailed explana�on of the
applica�ons of regality theory to issues of war and peace, the rise and fall of empires, the
mass media, economic instability, ecological crisis, and much more.
Warlike and Peaceful Societies draws on many different fields of both the social sciences
and the natural sciences. It will be of interest to academics and students in these fields,
including anthropology, poli�cal science, history, conflict and peace research, social
psychology, and more, as well as the natural sciences, including human biology, human
evolu�on, and ecology.
As with all Open Book publica�ons, this en�re book is available to read for free on the
publisher’s website. Printed and digital edi�ons, together with supplementary digital
material, can also be found here: www.openbookpublishers.com
Cover image: War memorial, Whitehall, London. Photo by Aimee Rivers (2011).
Flickr, h�ps://www.flickr.com/photos/sermoa/5361099123, CC BY-SA 2.0
Cover design: Anna Ga�

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